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A B S T R A C T
THE history of university development in Papua New Guinea is one of 
conflict between government and the university institutions, and 
between and within the institutions themselves. The conflict arose 
as government, university institutions, and various groups and 
individuals within the institutions sought to control the course of 
development.
The country’s education system took many years to reach 
maturity, and thus the stage where conflict over the universities 
became a significant issue. Though the first missionaries established 
primary schools in the late nineteenth century, the large-scale 
development of secondary and tertiary education did not occur for 
another sixty to seventy years. The poor development of the lower 
levels of the education system meant that the foundation of university 
institutions was delayed until the mid-1960s.
The late inception of university education brought much 
criticism upon the Australian government, which came under increasing 
pressure at home and abroad to implement a scheme for university 
education in preparation for eventual independence. In the end, when 
it became convinced that the time for university development was 
opportune, the Australian government engaged a commission of inquiry 
- the Currie Commission - to investigate the question. The Currie 
Report of 1964 was the first milestone in the development of Papua 
New Guinea’s university system. It recommended the establishment of 
an autonomous university whereas most people expected simply a 
university college of an Australian university. Such a proposal in 
that day and age was so radical government procrastinated for a year 
before taking action on the Report. Under pressure of continual 
criticism it finally gave way in 1965 and announced it would set up 
an autonomous university and an associated technological institute.
Councils for the two new institutions were set up in late 
1965 and began work immediately to plan the introduction of university 
teaching. They experienced many difficulties in becoming operational. 
Life for the first students and teachers was therefore hard, but
despite this they made an immediate impact on Papua New Guinean 
society. It was obvious that the university institutions would become 
major agents for social change.
In their early years the university institutions faced many 
problems. One of the earliest and most difficult arose over relations 
between the two institutions, the University and the technological 
institute, over control of the campus they shared. This was a source 
of such major disagreement that eventually the Institute moved to Lae.
A further area of difficulty was relations between the institutions 
and the government. Government, which was funding the institutions, 
believed it should have a controlling voice in the way they developed; 
but the institutions, being autonomous, resisted government control 
and regarded attempts to guide them as unwarranted interference. Two 
issues in particular revealed the tension between the parties - 
budgeting and the control of medical education. The controversies 
which arose over such questions enabled government and institutions 
to establish a modus vivendi with each other, though the potential 
for further conflict was always there.
The University and technological institute were only two of 
the tertiary training institutions established in the 1960s. Many 
other institutions had been set up, and consequently there were 
problems of co-ordination to achieve the most rational and economic 
use of resources. Government endeavours to produce better co-ordin­
ation led to problems with the university institutions, who interpreted 
government action as an attempt to undermine their academic autonomy. 
Government, however, was determined to effect a more economic use of 
resources and subsequently engaged another committee of inquiry, the 
Brown Committee, to examine the question, in 1971. This led to a 
proposed scheme which promised to co-ordinate all tertiary training 
institutions in a national organization. The scheme, however, was 
never implemented because in the meantime the transfer of political 
power between colonial and national governments had taken place, and 
the national government decided the scheme was unsuitable.
Although the Brown Committee proposals foundered, something 
of a national university system had nevertheless emerged from the 
uncoordinated mass of tertiary colleges. The medical college joined
the University as its medical faculty, and the government’s secondary 
teachers' college later united with the University as well. In 
addition the technological institute achieved separate university 
status. To co-ordinate all this university effort a government agency, 
the Office of Higher Education, came into being. Together these 
institutions comprised a national university system, the formation of 
which revealed numerous tensions between the institutions and govern­
ment, and between and within the institutions.
The main problem within the institutions was conflicting 
views as to how they should operate and be developed. Between instit­
utions the problem was one of competition, since they were essentially 
rivals for the same resources - status, government funds, students, 
new courses. The problem with government was its interest in getting 
best value for its investment, and where it tried to do this by 
restraining institutional ambition conflict inevitably arose. The 
tensions which became apparent through these various conflicts did 
much to shape the system which emerged.
The high cost of the university institutions made national 
government acutely aware of the role of the universities in Papua New 
Guinea. With the sanction of its nationalist, self-reliant, egalit­
arian ideology, it demanded that the universities be ’responsive’ to 
its policy to justify the expenditure devoted to them. Government 
clearly wished to have more effective control of the universities to 
ensure a good return on the investment being made in them. This 
concern in 1973-74 led to a third major committee of inquiry, the Gris 
Committee, to examine university development. The Gris Report 
recommended a radical restructuring of the universities and their 
courses within a framework of a single national university. These 
proposals were unwelcome to many with vested interests in the univers­
ity system, and as a result of the conflict which consequently arose 
the major proposals were scuttled.
The period leading up to independence was one of uncertainty 
for national and expatriate populations alike. The uncertainty of the 
times seemed to be reflected in the universities, which appeared to 
become ever more conflict-ridden as independence approached. There 
was staff militancy over conditions of service, student dissent over
questions of national policy, action by university women for more 
equitable treatment, demands for the reform of academic government, 
strident calls for localization of the key decision-making positions 
within the universities, and a questioning of the role of the univers 
ities* leaders. But throughout the prevailing uncertainty the govern 
ment seemed to become more sure of how it wanted the universities to 
develop. It clearly wanted greater control over their affairs, 
chiefly to guarantee the return on its investment, but also perhaps 
to curb their tendency towards privilege and an embarrassing independ 
ence. The government mood threatened many of the values they held 
dear, in particular their academic autonomy and their role as the 
conscience of the nation. Yet because government held the purse 
strings, and seemed more inclined to draw these tightly around the 
universities, it seemed likely that government will would eventually 
prevail.
iPREFACE
THE writing of a history such as the following presents certain 
methodological problems to an author who witnessed, and participated 
in, many of the events described. This is especially true when the 
events are very recent and often controversial. Questions of personal 
bias and prejudice arise inevitably; and because the events are fresh 
in many memories there are numerous 'authorities' to challenge the 
interpretations of any one writer. Furthermore, because many of the 
participants were 'doing their best' in what they were convinced was 
'a valuable job' (in many cases, perhaps, it was the great adventure 
of their lives), there are sensitive spots of personal pride which 
might bruise easily.
There is also an ideological problem. The implantation of 
a university system by a metropolitan power in a client state is an 
act raising theoretical issues for a host of political economists, 
educationalists, developmental theorists, sociologists, feminists, 
Marxists and anti-Marxists, organizational theorists, social psycho­
logists, and political philosophers. How should a mere historian wend 
his way through such an ideological jungle? Can he ignore it, 
floating above it on a 'value-free' magic carpet? Should he eclect­
ically gather theoretical fruit wherever they seem attractive enough? 
Or should he be sustained by the fruit of one tree alone? Can he try 
to make his way alone, eschewing alt theory?
What I have done (though how successfully I am not sure), 
is to attempt to put aside my personal bias and prejudice; my friend­
ships/rivalries/antipathies with those who, like me, took part in the 
events described; the patronage I enjoyed (and for which I am grate­
ful) from many of the principal characters; and my own ideological 
predilections (if any were left). In doing so I have tried to view 
the course of university development in Papua New Guinea globally, 
making conclusions which I feel the events themselves suggest.
Inevitably, however, the account, and the conclusions, are 
coloured by the fact that I spent six of the last nine years on the 
staff of one of Papua New Guinea's universities, while also being a
ii
a part-time, postgraduate student of the other. In addition I spent 
a further seven months divided between them both while doing research 
for this thesis; and this period in many respects was a climactic one 
for the universities. Having thus been both interested participant 
and observer (the distinction between these was not always clear), I 
am aware that what I have written could be personal. I have, however, 
endeavoured to be objective.
To ensure objectivity I used a wide range of the ample source 
materials available - the records of the now defunct Australian Depart­
ment of External Territories, of the University of Papua New Guinea, 
the University of Technology, and the Papua New Guinea Office of Higher 
Education. In addition I used the great stock of published records, 
such as government and institutional annual reports, parliamentary 
debates, reports of committees of inquiry, newspapers, magazines, and 
learned journals. This was supplemented with more than forty inter­
views with the principal characters, and much conversation and 
correspondence with these and lesser actors.
I.J.W. 
March 1977
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A NOTE ABOUT PROBER NOUNS
OVER the years proper nouns used in relation to Papua New Guinea 
institutions have undergone considerable change, especially in the 
period following self-government in 1973. This thesis, to avoid con­
fusion, tends to use the title or name by which the institution was 
known for the longest time. Proper nouns in this group are:
Papua New Guinea : this has been the official name of the country
since 1971. Before that the correct title was Territory of 
Papua and New Guinea; and before World War II, when there 
were two separately administered territories, the titles were 
Territory of Papua and Territory of New Guinea. For the pre­
war period the territories are referred to in the thesis as 
Papua, or New Guinea; for the whole of the post-war period 
the country is called Papua New Guinea in the thesis.
Papua New Guineans : for the entire post-war period the people of 
the country are called by this name, even though its usage 
has been correct only since 1971. For the pre-war period they 
are referred to as either Papuans or New Guineans. The word 
’national' is also occasionally used, as this has become 
common since self-government, to differentiate Papua New 
Guineans from the members of the expatriate community.
Department of Territories : this term is used throughout for the
Australian government department which at different times was 
also styled the Department of Home and Territories and the 
Department of External Territories.
Administration : this term refers to the Australian colonial
government of Papua New Guinea. Sometimes the term 'govern­
ment' is used, when no differentiation is required between 
government in Papua New Guinea and Australia.
Dollars and cents : Australian currency was used in Papua New Guinea
till 1975-76 when it was replaced by Kina and toea having the 
same value as Australian dollars and cents. Several re­
valuations and devaluations of each currency have since
Xoccurred, but until 1977 the difference was never more than 
5%. The thesis always refers to dollars and cents to avoid 
confusion. It was only after July 1976 when Papua New Guinea 
revalued by 5% that the two currencies lost parity.
World Bank : this informal title is used more frequently than the
cumbersome official title, International Bank for Recon­
struction and Development.
Australian School of Pacific Administration (ASOPA) : in 1972 this
institution changed its function and was renamed International 
Training Institute. The abbreviation ASOPA is always used.
House of Assembly : from its establishment in 1964 until independ­
ence in September 1975 the Papua New Guinean parliament was 
called this. At independence it became the National Parliament. 
The thesis uses the former title.
Cabinet : the forerunner of this body was the Administrator's
Executive Council (AEC), which is always referred to as such.
At independence Cabinet was renamed the National Executive 
Committee. The thesis uses Cabinet.
Department of Education : after independence the title became
Ministry of Education. The thesis always uses the former 
title.
Director of Education : the thesis always uses this title although
the official term became Secretary for Education after 
independence.
INTRODUCTION
BY the end of 1975, the year in which Papua New Guinea became independ­
ent, the country's two universities had produced 1042 graduates. This 
was well below the target of 2000 by 1973 set in 1964 when the Currie 
Commission produced its germinal report on the development of higher 
education in Papua New Guinea. Despite that, the accomplishment was 
notable: between them the universities had trained a class of
nationals with the skills necessary to run an independent state, and 
to bind together the hundreds of regional and ethnic communities who 
comprised the new nation.
At independence the university system was barely a decade 
old, but in that time it had become one of the country's most 
significant integral institutions. The importance of its function 
here had always been recognized, by government, by the universities 
themselves, and by the individuals making up the population of each 
campus. Opinion often differed between these groupings on what the 
true function of the universities was. And since those participating 
in university development had varying degrees of vested interest in 
the system, it is hardly surprising that conflict arose over control 
of university development.
The inherent tension in such a situation was heightened by 
the nature of the university system, which was a complex organism 
becoming ever more complex as it grew. The system properly consisted 
of both government and university institutions, but each of these in 
turn was highly complex. The government sector consisted of a 
diverse range of agencies such as the Department of Education, Office 
of Higher Education, Central Planning Office, Department of Finance, 
and Public Service Commission, with varying interests in the work of 
the universities. These bodies did not always agree on what was best 
for the system. The institutional sector, too, comprised many parts 
- two universities, the University of Papua New Guinea and the 
University of Technology, spread over three campuses in Port Moresby, 
Goroka and Lae. And the parts were highly fractionalized into both 
formal and informal segments, from the permanent and official
2governing councils and academic faculties to loose and impermanent 
groupings within the staff and student bodies. Between and within 
these numerous elements, all with particularistic interests in the 
total system, there was an intricate network of interactions which 
was bound to generate conflict because the interests were often 
opposed.
The system was, however, historical product as well as 
sociological phenomenon. The interactions had their roots in the 
past, their configuration being a result of long evolution. This 
thesis endeavours to chart the course of that evolution, from the 
'ancestral1 forms of 'further' education existing in Papua New Guinea 
before World War II to the multi-campus organization in existence 
by independence. It endeavours to show how, as the development un­
wound and the system grew in size and complexity, many influences 
served to shape the form it took. It argues that conflict was most 
often the factor tempering the process of development, for along the 
way there were many contending groups and individuals with their own 
vision of what the system should be like. Consequently there were 
also many struggles as they strove to influence or control the course 
of university development.
3CHAPTER 1
EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF ’HIGHER' EDUCATION IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA
UNIVERSITIES started late in Papua New Guinea. When the first 
university opened shop in 1966 similar institutions had been in 
business for several decades elsewhere in the English-speaking 
’colonial world’. Why the delay in Papua New Guinea? It was not 
for want of educational effort, for during the preceding seventy 
years or so a network of schools had spread across the country. This 
included institutions of 'further' and ’higher’ education providing 
a necessary base on which universities could be built. The more 
advanced education, however, had been blighted along the way.
Official neglect, religious introversion, popular prejudice, and 
dubious educational philosophy had all left their mark upon it, and 
as a result its deficiencies needed time for rectification. This 
chapter, in examining earlier forms of 'higher' education, will 
attempt to show why this was so.
(a )  THE POST-WAR LEGACY OF THE PRE-WAR YEARS
In late 1942, when war caused the suspension of civilian adminis­
tration in Papua and New Guinea, formal education was still in its 
infancy even though born in the 1880s. Why had the infant not 
matured? There was no single reason, for a complex set of inter­
connected factors had worked together to hold educational development 
at a primitive stage.
Among more obvious factors was a lack of government susten­
ance. In Papua the administration had run no schools for Papuan 
children, entrusting their education instead to five Christian 
missions subsidized with revenues from a poll tax on adult Papuan 
males. The New Guinea administration conducted only seven schools 
for New Guineans with a total enrolment of 598 in 1940, allowing 
eleven Christian missions to run 2556 institutions with a total 
enrolment of 65,600. The overwhelming majority of pupils were in 
primary schools, many of which taught in a vernacular language.
4Fully 97% of the mission schools in New Guinea in 1940 were either
’elementary’ or ’village’ schools, the rest being described variously
as 'high, intermediate and technical schools’ or 'training centres’.'*'
The numbers of children graduating from primary to ’further' education
was similarly small. In Papua in 1940 the school inspector examined
3002 children of different grades, but only 90 - 3% - gained the
Standard V Certificate, the highest level attainable in primary 
2school. Indeed so rudimentary were educational facilities in each 
territory that government did not publish detailed figures of the 
numbers of pupils, teachers and schools. Education was, presumably, 
low among government priorities.
Government neglect arose partly from prevailing attitudes 
of the time. Many Europeans in Papua and New Guinea could see little 
advantage in educating the local peoples. Even the most elementary 
education was hardly necessary for husking plantation coconuts, 
carrying packs of cargo, and shovelling gravel into sluice boxes. It 
could even be a positive disadvantage, for as Staniforth Smith 
roundly asserted in 1906, 'a native who has obtained a good education 
is less inclined to manual work than his unsophisticated brother; 
he is inclined to class himself with the white man, and as the latter 
never undertakes manual work such as is done by natives, the tendency
3
is for the educated native to look down on this class of labour'. 
Smith, who was later Administrator of Papua, was here voicing the 
opinion of several generations of white employers. That similar 
views were still current a quarter of a century later became clear 
when the Director of Education for Queensland, B.J. McKenna, visited 
New Guinea to advise the administration on educational development.
He found the hostility of the 'non-official' white population to 
education for New Guineans 'most surprising'. 'The prevailing belief 
is that any such training makes the native more cunning, generates
1 PAR 1939-40, p. 20; NGAR 1939-40, pp. 41-2, 127. Pre-war 
education in both Papua and New Guinea has received close 
attention in D.J. Dickson (1971), chapters 1 to 3; and 
Geoffrey Smith (1975), chapters 1 and 2.
2 PAR 1939-40, p. 20.
3 M.C.S. Smith, 'Report, 1906', excerpts reprinted in B.E. 
Jinks (et at.) (1973), pp. 91-2.
5and develops evil qualities, makes him disinclined to work, and renders
4him a less pliant instrument in the hands of his master', he observed. 
The lack of progress in developing an education system for New 
Guineans, the hostility of whites to black education, and the colonists' 
economic interest formed a strong nexus.
Europeans whose enterprises depended on black labour were
able to rationalize their views comfortably by alluding to 'the
uncivilized state' of the blacks. Manual labour for whites under
firm discipline was the best way to bring such backward peoples into
the modern world, they argued, and formal classroom education would
be wasted on humans so intellectually limited and close to savagery.
In 1928 the New Guinea Planters' and Traders' Association promoted
this viewpoint when it declared that 'the present policy of providing
a book education for a few natives... is, in the present stage of
native development, little better than a waste of money.... The only
real education... is provided... on the plantations and trading
concerns of the planting c o m m u n i t y ' T h e  only worthwhile education
to the association's thinking was one of informal contact with
Europeans in gainful, productive employment. A measure of academic
support for this view came from a young historian, Stephen Roberts,
later Vice-Chancellor of the University of Sydney between 1947 and
1967. 'The natives have no economic ideas; agricultural instincts
are peculiarly lacking; they know no continuity of effort or aim;
there is no incentive for them to work constantly', he claimed. The
remedy for such shortcomings was compulsory work through the indentured
£
labour system - 'one of the leading ways of native progress'. The 
task of civilizing the Papua New Guinean thus coincided felicitously 
with the exploitation of his brute strength, and formal education 
should not be allowed to interfere.
If half the European opposition to formal education for 
Papua New Guineans arose from a conviction that productive work was
4 B.J. McKenna, in NGAR 1929-30, p. 127.
5 New Guinea Planters and Traders Association, in T.W. Eggleston 
(ed.), (1928), pp. 56-62.
S.H. Roberts, in Eggleston (1928), pp. 75-6.6
6more appropriate than bookish learning, the other half arose from 
fear. Many whites believed the blacks were inherently savage, and 
were consequently afraid of any move to raise them above the station 
of menial servants. Occasionally events occurred to confirm the 
worst white prejudices: thus attacks by black men on white women or
children always produced a vehement clamour within the white community.^ 
At such times noisy public meetings and vociferous letters to the 
local press shrilled against the lack of discipline supposedly induced 
by the government's molly-coddling native welfare policies, of which 
education was part and parcel. One particular event in 1929 
crystallized the fears and prejudices of the whites and hardened 
their opposition to further education for blacks. This was the Rabaul 
Strike, when 3000 workers in Rabaul - almost the entire New Guinean 
workforce - struck for higher wages. The initiators of the strike 
became particular hate objects among New Guinea's whites, and seemed 
to provide exemplary evidence that too much training and advancement
g
for New Guineans was dangerous. Not all the whites were blinded by 
fear and prejudice, and the more rational believed Australia had an 
obligation to open up further educational opportunities to Papuans 
and New Guineans. McKenna, for example, called for a 'fair go' for 
the blacks. Only through creating educational opportunities for New 
Guineans could the administration prove whether or not white
9scepticism of further black education was justified, he advised.
The period following the strike was not, however, a propitious time 
for such appeals: the administration yielded instead to the hysterical
reaction of the white community and failed to act on his advice.
Similar arguments to McKenna's ran through the copious 
writings of F.E. Williams, the government anthropologist of Papua. 
Williams naively believed the fundamental cause of racial prejudice
7 Amirah Inglis (1974) deals with attacks in Papua. Australian 
Archives AG-836/3 concerns the murder of a white woman, and 
subsequent outcry, in New Guinea.
8 For accounts of the strike see Gammage (1975) and Willis (1970).
9 McKenna (1929-30), p. 127.
10 Gammage (1975) ; Willis (1970).
7was linguistic - an inability of blacks and whites to communicate.
The remedy lay in spreading literacy in English among the former, for
that would ’provide for the development... of the intellectual powers
which, however hidden at present, we must assume the natives to 
12possess’. Williams worked in Papua for nearly twenty years and 
enjoyed a considerable professional reputation; however, his education­
al writings, often unfortunately prolix and vague, apparently carried 
little weight with his employers. He tried to promote more advanced 
scholastic education, particularly teacher training, for Papuans,
but the administration gave no emphasis to teacher or other further
13training, and subsidized no education above Standard V.
The very casual official attitude to post-primary schooling
arose partly from paternalism, and partly from faith in the assumption
that the colonial era in Papua and New Guinea would continue for a
century or more. That much time seemed necessary before the blacks
learned to govern themselves; and meanwhile the wise guiding hand of
14the whites would be needed. Even the more enlightened minds were 
tinged with such paternalism. It was Williams, for example, who 
lamented the intellectual limitations of Papuans:
It is when we come to actual thinking, to the native’s 
reasoning, such as it is, that we are confronted by the 
real problem. Whether we decide that his thinking is 
prelogical or simply illogical, we find that he is 
constantly on the wrong track. His mind is swayed by 
whatever has emotional or affective appeal. 15
Williams believed extended education would ’help the native along the
16path of self-development and progress’; but the inference was that 
these would be a long time coming. Even more significant were the 
views of Papua’s long-serving and benevolent governor, Murray. At 
an early stage in his 34-year career in the territory he had confided 
to a correspondent his opinion that Papuans should not have ’anything
11 F.E. Williams (1935), p. 30.
12 ibid.
13 Dickson (1971), p. 119; and in EPNG (1972), p. 320.
14 Dickson (1971), pp. 84-5.
15 Williams (1928), pp. 14-16.
16 Williams (1935), p. 44.
8in the nature of a higher education’ as they were inherently inferior
to Europeans and should not be encouraged to look on themselves as
equals.^ These were hardly exceptional attitudes in 1912, but
Murray modified them little during the remainder of his career. In
1937, when the first Papuan Catholic priest returned from training
abroad, he conceded that if a Papuan could become a priest others
18could become doctors or lawyers; but he remained emphatically
opposed to the emergence of a local indigenous intellectual elite,
19in the current generation at any rate. It is not surprising that 
post-primary education remained a low government priority.
Even when the administrations attempted to promote further
education unforeseen obstacles usually appeared. The hostility of
the white community was usually an impediment. In 1929, for example,
the New Guinea administration had plans in hand for sending New
Guinean students to Australia for technical training. However, white
opposition in the wake of the Rabaul Strike was so determined that
20the administration abandoned the scheme. Such was the influence
of white opinion in New Guinea that a pre-war visitor, the American
anthropologist, Stephen Reed, observed 'one inevitably receives the
impression that the Government’s [educational] policy... is shaped
on the do-nothing model in response to the attitude of the non-
21official population'. In Papua the administration enjoyed more
success in sending trainees to Australia. Three batches of medical
assistants from Papua trained in Sydney, in 1933, 1934 and 1935; but
white objections, including the risk of contact with ’undesirable
22elements, especially low-down white women’, led to the scrapping
of the scheme. Even before this the third batch had to wear
Boy Scout uniforms lest normal Western dress should give them ideas 
23above themselves.
17 Cited in Dickson (1971), p. 30.
18 PAR, 1937-38, pp. 20-1.
19 Murray to the Minister for External Territories, 11 March 
1938, cited in Dickson (1971), p. 79.
20 Hank Nelson (1970).
21 S.W. Reed (1943), p. 189.
22 Jinks (et at.) (1973), pp. 132-4.
23 Nelson, loc. cit.
9At other times administration training schemes could 
founder on the reluctance of the Australian government. Canberra’s 
disinclination to approve bold planning in the territories was 
obvious in 1932-33 when the Acting Administrator of New Guinea, 
Griffiths, and the Director of Public Health, Brennan, proposed to 
set up a ’School for the Training of Native Medical Practitioners’. 
They advised Canberra there was a need for such an institution, which 
would select its recruits from the brightest students in the govern­
ment schools for a four-year training programme; alternatively these
24students could train at the Suva medical school in Fiji. The
Department of Territories was unimpressed. The departmental secretary
advised Griffiths that the proposal was premature. He had been
influenced by supposedly expert opinion which held that the proposed
scheme was unworkable because of New Guineans’ ’low stage of 
25civilization’. Further expert opinion maintained that the Suva
26course would be too difficult for New Guineans. Faced with such
opposition Griffiths dropped the idea ’with the very greatest
27reluctance and grief'. However, he persisted in remonstrating
with the department, pointing out that a British Solomon Islander
had completed the Suva course and was now practising successfully -
which suggested that popular assumptions about the intellectual
deficiencies of New Guineans might be false. In reply to further
pleas for permission to send two New Guineans to Suva as an experiment
he was duly advised that, following a Cabinet directive, New Guineans
28must be trained at home and only as medical orderlies.
A somewhat surprising obstacle in the way of further 
education was the attitude of a number of the Christian missions, who,
24 E.T. Brennan to T. Griffiths, 9 September 1932, and Griffiths 
to Secretary, Prime Minister's Department, 10 September 
1932, AA A-518 U832/1/3, Part 1.
25 R. Cilento to J.G. McLaren, n.d., AA A-518 U832/1/3,
Part 1.
26 McLaren to Griffiths, 1 December 1932, in ibid.
27 Griffiths to McLaren, 25 November 1932, in ibid.
28 Griffiths to McLaren, 9 January 1933; McLaren to Griffiths, 
27 April 1933, in ibid.
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by government default, had almost monopoly control of pre-war
education. Despite the advantage this gave them, their achievement
was limited by their strictly functional view of education: what
they wanted was ’not an educated community but a Christianized 
29community’. Furthermore they often refused government help if they
thought this might compromise their independence, preferring no
assistance to assistance which would give government a voice in their
30effort, for example requiring them to set minimum standards. Yet
another factor limiting the missions' achievement was the use of
vernacular languages in teaching. The Lutherans, for example, taught
in a number of languages - Graged, Kate, Jabem - rather than in
German, and later English. This practice was a logical extension of
Lutheran philosophy: each tribe was ein Volk3 a discrete, self-
contained cultural and social entity whose evangelization, and
31education, must proceed in the völkische tongue. Wherever missions 
held similar views their educational systems tended to be inward­
looking; and even though some comprised secondary and even tertiary 
as well as primary schooling, they were little concerned with the 
wider society of Papua New Guinea. This prevented them from contrib­
uting much to the emergence of a national education system.
A number of influences thus combined to hold back education­
al development in pre-war Papua and New Guinea. The economic value 
of the people to European business enterprises; white prejudice 
against black educational advancement; government paternalism, 
acquiescence in the face of white hostility, and low priority for 
education; reluctance in Canberra; and particularistic mission 
attitudes - all served to inhibit the creation of a comprehensive 
system of education.
Given the combined weight of such pressures it is perhaps 
surprising that any Papua New Guineans should have received post-
29 Dickson, EPNG (1972), p. 322.
30 ibid.
31 B.J. Harrison (1975), pp. 194-201. The theory that a tribe 
must be taught in its own tongue was fallible: in practice 
there were so many languages that the Mission arbitrarily 
had to pick on several for use as lingua franca.
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primary, let alone higher, education. Yet a considerable number did,
and with them a new social element was clearly emerging by the end
of the 1930s. This had close parallels in African colonies, where
such formations have variously been termed ’incipient’ or ’local and
provincial’ elites - people whose training and experience in colonial
society gave them advantages to confer on their offspring, thus
laying foundations for the later growth of an elite class of educated 
32Africans. The more perceptive observers noticed a similar trend
in Papua and New Guinea in the late '30s. Reed, for example, looked
on New Guinea as a caste society made up of white brahmins and brown
untouchables; and within 'the lower caste' certain occupational
groups - police, domestic servants, village officials: those 'most
intimately associated with the white man' - were 'distinctly upper
33class within their caste'. Education, training, and general 
acculturation clearly seemed to be opening up horizontal cleavages 
within the Papua New Guinean community. The extent to which this 
appears to have been happening might have surprised even Reed. Though 
no comprehensive statistics are available, there is evidence suggest­
ing that considerable numbers of Papua New Guineans were becoming 
'upper class' through post-primary training. The very number of 
mission-run post-primary training institutions gives some indication
of the volume of those receiving 'further' education: in New Guinea
34the missions were running 79 post-primary establishments.
There were, moreover, numerous avenues along which those
with some education could advance. Teaching for the missions
probably enabled the greatest number to climb higher into colonial
society. In Papua in 1939, 91 Standard V students secured their
certificates. Many of these appear to have become teachers, for the
possession of the certificate was now 'a coveted honour' and more
students were staying on at school to complete the final year in hope
35of becoming teachers. Teaching was one of the few activities where
32 P.C. Lloyd (1966), p. 27.
33 Reed (1943), p. 464.
34 NGAR 1939-40, p. 127.
35 PAR 1939-40, p. 20.
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Papuans could earn the unstinted esteem of Europeans, such as that
of a school inspector who examined the work of four Papuan teachers
around Hula in 1940. ’The standard of their schools was well above
the average', he wrote, 'and the examination of their pupils was made
36a pleasure by their alertness and keenness.' In New Guinea, too,
teaching allowed the ambitious lad to advance. All six government
primary schools in 1940 employed New Guinean teachers, and New
Guineans would have conducted most of the 2477 mission primary schools.
Some missions provided relatively advanced training, and had long done
so. The Lutherans at Finschhafen, for example, had opened a Jabem
teacher training school at Logaueng in 1907 which had trained 100
teachers by 1920; their Kate training centre at Heldsbach opened in
371914 and had trained 217 teachers by 1930. By the 1920s teaching
had become so prestigious an occupation the number of applicants was
embarrassing. The Mission had to introduce a third and intervening
level of education, 'middle schools', between the primary and teacher
38training schools to cater for those wanting post-primary education.
Pastoral work as a lay preacher ('evangelist' or 'catechist')
also provided stepping stones for the upward-mobile. The eleven
mission societies in New Guinea were maintaining 3000 mission stations
39in the charge of New Guineans by 1940. Their training might have
been minimal, but as Oram has shown for the London Missionary Society
pastorate at Hula, mission work enabled local elites to emerge.
Preferential access to education, contact with a European way of
life, use of English, the marriage of couples who had both received
education, and the general social confidence all these bestowed,
contributed to the rise of families associated with the mission,
giving them pre-eminence over neighbours and a means of entry later
40on into the national elite. Other biographical studies of important
36 ibid.
37 Harrison (1975) , pp. 173-6
38 ibid.
39 NGAR 1939-40, p. 127.
40 Nigel Oram (1971) , p. 131.
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Papua New Guineans suggest that Oram's conclusions are reasonable
41generalizations for the country as a whole.
Technical training was another route upwards. Two of the 
five mission-run technical schools in Papua - Kwato and Yule Island - 
deliberately aimed to create an elite of highly skilled craftsmen 
whose proficiency rivalled that of European tradesmen, the missions 
concerned wishing to be independent of outside skills. Some missions 
in New Guinea also gave trade training; and the government school in 
Rabaul, which was over ten years old and had 97 students by 1940, 
trained youths for a wide range of occupations - typing and clerical 
work, printing, blacksmithing, engine maintenance, telegraphic line 
maintenance, carpentery and joinery, plumbing, sail making, painting, 
and cement working. Overall the accomplishment of the technical 
schools was considerable; and if they did little else, they created 
a pool of tradesmen who proved indispensable in a later period of 
post-war reconstruction.^
Work for government and some business enterprises also gave 
further training and experience. Clerks, medical orderlies, police, 
interpreters, truck drivers, boats’ masters, and the 'boss boys' of 
labour gangs customarily received informal, on-the-job training; yet 
even this imparted a measure of expertise which enabled some Papua 
New Guineans to make their way into colonial society. Even though 
they might return home at the end of their contracts, they had 
knowledge of a wider world than that of the village, and they had 
modern skills to take home.
The pre-war educational achievement was modest by any
measure, but there was an achievement and it cannot be discounted.
It is not true, as one scholar has scornfully claimed, that before
World War II 'the educational efforts of the Administration and
missions came to nothing.... There was no serious attempt at 
43education'. Pre-war education remained a stunted tree, but it 
enabled numerous villagers to climb to career opportunities in a
41 F. Steinbauer (1974), pp. 161-76, 189-204; Maslyn Williams 
(1970).
42 A.R. Austin (1972), pp. 189-97; NGAR 1939-40, p. 42.
43 H.K. Colebatch (1967), pp. 110, 116.
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wider society. And these people, the 'first generation' of formally
educated Papua New Guineans, became the parents of children who would
44later comprise a national educated elite.
(b) A 'NEW DEAL ' FOR PAPUA NEW GUINEA: THE WARD-MURRAY REGIME 
AND EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Civilian rule returned to Papua and New Guinea in late 1945 after 
almost four years of war and military administration. The two 
formerly separate territories were now administratively wed; the first 
Administrator of the joint territories arrived in Port Moresby on 
25 October; and with that began the brief 'Ward-Murray era'.
Australia was under Labor rule, and the Minister for External 
Territories was a left-winger, E.J. Ward. Shortly after his appoint­
ment in 1944 Ward visited Papua and New Guinea and caused constern­
ation among 'old territory hands' with a gesture that to them seemed 
ominous: during a tour of inspection he insisted on wading ashore 
from a boat instead of accepting the customary ride on the back of a 
local villager. Later in parliament, when opposition members accused 
him of having lowered the prestige of the white man, he asserted that 
if whites needed that form of prestige they should relinquish their 
claim to the territories. Labor, he went on to say, intended to 
'increase the prestige of the white man... by treating the natives 
as human beings'.^
Labor's determination to start afresh, to shake off the 
lethargy of pre-war administrations, became obvious when Ward intro­
duced the Papua-New Guinea Provisional Administration Bill into 
parliament in July 1945. He said:
this government is not satisfied that sufficient interest 
had been taken in the Territories prior to the Japanese 
invasion, or that adequate funds had been provided for 
their development and the advancement of the native 
inhabitants. Apart from the debt of gratitude the people 
of Australia now owe to the natives of the Territory, the 
government regards it as its bounden duty to further to 
the utmost the advancement of the natives, and considers
44 S.G. Weeks (forthcoming).
1 APD vol. 184, 1945, p. 4361.
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that that can be achieved only by providing facilities 
for better health, better education and for a greater 
participation by the natives in the wealth of their 
country, and eventually in its government. 2
He further promised that Labor would honour the high ideals implicit
in the principle of colonial trusteeship recently accepted at the San
Francisco Conference. Both sides of the House shared the infectious
altruism of the moment. Two of Ward’s particular critics indicated
that the Opposition was unwilling to let the Government lay sole claim
to idealism by stressing Australia’s obligation to do more for the
magnificent ’Fuzzy-Wuzzy Angels’ who had recently proved such staunch
3allies in the struggle against Japan.
To carry the new ideas into practice Ward chose J.K. Murray 
as Administrator of Papua New Guinea. Murray, an academic and 
military man, was no stranger to the policies he had to implement.
He had been a colonel in the Australian Army's Directorate of Research 
and Civil Affairs, and most recently had been head of the School of 
Civil Affairs, which the Directorate ran to train officials being 
sent to the territories to administer areas recaptured from the 
Japanese. The Directorate was, in the opinion of one of its members, 
’a remarkable army unit... [which] introduced a dynamism so far un­
heard of in Australian colonial affairs,... [and] assembled an 
impressive body of experts whose work wholly transformed the quality4of Australian thinking on Papua New Guinea'. One of its specific 
interests was planning for post-war educational development, and it 
went so far as to set up the Sogeri education centre outside Port 
Moresby in 1944 to train Papua New Guineans to teach in village 
schools.
The Directorate’s officer most concerned with education was
2 APD vol. 183, 1945, p. 4052.
3 Speeches by T. White and P.C. Spender, APD vol. 183, 1945, 
pp. 4200, 4210.
4 EPNG, p. 1223.
'Report on the preliminary arrangements for the transfer 
of control from the military authorities to the provisional 
administration of the Territory of Papua New Guinea' (1945).
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the anthropologist, Camilla Wedgwood. She toured the territories as 
a lieutenant-colonel in 1944-45 assessing educational needs, and 
wrote several papers on her observations. One of these set out a 
30-year development plan for post-war educational growth which en­
visaged the creation of an hierarchical system of government schools - 
village, area, and intermediate schools, with specialized colleges 
for technical, teacher, and medical training as the final stage.^ 
Wedgwood perhaps added little new to ideas on educational planning 
for Papua New Guinea. Other educationalists - Williams, Groves [see 
below] - had formulated comparable schemes in the past, but her plan 
’was expressed in dispassionate terms that gave a clearer indication
g
of the objectives to be set1.
At least as important as Wedgwood's actual plans for the 
future school system were the ideas underlying them. Two themes 
recurred: anti-elitism, and a concern with what was relevant to
village needs. It followed that educational planning must avoid two 
pitfalls. First was the danger of ’producing only an educated elite 
and creating thereby a number of economic, political and socio- 9logical problems, without benefiting the bulk of the native population’. 
Second was the danger of encouraging in Papua New Guineans a taste 
for an 'irrelevant' European lifestyle, for this would arouse 
expectations among them that were unrealistic.^ Her writings were 
refreshingly free of paternalistic value judgements about the 
intellectual capacity of Papua New Guineans; but she made several 
questionable assumptions. Could it be taken for granted that the 
people would remain contented with a ’relevant’, rural education 
fitting them for life in the villages? Was it not possible that they 
would insist on a ’European’ education, aspiring towards a life away 
from the village in urban wage labour? Would not ambitious 
individuals continually try to fight clear of the ruck, seeking
6 Camilla Wedgwood (1944, 1945, 1945a).
7 Wedgwood (1945a).
8 B.E. Jinks (1975), p. 437.
9 Wedgwood (1944), p. 16.
10 Wedgwood (1945), p. 3.
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advantages not shared by the rest? Wedgwood failed to answer such 
questions. So, too, did the man chosen to implement the programme 
in education, Papua New Guinea's first Director of Education, W.C. 
Groves. Therein lay part of the reason why the educational achieve­
ment in the first five or six post-war years failed to live up to 
Ward's brave vision of a 'Rooseveldtian New Deal for Papua New Guinea'?
Groves took up duty in Papua New Guinea in June 1946. Behind 
him was a long career in education in the Pacific, including several 
years in New Guinea as Supervisor of Education in the early '20s, and 
a period of anthropological research in the early '30s. The latter 
resulted in a book, Native Education and Culture Contact in New Guinea3 
which was among his chief qualifications for the task ahead. It set 
out a fairly practical scheme for building up a system of village 
primary schools, regional schools for further education, and a 
government teacher training institution. However, it is remarkable 
mainly for the enthusiasm with which the author embraced a nebulous 
educational philosophy derived from questionable tenets of functional 
anthropology. His ideas complemented those of F.E. Williams and 
Camilla Wedgwood. Like Williams he wanted education to 'blend 
cultures', to be the agent for combining the best of indigenous and 
Western tradition to fashion a new, national culture. And like 
Wedgwood he wished to spread a distinctively 'native' education, one 
relevant to rural villages rather than inappropriately 'European'.
His ideal was an education combining modern knowledge with the co­
operativeness of traditional village society; this would produce
graduates who were content to use their modern skills in their home
12villages, improving the quality of customary rural life.
The major weakness in all this was Groves' fervent faith 
that the traditional village could be the basis for development, that 
through appropriate education it would remain immune from harmful 
by-products of modernization appearing elsewhere in the colonial 
world. His error, like that of other classical functional anthro­
pologists, whose ideas reached a peak of influence in the 1930s and
11 J.K. Murray (1969), p. 177.
12 W.C. Groves (1936), p. 135.
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’40s, was to see the traditional village as a static, eternal verity. 
He failed to allow for changes that might occur as numerous villages 
were aggregated into a national society. That Papua New Guinea might 
become a modern capitalist state; that this required the creation of 
an indigenous bureaucratic elite of necessity removed from their 
villages; and that the education system must produce such a class, 
were possibilities not taken into account by Groves’ ideal educational 
model.
The philosophical weakness in Groves' scheme affected his
performance as Director of Education. In translating belief into
practice a host of vexed questions arose. To take but one, language,
there were no easy answers. If the language of instruction were
English was this really relevant to the needs of Melanesian villagers?
If it were the vernacular who would teach it, and who would write the
text books? If both English and the vernacular were used, at what
level should the former be introduced? Groves agonized over such
questions but was unable to produce firm decisions from which
13programmes of practical development could proceed. And even if he 
had acted decisively his ideas were not generally acceptable to the 
public. Neither European employers seeking workers literate in 
English, nor villagers hankering after education as the key to 
material wealth, welcomed schemes for relevant, village-oriented 
education. He could not ignore their discontent, and as a result 
wavered between his ideal scheme and a more vulgar pragmatism; not
14surprisingly the education programme achieved the aims of neither.
Serious administrative weaknesses compounded the difficult­
ies arising from the philosophy. On the job Groves showed he was a 
’talker' rather than a 'doer'. He also had an unbalanced order of 
priorities: he appointed, for example, advisers in esoteric fields
of culture (musicologists, theoreticians of primitive art) while the 
quota of classroom teachers remained unfilled. He spent considerable 
time in conflict with important interest groups - for example,
13 Dickson (1971), ch. 6; Geoffrey Smith (1975), pp. 26-35; 
Hasluck (1976), pp. 85-6; J.T. Gunther, transcript of 
interview with Nelson (1972).
Jinks (1975), pp. 438-9.14
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European parents, the missions - whose demands he found difficult to 
reconcile with his ideal model. And his attempts to involve his 
department in wider questions of social development distracted his 
attention from his main task - planning a comprehensive system of 
modern education, gaining an allocation of funds to implement it, 
building up its physical facilities, and pushing through the schools 
an expanding intake of students at increasingly better standards.
It was hardly surprising that the educational achievement
under Labor fell short of what had been promised. The inadequate
statistics of the time show a superficially impressive growth of the
education system, but the real gains were slight. In the three years
1947-8 to 1949-50 numbers of pupils in government schools rose by 27%;
but mission school enrolments increased by 37%, and the missions
16were educating no less than 97% of all students. And although the 
number of government schools rose from 15 to 39 their spread was 
very uneven: four of the five government schools in Papua were
clustered around Port Moresby; in New Guinea 21 of the 34 government 
schools were in the New Britain district; eight of the 16 adminis­
trative districts had no government schools at all.^ At the same 
time a disproportionate amount of effort was, of necessity, going 
into schools for expatriate children. In 1949 there were 13 schools 
and 24 European teachers for 660 expatriate children; this was in
contrast to the 39 Papua New Guinean schools with 2657 pupils but
18only nine European teachers. In so far as 'higher' education 
existed, the achievement was very modest. By 1949-50 there were 150 
students in four government schools officially designated as 'higher 
training' institutions, though in effect these were little more than 
post-primary schools giving low-level teacher and 'pre-vocational' 
training. The missions had 1913 students in 50 'higher training'
15 Dickson, loc. cit.; Smith, loc. cit. ; Hasluck, loc. cit.;
Gunther, loc. cit.; Jinks, loc. cit.
16 PAR 1947-48, p. 85, 1949-50, p. 115; NGAR 1947-48, pp.
xxxviii-xxxix, 1949--50, p. 155.
17 PAR 1948-49, p. 89; NGAR 1948-49, pp . 151, 159.
18 ibid.
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schools, though it is likely that many of these were teaching in 
either Pidgin or the vernacular.
What the statistics fail to reveal is the poor quality of
the system being created. The vast number of mission schools, which
in 1949 were educating the overwhelming majority of schoolchildren,
were mostly run by untrained teachers who themselves had received
only the most rudimentary education. Most taught in Pidgin or the
vernacular; many did little but teach hymns and scripture by rote;
20and pupils attended erratically. So low was their general standard
when Hasluck took over the Territories portfolio in May 1951 that he
concluded that 'scarcely any' Papua New Guineans from any level in
any school, government or mission, were ready for the standard of
21education given in Australian secondary schools. Admittedly the
system had started from scratch, and it was expanding; but the
programme was hardly 'setting an example to the rest of the world'
22as 'new dealers' had boasted it would. A more energetic programme 
would not come until a Liberal government installed Hasluck as Minister 
for Territories.
(a) THE EARLY 'HASLUCK ERA': THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FORMAL HIGHER 
EDUCATION
In December 1949 the Labor government was defeated, and for
eighteen months the Minister for Territories was P.C. Spender. With
his replacement by Paul Hasluck another 'new era' began, to run for
twelve years. Until the 1949 elections Hasluck had been a senior
official of the Department of External Affairs. He had helped work
out the principles of trusteeship for colonial territories agreed on
at the San Francisco Conference, though in later UN involvement he
developed 'considerable scepticism about the outcome of the Trustee-
23ship provisions of the [UN] Charter'. This partly explains his
19 PAR 1949-50, p. 115; NGAR 1949-50, p. 155.
20 Hasluck (1976), pp. 86-7; Jinks (1975), p. 451.
21 Hasluck, loc. cit.
22 See speech by Ward, APD vol. 184, 1945, p. 4300.
23 Hasluck (1976), pp. 5-6.
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’dismay' at receiving Territories as his first portfolio; he was also
reluctant to take it because he knew no one else wanted it, and it
would probably not advance him far in Cabinet. He has since written,
2 A'It killed me politically’; yet more than any other Minister to 
fill the position before or after he left his mark on Papua New Guinea. 
During his ministry and at his direction the country was set decisive­
ly on the path to independence.
The education system Hasluck inherited from Ward via
Spender was still poorly developed. Twelve years later it was still
far from maximum growth, but in the meantime a transformation had
been taking place. Thus, in 1951 the education vote comprised 3.6%
of total government expenditure in Papua New Guinea ($.47 million
out of $12.8 million), whereas in 1962-63 it was 10.4% ($6.3 million
out of $59.9 million); in the same time Education rose from being
fourth to first ranking department in size of financial vote. The
number of Education Department schools and colleges increased from
74 in 1952 to 417 in 1963, and the number of students from 4834 to
44,959. Enrolments in post-primary education grew from 776 to 4769
25in the same period. The spread of schools was still very uneven:
in 1960 the best served district, Manus, had one school for every
1007 people, and one place in school for every 11.5; this contrasted
with the least served district, Western Highlands, with fifteen
times the population of Manus but only one school for every 36,587
26persons and one school place for every 458. But despite these 
great differences the education system was spreading steadily across 
the country, and by the end of Hasluck’s period in Territories none 
of the 15 administrative districts had fewer than seven government 
schools. A fully comprehensive system of education had not yet 
emerged - there were few high schools, and the commission investi­
gating the possible foundation of a university had not yet reported - 
but a firm foundation for higher education had now been laid.
24 ibid.
25 Figures derived from statistics in PAR 1950-51, and 1962-63; 
and NGAR 1950-51, and 1962-63.
26 Figures derived from statistics in PAR and NGAR 1959-60.
22
Hasluck saw educational growth as the key to a range of
developmental needs, and was therefore anxious to promote it. Earlier
in his ministry it failed to receive the priority he wished, however.
For this he blamed Groves, and he has since suggested that one of
his notable mistakes as Minister was not to sack his Director of
Education. He has claimed he wanted to give the Department of
Education preference in financial allocations, recruitment, and works
construction, but the department under Groves seemed incapable of
rising to the occasion. Groves was ’enthusiastic about visual aids,
... seminars, wall charts and UNESCO pamphlets’ but seemed unable to
devise 'a carefully prepared scheme for more schools and more
teachers - something officers in Canberra could use in making a case
for funds to the Treasury’. As a result ’the turning point’ in
education did not come until 1958 when Groves retired and his second-
in-command, G.T. Roscoe, took his place. Roscoe had qualities
Hasluck appreciated: 'he was a school-teacher and was aware that
the work of an Education Department had something to do with getting
more and better teachers.... [He] got down to the job of putting
28children into schools and teaching them'. Such praise for Roscoe 
was a measure of Hasluck’s impatience with Groves.
Hasluck had early misgivings about the Department of 
Education, and adverse comments about its poor organization and lack 
of objectives from the Public Service Commissioner and the Acting 
Administrator led him to appoint three officials to investigate the 
department in 1954. Disagreeing with much of the report they sub­
mitted he decided to intervene personally to set educational 
development on the course he thought best. He wrote out his own 
ideas in a long unpublished memorandum to the Secretary of the Depart­
ment of Territories in February 1955. The substance of this document
now became educational policy in the absence of any more definitive
29a programme devised by the department itself.
Hasluck’s policy set out six general objectives he thought
27 Hasluck (1976), p. 86; cf., Hasluck, RIW, 11 September 1975.
28 Hasluck (1976), pp. 224-5.
29 ibid., pp. 93-7; cf. Smith (1975), pp. 31-2.
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the education programme should accomplish. First was the achievement
of mass literacy - 'teach[ing] all native children to read and write
a common language'. The remaining objectives were more general:
to raise material standards of living; to help the people 'adopt the
practices of civilization'; to 'blend' the best aspects of traditional
customs with the best of Western influences; to replace paganism with
Christianity; and to strengthen the bonds between the two territories,
31and between them and Australia. In addition there were a number of 
'immediate tasks':
I think that in the immediate future the main work of 
the Education Department should be to make it possible 
for more children to go to school and to ensure that 
they do so. The first need is primary education. There 
can be no higher education without primary education.
The first requirement for primary education and for 
administrative success in other fields is a means of 
communication... [therefore] the goal of primary edu­
cation should be literacy in English. 32
Hasluck was to preach this message time and again over the next eight 
years. It was not, however, a lesson his many critics could agree 
with.
Hasluck attracted critics readily. His public pronouncements 
were eloquent, but he spoke to the public as a schoolmaster; and he 
stubbornly held to his professed goals even when changing circum­
stances in Papua New Guinea suggested reappraisal might be timely. 
Academics, journalists and politicians with 'progressive' views 
consequently saw him as the archetypal colonial paternalist, one 
remote from political reality in an era of decolonization. Among the 
'intellectual left' Hasluck-baiting became fashionable in the late
1950s, a fact emphasized by the label one liberal journal pinned on 
33him - 'Oom Paul'. Perhaps his most persistent and outspoken critic 
was Murray Groves, an academic and anthropologist who had done his 
major research in Papua New Guinea and was none other than the son of
30 ibid., p. 95.
31 ibid.
32 ibid., p. 96.
33 Nation_, 14 March 1961, p. 3.
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the former Director of Education. In a series of articles in The 
Observer and Nation during 1960 and 1961 he dissected Hasluck's
34public statements, castigating him for his 'paternalistic fallacy'.
Groves claimed, inter alia3 that pursuit of the goal of universal
primary education was an aim typical of Hasluck's archaic outlook;
what was needed instead was a rapid build-up in the secondary and
tertiary levels of the education system in order to facilitate the
rapid emergence of a true educated elite which could take the country
35into an early independence.
But despite such broadsides from his growing ranks of critics,
Hasluck resolutely held to his aims of literacy in English through
universal primary education. He was in respectable company here:
as Smith has pointed out, he was 'in line with views then widely held
about educational policy in developing countries.... Internationally,
the case for universal primary schooling [had] earned political
recognition in the Declaration of Human Rights and... [the] UNESCO
sponsored Karachi Plan of 1960 [had] set the goal of eight years'
36universal schooling in Asia'. He patiently answered his critics, 
though often they seemed more interested in scoring points off him 
than in understanding his exposition.
A typical exchange between Hasluck and a critic occurred 
in the House of Representatives in 1957. An Opposition member, 
apparently hoping to expose the Minister's 'paternalistic fallacy', 
referred to Papua New Guinean students at secondary schools in 
Australia then asked rhetorically if Hasluck 'would care to tell the
37House when it is proposed to build secondary schools in New Guinea'.
The long, detailed reply which followed reiterated a number of themes 
Hasluck customarily used in defending universal primary education:
(i) primary education, by force of historical circumstances, was still 
poorly developed; (ii) an effective system of secondary education 
depended on a soundly based system of primary education; (iii) the
34 Murray Groves (1962) .
35 Murray Groves (1960).
36 Smith (1975), p. 32.
37 APD H of R 16, 1957, p. 1227.
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government was gradually extending post-primary education, and would
continue to do so, as more students became available after completing
their primary schooling, but... (iv) the large-scale expansion of
secondary, and later tertiary, education must await the availability
of viable numbers of primary school graduates; therefore... (v) major
38effort must continue to be at the primary level. These arguments
were eminently reasonable yet they failed to satisfy the critics.
Hasluck could cite the statistics of growth almost ad inf'in'itum3
stating the percentage increases in the numbers of students, the
numbers of new schools opened, the steadily rising education vote,
the expanding body of teachers in training, all as evidence of his
39’vigorous action towards the expansion of school services’ - but
to little avail. The critics wanted more concrete proof of his good
faith. They wanted high schools, teachers’ colleges, and even a 
40university.
Hasluck did himself a disservice in insisting on the goal 
of universal primary education so firmly that he created the erroneous 
impression that the addition of secondary and tertiary tiers to the 
educational structure would only follow the attainment of the goal. 
That was clearly not his intention, and his many statements made 
clear that he had not turned his back on further post-primary forms 
of education. However, his obstinacy in promoting the goal gave the 
critics good cause for concern. Universal primary education was 
plainly unattainable. The statistics of growth revealed this even 
at the time: between 1953 and 1959 the education vote rose by 49%
and primary school enrolments by 70% - a commendable achievement - 
but as a percentage of the country's population, primary school 
pupils had risen by only three points, from 7% to 10%. For all its 
remarkable expansion the primary school system was not catching up
38 ibid.
39 APD H of R 19, 1958, p. 1336; H of R 20, 1958, pp. 770-1,
40 See for example, speeches in APD H of R 24, 1959, by A. 
Calwell, p. 1581, R. Cleaver, p. 1584, G. Bryant, pp. 1585-6, 
and E.G. Whitlam, p. 1586.
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on population growth, which had increased by 19% 1953 to 1959. The 
goal could clearly not be reached short of devoting the entire volume 
of government expenditure to education, and that was hardly practicable. 
Universal primary education was valuable perhaps as a rallying cry 
for great effort in the extension of basic literacy, but that was all.
To insist otherwise was to provide the critics with a hefty cudgel.
Similarly, Hasluck's insistence that educational standards
in Papua New Guinea must be comparable to those in Australia was
unfortunate. It gave the critics further weapons, and diverted
attention from the steady advances taking place in post-primary
education. His attitude towards educational standards received
perhaps its fullest expression in a parliamentary speech late in his
Ministry when K.E. Beazley, a Labor spokesman on Papua New Guinean
issues, had attacked the government’s failure to introduce university
education. The government's neglect of tertiary education, Beazley
argued, was a culpable hindrance to Papua New Guinea's march towards 
42independence. In his long and exasperated reply Hasluck said:
Successful tertiary education requires... eleven years 
of solid preparation, and it is unfair to a child, 
particularly one which comes from a totally illiterate 
community, to try to plunge it into tertiary education 
without that solid grounding.... You cannot go into 
the jungle, pick a child - even the brightest child - 
and plunge it into a university. Eleven years of 
training is required.... 43
His insistence on eleven years of preparatory education before 
university entrance was reasonable, and few could have denied it.
But once again his obstinacy and the tenor of his comments enabled 
the critics to impute paternalism to him. In the process everyone 
overlooked the significant developments which had been taking place 
in post-primary education, albeit at a level lower than the university 
the critics were calling for.
What were these developments? Firstly, contrary to any
41
41 Percentages calculated from statistics in PAR and NGAR 
1952-53 and 1958-59.
42 APD H of R 35, 1962, pp. 1548-62.
43 ibid., pp. 1553-4.
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impression otherwise that Hasluck might have created, there had been 
a steady growth of secondary education during the 1950s and early '60s. 
The system of post-primary schooling was not officially designated as 
'secondary’, though that is what it essentially was. For those 
following it right through there were six years' primary education 
followed by three post-primary years, 'standards 7, 8 and 9'. Over 
the years the post-primary schools went under a number of names as 
they evolved into formal high schools; but through numerous changes 
of title the schools remained basically the same - institutions 
offering up to three years of post-primary schooling.
The build-up of numbers in these schools, and their 
permutations of title, are evident in the following table:
Government post-primary schools3 1951 to 196444
Number of Number
Year Type of School schools student
1952 'higher elementary-central' 7 466
'secondary-general and
teacher training' 3 103
technical 3 207
Total 13 776
1957 'intermediate' 12 669
'secondary' 2 102
technical 3 218
teacher training 2 76
Total 19 1065
1962 'post-primary' and
'junior high' 23 1314
'secondary' 5 381
technical 15 679
teacher training 3 215
Total 46 2589
1964 high 21 3055
technical 31 1360
teacher training 4 363
56 4778
44 Figures from PAR and NGAR 1951-2, 1956-57, 1961-62, 1963-64
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These schools may not have attained the academic standards of their
Australian counterparts, as Hasluck thought they should, but in the
context of Papua New Guinea they did offer ’secondary' education. And
in addition to the students in these institutions, there were specially
selected scholarship students receiving secondary education in
Australian schools. The scholarship scheme began in 1953-54 as a
stop-gap measure to ensure a flow of students of Australian standard
from the secondary level. Hasluck doubted the value of the scheme,
but those organizing it generally believed it was successful.^ By
the late 1960s, when the growth of high schools in Papua New Guinea
itself made the scheme needless, well over 200 students had benefited
46from it, including the country’s first university graduates.
There were other post-primary developments Hasluck could
have mentioned to show he was not neglecting higher education. Since
1947 a steady stream of Papua New Guineans had been taking courses
in medicine, dentistry and nursing at the Central Medical School in 
47Suva, Fiji. When the Department of Public Health set up the Papuan 
Medical College in 1957-58 training in Fiji was phased out. The first 
18 students of the new college entered formal training in 1958, and 
its first graduates emerged in 1962; thereafter the college maintained 
a steady supply of qualified practitioners.
The Public Service Institute, set up in 1953, was another 
important channel of post-primary education. It existed to upgrade 
the quality of the public service by helping government employees 
improve their educational qualifications. At first its students were 
mainly expatriate officers undertaking part-time external tuition in 
various Australian diploma and degree courses. From 1957, when the 
Auxiliary Division was created to enable Papua New Guinean officers 
to qualify for entry to higher divisions of the public service,
45 John Lee (1967), pp. 113-7.
46 Smith (1975), p. 32.
47 Hasluck (1976), pp. 110, 342.
48 ibid.; and PAR 1958-59, p. 77; and Gunther, transcript of 
interview with Hank Nelson (1972), pp. 86-7.
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increasing numbers of ’local officers’ trained through the institute.
By 1964 there were 2100 taking either full- or part-time and
correspondence courses to lift their qualifications to the Standard 9 
49level.
Teacher training also made a significant contribution to 
further education during the 1950s. The appointment of former teachers 
as the first Papua New Guinean permanent heads of a number of govern­
ment departments in 1971 emphasized this. From the opening of the 
Sogeri education centre in 1944 teacher training had been one of the 
chief means by which Papua New Guineans could receive a post-primary 
education. Indeed post-primary schooling often proceeded on the 
assumption that those receiving it would become teachers; as a result 
the normal post-primary curriculum for a number of years included 
teacher education. In 1954-55 the Department of Education instituted 
more formal arrangements for prospective teachers - three separate 
levels of training, 'A', ’B’ and ’C' Certificate courses of training. 
The lowest level students, the ’A' stream, took a year of training 
after completing Standard 6; the ’B’ stream underwent a year of 
training after Standard 8; and 'C' stream students - the most able - 
entered training after Standard 9, then took two years of ’secondary’ 
education followed by a year of professional e d u c a t i o n . T h e  first 
17 ’C’ Certificate students graduated at the end of 1954. To the 
Department of Education this marked a major milestone in the country’s 
educational development, and the Annual Report jubilantly recorded 
the fact that ’this is the highest scholastic standard yet attained 
by any student within the Administration school system’. ^
As Hasluck has since noted, 'the real progress in education
52belongs to a period after this’. However, the educational achieve­
ments of the 1950s were tangible enough. The system was expanding 
steadily at its base in the primary schools. The ultimate goal of
49 PAR 1957-58, pp. 25-7; NGAR 1957-58, pp. 32-3, 1960-61, 
pp. 40-1.
50 NGAR 1954-55, pp. 92-3.
51 PAR 1954-55, p. 65.
52 Hasluck (1976), p. 99.
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universal primary education remained far distant even if not actually 
receding, postponed by population growth. Yet that could not detract 
from the unobtrusive gains in post-primary education, which was 
providing increasing numbers of Papua New Guineans with professional 
and administrative career opportunities for the future.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ADOPTION OF UNIVERSITY EDUCATION AS A SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE
WITH Hasluck as Minister for Territories the Australian government 
throughout the 1950s firmly adhered to an orthodox position on higher 
education in Papua New Guinea. Official opinion resolutely maintained 
that higher education generally and university education in particular 
were not yet feasible because the necessary substructure of primary 
and secondary schools remained inadequately developed. Each year 
this orthodoxy received reaffirmation in the Annual Reports3 which 
usually noted that ’secondary and higher education will be made 
available to all students who qualify to progress to higher standards, 
but advantage of this can only be taken by those having a sound 
primary education and a good knowledge of English’.^
Such statements failed to indicate accurately the actual
progress of post-primary education. As Hasluck noted, 'the school
system was beginning to produce candidates for higher education in
sufficient numbers for us to be able to turn more purposefully towards2Tertiary education'. As this realization dawned the official 
position changed to open espousal of higher education as a priority 
task. The Department of Territories now initiated a series of inquiries 
into higher education, the culmination of which was the Currie Report, 
the first major milestone in university development in Papua New Guinea.
(a) MOUNTING PRESSURES3 INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL3 FOR HIGHER EDUCATION
A number of influences combined to persuade the government to 
swing its emphasis away from primary towards secondary and tertiary 
education. Some of these were internal to the government and to Papua
1 NGAR, 1953-54, p. 90. Until 1961 the Annual Reports carried 
a brief entry under the heading 'Institutions of Higher 
Education' which began: 'There are no universities and some 
years must elapse before they can be justified... [as] the 
vast majority of the indigenous people have not yet reached 
the necessary educational standard' (NGAR, 1952-53, p. 90).
Hasluck, A Time for Building, p. 386.2
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New Guinea, others were external; together they prompted the govern­
ment into initiating vast changes during the 1960s. Among the internal 
influences the strongest were possibly from departments of the Papua 
New Guinea Administration which had progressive heads, were extending 
their activities steadily, and generally saw sense in recruiting 
Papua New Guineans to positions requiring formal skills and responsi­
bility. Public Health, Posts and Telegraphs, and Education appreciated 
that Papua New Guineans were capable of being more than ' tea-makers'
for expatriate public servants, and were the most notable in establish-
3ing their own training institutions. Education had conducted various 
training schemes from the outset, and the establishment of the streamed 
'A', 'B', and 'C' courses for teachers indicated rising standards of 
training. The Posts and Telegraphs Training College, which opened in 
1957-58, was the first of many training institutions sponsored by a
4government department other than Education. Public Health opened 
the second of such specialized training schools - the Papuan Medical 
College - in 1958. Under the directorship of Dr J.T. Gunther it was 
the most vigorous of departments in pursuing indigenous staff 
development. It first undertook the training of nurses, dentists and 
doctors in Fiji, then in 1956 began a 28-year scheme for producing 
locally trained personnel to permit the complete localization of the 
medical service by 1984. The energetic training programmes of these 
departments demonstrated to the less venturesome agencies that Papua 
New Guineans could do 'more than fetch and carry for Australian 
officers'. And so by the end of the 1950s the departments of 
district administration, police, agriculture, and forestry were also 
devising localization and training schemes and were planning their 
own specialized training institutions.^
An ironic result of these moves was a shortage of Papua 
New Guineans willing to undertake further education. Until the primary
3 ibid., pp. 103, 143, 246; McConaghey to Lambert, 9 March 
1961, p. 2, DTOR 61/6508.
4 PAR, 1957-58, pp. 25-7.
5 Gunther, RIW, p. 6.
6 Hasluck, op. cit., p. 246.
7 PAR, 1957-58, pp. 25-7.
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and secondary schools began releasing a tide of school leavers into
g
the employment market in the late 1960s there were relatively few
students qualified for advanced training. Competition for them among
prospective employers was brisk. It was a sellers’ market: wastage
rates from higher levels of the education system were severe, with
many students preferring to earn the attractive wages offered by
employers rather than continue into further education. This was a
problem to which Hasluck frequently alluded, sometimes using it to
9justify the slow development of higher education facilities. He was 
not simply making excuses. The Administration periodically advised 
him that 'few students proceed beyond the Internediate [Form 3] level 
because of the attraction of the higher wages offered to the small 
number with this qualification and of the urgent need of all govern­
ment departments for employees with sufficient education to equip 
them for semi-professional tasks'.^ The Administrator, Cleland, 
recommended that likely students be awarded cadetships to encourage 
them to complete secondary school and proceed to higher education.^ 
The competition for students emphasized both the shortage of young 
people receiving higher education and the absence of facilities for 
training them. It thus constituted indirect pressure on the govern­
ment to engage in higher education more boldly.
There was a general awareness among senior Administration
officials in the late 1950s that the time was ripe for changed
educational emphases, that special effort was required at the tertiary
level. Their concern became obvious at the 1958 Senior Officers'
Course, a scheme which brought together senior personnel for a
12programme of lectures, seminars and research. The 1958 course 
produced a 20,000-word 'Report on Education', the latter half of 
which dealt with post-primary training. This document singled out
8 J.D. Conroy, 'Education, employment and migration in Papua 
New Guinea’, Ph.D. thesis, UPNG, 1974, pp. 32-49.
9 APD, vol. H of R 35, 1962, pp. 1553-4; 'Discussion with 1962 
Visiting Mission to P & NG', DTOR 62/3488.
10 Cleland to Lambert, 19 June 1962, DTOR 62/3488.
11 ibid.
12 Hasluck, A Time for Building3 p. 282.
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for explicit criticism a number of crucial aspects of Hasluck’s 
publicly stated beliefs and the orthodox official position on higher 
education. It attacked the official goal of universal primary 
education; challenged the anti-elitist rhetoric in which educational 
objectives were often phrased; criticized the delay in building up 
post-primary education until an adequate primary school output was 
achieved; and generally demonstrated that official orthodoxy was 
poorly regarded by some of the best and most senior officers of the 
service. It then went on to recommend the establishment of ’a
13University or University College in the not too distant future*.
There was no doubt what many officials thought the Administration 
should be doing.
Papua New Guineans themselves were no less sure. At local
government council meetings and at large gatherings to meet visiting
officials they made it plain they wanted not a rural or vernacular
education to fit them to life in the villages, but something to give
access to the benefits of modem society. The words of a highlands
Big-Man to the Director of Education in 1959, 'We want our children
14to be exactly like you', expressed the aspirations of most. On a 
national scale their opinion was heard most consistently in the 
Legislative Council, even though it contained only three Papua New 
Guinean members throughout the 1950s. Education was one of the topics 
on which they spoke with assurance, and the recurring themes of 
their speeches indicated the sharpness of their dissatisfaction with 
current effort. Chief among their wishes were a higher level of 
technical education so Papua New Guineans could acquire the skills 
of mechanised society; less religious and more secular training; 
schooling in English rather than Pidgin or the vernacular; and the 
establishment of facilities for secondary and higher education so 
students need not go overseas for t r a i n i n g . T h e y  were sensitive to 
the fact that education was poorly developed in their country, taking
13 'Report on Education 1958', No. 3 Senior Officers' Course, 
Australian School of Pacific Administration.
14 Smith, Education in Papua New Guinea3 p. 46.
LCD, I, 2(2) 1952, pp. 68-9; II, 1(1) 1954, p. 107; 11(5)
1956, pp. 33-4.
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this as a slur against their people. The first speech by Merare
Dickson, a Papuan member, indicated the general feeling: ’We... are
simple and human but will do better if we are given a higher and a
16better education....’ Several years later, in his last speech to 
the Council, he again said, ’I just want to say here how important it 
is for us to see that a Native is well developed, educating him in 
the same manner as a European is educated’. ^  These pathetic pleas 
for equality portended a growing popular demand for education, which 
in the next decade became increasingly insistent and vocal. By 1961 
their demands were detailed: John Guise, the future Governor General,
was demanding in the Council that ’(a) students passing the Junior 
Certificate should be given every opportunity to study to university 
level in Australia; (b) a university college affiliated with univers­
ities in Sydney should be built in Papua New Guinea; (c) a higher
education for the university graduates should be available so they
18could study abroad’.
Some of the internal pressure for higher education came from
within the Department of Territories itself, where the chief concern
was the future of the Australian School of Pacific Administration.
ASOPA had been making a notable contribution to education in Papua
New Guinea through its teacher training programme. (Altogether 520
certificated teachers for Papua New Guinea (242 primary and 278
19secondary) graduated from the school between 1954 and 1972.) However, 
Hasluck and Lambert, the Secretary of the department, were never 
entirely happy with it. They suspected its staff of continually trying 
to upgrade it to university status so they could criticize government 
policy as unfettered academics. Instead of this Minister and Secretary 
wished it to be content with a ’less exalted role’ - equipping with 
specific job skills trainees who would later work in Papua New Guinea
16 LCD, I, 2(2) 1952, p. 69.
17 LCD, II, 1(1), 1954, p. 107.
18 LCD, VI (1) 1961, pp. 15-16.
19 V. Parkinson (formerly ASOPA Registrar), RIW, 2 October 1975, 
p. 1; G. Leaver (ed.), 25 Years of ASOPA (Sydney, ASOPA, 
1972, pp. 16-17.
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20(and other territories). Consequently there was considerable
21antipathy between school and department.
In November 1960 Lambert raised the changing educational
needs of Papua New Guinea with Hasluck, and brought the future of
ASOPA into the discussion. Hasluck was 'receptive* to the suggestion
that 'what was wanted... was an institution which... would combine
functions similar to a university college and a public service training
institute. This would involve the merger in the one institution of
22ASOPA and the Public Service Institute'. Hasluck asked for a
'working paper' on the subject. Lambert now brought into the discussion
Cleland and Gunther, who had become Assistant Administrator in 1957.
Gunther believed the first priority was a tertiary level administrative
training college which could later become the nucleus of a university.
Papua New Guinean nationalism was becoming so strong, he said, that
localization would become a major political issue within a decade;
and this should be anticipated by the early establishment of his
23proposed institution. His views exerted strong influence over 
subsequent government discussion.
Gunther's and Lambert's interest indicate how internal
pressures were coming together to ensure greater government commitment
to higher education. It was not the case, as one critic of Australian
policy has claimed, that internal influences 'were weak, and usually
arose as a result of outside criticism', that officials were 'reacting
24belatedly to pressures which began outside the Territory'. Those 
applying internal pressure were vocal, articulate and insistent; they 
were, moreover, well placed to see the needs and to influence govern­
ment policy. Arguably, their influence in effecting a shift in 
emphasis - the adoption of higher education as publicly stated 
policy during 1961-62 - was as strong as the outside influences.
20 Hasluck, RIW, p. 4; Rowley, RIW, p. 1.
21 Parkinson, RIW, pp. 1-3; Rowley, RIW, pp. 1-2.
22 Lambert, note for file, 17 November 1960, DTOR 61/6508.
23 Gunther to Cleland, 13 February 1961, DTOR 61/6508.
24 Colebatch, 'Educational policy and political development 
in Australian New Guinea', pp. 136-7.
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Hasluck himself has specifically rejected the notion of
outside influence. He has claimed a 'steadfastness of objectives'
which, by implication, always included the building up of higher 
25education. In education, he has argued, there was a natural pro­
gression of development from the primary level up, the only constraint
to expansion at a higher level being the availability of adequately 
26prepared students. His department maintained an overview of the
course of development and reviewed policy as needs changed; and so,
according to Hasluck, when the shift in emphasis came it was a result
27of a well-considered assessment of future needs. He has thus pleaded 
the case for internal pressures, specifically those from within his 
department. Perhaps he has overstated the case, but his refusal to 
concede the force of outside influence does not gainsay the strength 
of the internal influences.
Not only Hasluck is guilty of overstatement: his critics
have given undue weight to the opposite case, that of external 
pressures. This was perhaps inevitable since the critics of education­
al policy in Papua New Guinea in the late 1950s and early 1960s were 
many, vociferous, and well publicized. And as a result those sub­
scribing to the 'outside influences' argument assume the government 
only implemented programmes of tertiary education because it was 
driven, reluctantly and tardily, by its opponents. There was no 
denying that the opponents comprised a formidable throng: the UN
Trusteeship Council, the Australian press, the Australian academic 
community, and the parliamentary Labor Party all joined the attack.
But to what extent they influenced the government is uncertain.
Perhaps the most hostile opponents were the Soviet bloc 
delegates within the Trusteeship Council, which became a forum for 
authoritative (if not always well-informed) debate on Australian 
colonial policy during the 1950s and early 1960s. The Council 
expressed concern over a number of aspects of educational development -
25 Hasluck, 'Present policy and objectives', paper read to 
Summer School of Council of Adult Education, Melbourne, 
January 1964, pp. 2, 4; RIW, p. 1.
26 APD, vol. H of R 35, 1962, pp. 1553-4; RIW, p. 1.
27 Hasluck, 'Present policy and objectives', pp. 2, 4.
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the lack of facilities for higher education, the continuing imbalance
in the ratio of government to mission schools, the separate and
costly education of expatriate children, and the apparently slow
growth of the education system - though it generally showed sympathy
for Australia in the immensely difficult task of building up an entire
28educational system almost from scratch. From the outset, however,
USSR delegates dissented from the majority view of the council. Their
vehement denunciations of Australian effort became something of a
ritual at each session as they sought to expose ’Australia’s typically
colonialist policy... and its unwillingness to carry out its obli-
29gations under the UN Charter'. In 1961, for example, the Soviet 
delegate asserted that
[no] credence [could] be attached to the Administering 
Authority's statements that it was endeavouring to 
educate the people of New Guinea since not a single 
indigenous inhabitant had received higher education....
The [Australian] representative has told the Trustee­
ship Council that the Territory lacked qualified and 
trained cadres. Yet [Australia] was doing practically 
nothing to develop education in the Territory. 30
While the delegates of most other nations usually dissociated them­
selves from the frequently inaccurate Soviet diatribes, they were
nevertheless concerned about higher education; and as the 1950s wore
31on they began nagging about its poor development.
Criticism within the Trusteeship Council rose to a crescendo 
in 1962 with the presentation of the so-called Foot Report, the report 
of the council's 1962 Visiting Mission to New Guinea, of which Sir 
Hugh Foot had been the leader. It was the most critical ever made by 
a Visiting Mission in the 30 years the UN had a direct interest in 
New Guinea via the trusteeship agreement. In reference to education 
it stated that
28 See for example UN, Report of the Trusteeship Council,
1953-54, p. 263.
29 UN, Trusteeship Council Official Records, 27th Session, 
1961, pp. 48-9.
30 ibid.
31 UN, Report of the Trusteeship Council, 1960-61, p. 59.
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the main reason why the present education program is 
inadequate is that it pays little or no attention to 
the need for higher education.... Nor is there any 
evidence that the Administration intends to encourage 
these students [presently taking post-primary education] 
to remain at school and university....
The Territory needs more than the promise that such 
education will be made available. What is required is a 
positive programme to ensure that hundreds of students 
do qualify and do demand it....
The kind of programme for secondary and higher 
education needed in New Guinea must be approached with 
greater imagination and boldness.... The Administration 
should be planning now to provide an annual turnout of 
university graduates of the order of at least a hundred....
The Mission feels that the time has come to complete 
the structure of earlier effort and to provide the apex 
of the pyramid by a new policy of selection for and 
encouragement of higher and university education. 32
The Foot Report added little to the knowledge of either Hasluck, his
department or the Administration, for as we will see they had been
planning for eighteen months the type of development called for in
the report. It seems likely that Foot simply ’upstaged’ Hasluck,
recommending changes he knew Hasluck was already in the process of 
33implementing. However, Foot’s personal eminence as an expert on 
colonial problems lent great authority to his report, which was 
probably why his criticisms were greatly amplified by the liberal 
press in Australia.
As the press had taken up the cause of more rapid develop­
ment for Papua New Guinea a number of journalists had emerged as 
’specialists’. Among the most prominent was Peter Hastings, who had 
begun contributing articles on Papua New Guinea to The Observer in 
the late 1950s. He later became editor of The Bulletin3 and later 
still, in 1964-65, was one of the foundation members of the Council 
on New Guinea Affairs, a group which produced the New Guinea quarterly 
edited by Hastings. A recurring theme in his articles was the need to 
promote the rapid development of a university-trained elite capable of 
guiding Papua New Guinea into stable independence. He and other
32 UN Trusteeship Council, Visiting Mission to the Trust Territ­
ories of Nauru and New Guinea3 19623 pp. 23-6.
33 Hasluck, A Time for Building3 p. 398; RIW, p. 3.
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journalists accused Hasluck of pursuing 'gradualist' policies in
34Papua New Guinea, of deliberately 'going slow'. 'Gradualism' was
one of the myths of the 'Hasluck era', a misinterpretation of govern-
35ment objectives, created by the journals of the day. However, the 
myth served to focus public attention on the reality, which was that 
for all the government's effort much more remained to be done, 
particularly in key areas such as higher education.
A number of academics amplified the journalists' message as 
they dissected Hasluck's public statements and discovered nuances he 
may not have intended. The anthropologist Murray Groves was perhaps 
the chief among them. As one of the leading apostles of elite develop­
ment he became an outspoken critic of Hasluck. He repeated his 
message in a number of journals:
Mr Hasluck probably underestimates the size and strength 
of the Papuan elite.... In the foreseeable future they 
will demand self government.... In this situation we must 
accept the timetable [they] and international opinion 
will impose upon us.... Our primary task in the immediate 
future must be to promote the necessary skills and
34 See for example Peter Hastings, 'The New Guinea Elite',
The Observer3 2 April 1960, p. 9; see also 'Whose New 
Guinea?', The Observer, 8 March 1958, p. 38; John Kerr, 
'Independence for New Guinea?', The Observer3 6 September 
1958, p. 60; 'Mugga', 'No Policy for New Guinea', The 
Observer3 20 September 1958, p. 49; Richard Donington,
'The Dutch Case', The Observer3 21 March 1959, p. 179;
'Know Your New Guinea As You Are', The Observer3 9 July 
1960, p. 3; 'Ending the Colour Bar in New Guinea', The 
Observer3 23 July 1960, p. 3; 'Some Lessons for Mr Hasluck', 
The Observer3 17 September 1960, p. 3.
35 Hasluck, for example, speaks of the 'unremitting effort'
he made to promote development in Papua New Guinea. In his 
role as 'Sisyphus' there were many obstacles to be overcome 
- the recalcitrance of his own party, the inefficiency of 
the Papua New Guinea Administration, but the objective was 
never gradualism; rather was it one of trying to make others 
as aware of the urgency of the task as he, he has claimed.
See 'Present policy and objectives', pp. 2,3,8; A Time for 
Building3 pp. 240-1, 284-5; cf. J.T. Gunther, record of 
interview by H.N. Nelson, August 1972, pp. 240-8.
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attributes among the ’advanced' section of the population.
We could achieve this goal smoothly in 10 to 15 years if 
we set out minds to it. 36
Hasluck was perhaps more perceptive and flexible than given credit 
for. He has since stated his pragmatic philosophy:
In practice a great part of the wisdom of administration 
was in making sure that we anticipated the changes taking 
place and were ready to meet new needs before they 
emerged.... We had to try to ensure that there was 
intelligent anticipation both at the Cabinet level and 
perhaps even more importantly at the level of the 
Territory Administration. 37
Groves and like-minded critics wanted a timetable for change, the 
setting of target dates for university development, for independence. 
Hasluck preferred 'intelligent anticipation'.
Hasluck apparently had sufficient faith in his own abilities 
and that of his department and the Administration to anticipate 
intelligently. Many critics, however, doubted his sensitivity to 
the changes occurring in Papua New Guinea. His public statements gave 
them little confidence in his capacity to turn with the winds of change 
For example, he appeared to set himself resolutely against the notion 
of elite development. In a notable public statement in 1958 he 
commented on 'certain discouraging signs' appearing in Papua New Guinea
Already we face a situation where a small minority of 
the people may be regarded as advanced while the majority 
are still living in a primitive state. This situation is 
one which gives dangerous and unusual opportunities for 
the native demagogue who claims on behalf of himself or a 
minority rights and powers which should belong to the 
whole people.... [We must] call on the advanced native 
people to accept with patience and moderation a wider 
good for the whole of the people rather than the early 
serving of their own sectional advantage. We sometimes 
talk of an 'elite' and our special responsibility to it.
36 M. Groves, 'Educating New Guinea', The Observer3 26 November 
1960, pp. 5-7. See also F. West, 'The political development 
of Papua-New Guinea', D. Bettison (et. al.). The Independence 
of Papua-New Guinea (Sydney, Angus & Robertson, 1962), pp. 57-8.
37 Hasluck, A Time for Building, p. 378.
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They need to earn that title by the standards they set 
themselves. 38
He later admitted an ’exasperated dislike’ for the word ’elite’, and
39avoided using it whenever possible. But as the academics pointed
out, 'risks attend[ed] any policy of rapid development’, and one of
the risks was that educated leaders would 'exploit their own people,
40... become in truth black Neros’. Despite that, elite formation 
seemed to be an objective fact of social change and therefore had to 
be accommodated. Hasluck’s refusal to recognize this publicly 
persuaded his critics that he had a poor grasp of the social realities 
his programmes were creating. And this possibly explains the vehemence 
of their attacks.
Some of their criticism was misplaced. So averse did Hasluck 
seem to the emergence of an educated elite that they wrongly saw in 
his anti-elitism a reluctance to add a tertiary level to the education 
system. This inference prompted intemperate assertions that Papua 
New Guinea was bound to become ’another Congo'. It was the socialist 
review Outlook that warned of impending doom:
The government has reason to be afraid. So have we 
all.... The conclusion we ought to draw from the Congo 
is that the training of the native elite and the develop­
ment of modern social and political organizations in New 
Guinea are horribly urgent tasks.... The important pre­
requisite for a healthy political future... as [the] 
political breakdown in the Congo suggests is that the 
political elite... must itself by experienced in govern­
ment, trained in economic and technical processes, and 
united in loyalty to national institutions. 41
Hasluck, as his record of achievement later showed, appreciated these 
issues. But whether or not he needed such prompting as Outlook gave 
is problematic.
38 Hasluck, 'Present tasks and policies’, Australian Institute 
of Political Science, New Guinea and Australia (Sydney, Angus 
& Robertson, 1958), p. 88.
39 Hasluck, A Time for Building3 p. 85; cf. Gunther, record of 
interview by H.N. Nelson, p. 7. Gunther recalls Hasluck 
’hated the word elite’.
40 West, op. cit., pp. 57-8.
41 Outlook3 4(5) October 1960, pp. 2,9,12.
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Within Australia the most persistent critics were the 
politicians. With some success Hasluck had endeavoured to remove 
Papua New Guinea from the sphere of party conflict by encouraging 
a bipartisan approach to the Territory.^ Yet there remained a force­
ful body of opinion within the front ranks of the parliamentary Labor 
Party who badgered him over education. In the late '50s and early 
'60s any one of E.J. Ward, G.M. Bryant, K.E. Beazley, E.G. Whitlam, 
W.G. Hayden or L.R. Johnson could be relied on to ask provocative 
questions in the House, or to declaim to the effect that ’the training
of an elite requires a whole-hearted, full-blooded approach to 
A3education’. He also had to combat conservative elements within his 
own party who thought the rate of development in Papua New Guinea was 
dangerously fast. A Queensland member of the government in 1960 
congratulated his department on being ’able to withstand the pressures 
that have been brought to bear by... idealists and completely ignorant 
people who think we can... bring these stone age people up to the 
level of civilized races in a matter of five or ten years’. With 
opinions like this to overcome among his colleagues he often felt he 
could find more sympathy for his programmes within Labor ranks. ^
Though Laborites may have been sympathetic, they still 
wished to prod the government into public espousal of elite training 
and university development. Beazley was the most articulate Labor 
spokesman here. Over the years he made a series of eloquent and 
impassioned speeches urging greater effort. In 1960, for example, 
he said that
the sort of education that we now have has given a 
considerable number of native peoples... primary 
education and the beginnings of post-primary education, 
and I think it is now time to consider the establish­
ment of a university.... If they do not have groups of 
professionally educated men they cannot have a viable 
self-government.... While going ahead with... the 
university we must keep in mind the middle level of
42 Hasluck, A Time for Building3 pp. 215, 264.
43 APD, vol. H of R 28, 1960, p. 1663.
44 ibid., p. 1506.
45 Hasluck, A Time for Building3 pp. 215, 264.
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education, which involves the establishment of technical 
schools and agricultural colleges. 46
Many government members greeted such suggestions sceptically, probably 
sharing the belief of a colleague that ’the children of the present 
children may have a chance... [but] the children of today will have 
no chance of achieving effective self government'.^  Hasluck, however, 
probably appreciated their truth.
Did Hasluck therefore need coaxing by Beazley and the 
Laborites, by journalists and academics, by the Trusteeship Council?
His assertions to the contrary are strong. Yet the external pressure 
for greater emphasis on tertiary education was heavy, and mounting: 
there was no letting up in the Australian parliament, the press, the 
universities, or the UN. His vaunted five-year education plan of 
1961, and the series of reports written at his direction between 1961 
and 1964 and leading to the establishment of a university, came after 
five or six years of increasingly vocal criticism. Were outside 
influences of no effect in the timing of such plans? Or did the 
planning simply proceed according to ’intelligent anticipation'? The 
critics had created a strong climate of opinion by 1962. Hasluck 
would have been obdurate in the extreme not to have sensed it, and 
not to have been influenced by it.
(b) THE SEARCH FOR AN ACCEPTABLE MODEL OF HIGHER EDUCATION
When Hasluck favourably received the suggestion for a tertiary 
institution 'similar to a university college' in November 1960 he set 
in motion a train of events which five years later led to the establish­
ment of the University of Papua New Guinea. The first step in this 
direction was the preparation of a 'working paper' on the subject.
This was produced by an officer of the department, F.W. McConaghy, 
who presented a long report after spending several weeks in Papua New 
Guinea investigating Public Service training and general educational 
needs.^ His conclusions were strongly influenced by his discussions
46 APD, vol. H of R 28, 1960, pp. 1442-3.
47 ibid., pp. 1644-5, 1672.
1 F. McConaghy, 'The future of ASOPA: a departmental working 
paper', March 1961, DTOR 61/6508.
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with Gunther and David Chenoweth, the inspector of training in the
Public Service Commissioner’s Department, an officer whose contribution
to the subsequent development of higher education was significant.
His main proposal was for the creation of a central residential
administrative training institution. Hundreds of Papua New Guineans
employed in the Public Service were not being used to capacity, he
claimed, because of lack of professional training. The greatest
educational need therefore was to raise their educational level so
they could take over responsibility from expatriate officials, who
2would then be available for more important work.
The McConaghy report led to the formation of a committee
charged with working out a detailed and comprehensive scheme of
training. Lambert proposed to Hasluck that the committee should
comprise J.E. Willoughby (first assistant secretary in the department),
E.J. Foxcroft (first assistant secretary in the Prime Minister’s
Department), C.D. Rowley (Principal of ASOPA), and L. Newby (head of
3Extension Services in Papua New Guinea). The Minister gave 
enthusiastic approval, and ordered the committee to start work 
immediately in order to present an early report so that provision 
could be made in the 1961-62 Budget for the expansion of training 
facilities.^ The committee, styled 'The Committee on the development 
of tertiary education and higher training in the Territory of Papua 
and New Guinea’, or more conveniently (taking the name of its chairman) 
the Willoughby Committee, began work in May 1961. After four months’ 
work it produced a 20-page report which was submitted to Hasluck in 
the September. This document recommended a range of institutions:
(i) a central residential administrative staff college, to be set up 
as soon as possible, giving both general and specialized administrative 
education full time to public servants. (ii) A university college, 
to be established by 1966, affiliated with an Australian university, 
preferably ANU. Discussions should begin with ANU to determine its 
interest in establishing such a college. (iii) An Australian standard
2
3
4
ibid., pp. 1-2, 11.
Lambert to Hasluck, 11 April 1961, DTOR 61/6508. 
Hasluck to Lambert, 14 April 1961, DTOR 61/6508.
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multi-racial teachers’ college, with ASOPA links, to be established 
in Papua New Guinea. (iv) A ’polytechnic’, or higher technical and 
trade training institution. (v) ’Many more’ secondary schools, to 
ensure an adequate supply of students to the various tertiary 
institutions. (vi) A tertiary education complex, to be sited at Wards 
Strip, near Port Moresby, with space enough for the administrative 
college, the university college, the multi-racial teachers’ college, 
the polytechnic, and possibly other specialized training institutions 
still to be created, such as the police college.^
Hasluck appreciated that the Willoughby recommendations 
’foreshadow[ed] major decisions of far-reaching importance’ but 
thought some aspects needed elaboration and clarification. He warmly 
greeted the idea of an administrative college and instructed Lambertg
to start planning it immediately, though other suggestions received 
more circumspect treatment. Thus, ’any approach to ANU [should be] 
deferred until our departmental planning has proceeded further'.^ 
Planning of the administrative college proceeded with due expedition.
A site was selected at Wards Strip by the end of October 1961. During 
November and December Chenoweth worked in Canberra with McConaghy to 
produce draft papers on the function of the college, the formation of 
its interim council, and a duty statement for its Principal. In 
January 1962 Hasluck approved the creation of the position of Principal 
and Chenoweth’s promotion to it. An interim council was appointed in
g
April 1962 and met for the first time in June. Eventually, after
some disagreement between the Department of Territories and the interim 
9council, the college took in its first students in early 1964,
5 J.E. Willoughby (et. al.), ’Report...’, September 1961, DTOR 
61/6508, pp. 17-19.
6 Hasluck to Lambert, 11 October 1961, DTOR, 61/6508.
7 ibid.
8 Lambert to Hasluck, 11 December 1961, and Willoughby, 'Resume 
of action to 7 February 1962', DTOR 61/6508; B. Jinks, 
'Administrative training in Papua New Guinea’, Australian 
External Territories 11(4) October-December 1971, p. 17.
9 R. Swift, note for file, 10 October 1962; Gunther to Hasluck, 
7 November 1962; Hasluck to Swift, 19 December 1962, DTOR 
61/6508.
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ironically just after Hasluck had moved on from the Territories port­
folio. It was to make a most notable contribution to higher education: 
by 1971 more than 3500 students had passed through it, including 
'nearly all of the present bureaucratic and government elite' .
The recommendations for the Administrative College were in 
the end the only ones from the Willoughby report which the government 
followed through into practice. The others were either overlooked, 
deliberately not implemented, or bypassed by subsequent events. Those 
concerning the university college, most notably, ran aground during 
negotiations with ANU. Hasluck had reacted cautiously to the proposal 
that Territories should open discussions with ANU. He wished to defer 
the matter until the department was sure of its position on university 
development. However, events seem to have outstripped his measured 
pace and he was soon forced into temporary alliance with ANU in order 
to keep up with new developments. If not before, 'outside influences' 
at last brought pressure to bear upon him.
Two events in April 1962 appear to have driven Hasluck into
dealings with ANU. First, the Foot Mission from the Trusteeship
Council had arrived in Australia at the end of March, en voute to
Papua New Guinea. Foot was clearly aware of the criticism Hasluck
had been receiving over higher education and elite development. Early
in April he had been reported in the press as being 'fully conscious
of the differences in Australian opinion on the question of whether...
progress should be brought about by raising an elite of the "dynamic
few" or by a general raising of standards to a less ambitious level'.^
Second, the Labor parliamentarian Beazley had given notice of raising
a 'matter of urgent public importance' - the need to establish a
university as a necessary step towards self government - for debate 
12in the House. April 11th was scheduled for consideration of 
Beazley's question. The presence of a UN official with thirty years' 
experience in colonial administration and a pronounced interest in 
higher education, together with the prospect of a searching parliament-
10 Jinks, loc. cit.; and personal communication, 12 December 1975.
11 Pacific Islands Monthly 32(9) April 1962, pp. 15-16.
12 APD vol. H of R 35, 1962, pp. 1548-9.
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ary examination of educational policy were events to sway even Hasluck.
They seem to have forced him into publicly justifying his stand on
education: he issued a long press release, ’Higher Education in Papua
13and New Guinea’, setting out ’progress in planning for a university'. 
This statement came on 8 April 1962, three days before the introduction 
of Beazley’s question in the House, and on the very day the Foot 
Mission travelled to Papua New Guinea. Perhaps this timing was co­
incidental, yet there appears to have been undue haste on the part of
14Hasluck and his department.
Hasluck’s press release of 8 April 1962 made public the 
Department of Territories' planning over the preceding year and a half. 
The Minister, despite many questions in parliament, up till now had 
given no indication of government thinking on university development. 
The nearest he had previously come to this had been six months before, 
in October 1961, when he had made a Ministerial Statement to parliament 
on ’Educational, Social and Economic Advancement in Papua and New 
Guinea'. This had announced, inter alia3 a five-year plan for 
education which included 'a central administrative training college', 
a target figure of 3500 in tertiary educational institutions by 1967, 
a 130% increase in school enrolments to 350,000, and increases in post­
primary enrolments to bring 10,000 students into secondary training, 
2000 into technical schools, and 2000 into teacher training instit­
utions by the end of 1966. Amidst these target figures there had 
been no mention of university enrolments.^  But now, the public was 
suddenly informed, there was a Willoughby report which the government 
endorsed. The press release stated that priority was going to the 
Administrative College but talks with ANU would soon begin to bring 
a university into being by 1966. This university, the release went
13 Folios 75-6, DTOR 62/895.
14 The press release was drawn up 'in view of recent develop­
ments, particularly the impending urgency motion’ (Willoughby 
to Hasluck, 6 April 1962, DTOR 62/4307). Hasluck had also 
called for the preparation of a Ministerial Statement in 
early April ’to suit the changing situation’ (Hasluck to 
Lambert, 12 April 1962, DTOR 62/895).
APD vol. H of R 33, 1961, pp. 2529-32.15
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on to announce, would develop links with the Papuan Medical College,
the proposed multi-racial teachers’ college, the polytechnic, and the
16Administrative College.
Thus, publicly committed to university development, Hasluck 
was obliged to enter discussions with ANU. Informal talks subsequently 
began between Willougby and the ANU Registrar. But fate intervened 
to upset government planning: Willoughby and Foxcroft both died
suddenly in June 1962. For the past year they had been the two 
officials most concerned with the question of university development 
in Papua New Guinea. Their deaths were a great setback, and govern­
ment planning went into temporary abeyance while a new Territories 
official, R.S. Swift, tried to gather up the threads."^
In the meantime several interest groups within ANU had
enthusiastically taken up the idea of an ANU-sponsored university
college in Papua New Guinea. During the preceding March information
had come back to the Department of Territories that the director of
the ANU New Guinea Research Unit had said in Port Moresby that he had
18instructions to find a suitable site for the university college.
Lambert promptly wrote to Cleland saying, ’We do not know anything 
about this in official circles in Canberra.’ Cleland replied that 
he would see the director of the research unit and 'put him and his 
people back on their heels until the position is clarified'. Then 
in mid-July a committee from within the ANU Research School of Pacific 
Studies had produced a report making a series of detailed recommend­
ations about the links that should exist between ANU and the proposed
21university college. This report was subsequently endorsed in early 
August by a wider ANU committee called together by the Vice-Chancellor.'
16 Folios 75-6, DTOR 62/895.
17 Hoyle to Lambert, 28 June 1962, DTOR 62/4307.
18 Willoughby to Lambert, 28 March 1962, DTOR 62/4307.
19 Lambert to Cleland, 29 March 1962, DTOR 62/4307.
20 Cleland to Lambert, 4 April 1962, DTOR 62/4307.
21 ’Report of the Committee of the Research School of Pacific 
Studies to consider the proposed university for Papua New 
Guinea', July 1962, ANU document no. 1161 B/1962.
22 ’Report... to advise [the Vice-Chancellor] on... the establish­
ment of a university college for Papua New Guinea', August 
1962, ANU document no. S.969/1962.
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The records of both committees were remarkable for the evident willing­
ness of some academics to arrogate to themselves the exclusive right 
to determine how university education should develop in Papua New Guinea.
Following the hiatus caused by the deaths of Willougby and
Foxcroft a formal meeting between government and ANU representatives
took place on 8 August 1962. This meeting agreed to set up a ’Working
Group on the Proposed University in Papua and New Guinea'. It met
only twice, with conspicuous lack of success. At the second meeting,
on 10 October, a serious division of opinion within ANU ranks became
obvious. There was petty bickering between the delegates from the
School of Pacific Studies and those from the School of General Studies
over the opening date for the college, the courses to be initially
23offered, and the composition of the potential student body. Hasluck
was now anxious to see the university college operational, and so the
division of opinion at ANU impressed him most unfavourably. Hasluck,
as an ANU professor who knew him well has commented, 'being a man of
common sense realized that a dialogue was impossible if one of the
speakers is a split personality talking with many and rather incoherent 
2 Atongues'. He let his department know his great displeasure at the
25drift in negotiations. He had come to the conclusion that some ANU
staff saw the proposed college chiefly as an opportunity for carving
26out comfortable personal niches. A meeting between Hasluck, the
Prime Minister (R.G. Menzies) and Sir John Crawford, director of the
ANU School of Pacific Studies, set the government against further
dealings with ANU. Crawford, somewhat enigmatically, advised that the
government would be unwise to continue with ANU as the arbiter of
27university development in Papua New Guinea. Hasluck now appointed
23 Minutes of Working Party, 10 October 1962, DTOR 62/4307.
24 O.H.K. Spate to F. Kaad, 28 September 1971, Spate papers.
25 L. Hennessy, personal communication, 21 July 1975.
26 Swift to Hasluck, November 1962, DTOR 62/4307; Gunther, RIW, 
p. 7; Hasluck, RIW.
27 ibid.; and Hasluck, A Time for Building, p. 388; Hasluck to 
Lambert, 25 October 1962, DTOR 62/4307.
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'a representative commission with a person of some eminence as chair-
28man... to examine and report on all matters of higher education’.
He appears to have decided on a commission in order to obtain
a clear, authoritative statement on the way tertiary education should
develop. The subject had now been under his department’s constant
consideration for two years, no less than five committees had considered
it, yet the university college seemed no closer to being established.
He therefore chose his three commissioners carefully: Sir George
Currie, the chairman, had been Vice-Chancellor of the University of
Western Australia, and of the University of New Zealand, and had
recently chaired a commission on education in New Zealand; Gunther,
representing the Administration, was an obvious choice - as foundation
chairman of the Administrative College council and as initiator of the
medical training scheme he had displayed interest, drive and imagination
in higher education for Papua New Guineans; O.H.K. Spate, Professor
of Geography in the ANU School of Pacific Studies, had been a member
of a 1953 committee on economic development in Papua New Guinea and
had been a member (though a sceptical one) of two of the recent ANU
committees making proposals for a university college. Men of this
calibre could be expected to give him the mandate he now wanted to
29go ahead with the university development. And he certainly needed
such a mandate for there were many within the government, the public
service, and the Administration who thought the idea of university
30education in Papua New Guinea was still premature.
Hasluck instructed the commissioners to investigate and
report on ’the means for further developing tertiary education to meet
the present and prospective needs of the Territory to serve the best
interests of its people and enable them to take an active part in the
31social, economic, and political advancement of their country'. The
28 Hasluck to Lambert, 25 October 1962, DTOR 62/4307.
29 Currie, RIW, 9 July 1975, p. 2.
30 R.S. Swift, RIW, 12 August 1975, p. 1; C.E. Reseigh, RIW, 
9 July 1975, p. 1; B.J. Meek, RIW, 1 August 1975, p. 1.
31 G. Currie (et. al.), Report of the Commission on Higher 
Education in Papua and New Guinea (Canberra, 1964), p. ii.
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terms of reference were so wide they gave the commissioners a carte
blanche. Hasluck emphasized this point at their first formal meeting
in March 1963: ’We wish [you] to look over the whole field of higher
education and to feel that you have very wide liberty in making
32proposals within that field’, he said. They approached the task 
enthusiastically and thoroughly. They first collected and studied 
published material on Papua New Guinea and relevant publications on 
other developing nations, then sought opinions and evidence from a 
wide cross-section of organizations and individuals in Papua New Guinea, 
Australia and beyond. They made two long tours through Papua New 
Guinea to look at educational institutions of all types and to speak 
with local government councils and various business and community 
groups. Altogether they took evidence or received submissions from 
almost 400 individuals and organizations. The Papua New Guineans they 
met particularly impressed them by ’their strong sense of the need for
33higher education to enable them to develop and run their own country'.
The public took considerable interest in their work. There
were some sceptics in Papua New Guinea with what Currie later described
3 Aas ’the Rotarian mentality'. Like the Pacific Islands Monthly such
people regarded the notion of a university for Papua New Guineans as
’a damn fool idea' since the university could only be ’an educational
hothouse’ producing 'instant graduates' while 'the vast majority of
35the people are still denied even a basic education’. Winning over 
the cynics and creating a climate of opinion in which the idea of a 
university became acceptable was thus one of the commissioners’ chief 
tasks. In this endeavour they had a number of allies. The education­
alists in Papua New Guinea, for example, had already made their support 
for university development clear. In May 1963 they had devoted their 
annual Camilla Wedgwood lecture and seminar to the subject of the 
proposed university. Their assumption was that there would be a
32 ibid., p. iii.
33 ibid., pp. 4-5, 289-304.
34 Currie, RIW, p. 1.
35 Pacific Islands Monthly 33(1) 1962, pp. 13-14, 49; 33(8)
1963, p. 20.
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university soon, and they went so far as to suggest the curricula it
should teach, the type of academic and administrative structure it
should adopt, the level of its financing and its operating costs, and
36the timetable to be followed in setting it up. As both public 
relations exercise and statement of faith the lecture and seminar were 
opportune.
By December 1963 the commissioners had begun drafting their 
report, which they compiled with great despatch and presented to C.E. 
Barnes, the new Minister for Territories, on 26 March 1964. The report 
was a magnum opus in every respect, and received widespread and lavish 
praise. A measure of the interest it raised was a review in the 
British journal The Economist:
Notable state papers from Australia are distressingly 
few, but at last there is one to be proud of.... The 
report is written tersely, wittily, and in great detail; 
it sticks consistently to the point, which is, what is 
best for a territory with two million people just 
emerging from extremely backward and isolated conditions?
Such praise was well merited: the report was the most thorough and
searching to have been made on an aspect of Papua New Guinea’s 
development, and set a high standard for many subsequent reports into 
other aspects of development. Its 172 major recommendations not only 
set out clear guidelines for the establishment of a university, but 
provided a blueprint for upgrading the total education system, 
including primary, secondary, technical, and the more specialized 
forms of vocational tertiary education.
The report started by considering the lower levels of 
education. It wished to see each level related to the one above, with 
a natural transition from primary through secondary to the tertiary 
levels. Above all it wanted the curriculum to be adjusted to local 
conditions: too often in the past Papua New Guinean practice had
slavishly followed what was thought best in Australia. The report
36 Papua and New Guinea Journal of Education 2(1) January 1964, 
pp. 40-50.
37 The Economist^ 8 August 1964, p. 548; cf. Nation> 8 August 
1964, p. 7; and Pacific Islands Monthly 35(9) September 1964, 
pp. 23-7.
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made a number of practical suggestions for improving the curriculum,
and especially upgrading teaching in the key areas of English and
mathematics. However, because curriculum development was such a
neglected field an ’Educational Research Unit' should be set up as
38’one of the first functioning parts of the Territory university. Any 
attempt to establish a university presupposed a wholesale improvement 
in the quality of primary and secondary schooling; and this was a 
point the report hammered home.
The report then proceeded to consider vocational and
technical education in great detail. If the country was not to be
forever dependent on the expensive skills of expatriates, and if it
was to avoid the ’Arts-Law fallacy’ of, say, India, technical education
must proceed at the higher as well as the middle levels. The report
therefore made a series of specific recommendations for middle-level
technician-type training via apprenticeships and technical colleges.
At the higher level, that appropriate to the training of engineers, it
recommended the establishment of an autonomous Institute of Higher
Technical Education to operate in close association with the University
in teaching four-year, full time diploma courses. This body was an
39important priority and should be set up early.
With regard to other forms of specialized vocational higher
education, the report was 'averse to the proliferation of separate
"schools" established by government departments’.*^ This would produce
unnecessary and wasteful duplications of staff and facilities. The
existing government department training institutions should therefore
come beneath the ’umbrella’ of the university. Thus, the Administrative
College should become an Institute of Administration within the
University, and the Papuan Medical College should be absorbed as the
41Faculty of Medicine. A slightly different arrangement was recommended 
for the teachers’ colleges. The University should have a School of 
Education with a teacher education division which would take over
38 Currie Report, p. 38.
39 ibid., pp. 57-8, 92-6
40 ibid., p. 85.
41 ibid., pp. 240-7, 259'
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control of the teachers' colleges from the government and thus be
42responsible for all official teacher education. A looser form of
association was proposed between the University and the agricultural
and forestry colleges: the University would set the syllabuses, carry
out the examinations, and award the diplomas, while the government
departments of agriculture and forestry would continue to run their
43colleges and also have representation on the University faculties.
By thus bringing the pre-existing institutions of tertiary education 
into a form of association with the University the commissioners were 
in effect advocating machinery that offered to solve problems that 
would later emerge. First, their system promised a degree of co­
ordination within higher education to minimize the duplication and 
waste of effort implicit in running many separate educational 
institutions. Second, affiliation with the University promised a 
measure of prestige and a guarantee of academic standards to the 
various institutions already in existence. But, as we will see, the 
later failure of the education system to develop in strict accordance 
with Currie recommendations gave rise to problems of co-ordination 
and institutional prestige which otherwise might have been avoided.
The commissioners' major recommendations, of course, dealt
with the University. Their primary proposal was for the creation of
an autonomous University of Papua New Guinea as opposed to the mere
college of an Australian university which previous reports had en- 
44visaged. The University should be located in the June Valley 
(Waigani) area of Port Moresby, and it should begin under the govern­
ment of an interim council, which should include five members of 
'academic distinction’ appointed from among the staff of Australian 
universities. This would provide the link with Australian universities, 
though further ties could be maintained through the appointment of
external examiners, and through the Australian Vice-Chancellors'
45Committee, which hopefully the UPNG head could join. Among the first
42 ibid., pp. 163-5.
43 ibid., pp. 248-58.
44 ibid., p. 276.
45 ibid., pp. 276, 282
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duties of the interim council would be the appointment of a Vice- 
Chancellor, Registrar, Bursar, Staff Architect, Librarian, and the 
first professorial appointments - in Education, English, Agriculture, 
Anthropology, Geography, History and Political Science, Economics, 
Mathematics, Law, Medicine, and either Biology, Chemistry or Physics 
depending on the specialty of the Professor of Agriculture.^
Several recommendations for the new University were novel,
at least in terms of Australian experience. First, there would be a
'Preliminary Year' or pre-matriculation course done within the
University after completion of the four-year Papua New Guinea secondary
school programme. This would 'offset the predictable deficiencies of
the Territory school leaver... arising essentially from his restricted
environmental background and the late development of secondary 
47education'. It would thus be a bridging year between school and
university, providing students with cultural broadening, enhanced
linguistic and mathematical skills, and greater maturity so they might
48embark on university studies more confidently. Second, the University 
should be residential, despite the high costs entailed, for obtrusive 
socio-geographic reasons: it 'should not only be a symbol of approach­
ing nationhood but a place for the fostering of unity in a society
49where tribal and regional loyalties are still strong'. Third, there 
must be 'liberal provision of State scholarships', again despite the 
high costs, because 'very few, if any, indigenous students could pay 
any substantial fees or make more than a token contribution to their 
cost of maintenance in the halls of residence'. ^  Fourth, the 
University must provide a large-scale programme of external studies.
The country needed as many university-trained people as possible, and 
'the teacher at Telefomin, the patrol officer... at Pomio' might be 
able and qualified enough to attend university. To cater for such 
people there should be a comprehensive External Studies Department.
46 ibid., pp. 278, 282.
47 ibid., p. 121.
48 ibid., p. 123.
49 ibid., pp. 141, 279.
50 ibid., pp. 143, 279.
51 ibid., pp. 145-8, 280.
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The commissioners wanted the University to open as soon as
possible. If the first students entered Preliminary Year during
1964-65, using Administrative College facilities and taught by seconded
52staff, the first graduates could emerge by the end of 1968. The
commissioners subscribed to an ’education as investment1 philosophy,
seeing ’higher education not only as a means to economic development
53and self-government, but as the key to them’. By inference, any 
delay in implementing their proposals would add to the costs, politic­
ally as well as economically. This awareness underlay ’the Commission’s
sense of the general urgency of the case for university teaching in
54the Territory’ pervading the report. And so the commissioners were 
anxious to see the University make a start within a year.
They estimated there would be a rapid build-up in student
numbers - from 30-35 in Preliminary Year in 1964-65 to a total
population of 140 in 1966, 240 in 1967, 375 in 1968, 580 in 1969, and 
55830 in 1970. Such numbers would necessitate an energetic and
extensive building programme, and so they recommended a detailed
schedule of construction of classrooms, libraries, laboratories,
offices, halls of residence, student union, assembly hall, and sporting
and recreational facilities. The University would become a national
monument, 'a symbol of community and national pride’, and must there-
forehave such features as ’fine buildings’, physical surroundings
landscaped as botanical gardens, and a 'national museum of archaeology
56and ethnology' established in association with the library. They 
made detailed estimates of costs and recommendations for sources of 
revenue to fund these developments. They projected estimates ahead 
for the ensuing two triennial periods, 1965-67 and 1968-70, suggesting 
that both University and Institute of Higher Technical Education would 
require funds as follows:
52 ibid., pp. 125, 168,
53 ibid., pp. 15, 162.
54 ibid., p. 194.
55 ibid., p. 120.
56 ibid., pp. 194-8.
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Summary o f  to ta l  eozpenditure 57
First triennium 
Second triennium 
Total
Capital
$5,583,900
$5,101,400
$10,685,300
Recurrent
$6,036,484
$14,724,140
$20,760,624
Total
$11,620,384
$19,825,540
$31,445,924
The bulk of these funds must come from Australia, in the form of
specially earmarked Commonwealth grants so that the institutions would
not have to compete for funds during normal Administration budgeting.
In addition the institutions should be able to petition the Minister
58for Territories for ’special contingencies’ if that were necessary.
To ensure that funds being sought were 'reasonable and consistent with
true university purposes and standards’, the Australian Universities
Commission should report to the Minister on the University’s proposed
59projects and budgets. The financial burden would be heavy, the
commissioners warned, for university development ’cannot be carried 
60out on the cheap’. On the other hand Australia had powerful 
interests in seeing university education advance in Papua New Guinea, 
and when viewed in this light the cost was not so awesome. Indeed, 
spread over the first two triennia it was no more than the price of 
'half a packet of cigarettes per annum for each inhabitant of 
Australia’. ^  Stated in these terms the cost might have been acceptable; 
however, as we will see, the question of finance was to bedevil the 
University and the Institute in their early years.
The arguments of the Currie Commission were not something 
the government could easily pass over, as it had the previous reports 
on university development. The Currie Report was a formidable document 
in every respect, its proposals meticulously researched, thoroughly 
documented, deftly and persuasively argued, expressed with literary 
elan. Above all the wisdom and authority of its distinguished authors
57
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59
60 
61
Figures derived from expanded table, ibid.,
ibid., pp. 228-9.
ibid.
ibid.
ibid.
p. 227.
59
pervaded the whole work. It was therefore surprising that the Depart­
ment of Territories greeted it with less than wholehearted appreciation. 
Yet that is what happened.
(c) THE DELAY, AND THE DEBATE OVER, IMPLEMENTING THE CURRIE 
PROPOSALS
When the commissioners handed their report to the Minister for
Territories in March 1964 a new incumbent occupied that office. After
the elections of i963 Hasluck had moved to the Defence portfolio and
his place in Territories was taken by a Country Party politician,
C.E. Barnes. As well as a new Minister there was a new Secretary.
Lambert had retired in 1963 and Hasluck had been planning to put
Gunther in his place.^ But the new Minister had his own appointee -
G.W. Smith, once described by the Country Party leader, Sir John
McEwen as ’the departmental head who most exactly exemplifies the
2spirit and philosophy of the Country Party’. The new management in 
Territories did not necessarily share Hasluck's enthusiasm for higher 
education. A Hasluck might have endorsed the Currie proposals as being 
in line with his own thinking, and might then have used them as a 
programme for immediate action. But to Barnes and Smith the report 
was a radical, disturbing document requiring the most careful consider­
ation before being adapted as government policy. Senior officials of 
their department then dealing with the Currie Report recall that the 
Minister's and Secretary’s approach to university development was, in
3keeping with their personal and political inclinations, conservative.
Barnes’ party in many issues was the more conservative partner in the
governing coalition, and his parliamentary speeches on Papua New Guinea
4evinced an arch-conservatism. As a Queensland pastoralist he could
1 Hasluck, A Time for Building, pp. 418-9.
2 Meek, RIW, p. 1.
3 ibid.; and Swift, RIW, p. 1; and Reseigh, RIW, p. 1.
4 For example, in 1962 discussions in the House on the Foot 
Report he made plain his view that there was no merit in the 
changes proposed by Foot (but which the Department of Territ­
ories under Hasluck was already working towards). 'I believe 
the implementation of the [Foot] report... will be of great 
disadvantage to the people of Papua New Guinea', he had then 
stated (APD vol. H of R 36, 1962, pp. 1548-9).
60
be enthusiastic about technical education, but he remained suspicious 
about the proposals for a university, for he tended to see universities 
as the source of sedition."* Smith for his part was ’a conventional, 
conservative public servant1 unlikely to be enthusiastic over ’far out’ 
schemes such as the establishment of an autonomous university in Papua 
New Guinea.^
Some aspects of the Currie Report especially perturbed the 
Minister and Secretary. The idea of an autonomous university in which 
staff and students would be unrestrained by ties with a parent 
institution in Australia troubled them greatly. Both feared that 
student radicalism and activism, then a rising wave in other parts of 
the world, would sweep into Papua New Guinea with the establishment 
of a university.^ And both were so staggered at the expected costs of 
university development they wondered whether the money would be bettergspent on other forms of development. In this respect they relied on 
the views of the 1963 mission from the International Bank for Recon­
struction and Development (the World Bank). This mission had carried 
out its investigations at the same time as the Currie Commission was 
at work. Without knowing what the Currie Report would recommend it
made plain that it 'considered the development of the secondary system
9the most urgent [educational] need’. And while it agreed that 'there 
is nothing more central to the future progress of the Territory than 
leadership of a high calibre, some of which... the university may be 
expected to provide’,"*"^ it expressed its opinion privately to Territ­
ories officials that university education should not be set up in Papua 
New Guinea for a further five years.^ Beyond these specific views
5 Reseigh, RIW, p. 1.
6 Meek, RIW, p. 1.
7 Reseigh, RIW, p. 1; Swift, RIW, p. 1.
8 ibid.
9 IBRD, The Economic Development of the Territory of Papua 
and New Guinea (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), 
pp. 289, 312.
10 ibid., p. 319.
11 Minutes of meeting of interdepartmental committee to consider 
the Currie Report, 5 August 1964, p. 2, DTOR 64/2626.
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there was the general thrust of the World Bank argument - that the
government should be seeking economies wherever possible. Barnes and
Smith took this lesson to heart. As Smith later said, 'the World
Bank Mission... lays heavy stress on the need for economies.... The
Territory circumstances certainly require that the [tertiary] instit-
12utions be planned as modestly as is consistent with effectiveness'. 
Proposals for institutions promising to cost $31.5 million in their 
first six years, and which might well become the focus for anti­
government dissent, were thus a rude shock for Barnes and Smith. And 
so, instead of acting promptly to endorse the Currie Report as Hasluck
might have done, they temporized, literally agonizing for months over
13what to do with it.
The Department of Territories appears to have done little 
with the report for about six weeks after receiving it. In May 1964 
senior officers of the department finally met to discuss and plan action 
on it. They first decided to publish it with certain minor amendments 
(for example, 'some errors of fact and syntax' should be corrected),"^ 
and then formed a departmental committee under Swift to plan further 
action. Later in the month Smith wrote to Cleland advising him of 
'tentative conclusions' the department had reached. Cabinet, he said, 
should approve the 'general pattern of education' recommended in the 
report - that is, a four-year secondary course and university studies 
after a preliminary year. However, more substantive issues, such as 
the nature of the institutions recommended in the report, and the 
timing and costs of their establishment, must be subject to further 
detailed examination.^“*
Cleland saw that Smith was in a state of indecision. Probably 
after consultation with Gunther he answered the Secretary brusquely, 
reminding him of several pertinent points: (i) the previous Minister
had wanted the earliest possible recommendations for the establishment 
of university-level institutions; (ii) the commissioners were eminent
12 Smith to Gunther, 20 January 1965, DTOR 69/5654.
13 Meek, RIW, p. 1; Swift, RIW, p. 1; Reseigh, RIW, p. 1.
14 'Discussion on Currie Report', 6 May 1965, DTOR 64/2626.
15 Smith to Cleland, 28 May 1964, DTOR 64/2626.
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men specially selected for the authority with which they could speak;
(iii) the commission had carried out the most searching and thorough 
examination possible.“^  He then said he was ’surprised... at the 
inference... that this ground is to be traversed again, probably by 
officers of less status and experience than the members of the commission 
and in possession of less information'."^ He concluded his letter by 
roundly asserting that both department and Minister must 'express a
18positive view towards the central recommendations of the commission'.
Despite Cleland’s insistence on the need for a bold approach 
and an early decision, both department and Cabinet were cautious.
Their response was to refer the Currie proposals to an interdepartment­
al committee comprising representatives of the Prime Minister's,
Treasury, External Affairs, Labour and National Service, and Territories 
departments 'for further detailed examination especially on timing and 
costs for both Institute and University'. The interdepartmental 
committee, chaired by Swift (now a veteran of the campaign to bring 
university development to Papua New Guinea), held only three meetings, 
between 5 August and 12 December 1964. It was not an expert body: as
Gunther later remarked, 'it was made up of middle run-of-the-mill
20Commonwealth public servants’. And it seems to have gone about its
task in desultory fashion. It was after all an interdepartmental
committee, with representatives from five departments who were often
hard to summons together. Barnes and Smith moreover simply did not
21press it to produce a set of recommendations promptly. Its meagre 
13-page report, not completed till mid-January 1965, quibbled over a 
number of points raised in the Currie Report. For example, it revised 
the Currie estimate of enrolments in degree courses at the University
16 Cleland to Smith, 17 June 1964, DTOR 64/2626.
17 ibid.
18 ibid.
19 'Notes on discussion of Currie Commission report held in 
Department of Territories, 9-10 July 1964', DTOR 64/2626.
20 Gunther, address to the Australian College of Education, 
UPNG Newss June 1972, pp. 7-11.
Reseigh, RIW, p. 1; Meek, RIW, p. 1.21
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22from 830 in 1970 to 575. It also queried the Currie costings: where­
as the Currie Report had calculated costs to total $31.5 million over
the first two triennia, the interdepartmental committee thought $18.9
23a more realistic figure. Its recommendations were an emasculated 
version of the central proposals of the Currie Report. It agreed, that 
an autonomous University and an Institute of Higher Technical Education 
should be established as early as possible. And it recommended a 
timetable for setting up these institutions, allowing for the appoint­
ment of the University’s interim council in April 1965, the commencement 
of the Preliminary Year in March 1966, the graduation of the first
students in late 1969, a university enrolment of 1500 by March 1973,
24and an output of 200 graduates a year by 1976.
But in one significant area - finance - the interdepartmental
committee disagreed with the Currie Report. It did not believe in
the special earmarking of Commonwealth grants. The committee argued
that ’it would not be consistent with the movement towards a self-
contained structure of government within the Territory to place the
University and Institute funds outside the general framework of
25Territory finance’. The majority of the committee nevertheless
thought - with the Treasury representatives dissenting - that 'within
the framework of Territory finances continuity of funds for triennial
periods should be assured’; and they thought this should be done
through the creation of an Administration committee to examine the
institutions’ triennial estimates and to advise the House of Assembly
26in its drawing up of appropriation bills. In view of the country’s 
eventual rise to independence these were possibly reasonable recommend­
ations; indeed similar machinery for processing the institutions' 
budgetary estimates was much later established. However, they were 
not recommendations the Barnes-Smith regime chose to follow. The 
whole manner in which the Department of Territories conceived and 
handled the interdepartmental committee was, and remained, a source
22 Interdepartmental committee on the Currie Report, ’Report’, 
pp. 2-4, DTOR 69/5654.
23 ibid., pp. 8-9.
24 ibid., pp. 7, 12.
25 ibid., pp. 10, 13.
26 ibid.
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of conflict between Canberra and Port Moresby: as Gunther later
observed, ’the report [of the interdepartmental committee] was never
sent to the Administration of Papua New Guinea, the country the report
set out to serve, asking for the Administration’s consideration and 
27advice’. The most serious discord was to come over the decision 
relating to university finances, for the department’s failure to act 
even on the interdepartmental recommendations in this area was to place 
the institutions in a state of perpetual uncertainty.
While Barnes and Smith, their department, and the inter­
departmental committee ponderously deliberated on the Currie Report 
those members of the public keen to see university education extend 
to Papua New Guinea grew increasingly restive. Letters-to-the-editor 
began appearing urging Barnes to action, and there were pointed
28questions in the House from Beazley and other interested Laborites.
The Bulletin captured the popular mood when it accused the Minister of 
maintaining ’tight-lipped silence about the training of New Guinea’s 
future rulers'. Many critics of the government felt shamed at the 
thought that his delay was earning international opprobrium for 
Australia. They were mindful of the opinion of overseas observers 
such as Kenya’s vocal Minister for Economic Planning and Development,
Tom Mboya, who visited Papua New Guinea in mid-1964 and came away 
highly critical. 'There can be no proper growth of a people's 
personality under colonialism or trusteeship’, he said. ’It is more
than urgently necessary that a University should be established in the
T ,30Territory .
Public criticism came to a head in late 1964 at a public 
seminar to discuss the Currie Report, organized by Peter Hastings, 
the journalist and executive director of the Council on New Guinea 
Affairs. Many eminent citizens from the parliamentary, legal, academic, 
and business fraternities attended. Spate was the first speaker. His
27 UPNG News June 1972, pp. 7-8.
28 APD vol. H of R 42, 1964, pp. 1304 
1964, p. 428; vol. S 27, 1964, pp.
, 1796; vol. H 
1141, 1150-61,
of R 43, 
1204.
29 The Bulletinj 28 November 1964, p. 13.
30 New Guinea 1(1), March-April 1965, pp. 11-13.
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theme was that ?a New Guinea education policy, boldly conceived and
resolutely carried out, is in all probability the only thing which
can prevent a slide into a messy, anarchic, and quite possibly literally
31bloody waste of political factionalism: a second Congo'. Another
speaker was an official of the National Union of Australian University
Students, Kevin Martin, who had recently visited the new Tjenderawasih
University in West Irian and was able to say it had an enrolment of
32200 in four faculties. Reports of Spate's and Martin's comments
were lead stories in many Australian newspapers the next morning.
Later in the day Whitlam and other leading Laborites in the House
subjected Barnes to a torrent of questions on the issue. The Minister
did not perform well: he lamely tried to argue that Spate's was but
one opinion. The Opposition pressed him to name target dates for
opening the university, but all he would say was that the government
'accepted Currie Commission recommendations for the establishment of
33a university, but not from the point of view of timing'. Further
unfavourable publicity for the Minister came the next month when
several newspapers ran accounts of statements by J.R. Kerr, a former
principal of ASOPA, a foundation member of CONGAF, and since the late
1950s a publicist for the cause of accelerated development in Papua 
34New Guinea. Kerr accused the government of deliberate procrastin­
ation, claiming that in referring the Currie Report to an inter-
35departmental committee, it had used 'the classic tactic for delay'.
How much effect such publicity had on either Barnes, his 
department, or government generally is uncertain. Hastings and Spate 
believed it finally prompted government to treat university development
31 The Age3 16 November 1964, pp. 1, 3; The Australian3 16 
November 1964, p. 3.
32 ibid.
33 APD vol. H of R 44, 1964, pp. 2981-2.
34 Kerr, then president of the Law Council of Australia, had 
assisted the work of the Currie Commission by contributing 
an appendix to the report on legal education. He had also 
won support from the legal profession for the idea of a UPNG 
Faculty of Law, something the profession had opposed. 
(Gunther, RIW, p. 15).
35 The Australian Outlook3 December 1964; Canberra Times3 30 
December 1964.
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in Papua New Guinea with greater urgency. They point out that the
spectre of 'a second Congo' was a real fear at the time: the 'daily
murder of white missionaries' in the Congo was providing exemplary
topical evidence of the results of mismanagement by a former colonial 
36government. And one member of the interdepartmental committee,
B.J. Meek (who became foundation Bursar of UPNG) later suggested that
the committee's recommendations were timely because they 'got Barnes
and Smith off the hook' - by recommending what the government's critics 
37were demanding. Perhaps the interdepartmental committee allowed 
them to ride with the force of public opinion without losing face; 
but the question may have to await an answer until Barnes, like Hasluck, 
writes his memoirs.
Cabinet finally approved a submission from Barnes supporting
the establishment of the University and the Institute of Higher
Technical Education in February 1965. The submission had closely
38followed the recommendations of the interdepartmental committee. A
Ministerial press statement announcing Cabinet's decision and giving
details of the timetable for the development of the new institutions
was released on 19 March 1965. Papua New Guinea was now assured of its
university, an institution much tempered by controversy even before
its establishment. The halting progress of the past decade had at last
brought the prospect of a Papua New Guinean university from wishful
thinking into reality. And as the Department of Territories began the
comparatively mundane task of selecting chairmen and councils for both
University and Institute, it was Spate who once more caught the mood
of many. In a magazine article he noted his relief: 'I think my
reaction to the announcement by the Minister... will be shared by most
39people interested in New Guinea affairs - better late than never'.
36 Spate, RIW; Hastings, RIW.
37 Meek, RIW, p. 1.
38 Cabinet submission, 'Report on Higher Education in Papua and 
New Guinea', 20 January 1965, DTOR 69/5654.
39 Pacific Islands Monthly 36(4) April 1965, pp. 26-7.
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CHAPTER Z
THE FOUNDATION OF UNIVERSITY INSTITUTIONS: 
EARLY PROBLEMS AND DIFFICULTIES
BOTH Minister and Secretary for Territories anguished long over the 
Currie Report, but having decided in favour of university development 
they pushed their department and the Administration to get the 
University set up quickly. They wanted it open and teaching its first 
students by 1966, the target set by Hasluck three years before.^- The 
first task was legislation to permit the establishment of both 
University and Institute of Higher Technical Education (IHTE). Prepar­
ation of the necessary bills proceeded with great expedition: within
two months the Director of Education, L.W. Johnson, was able to 
introduce the two bills into the House of Assembly, on 18 May 1965.
In tabling the bills in the House Johnson made a determined
effort to 'sell' the proposed tertiary institutions. He was concerned
that 'there was a good deal of quite strong resistance... and a fair
2chance that the House... might turn [the bills] down’. His anxiety
proved needless, for when the House debated the issue not a single
member challenged the principle of immediate university development.
The only disagreement was over the choice of a Port Moresby site for
both University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG) and IHTE. Predictably,
several New Guinean parliamentarians with strong regionalist sentiments
grumbled about the centralization of higher education in the capital.
One member from ’the New Guinea side’ even tried to amend the bills
so the word ’Lae’ would replace ’Port Moresby’; however, when the vote
3came only two members opted for Lae. It was perhaps the last time 
such a high degree of unanimity prevailed in public discussion of 
university education in Papua New Guinea. Henceforth conflict was to 
be the more usual characteristic.
The new tertiary institutions had numerous difficulties to
1 Meek, RIW, p. 1.
2 HAD 1(5) 1965, pp. 625-9; and L.W. Johnson (1970), p. 11.
3 HAD 1(5) 1965, pp. 724-33.
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overcome. There were first the prolonged tasks of establishing 
administrative machinery, deciding on policy, attracting staff and 
students, and mounting the teaching programme. There was the huge job 
of constructing physical facilities. There was a public relations 
imperative, a need to convince an uncertain public that the new seats 
of learning were an integral part of public life. There were to be 
numerous problems in working out a modus vivendi, with government, both 
at Konedobu and in Canberra. There were also questions about the 
relationship between the institutions themselves, particularly concern 
ing the degree of co-operation between them. As the new institutions 
sought a way through these problems they revealed their potential as 
epicentres of controversy and conflict. In much of the conflict a 
common theme was obvious: ’Who controls the university institutions?'
The various parties to the many disputes which arose had different 
answers at different times, but the same theme was to keep recurring 
throughout succeeding years.
(a) TEETHING TROUBLES
Even before the House of Assembly approved the ordinances
establishing UPNG and IHTE the Department of Territories had been
setting up their governing councils. For council chairmen Smith, the
departmental secretary, wanted politically ’safe’ appointees who were
well regarded in Australian academic and government circles but would4vigorously tackle their duties. In the man chosen as Chairman of
the UPNG Interim Council he got everything he wanted: P.H. Karmel,
Professor of Economics at Adelaide University and Vice-Chancellor
designate of the new Flinders University, was reputedly among the
most able and energetic university administrators in Australia. Smith’
critics agreed he made up for his delay in implementing the Currie
Report by appointing Karmel, who soon vindicated the choice. Karmel
attacked the task with zest and dedication, and when the University5opened on time in March 1966 the credit was largely his. IHTE was 
less fortunate. Its chairman, Sir Herbert Watkin, the recently
4
5
Smith to Cleland, June 1965, DTOR 65/3288, folios 43-5. 
C.E. Reseigh, RIW, p. 3; Meek, RIW, p. 1.
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retired Director of Education for Queensland, probably owed his appoint­
ment as much to the fact that he came from the same state as both 
Minister and Secretary for Territories as to his knowledge of highergtechnical education. He lacked Karmel’s drive, and seemed unable to 
give IHTE the primacy Barnes desired. In the year he served before 
his sudden death in 1966 IHTE made little headway.
The appointment of members to the IHTE and UPNG councils 
followed soon after the Minister announced the selection of Karmel 
and Watkin, in August 1965. The IHTE, in accordance with the Minister’s 
wishes, began formal operations first. The initial Council meeting 
took place at the end of September. Five further meetings occurred 
over the next year, but for various reasons little progress was made. 
Watkin was not a dynamic leader; consequently the Institute only gained 
momentum after the appointment of his successor, J.A.L. Matheson. 
Matheson was an engineer by training and Vice-Chancellor of Monash 
University. Johnson had promoted his appointment with the Department 
of Territories, arguing that only he could give IHTE the leadership 
it had lacked.^ Then the Institute had further trouble deciding 
exactly what its role would be. Much Council time went in defining 
the boundaries between IHTE's activities and those of the Education 
Department technical colleges, in deciding whether to teach at the 
technician (certificate) or the sub-professional (diploma) level, in 
discussing the status of IHTE academic awards V'is-a-V'Ls UPNG’s, and 
in considering the academic level and status of the teaching staff to
gbe appointed. Then early problems arose in IHTE's liaison with UPNG
9over control of the Waigani campus both institutions were to share. 
Finally, the IHTE Director, W.E. Duncanson, did not arrive until 
September 1966. Together these factors considerably retarded the
6 Discussion between Watkin and the Minister, 13 May 1965,
DTOR 65/3288, folios 34-5; Smith to Watkin, 18 June 1965, 
DTOR 65/3288.
7 D.M. Cleland, cables to Department of Territories, 18 October 
and 2 November 1966, DTOR 65/3288.
8 CM, IHTE: I, September-October 1965; II, December 1965;
III, February 1966; IV, April 1966; V, June 1966; VI, 
September 1966.
9 See below for a full discussion, section (b)(i).
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start made by IHTE: as its first annual report noted with some under­
statement, the Institute experienced a ’difficult' foundation year.^
Duncanson’s appointment was the most notable achievement in 
IHTE’s first year. He was an eminent Australian-born physicist who 
had been an associate of Lord Rutherford at Cambridge during the early 
1930s. He subsequently spent twenty years as Reader in Physics at 
University College, London; more recently he had spent six years as 
head of the Kumasi College of Technology, Ghana, and six years as head 
of the Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi. He and Matheson formed 
a good team. They shared a clear view of the direction they thought 
IHTE must take and with determination steered its development accord­
ingly. They believed it should work towards producing graduate-level 
technologists, eventually becoming a university of technology.^  
Planning at last began to proceed expeditiously under their guidance. 
The first academic staff were appointed and the first 31 students in 
engineering and surveying were able to begin training in February 
1967. By this time the House of Assembly had decided to relocate IHTE 
at Lae, but as no facilities existed there yet the students were 
housed temporarily and with considerable inconvenience at the Education 
Department's Idubada technical college near Port Moresby. They did
most work at Idubada, but had to travel seven miles along a winding
12dirt road to Waigani for some classes taught by UPNG staff.
The halting start by IHTE was in strong contrast to the 
burst of energy with which UPNG sprang into action. Even before the 
first meeting of the Interim Council in early October 1965 Karmel had 
done a vast amount of preparatory work with B.J. Meek, a Department 
of Territories official who resigned to become UPNG's foundation 
bursar. Within days of his appointment Karmel prepared a comprehensive
10 IHTE, Annual Report 1966-67.
11 Reseigh to Smith, 5 November 1966, DTOR 65/3288; CM, IHTE:
VII, December 1966, 'Addenda to Agenda Item 7: Siting of
the Institute'; W.E. Duncanson, 'Proposed pattern of develop­
ment and academic policy of IHTE', November 1966, DTOR 66/6426; 
folios 97-8, DTOR 66/6426.
IHTE, Annual Report 1966-67.12
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'action sheet’ of matters for the Interim Council to consider at its 
first meeting - administrative procedures for Council, relationships 
with other tertiary training institutions, appointments to adminis­
trative and academic staff, finance, the building programme, scholar-
13ships, the teaching schedule, and the creation of the library. He 
and Meek also produced a series of draft statements concerning staff 
appointments, housing, rentals, and staff conditions for consideration 
by the Interim Council. When Council met much of the groundwork had 
thus been laid.
That the UPNG Interim Council shared Karmel's enthusiasm 
became clear in its decision to begin the Preliminary Year of studies 
in 1966, even though the University had no facilities and no guarantee 
of obtaining adequate staff. Council members experienced in university 
administration thought teaching should not begin until 1967. However,
the Papua New Guinea residents on Council were reluctant to see the
14University delayed another year and pushed for a 1966 opening. There 
was also pressure through the Department of Territories representative 
on Council. His Minister and Secretary were anxious to avoid further 
criticism and embarrassment about delaying the inception of the 
University. An offer from Chenoweth, the Administrative College 
Principal, clinched the decision to start early: he undertook to
provide temporary accommodation for staff and students at the college, 
arrange temporary classrooms, mount a publicity programme, recruit 
and select students, and supply any teachers the University might want.'
The first batch of UPNG students comprised six women and 42 
men whom Chenoweth had enrolled after a recruiting campaign through 
the high schools and teachers’ colleges. Life for them was to be hard. 
Meek has described the conditions they had to put up with:
Huts at the Showgrounds were done up with native materials 
for use as classrooms. The students lived in cramped
13 ’Summary of discussions on 13 September 1965, at Canberra... 
with Professor Karmel’, Meek papers.
14 P.H. Karmel, RIW, p. 1.
15 Meek, RIW, p. 1.
16 ibid.
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barracks on the ’Adcoll’ site two miles away. Meals 
were prepared at the Ranaguri Hostel and delivered by 
truck. There was a wet ’wet-season' and the dirt road 
to town was often a quagmire; and there was a bad 
mosquito plague. These conditions continued for the 
whole of 1966, until we could temporarily move into the 
permanent Administrative College buildings in 1967. 17
The Australian press deplored the early start of the ’tin-hut seat of
18higher learning’ and the improvization and hardship this entailed.
But as Karmel pointed out, postponement would have meant better
preparations at a cost: ’another year's students would have been
19denied a university education’.
The key UPNG appointment was that of Gunther to the Vice- 
Chancellorship. There were few better qualified for the job. His 
efforts in medical training, chairmanship of the Administrative College 
Council, work as a Currie Commissioner, and more recent membership of 
the Councils of both IHTE and UPNG had demonstrated his ability in 
planning higher education. When the appointments committee met in 
January 1966 some of its members argued that his non-academic back­
ground disqualified him, but Currie swung opinion in his favour. 
Gunther, he said,
had great ability and imagination and was all for the 
good of Papua New Guinea. He knew the natives..., he 
knew the Administration, he understood the Australian 
government and its relationship to Papua New Guinea.
He could be prickly and prejudiced, and had enemies in 
Papua New Guinea and the Department of Territories but 
was still the best man for the job. He was a natural 
leader, he had charisma, and the necessary executive 
ability. None of the other applicants had the moral 
courage, the style, or the local knowledge of Papua 
New Guinea of Gunther. 20
Gunther proved worthy of this confidence: the University in its
’earliest frugal years... turned largely round his forceful personal- 
21ity’, and 'the Waigani campus became a monument to his enormous
17 ibid.;
p. 26;
cf. J. Griffin (1976), pp. 104-5; K.S. Inglis (1967), 
Nelson (1966-67), pp. 19-23.
18 Inglis, loc. cit.
19 ibid.
20 Currie, RIW, p. 3.
21 Griffin (1976), pp. 112-14; cf., UPNG News no. 30, 1972.
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22efforts’. His drive coupled with Karmel's administrative and
diplomatic skills made them a formidable team. UPNG's head-start
and rapid progress in the first four or five years can be explained
23by their strong and enterprising leadership.
One of the earliest and most prolonged tasks for IHTE and
UPNG was to win public acceptance, to prove themselves worthy of the
public funds being invested in them. Considerable misunderstanding
and suspicion about their role had first to be overcome. Their
conspicuous costs were among the reasons for most concern in some
quarters. Perhaps the most carping and persistent critic on this and
other matters was the renegade Tasmanian senator, R.J. ('Spot')
Turnbull. After a visit to the University in April 1967 he told the
press that UPNG was 'a gross extravagance, ten to fifteen years before
its time and poor window dressing for the United Nations.... It would
2 Ahave been much cheaper to have sent all the students to Australia'.
The settler community also kept up a barrage of vocal criticism 
throughout the late '60s. There were prejudiced grumblings about 
ivory towers in which 'great numbers of overpaid academics [were]
25forcing radical ideas into black skulls not ready to receive them'.
And warnings came, most notably from the reactionary Highland Farmers 
and Settlers Association, that the country would race downhill into 
political chaos unless both staff and students were kept in strict 
check. Among such critics was a 'Yahoo' element, which found a
mouthpiece in the larrikin journal Black and White. Both IHTE and 
UPNG were regular targets for this vicious magazine, which at its 
most generous was offensively patronising of Papua New Guinean students/ 
There were also 'Yahoos' in the House of Assembly, one of whom rowdily
22 K.R. McKinnon, RIW, p. 3.
23 The closeness of the Gunther-Karmel relationship can be seen 
in the UPNG file of the Vice-Chancellor's correspondence, 
'Correspondence with Professor P.H. Karmel’ (GKC).
24 UPNG News no. 2, 1967, p. 1.
25 PIM 38(4) 1967, p. 13.
26 New Guinea Highlands Bulletin 8(1) January 1967, pp. 7-8.
27 Griffin (1976), p. 113.
28 See for example Black and White August 1968, pp. 18-19.
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proclaimed on one occasion that the government should ’tear down the 
new university and use the materials to build primary schools in the 
villages’.^
Perhaps the most common charge levelled against UPNG and
IHTE was that their graduates would be 'half-baked' and in possession
30of qualifications 'worthless' outside Papua New Guinea. Many
sceptics assumed the new institutions would be unable to attain
acceptable 'white' standards but would run courses at a 'black', that
31is inferior, level. Some of the students themselves worried about
this, and wished to be reassured on points such as whether or not the
textbooks they were reading were the same as those used by university
students elsewhere, or if they were working from special simplified 
32editions instead. Some early members of the University took pains
to answer the sceptics with assurances about the academic status they
hoped UPNG would achieve. Karmel, for example, freely admitted the
difficulties students would experience but promised that 'the
University has the foundation of a great institution [and] must be
given time to establish itself securely as a powerful weapon for the
33development of the Territory'. A lecturer in history, with somewhat
more confidence, predicted that if a valid test existed for comparing
degrees from different universities, there would 'probably be little
34variation between standards in Australia and Papua New Guinea'.
The foundation Professor of Education, Ernest Roe, took a large share 
of this task of promoting the University’s academic image. In a 
series of articles in educational journals he gave assurances about 
the respectability of the training being devised at UPNG. The 
University, he claimed, was already attracting the valuable interest 
of 'large numbers of distinguished academic visitors.... The research 
possibilities here are so enormous that the University's life is
29 PIM 38(10) 1967, p. 155, citing comments by K. Tetley, MHA.
30 See for example Black and White August 1967, pp. 6-7.
31 Inglis (1967), p. 26; Nelson (1967), p. 24.
32 Inglis, loc. cit.
33 Karmel (1967).
34 Nelson, loc cit.
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likely to be continually enriched by anthropologists, biologists,
35political scientists, linguists and others coming to work here’.
Public relations material such as this appeared in numerous journals, 
but perhaps the best advertisements for the University were the 
enrolments of numerous expatriates with sufficient faith in it to 
undertake courses there. UPNG always had a substantial body of white 
students, mostly part-timers - so many that by 1975 61% of degree-
36level graduates (324 out of 524) were from outside Papua New Guinea.
Many of the early problems in developing IHTE and UPNG were 
logistical, and there was a host of irritating even if minor difficult­
ies. Co-ordinating the building programmes was a continual headache 
in the early years. Inevitably there were delays in construction, 
failures in services such as water-supply and electricity, the late 
arrival of urgently needed equipment, and staff shortages which often
caused senior staff to be overloaded with time-consuming trivial 
37tasks. Each institution started two years before its first permanent 
buildings were completed, and that only aggravated such problems.
Staffing was another source of trouble. The majority of 
staff at each institution were enthusiastic, capable and co-operative, 
eager to devote themselves to building up new institutions in a new 
country. However, serious problems arose from the appointment of one 
or two staff members who were either so inadequate or disagreeable 
they upset the work of their institutions. At UPNG, for example, a
38buildings officer was a 'complete failure' and had to be dismissed.
And at IHTE one of the key administrative officers proved to be such
a scheming, incompetent malcontent Council was glad to 'buy' him out
39of his contract to have him out of the way. At both IHTE and UPNG 
there were also several notable personality clashes. Gunther, for
35 Ernest Roe (1968), pp. 58-71.
36 UPNG, Calendar 1976, p. 46. In addition to degrees, UPNG 
awarded 257 diplomas, 116 (45%) to non-Papua New Guineans.
37 Gunther to Meek, 2 March 1967, Meek papers: Hay to Smith,
25 August 1967, DTOR 66/6426.
38 Gunther to Meek, 2 March 1967, Meek papers.
39 Hay to Smith, 25 August 1967, DTOR 66/6426.
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instance, complained to Karmel about one leading academic whom he
40found ’impatient,... unapproachable, and dogmatic*. Students
complained that this man was forcing them to attend the Bible-study
and prayer meetings he ran voluntarily after hours, and Gunther
protested that were he as Vice-Chancellor less forbearing there would
41be continual 'open clashes' over such matters. Then there was
friction between sections of the IHTE and UPNG staffs. IHTE staff
during 1967 lived in housing supplied by UPNG, and relations in the
42housing area were sometimes less than neighbourly. There was also 
friction between elements of the UPNG and Administrative College 
staffs while the former were sharing office space with the latter at 
the college.^
All of these problems, however aggravating, were but teeth­
ing pains. They hindered the smooth establishment of the two 
institutions perhaps, but in the long term were relatively minor. As 
we will see in following sections, there were more momentous diffi­
culties to be resolved.
(b) INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY AND GOVERNMENT INFLUENCE
By the end of 1967 Papua New Guinea's two major institutions of 
tertiary education were operational, but they still faced a long 
uphill struggle to secure the facilities they needed badly, and to 
ensure they would have adequate funds to grow as required. As they 
set about this upward climb a number of tensions became apparent 
within the emerging system of tertiary education. The most serious 
source of strain was that between the institutions and the government, 
most notably over the question of finance. There were also growing 
tensions between the two institutions themselves, and it became clear 
they would not enjoy the harmonious relationship foreseen by the 
Currie Commission. The proper balance between institutional autonomy 
on the one hand and governmental control of higher education on the
40 Gunther to Karmel, 15 June and 29 June 1966, GKC.
41 ibid.
42 Gunther, RIW, pp. 10, 38.
43 Meek, RIW, pp. 2-3.
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other was a further question of concern to all parties, and as they 
sought a modus vivendi with each other further tensions arose. The 
lines of stress were most apparent in several public controversies 
involving IHTE and UPNG - the transfer of IHTE from Port Moresby to 
Lae, the dispute over government funding of higher education, and 
the creation of a Faculty of Medicine at UPNG.
(i) The transfer of IHTE from Port Moresby to Lae
The IHTE Council had met on only four occasions when relations
between the Institute and the University came under strain. Sections
of the Council were clearly unhappy with the subordinate position of
IHTE in relation to UPNG, particularly in so far as this affected the
Institute's ability to plan the layout of its own facilities on the
joint campus. After the third meetings of the IHTE and UPNG Councils,
both held in February 1966, the UPNG Interim Council advised IHTE
that for 'expeditious' and 'harmonious' development of the Waigani
site, 'the whole... area should be vested in the University'.^ The
IHTE Council was singularly dubious of this proposition. It deputed
two of its members, Don Barrett, a parliamentarian, and Jock Rutter,
Chairman of the Papua New Guinea Electricity Commission, to prepare
2a reply containing a counter set of proposals.
The personalities of those involved on either side, and
their ambitions for their respective institutions exacerbated
relations. Gunther, as Currie Commissioner and Vice-Chancellor, had
firm ideas about UPNG's being the major and IHTE the subsidiary 
3institution. Watkin seemed happy enough for IHTE to accept a minor 
role; indeed he thought it would be 'only a matter of time' until 
the Institute merged with UPNG.^ But several forceful members of his 
Council resented what they saw as UPNG arrogance, and refused to let 
IHTE take a back seat. Three members in particular thought this way - 
Barrett, Rutter, and J. Burns, Director of the Public Works Department,
1 Karmel to Watkin, n.d., UPNGR F.2 (part 1).
2 CM, IHTE: IV, April 1966.
3 Gunther to Karmel, 15 June 1966, GKC.
4 Watkin to Karmel, 11 May 1966, UPNGR F.2 (part 1).
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who together comprised the IHTE Budgetary and Planning Committee. 
Barrett 'exuded self-confidence. He was never still, always planning, 
pushing, working, talking'.^ It was unlikely he would be satisfied 
for long to let anything he was associated with remain in the back­
ground. Rutter and Burns, both engineers and heads of key government 
technical agencies, had a vested interest in IHTE, which would supply 
their indigenous professional staff. They, too, were unlikely to 
meekly allow UPNG to assume total control of the campus. Personal
resentment against the UPNG leadership, particularly Gunther, grew £
among this group. This was ironic, for Gunther more than anyone had 
been responsible for the idea of an 'institute of higher technical 
education': as the Currie Commissioner responsible for investigating
technical education, he had conceived of IHTE as the answer to the 
country's higher technical training needs.
With the two major institutions of tertiary education 
heading into serious disagreement within six months of their creation, 
government had to view developments with concern. One possible 
solution soon presented itself: Watkin's death gave the government
a chance to draw IHTE and UPNG together in some structural union, say 
by appointing the UPNG Council Chairman, or the Vice-Chancellor, as 
Chairman of IHTE Council. But this idea was firmly squashed in 
Canberra. The Minister was against any merger as he doubted that the 
Institute could retain its practical bias if it became part of the 
University. He thought it 'critical that the individuality and the 
priority for the Institute be maintained'.^ And so IHTE and UPNG 
were left free to drift apart.
There was little doubt the two institutions had become 
estranged. The 'Reply' which Barrett and Rutter drew up on behalf 
of IHTE in answer to the UPNG proposal for control of the campus was 
phrased very provocatively. After observing that UPNG could hardly
5 PIM 44(2) February 1973, p. 1.
6 Johnson to Reseigh, 25 August 1966; Reseigh to Barnes, 
22 September 1966, DTOR 65/3288.
7 Smith to Barnes, and Barnes to Smith, 29 September 1966, 
folio 251, DTOR 65/3288.
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be serious in suggesting that the Interim Council should rule Waigani 
alone, the ’Reply’ made a series of counter propositions. First 
there should be a Board of three Trustees, one from UPNG, one from 
IHTE and one from the Administrative College, in whom the Waigani 
site should be vested. And second, planning and executing site works 
would be the responsibility of a ’Joint Budgetary and Planning 
Committee’, also composed of representatives from the three institutions. 
There was, the ’Reply’ stated, ’no other effective way’ to settle theg
disagreement. Gunther’s reaction was predictable. In trenchant
terms he advised Karmel to reject these suggestions unequivocally.
If agreed to they would create independent and possibly unsympathetic
bodies with the right to arbitrate University affairs, to the9
diminution of UPNG's autonomy. Autonomy, in Gunther’s view, was 
UPNG’s most important and fundamental right - something to be cherished 
and resolutely defended - and many of the conflicts in which UPNG 
subsequently became engaged can be explained in terms of his determin­
ation to protect it. He rounded off his advice to Karmel with the 
suggestion that, if there were no acceptable compromise, 'we inform 
the Institute that the University is a degree-giving body, that the 
Institute is not, and unless the Institute is prepared to accept our 
conditions, we feel it is an unsuitable body to be within University 
g r o u n d s W i t h  each side thus hardening its position, there was 
little surprise that a joint meeting of UPNG’s Finance Committee and 
IHTE's Budgetary and Planning Committee in June 1966 failed to resolve 
the deadlock.^
At this stage the IHTE Council decided to hold off for a 
time, deferring further action until after the arrival of Duncanson.
In the meantime the government, concerned at the cost of developing 
both institutions, was urging them to achieve every possible economy
8 IHTE Council, 'Reply to University Interim Council over the 
vesting of land at June Valley’, UPNGR F.2 (part 1).
9 Gunther to Karmel, 15 June 1966, GKC.
10 ibid.
11 CM, IHTE: V, June 1966.
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through 'the closest association... [and] joint planning'. But as
far as Barrett was concerned such admonitions fell on deaf ears. He
seems to have come privately to the conclusion that co-operation
between IHTE and UPNG was impossible, and that the only solution was
to develop the Institute on a site well away from Waigani. An important
contributing factor here was the Minister's rejection of IHTE's plans
for its first academic building on the grounds that it was too lavish.
This necessitated new plans, and a probable delay of six months or
more. The attitude of Barrett and the IHTE Budgetary and Planning
Committee was that if there were to be a major revision of the
Institute's building programme this may as well allow for a site well
away from Waigani. Barrett then made enquiries and located an avail-
13able site of several hundred acres five miles from Lae.
Having found an alternative site, Barrett produced a paper 
advocating the establishment of the Institute's facilities in Lae 
which he tabled at the September 1966 meeting of the IHTE Council.
Debate on his proposals was spirited. Council members divided over 
the issue: some, led by Rutter, supported Barrett; others agreed
with Johnson, who strenuously objected that the Ordinance specified 
Port Moresby as the IHTE site. Barrett's response was to announce 
his intention of amending the IHTE Ordinance at the forthcoming House 
of Assembly meeting, substituting the word 'Lae' for all references 
to 'Port Moresby'; and given the temper of the house, he said, his 
motion would probably succeed.^
The Administration, the Department of Territories, and 
Duncanson discussed Barrett's proposals at great length. Cleland, 
the Administrator, spelt out their advantages and disadvantages.
Among the advantages were these: (i) Lae was developing fast as the
country's industrial centre; it was therefore appropriate to locate 
a technological institution there. (ii) A move to Lae, on 'the New
12
12 Cleland to Karmel, August 1966, UPNGR F.2 (part 1); Smith, 
draft letter to Cleland, folio 256, n.d., DTOR 65/3288.
13 'Site planning for Institute', n.d., folios 247-8, DTOR 
65/3288.
Cleland, cable to Territories, 26 October 1966, DTOR 65/3288.14
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Guinea side’, would placate anti-Port Moresby opinion in New Guinea.
(iii) 'It would be the first major step in limiting the aggregation
of student... bodies in Port Moresby'; that is, by dividing the student
body the danger of student radicalism and activism - an anathema to
Barnes - might be m i n i m i z e d . T h e  disadvantages were: (i) There
could be a diminution of the Institute's academic standing if it were
no longer associated with the University. (ii) The loss to IHTE of
facilities it could share with UPNG - library, student union, sports
amenities - and their duplication in Lae at considerable extra cost
16would be too expensive. Duncanson, who had only just arrived in
the country, was circumspect, wishing to be identified with neither
the pro- nor anti-Lae factions. However, his short experience in
Port Moresby had convinced him that Waigani could not house both IHTE
and UPNG harmoniously, and so he advised the Department of Territories
accordingly."^ After much correspondence between Canberra and Port
Moresby the department decided that if the House voted with Barrett
a final decision would have to be made by the Administrator-in-
18council, with the concurrence of the Minister.
Barrett duly brought his motion before the House on 25
November 1966. There was little doubt about how New Guinean members
would receive it. The first of them to rise, Pita Lus, probably spoke
the minds of most New Guineans when he said, 'We cannot have all
these institutions in one place.... I think we should spread them all
19over the Territory and this one in particular should go to Lae'.
Johnson gamely tried to amend Barrett's motion so as to leave the
final decision open for the Administrator-in-council, arguing on the
basis of increased costs - up to an extra million dollars - in a move
to Lae. But it was like talking to a very deaf post, and he wryly
20admitted, 'I can recognize a lost cause when I hear one'. Shortly
15 Cleland, cable to Territories, 4 November 1966, DTOR 65/3288.
16 ibid.
17 Duncanson to Reseigh,15 November 1966, DTOR 66/6426.
18 Cable, Territories to Cleland, 21 November 1966, DTOR 
66/6426.
19 HAD (1(11) November 1966, pp. 1977-80; Johnson, RIW.
20 ibid.
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after the gag was applied to cut debate short. Johnson’s amendment
21failed resoundingly and the House went on to approve Barrett’s motion.
The ball was now back in the court of the Minister. He
could approve or reject the vote of the House, or he could play for
further time. He chose the last of these by passing the issue over
to the IHTE Council for an opinion. He let Matheson know he would
disallow the legislation only if a substantial section of Council 
22opposed the move. Council considered the matter again in December
1966. Before it Council had papers from both the pro- and anti-Lae
factions. Those in favour agreed with Matheson and Duncanson that 'it
is not feasible... to have two sovereign bodies sharing the same
grounds and if the Institute eventually goes to June Valley [Waigani]
23it must have undisputed authority over its own territory’. Those
against agreed with John Lavery, the sometime acting Chairman of
Council, that if for no other reason than cost IHTE should remain at 
24Waigani. In the end Council fell in behind the Chairman and 
Director, and the Administration endorsed the decision. The Minister, 
after having the costs of the move checked out, gave his assent in 
February 1967. The Institute now got down to the task of simultaneous­
ly teaching its first students and planning the move to Lae.
UPNG viewed IHTE's proposed leap over the Owen Stanley 
Range with mixed feelings. On the one hand it was relieved to have 
IHTE out of the way, for it could now proceed with developing the 
campus unimpeded by troublesome meddlers such as Barrett. On the 
other hand IHTE’s relocation posed certain threats. Firstly, the 
Institute was obviously ambitious to upgrade its own status. The 
IHTE Council had already decided to give its academic staff salaries 
and conditions aligned with those of universities rather than 
institutes of technology; it intended to appoint professors to lead 
its academic departments; it was bruiting the possibility of becoming
21 ibid.
22 Matheson to Duncanson, 28 November 1966; Reseigh to Matheson, 
30 November 1966, DTOR 66/6426.
23 'Addenda to Agenda Item 7 - Siting of the Institute', CM, 
IHTE: VII, December 1966,
24 ibid.
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a degree-granting body; its five-year diploma courses in engineering
25seemed to be degree courses in all but name. The University was
later to concede that the Institute’s rise to degree-granting and
university status was logical, necessary and inevitable once the UPNG-
26IHTE split had occurred. But in early 1967 'Louis Matheson's quite
strong ambitions’ for the Institute seemed to endanger UPNG's status
26aas the degree-awarding institution of Papua New Guinea. The second,
and major, cause for UPNG concern was the great cost of the relocation.
By early 1967 the extra cost was being estimated at $770,000 over the
271967-69 triennium. Such a sum, Gunther argued, must come from the 
total amount allocated to tertiary education; consequently UPNG would
receive less for its own programme of development, and its growth
28would be retarded.
For a while Gunther and Karmel contemplated manipulating 
events so that both the transfer to Lae and IHTE's rise to degree­
giving status would be blocked. Gunther wanted the relocation of IHTE 
referred back to the House of Assembly. He was confident he could 
persuade the large bloc of Highlands members to vote against Lae,
especially if they could be persuaded that the country's second
29university would one day be built within their home region. Karmel,
for his part, was prepared to take the matter up at a personal level
with government. He doubted the government appreciated 'just how
ambitious the Institute would become'; and he thought it wrong 'to
disperse the development of tertiary education... [as] there is no
doubt that the separate development of the University and the Institute
30will result in two weaker rather than one stronger institution'.
Though Gunther and Karmel believed they would be justified in engineer-
25 Reseigh to Barnes, 29 July 1966, DTOR 65/3288; Matheson, 
'Notes on the location of IHTE', CM IHTE VII, December 1966; 
Gunther to Karmel, 31 January 1967, GKC.
26 Gunther, RIW, p. 10; E.G. Kedgley, 'The University of Papua 
New Guinea', Section 2, UPNGR D.2 (part 1).
26a Gunther to Karmel, 15 June 1967, GKC.
27 PIM 38 (5) May 1967, p. 6.
28 Gunther to Karmel, 31 January 1967, GKC.
29 ibid.
30 Karmel to Gunther, 6 February 1967, GKC.
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ing the restraint of IHTE ambitions, doing so placed them in a quandary.
They did not wish to be seen to be thwarting the Institute, or holding
back its development. That would open them to charges of ’empire
building', of a ’dog-in-the-manger’ attitude towards technical
education, of being petty in retaining a UPNG monopoly of degree- 
31giving. In the end they pursued the matter unofficially, but to 
no avail. By then the government had probably convinced itself that 
IHTE's relocation was warranted, despite the additional cost.
The dispute between IHTE and UPNG over control of Waigani, 
and the IHTE move to Lae suggest a number of conclusions about the 
nature of early university development in Papua New Guinea. Firstly, 
once the major institutions of tertiary education came into being 
they developed corporate ’personalities' of their own. These usually 
reflected the personalities of the dominant figures within each 
institution. If UPNG was an uncompromising driver of hard bargains, 
and was jealous of its status as the country's sole degree-granting 
body, then these attributes derived from the influence of Gunther and 
Karmel. And if IHTE was provocative and ambitious, that in turn 
represented something of Barrett's and Matheson's influence. The 
corporate personalities were important because they were so strong 
that conflict became inevitable. Both institutions pleaded their 
readiness to collaborate in economic joint use of facilities; but 
when sensitive issues such as status and the order of precedence 
between them, and the control and division of resources arose, their 
conflicting personalities set them on a collision course which 
negated any hope for co-operation. A meeker, more pliant IHTE Council 
might well have accepted a minor role in relation to UPNG; but the 
presence of determined, ambitious and dominant men with vested 
interests in technical education gave IHTE an aggressive, competitive 
character, and predisposed it towards a clash with UPNG.
The second lesson to be learned from the conflict between 
UPNG and IHTE was the importance to the self-governing educational 
institutions of their autonomy. Much of the conflict between them 
can be explained by that. Each institution saw the wish of the other
31 ibid.
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to control Waigani as an incursion on its own autonomy. An IHTE move 
to Lae offered them both safeguards to their jealously protected 
right to self-determination: each could develop more freely along
the lines desired by their respective Councils without fear of inter­
ference from the other. However, the University's leadership recog­
nized the costs involved in the emergence of a rival institution with 
claims to equal status and a more favourable share of funds. The 
determination of UPNG and IHTE to preserve their autonomy also created 
tensions between them and government. Being autonomous they developed 
a momentum of their own which became hard for government to contain.
This was obvious in the relocation of IHTE. The Currie Commission 
had originally seen IHTE as a subsidiary, technological arm of UPNG 
teaching lower-level, sub-professional courses. Yet being autonomous 
it could not be held to that role alone, particularly when its leader­
ship thought it should have a more exalted part. Its challenge to 
UPNG for control of Waigani failed, but it emerged from the dispute 
with enhanced status as an equal partner with the University at the 
apex of the education system, and to confirm that pre-eminence it now 
began pursuing full university status. The Institute's determination 
to climb that high, and UPNG’s wish to resist it, made them rivals 
for both status and financial resources. The question of rivalry was 
not yet overwhelmingly important; however, the potential for compet­
ition was obvious. In a later period of university development it 
became a more contentious issue.
Finally, autonomy enabled the institutions to emerge as 
effective actors in the national political arena. The relocation of 
IHTE was the first occasion of many in which this became evident.
Both institutions demonstrated that when their interests were threatened 
they could become resolute political operators, ready to exploit 
whatever political resources were available. IHTE under Barrett's 
influence was little hindered by its own constitution; it simply used 
resources available in the House of Assembly - the parochial 
prejudices of the New Guinean members - to achieve its ends. UPNG 
endeavoured to counter these moves offstage and unofficially; however, 
the informal political channels were not as effective in this case as 
the formal political processes. 'Government, too, had sectional
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interests to serve, and as a result it joined in actively in the 
scenario unfolding between the two institutions. It could have 
exercised the ultimate sanction of withholding assent from the decision 
to relocate IHTE; but to protect its own interests - its wish to 
appease New Guinean parochialism, its desire to minimise the threat 
of student activism - it declined to take that step. It could well 
have insisted on the original plan for a major and a minor institution 
working in close association with each other. However, allowing IHTE 
to pursue its ambitions was more attractive.
This complex interplay between institutions and government 
underlined the fallibility of educational planning. The Currie 
Commissioners and like planners might devise immaculate models, but 
there was no guarantee that these models would not be drastically 
restructured between planning and execution. Political interaction 
between the government of the day, the institutions themselves, and 
individuals promoting their own ends could always cause major revisions.
(ii) The dispute over UPNG-IHTE funding
The disagreement between IHTE and UPNG over control of Waigani 
was one between two competing educational institutions, but their 
second controversy found them allied against the Department of 
Territories. This was the 1967-68 dispute over the level of govern­
ment funding of both institutions.
The dispute resulted directly from the government's failure 
to provide adequate machinery for ensuring a certain, smooth and 
continuous flow of finance to the two institutions. The Currie 
Commissioners had thought the Australian government should specially 
earmark funds for university development in Papua New Guinea, and 
that the Australian Universities Commission (AUC) should assess IHTE- 
UPNG financial needs. This arrangement did not eventuate because 
the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Currie Report had convinced 
the Minister for Territories that the movement towards independence 
made it more appropriate for IHTE-UPNG funds to come from general 
Papua New Guinea finances as part of the country's normal budgetary 
processes. However, the Inter-Departmental Committee had nevertheless 
wanted to guarantee continuity of funds to IHTE and UPNG, and there-
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fore suggested their estimates for a triennial period be examined by 
a special committee of the Administration in lieu of the AUC. Such 
a procedure would have placed IHTE and UPNG on a similar guaranteed 
financial footing to universities in Australia, and would have allowed 
them special consideration as they undertook their programmes of rapid 
expansion. But this was something government did not accord them. It 
declined to set up any committee to assess their needs, and consequent­
ly they found themselves in the position of any government department 
- obliged to compete with numerous other agencies for an annual 
allocation of money.
This situation strongly reflected the opinions of both 
Minister and Secretary for Territories. Barnes' and Smith's commitment 
to a 'World Bank' ideology of economic development meant 'modest' 
educational spending, as befitted the country's position as an under­
developed nation. They strongly believed IHTE and UPNG should not 
receive preferential treatment in front of other urgent developmental 
priorities. And above all they wished to avoid transplanting the 
expensive cost structure of Australian tertiary education to Papua New 
Guinea."^ These seem reasonable views; at least they were prescient 
of those an independent Papua New Guinean government adopted a decade 
later. But in 1966 they could only cause conflict between the 
government and the two institutions, which were then embarking on 
costly programmes of obligatory rapid expansion and were anxious for 
funds to permit this.
Portents of trouble to come were evident in the handling of 
UPNG's first submission of estimates in 1966. A conference between 
the University and the Department of Territories in Canberra in April 
1966 agreed on a figure of $1.8 million as a sum sufficient to let
2the University function during the coming financial year, 1966-67.
UPNG later submitted estimates requesting $2.4 million, having 
reassessed its needs in the meantime. Then in June 1966 the Adminis­
trator wrote formally to advise the University that UPNG and IHTE
1 Meek, RIW, p. 3; C.E. Barnes, letter-to-the-editor, New 
Guinea 3(3) September-October 1968, pp. 8-9.
Karmel to Cleland, 27 June 1966, GKC.2
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together could spend up to a maximum of $2 million in 1966-67, and
3that the Institute was to have priority within that figure. Under
protest UPNG resubmitted for $2 million as 'the minimum needed for
4
the effective functioning of the University’. Karmel forcibly 
argued that any reduction below this would 'place the future of the 
University in serious jeopardy'.After considering the University's 
revised submission the Minister informed Karmel he would raise the 
grant by $25,000, letting UPNG make up the remainder of its needsg
from fees, rents, and readjustments in the building programme.
Gunther and Karmel both reacted angrily to what they saw as Department 
of Territories niggardliness. Gunther protested that the government 
was treating UPNG with contempt. He pursued the matter with Johnson, 
who privately thought the University's treatment shabby and said the 
Prime Minister should be apprised of the fact.^ Karmel issued a 
veiled threat to government: he informed the Administrator he had
accepted the UPNG Chairmanship on the understanding that the Universityg
would develop with ’reasonable haste', which implied adequate funds. 
However, protests were in vain. The Minister stood firm, and UPNG 
had to be content with the amount decreed. This experience left UPNG 
resentful. It felt its modest and legitimate claims had been 
arbitrarily rejected by a government which was over anxious to obtain 
university facilities 'on the cheap'.
Levels of funding provoked conflict again the following year.
Early in 1967 UPNG submitted estimates seeking $3.3 million for
1967-68. The Department of Territories then asked what effect there
would be if only $2.7 million were granted. UPNG replied that less
than $2.9 million would mean a curtailment of teaching. The department
9then granted this 'rock bottom' sum. On this occasion the University
3 Cleland to Gunther, 1 June 1966, GKC.
4 Karmel to Cleland, 27 June 1966, GKC.
5 ibid.
6 Barnes to Karmel, 30 August 1966, GKC.
7 Gunther to Karmel, 15 June, and 29 June 1966, GKC.
8 Karmel to Cleland, 25 October 1966, GKC.
9 Gunther, report to final meeting of UPNG Interim Council, 
UPNGR D .2 (part 1).
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was not greatly perturbed by the reduction in its estimates: it had
included some 'fat’ around the bare bones of what it needed to survive 
and could not object too strongly if some 'fat' were pared away.^ 
Gunther, however, greatly resented the late approval to commit the 
$2.9 million. He knew only six weeks before the end of the previous 
financial year what sum he had for the ensuing financial year.^ In 
the meantime UPNG had been living for months in uncertainty about the 
funds it would have for development, and thus could not plan forward 
with confidence.
In 1967-68 IHTE, too, struggled with the Department of Terri­
tories for finance, like UPNG haggling while the department reduced 
its estimates below what it regarded as its 'rock bottom' level. The 
Institute informed the department that $1.5 million was the minimum 
amount enabling it both to function and embark on the development 
programme the government desired. The department then instructed 
Duncanson to revise the estimates to $1.2 million. He achieved some 
reduction but was unable to get the figure below $1.3 million. The 
Institute then received informal advice that the government might 
reduce the grant even further, to $.9 million. Duncanson protested 
strenuously that such a reduction would cause a debilitating curtail­
ment of the Institute's activities: 'There would [for example] be
12little point in continuing xvith our engineering courses.' By this
stage the department was becoming concerned that IHTE was upgrading
its operations above the level needed to train the middle-level,
13practical technologists desired. The department suggested IHTE
could save money by granting staff conditions less than those of the
University, by teaching three-year rather than four- and five-year
14courses, and even by enrolling fewer students. Matheson and 
Duncanson countered these suggestions with the claim that the low-
10 Gunther, RIW, p. 36.
11 Gunther, report to final meeting of UPNG Interim Council, 
UPNGR D .2 (part 1).
12 Duncanson to the Treasurer 
66/6426.
(PNG), 23 March 1967, DTOR
13 Matheson, RIW, p. 3.
14 Minutes of meeting between 
representatives, Canberra,
IHTE and Department of Territories 
26 September 1967, DTOR 67/3555.
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level type of Institute envisaged by the department was 'not a viable 
proposition': it would have insufficient status to attract either
staff or students.'*'“’ After much bargaining like this, and after the 
Administrator had urgently pleaded IHTE’s case with the department,
1 fithe Institute received $1.1 million.
Further difficulties still arose between government and the 
two institutions over academic salary increases. When Australian 
academic salaries rose in mid-1967, IHTE and UPNG assumed they were 
obliged to pay the increases to their staff as well. The Department 
of Territories, however, advised that the Minister must approve the 
increases first. This raised the question of how far IHTE and UPNG 
could go in any project entailing expense without first having 
Ministerial approval. The department, determined that ’there should 
be no intrusion on the Minister’s prerogative by unilateral action 
by the University or Institute’, instructed the Administrator (now 
D.O. Hay) that a l l  matters 'affecting the revenue or expenditure of 
the institutions’ must have Ministerial clearance.^  Hay warned the 
department against thus assuming too close a control over UPNG and 
IHTE: there would surely be an embarrassing ’adverse reaction’ since
they would view the government’s financial controls as an affront to 
their autonomy."*"^
The increasingly frequent disagreements over money matters 
showed that government had called UPNG and IHTE into existence with­
out adequate means for assessing their financial needs, or for 
regulating their dealings with government. In the absence of some­
thing akin to a grants commission, as recommended by both Currie 
Commission and Inter-Departmental Committee, relations between the 
institutions and the government, particularly in financial matters, 
were fast becoming a morass. The ’ad hocery’ whereby IHTE and UPNG 
made annual submissions to government, which then applied a pruning
15 ibid.
16 Hay, cable to Territories, 15 June 1967, DTOR 67/3555.
17 Territories, cable to the Administrator, 30 June 1967; 
Smith to Hay, 14 July 1967, DTOR 67/3555.
18 Hay to Smith, 26 July 1967, DTOR 67/3555.
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knife drastically, was clearly unsatisfactory. More adequate machinery 
was needed if the government and institutions were not to be in 
perpetual confrontation.
The need for such machinery became more obvious more than
ever before in 1968 when the most serious conflict yet occurred, once
again over UPNG’s estimates. During 1967 the University had requested
$4.5 million for 1968-69, but in the November the government said it
would grant only $3.5 million, a figure which would apply not only to
1968-69 but to 1969-70 as well."^ In addition to this financial
ceiling there would be a limit to student numbers as well - a maximum
20enrolment of 575 by 1970. UPNG then argued for ’absolute minimum'
21finance of $3.85 million. The Department of Territories held
resolutely to $3.5 million well into 1968, despite representations
22from Hay and Johnson that $3.65 million was more appropriate. In
the end, and only after concerted lobbying by UPNG, the department
23relented and granted the 'rock bottom' $3.85 million.
The dispute accompanying this process of bargaining was
bitter. It became public on 22 February 1968 when the Acting Vice-
Chancellor, K.S. Inglis, addressed a Melbourne meeting on UPNG's
progress over its first two years. He said UPNG had based its planning
on 825 enrolments by 1970 [approximate to the Currie recommendations];
however, the recently imposed ceiling of 575 students forced it to
restrict its intake to a lower number than it was able and willing to 
24teach. He then claimed the $4.5 million originally requested was
the minimum needed to build the University up to the level envisaged 
25by the government. He predicted that unless the University received
19 Gunther to Karmel, 1 November 1968, GKC; Gunther, report to 
final meeting of UPNG Interim Council, UPNGR D.2 (part 1).
20 ibid.
21 Meek to Gunther, 22 March 1968, GKC.
22 Gunther to Karmel, 2 May, and 7 May 1968, GKC.
23 Gunther to Karmel, 1 November 1968, GKC; Gunther, report..., 
loc. cit.
24 UPNG News no. 7, March 1968, p. 6; New Guinea 3(2) June- 
July 1968, pp. 76-7.
25 ibid.
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’substantially more money than at present foreshadowed’ its future
26programmes would be crippled. Rightly or wrongly these comments
created the impression that the Department of Territories had simply
been capricious in cutting back on UPNG funds. Not all his claims
were strictly accurate: the figure of $4.5 million, for example, was
well above ’rock bottom’, and even by Gunther’s admission contained 
27much ’fat’. Nevertheless, as a public relations venture on behalf
of UPNG the Inglis lecture was a hit, drawing editorials and leading
articles from much of the Australian press the next day. One
respectable daily, for example, said the government was guilty of
such ’dangerous parsimony’ over UPNG funding the Prime Minister should
28’consider Mr Barnes’ position as Minister for Territories'.
The public rebuke from the Acting Vice-Chancellor visibly
hurt the Department of Territories. It issued a press statement in
Barnes’ name stating that 'it was unreal to argue that UPNG should be
29allowed to write its own ticket for money’. The University, more­
over, was receiving more than its fair share of government funds: of 
the $23.5 million allocated to all education in Papua New Guinea,
primary, secondary and tertiary, UPNG alone was receiving at least
30$3 million, or more than 12^%. This statement received wide 
publicity; however, Inglis's complaints by then had made their impact. 
The public was probably convinced that a miserly government was 
starving the infant university.
The dispute between the department and UPNG continued 
publicly as the indignation of the University community boiled right­
eously over. Ten UPNG professors wrote to The Australian^ accusing
the Minister of ’jeopardis[ing] the standards of the University for
31many years to come'. And the academic staff in general joined 
their professors in fulminating against the government with a public
26 ibid.
27 Gunther to Karmel, 2 April 1968, GKC.
28 Sydney Morning Herald, 23 February 1968, p. 2
29 Sydney Morning Herald, 23 February 1968, p. 3
30 ibid.
31 Quoted in UPNG News no,• 9, May 1968, pp. 7-8.
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statement from their staff association claiming UPNG was being 
’stifled’. Some of their number, they threatened, were even contemp­
lating a move from UPNG to ’institutions whose standards are not in 
32jeopardy’. There was an aggressive self-righteousness about much 
of this invective. This was to be a common characteristic of UPNG 
rhetoric in subsequent controversies with the government. Many at 
UPNG appear to have made the simple assumption that the University 
could not be wrong and the Department of Territories could never be 
right. They certainly had good reason to be suspicious of the depart­
ment: it had made a number of ham-fisted attempts to interfere
unjustifiably in internal University matters. It had endeavoured, 
for instance, to have UPNG submit lists of prospective appointees for 
security checks; and there were incidents where it delayed the
issuing to incoming Asian staff members of permits to enter the
33country, presumably because they were not white.
But while the Department of Territories was not blameless,
those at UPNG seemed not to appreciate the department’s obligation
to scrutinize the University's expenditure. The department had a
real responsibility to keep the growth of both UPNG and IHTE in
perspective in relation to the overall development of the country. It
could not simply grant them optimal budgets - all the money they
requested - for it had to ensure their building standards and
conditions of employment were not conspicuously superior to those
prevailing in the rest of the country. It was bound to ensure
economy, and that meant bargaining with UPNG and IHTE when the latter
submitted estimates. Many at UPNG were not inclined to see the
bargaining process as such, viewing it instead as a means by which
a ’wicked’ government was persecuting a needy client. Nor did they
seem to appreciate that by and large the University received fair
34financial treatment. Much UPNG rhetoric, in this and other disputes,
32 ibid.
33 APD vol. H of R 66, 1969-70, pp. 460-3, and H of R 67, 1970, 
p. 1631; Gunther, RIW, p. 37.
34 Gunther, transcript of interview with Nelson, p. 201; Karmel, 
RIW, p. 2.
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showed a pronounced reluctance to understand the department's position; 
and that became a factor in later disagreements between the government 
and the University.
Throughout the dispute Karmel was more circumspect than most
at UPNG. He advised the University staff that 'publicity often does
35more harm than good’, and he seemed worried by the inaccuracies
36that peppered the public statements of some UPNG protagonists.
Gunther, on the other hand, was not loth to see the dispute continue
publicly. If the University could not get what it wanted through
normal channels of communication with government, he argued, then it
was justified in 'going public’ with vehement statements which might
embarrass the Department of Territories into acceding to UPNG requests.'
He thought it futile to attempt negotiation with Smith. The Secretary,
he believed, customarily bullied UPNG in private dealings, but usually
38capitulated if criticized publicly. Gunther also complemented
public statement with moves behind the scenes: he bypassed Barnes
and the department by taking up the question of UPNG finance with
Hasluck and J.M. Fraser (Minister for Education and Science) in an
attempt to get them to intercede on the University's behalf in 
39Cabinet. His special contribution to the dispute, however, was an 
exchange of letters with the Minister in the journal New Guinea.
Barnes, angered by Inglis’s suggestion that he was giving Papua New 
Guinea a university 'on the cheap’, had written to both New Guinea 
and Pacific Islands Monthly to state the department’s case.^ Gunther 
replied, exposing a number of the Minister’s weak points, particularly 
in relation to the department's prevarication over the Currie Report. 
The Minister again answered, but rather unconvincingly, and there was
35 Karmel to Gunther, 26 March 1968, GKC.
36 Karmel to Gunther, 5 June 1968, GKC.
37 Gunther, RIW, pp. 36-7; transcript of interview with Nelson,
p. 201.
38 Gunther to Karmel, 30 April, and 7 May 1968, GKC.
39 Gunther to Karmel, 22 April 1968, GKC.
40 New Guinea 3(3) September-October 1968, pp. 8-9; PIM 39(10) 
October 1968, pp. 52-3.
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little doubt that the Vice-Chancellor had scored most points.
The Department of Territories could hardly be blamed for 
excising superfluous ’fat’ from UPNG estimates, but it had been both 
arbitrary and ruthless in wielding the knife. The attempt to fix 
University funds at a static level could only have caused a running 
down of UPNG activities as inflation bit into the budget, and would 
have prevented any form of growth. And to set an early ceiling on 
enrolments was also ill-advised, especially as the department pre­
varicated here. It took its figure of 575 students by 1970 from the 
report of the Inter-Departmental Committee, a confidential document 
it had never made available to UPNG or IHTE. Quite justifiably the 
Interim Council had assumed the Currie Report was the basis for 
planning, and government representatives on Council - the Assistant 
Administrator, the Director of Education, and the department's own 
representative - had given no indication that UPNG should be working 
to the figure of 575 rather than the 830 recommended in the Currie 
Report.
But while the dispute exposed the weak points of both 
University and department, as much as anything it accentuated the 
inadequacy of the machinery for assessing needs and channelling funds 
to UPNG and IHTE. Even before the University 'went public' the 
department had been working towards some more satisfactory arrangement. 
It had discussed with Karmel and Matheson the procedures they would 
prefer to follow, and in late 1967 this led to the production of a 
'Relationships Document' setting out procedures for advancing funds
/ O
to UPNG and IHTE. After further discussions, the department, Karmel 
and Matheson had hammered out an agreement whereby each institution 
would prepare estimates for a 'rolling triennium', that is a three- 
year period with a review at the beginning of each year. An independ­
ent assessor experienced in university administration would undertake
the review and advise government on the level of grants appropriate
43to each institution. The assessor they agreed on was Sir Leslie
41 ibid.
42 Folios 99-114, no title, December 1967, DTOR 67/3555.
43 'Procedures for determining grants', n.d., folios 247-9;
Smith to Melville, 18 July 1968, DTOR 67/3555.
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Melville, an economist, former Vice-Chancellor of ANU, and more recently 
chairman of the Commonwealth Grants Commission. The assent of the 
Australian Treasurer to the new procedures came in August 1968. UPNG 
and IHTE were now assured of a more regular basis for planning. Their 
financial uncertainties, which had been troubling them for the past 
three years, were not yet over, but at least there was a more certain 
means for assessing their needs.
Like the disagreement over the Waigani site, the dispute 
over finance suggests a number of conclusions about the developing 
university system of Papua New Guinea. It first indicated something 
of the determination with which autonomous institutions would fight 
to assure their survival. Having come into being UPNG and IHTE soon 
grew into complex organizations in which many people had a variety 
of vested interests to defend, professional, economic and emotional. 
Whenever these interests were challenged, as in the annual haggling 
over estimates, the institutions showed their capacity for resolute 
self defence. It was unlikely that they would quietly accept heavy- 
handed treatment; it was likely they would use every weapon at their 
disposal to protect their interests.
How UPNG and IHTE safeguarded their interests reflected 
their institutional ’personalities’. A UPNG under Gunther was a 
UPNG prepared to engage in acrimonious public debate and orchestrated 
denunciations of its opponents, even in spite of the moderating 
influence of Karmel. The impasse to which UPNG and the Department of 
Territories appeared to be moving seems to have been very much a 
matter of conflicting personalities - Gunther’s and Smith’s. Their 
mutual antipathy was to be a serious impediment to better relations 
between the University and government. On the other hand, an IHTE 
under Duncanson was a different creature, one more ready to confine 
itself unobtrusively though no less persistently to established 
channels of communication with government, relying on the Administrator 
and the IHTE Chairman to plead its case in Canberra.
The dispute also emphasized once more the institutions’ 
potential as political operators who would wheel-and-deal behind the 
scenes or plead their cause in public, whichever they thought 
appropriate under the circumstances. Their disputes with government
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gave them considerable political experience, and they learnt to become 
effective survivors in the process. Their autonomy was an important 
asset here, and as the Department of Territories discovered, even 
their financial dependence on government could not prevent their becoming 
inconvenient (albeit interested) critics of government policy.
The dispute also revealed something of the complexity of the 
political network in which they were located, and which they could 
exploit to their own advantage. The demands of the institutions, and 
the resistance to these offered by the Department of Territories, 
created tensions within the Australia-Papua New Guinea governmental 
relationship which UPNG and IHTE could manipulate. There was, for 
example, tension between the Department of Territories and the Adminis­
tration, and between the Minister and some of his Cabinet colleagues.
The Administrators, Cleland and Hay, and their Assistant, Johnson, 
officially had to represent the department to the institutions. How­
ever, they remained personally sympathetic to UPNG and IHTE, which 
they privately thought were being ill-used; and this led them to 
petition the department vigorously on behalf of the institutions.
There was also sympathy for UPNG within Cabinet, and Fraser and Hasluck 
were ready to plead the UPNG cause against their colleague in the 
Territories portfolio. Whether or not they actually did so is un­
certain, though the sympathy they expressed privately was a resource 
UPNG could attempt to utilize.
Finally, it was becoming clear that higher education was a 
field for dynamic interaction between many interest groups, an arena 
where achievement was more a result of effective bargaining that of 
rational pursuit of optimal plans of progress. The government’s 
critics at UPNG who thought the Minister should see reason, and grant 
the University whatever it requested, were politically naive. The 
finance on which the institutions depended was a scarce resource 
being distributed carefully among many competitors. Those who could 
compete the more effectively - those most adept at bargaining - were 
the most likely to receive a favourable allocation. This was a fact 
of life the institutions had to learn. It was something the seasoned 
political operator Gunther recognized; and he, if not his staff, knew
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that ’going public' was more of a contribution to bargaining than a 
protest against iniquity.
The interaction between the institutions and government was 
dynamic for another reason - it generated new organizations and 
procedures that added to the complexity of administration in Papua 
New Guinea. Although the disputes over finance were bitter, they had 
a positive aspect too since they formed a testing ground in which 
government and institutions were able to work out through trial and 
error a system to govern their relationships. Where no adequate 
structure had previously existed for mediating their opposed interests 
machinery was created to cope with this. Papua New Guinea received a 
'one-man university grants commission' in the person of Sir Leslie 
Melville. The independent assessor, later expanded to a permanent 
committee of three, became a permanent feature of the university 
system, serving as machinery to mitigate potential conflict between 
government and institutions over finance.
(Hi) The creation of the Faculty of Medicine at UPNG
The most intense of early disputes between government and 
University burst into public prominence in late 1969. It centred on 
the establishment of a Faculty of Medicine, but raised many issues 
concerning institutional autonomy and government control over higher 
education. As it widened it became more important than a mere 
disagreement between the Department of Territories and UPNG: in some
respects it was indeed a watershed in Australian-Papua New Guinean 
relations, for it raised questions about the colonial relationship 
between the countries and the transfer of government power from one 
to the other.
The dispute had been building up steadily for three years 
before finally erupting in public in November 1969. It had its roots 
in the Currie Report, which recommended that the Papuan Medical 
College (PMC) should 'remain under the Department of Public Health 
[DPH] until 1966, when it should become the Medical School of the 
University'.^ The UPNG Interim Council, at only its second meeting,
1 Currie Report, p. 287.
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in December 1965, decided to implement this recommendation and resolved
2to establish a Faculty of Medicine. Karmel accordingly contacted
Cleland and the Director of Public Health (Dr R. Scragg), who both
welcomed the idea; then Cleland wrote formally to the Secretary for
Territories seeking ’approval in principle’ for the transfer of medical
education from PMC to UPNG, and requesting permission for DPH to enter
3negotiations with the University to effect this.
Smith took more than two months to answer Cleland’s letter
- the first of many long delays on Canberra’s part in replying to
correspondence on this issue. When he finally allowed negotiations
to begin he made clear that his department must be satisfied on many
points, particularly those relating to cost, before the transfer could 
4proceed. A series of discussions between DPH, PMC, and a member of 
the UPNG Interim Council, B.S. Hetzel, Professor of Medicine at the 
University of Adelaide, worked out a detailed reply to the Secretary’s 
queries; and following this, DPH devised a plan for transferring 
medical training to a UPNG Faculty of Medicine which the Interim 
Council approved in December 1966.^ In the meantime PMC and UPNG had 
begin co-operating in science teaching, PMC first year students taking 
the UPNG Preliminary Year science stream, in anticipation of a closer 
union soon.
The Administrator (now Hay) forwarded the DPH plan for the 
transfer, titled 'Proposal to Establish a Faculty of Medicine in the 
UPNG', to Smith for his and Barnes' approval. Despite Hay's plea 
for 'early consideration' of the proposal, a further long delay - this 
time more than five months - occurred before the Secretary replied.
In late November 1967 he answered with a long series of queries 
questioning most points in the proposal. Apart from his doubts about 
costs, Smith suggested that UPNG might raise the standard of medical
2 Acting Director of DPH to Assistant Administrator, 21 March 
1968, DTOR 69/5536.
3 Swift to Reseigh, 2 May 1966, DTOR 66/975.
4 Smith to Cleland, 19 May 1966, DTOR 66/975.
5 W.D. Symes to Johnson, 21 March 1968, DTOR 66/975.
6 Hay to Smith, 11 June 1967, DTOR 66/975.
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training so that fewer doctors would be trained, and then in a manner 
unsuitable to DPH needs.^ Hay duly answered all Smith’s queries and 
doubts, and once again asked for the Minister's assent to the proposal. 
When a further three months went by without a reply Hay wrote again 
to Smith pointing out that the proposed transfer had been under 
consideration for two-and-a-half years, that the Minister had now 
had before him a detailed submission for almost a year, but that no
g
indication had yet been given that the proposal was acceptable.
The long delays in dealing with the Administrator's requests
seem to have stemmed from anxiety on the part of Smith over the cost
of the transfer. He appears to have agonized over the proposals much
as he did over the Currie Report some four years previously, worried
no doubt by a World Bank Report injunction to restrict spending on9
public health. When Smith at last replied to Hay's inquiries he 
once again mentioned his apprehensions about possible pressure from 
UPNG to upgrade the standard of medical education to the costly levels 
general in Australia. Hay took these up in further discussions with 
the University, but UPNG's attitude was that no outside authority, 
be it DPH or Department of Territories, should impose restrictions on 
the duration, content or teaching methods of courses sponsored by the 
University.^  Smith now dug his heels in stubbornly, advising Hay,
'We adhere to the view that the length and standard of the medical 
course be a condition of the absorption of the PMC by the University'.^
Discussions between the Department of Territories and a DPH 
representative, Dr W.D. Symes, now took place to find a way around 
the problem of the department's attitude. Symes proposed that the 
Dean of PMC be seconded to UPNG to work out a detailed curriculum 
and programme of development over the next three years for the
7 Hay to Smith, 24 January 1968, DTOR 66/975.
8 Hay to Smith, 18 March 1968, DTOR 66/975.
9 Territories, telex to Administrator, 17 May 1968, DTOR 66/975.
10 Administrator, telex to Territories, 
DTOR 66/975.
26 September 1968,
11 Territories, telex to Administrator, 
66/975.
1 October 1968, DTOR
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University to submit for government consideration. The department
agreed, and subsequently the Administration announced publicly that
the PMC Dean, Dr Ian Maddocks, had been seconded to UPNG and it was
expected that the transfer of medical training would occur during the
131969-70 financial year. Maddocks duly worked at UPNG, preparing a
report which contained proposals ’covering all aspects of current and
14future medical college administration’. The UPNG Interim Council 
subsequently endorsed the report, and Gunther assured the Administrator 
that UPNG would not 'upgrade the [medical] course beyond the Territory’s 
needs’."*"^ In view of this undertaking Hay advised Smith to accept 
the Maddocks Report as the basis for planning, to grant UPNG finance 
to start taking over PMC from July 1969, and to allow the completion 
of the takeover by the end of 1969. He also said he had submitted 
the report to the assessor of UPNG estimates, Sir Leslie Melville, 
for his perusal.^
Melville's subsequent report convinced Smith his fears about
the merger were justified. Melville said he had discussed the
Maddocks Report with ’medical educators’ in Australia who suggested
that 'the kind of medical training proposed... is not what the
Territory n e e d s S m i t h  checked out Melville's comments with four
medical professors at the University of Sydney. They had 'no criticism
of the proposed curriculum’, but suggested the relationship between
18DPH and UPNG required further definition. This was further grist to 
the Secretary's doubts: Smith, apparently, thought anything would be
preferable to a PMC-UPNG merger. He now had his department draw up 
a 'List of Alternatives to the Transfer of the PMC to the University'.
12 Record of discussion, 8 October 1968, folios 145-6, DTOR 
66/975.
13 PNG press release no. 272, 3 December 1968, DTOR 66/975.
14 Hay to Smith, 25 April 1969, DTOR 66/975.
15 ibid.
16 ibid.
17 Lovell to Maddocks, 29 July 1969; Hetzel to Smith, 12 
August 1969, DTOR 66/975; 'Cost of medical training', folio 
198, DTOR 69/5536.
18 Notes of meeting between C.E. Reseigh and Medical Faculty, 
University of Sydney, 17 November 1969, DTOR 69/3121.
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This included affiliation of PMC with an Australian university, the
establishment of a 'National Accrediting Body' to award degrees and
diplomas to PMC graduates, and the creation of an hierarchical
19academic structure at PMC analogous to that of a university. By this
time, November 1969, five months had passed since the merger was
supposed to have begun, and only a month remained before it was
supposed to have been concluded. But so far neither the Administration
nor UPNG knew if the Department of Territories accepted the Maddocks
Report. Once again Hay contacted Smith with his by now customary plea:
'We are most concerned to get an early indication of your views on
20the proposal put forward by the Administration.' After a further
fortnight he received a reply informing him that 'the Minister has
directed that [PMC] should not be transferred to the University but
should be developed by [DPH].... The Minister takes the view that [it
21is] inopportune to transfer the college to the University'.
The Minister's decision to block the PMC-UPNG merger was
publicly announced in a press release on 2 December 1969. It said
he had acted from concern for 'the best interests of the Territory'.
UPNG would only take over PMC if it had 'complete independence in
22determining the content and length of the medical course'. This,
he said, was unsatisfactory: medical services in Papua New Guinea
were chiefly a government concern, and government must therefore set
the standard of training. Furthermore, his decision would ease UPNG's
burden since 'medical faculties tend to absorb a disproportionate
amount of the university funds available at the expense of other
23university activities'.
The public reaction to this announcement was immediate and 
hostile. The Papua New Guinea Medical Students Society promptly 
issued a defiant 'Statement and Declaration':
19 Folios 143-4, n.d., DTOR 69/3121.
20 Hay to Smith, telex, 17 November 1969, DTOR 69/3121.
21 Smith, telex to Hay, 17 November 1969, DTOR 69/3121.
22 Press release no. 68/69, 2 December 1969, DTOR 69/3121.
23 ibid.
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Once again the faceless men of Canberra have made a 
decision, after months of indecision, that sets back 
progress in this country. This time the medical 
education programme... has been set back. Students 
in the Faculty of Arts or Laws are granted degrees in 
recognition of their studies, but Medical students, 
after a five year course in the oldest established 
Tertiary Institution in the country are still to be 
awarded only diplomas. 24
This was but a presage of the storm to come once the Minister confirmed 
his decision.
To Gunther the decision was a personal affront. Eleven
years as foundation Director of Public Health, his prolonged efforts
in medical training leading up to the establishment of PMC, his
authorship of the section of the Currie Report dealing with medical
education all gave him a personal stake in the medical faculty now
snatched from him. He was probably right in thinking Barnes and Smith
had taken malicious pleasure in preventing the merger. It was no
secret that they disliked his forcible, brusque style, and his blunt
public statements (as in the dispute over UPNG finances) which made
them look foolish. Barnes' personal antipathy was evident in his
refusal to visit UPNG officially. (Unlike his predecessor and two
successors in office he declined to attend the University for official
functions such as the opening and graduation ceremonies. The UPNG
25community saw this as a calculated insult. ) The chance of 'taking
toffee' from Gunther undoubtedly added relish to a Ministerial
26decision taken primarily for economic reasons.
Gunther's private and public reactions differed. Privately
he said he and the University were being persecuted, and he circulated
27a minute to Council members denouncing the decision. This probably 
strengthed the impression among UPNG circles that the Department of 
Territories was 'wicked'. They were in any case sure the Minister 
had acted in an underhand manner, for his decision was announced at
24 'Statement and Declaration', 28 November 1969, DTOR 69/5536.
25 Meek, RIW, pp. 3-4; Griffin (1976), p. 103.
26 Meek, loc. cit.; Reseigh, RIW, p. 2.
27 Griffin, loc. cit.
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a time when UPNG was on vacation and both House of Assembly and Austral-
28ian parliament were in recess. Gunther's public reaction, on the
other hand, was dignified and restrained: he issued a dispassionate
press statement that government fears about the cost and direction of
medical training under UPNG auspices were misplaced since the govern-
29ment itself held ultimate control of the University's funds.
The public, and especially the medical profession, were
prompt in entering the fray on the side of UPNG. The president of
the Papua New Guinea Medical Society said the Minister had 'dealt a
30great blow to Medicine in the Territory'. PMC staff shared this
opinion. Maddocks said it was 'difficult to find words which adequately
express the bitter disappointment' of his PMC colleagues, and he
31predicted 'mass resignations' from the staff as a result. Then a
letter from Hetzel appeared in The Australian castigating Barnes for
32his 'narrow and small-minded approach'. A week after this two PMC 
students, Morris Wainetti and Vaeloto Meleisea, flew to Canberra well 
briefed by PMC staff to petition Barnes on behalf of the PMC student 
body, and to plead for a reversal of his decision. They appeared on 
television, spoke on radio, and were interviewed by the daily press.
They claimed the Minister had made his decision on the basis of 
'personal prejudices' and against the considered opinion of the 
Administrator, the Director of Public Health, the PMC staff, the 
Medical Society, the House of Assembly, and general public opinion.
It had, they said, led to increasing Papua New Guinean distrust of the 
Australian government and would probably lead to 'campus strife in 
Port Moresby'.^
Once again the Minister and his department became targets 
of a media enfilade which agreed that they had bungled yet again by 
'acting arbitrarily... against the weight of all existing evidence
28 ibid.
29 Hay, telex to Territories, n.d., folio 10, DTOR 69/3556.
30 Post-Courier 4 December 1969, p. 5.
31 Maddocks to Scragg, 3 December 1969, DTOR 69/3556.
32 The Australian 5 December 1969, p. 2.
33 Sydney Morning Herald 11 December 1969, p. 3.
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34and opinion'. And once more the Minister publicly justified his
35actions in long letters-to-the-editor. But whatever the merits of
his case he continued to receive a bad press as further individuals
36and groups added their comments to the mushrooming controversy.
The hostile reaction seems to have hardened the Minister's
attitude. It was known within his department, for example, that he
37was 'firmly against compromise'. He did, however, agree to meet a
deputation from the UPNG Council after representations from the
Administrator. Hay had advised the department that one of the chief
objections to the Minister's decision was that it deprived the medical
students of degrees; possibly some arrangement might therefore be
reached whereby PMC remained under Administration control but with
38UPNG awarding its graduates degrees. The UPNG deputation, consisting
of Karmel, Gunther, Hetzel and Spate, met Barnes and Smith in Canberra
on 27 January 1970. The meeting traversed the now well-worn ground
between them. Barnes and Smith said government must retain control
of medical training; the deputation countered by saying substantial
DPH representation on the Faculty of Medicine would ensure that. The
Minister and Secretary then alluded to the possibility of escalating
costs of training under UPNG patronage; the UPNG party replied that
DPH accepted the costing in the Maddocks Report as reasonable. The
Minister by this stage seemed to have painted himself into a corner,
but there was still one way out: 'having regard to the fact that
there was an elected political system' it was appropriate for him to
turn the matter over to the Administrator's Executive Council (AEC),
39the embryonic Papua New Guinean Cabinet, for a decision. Gunther 
quickly countered, 'Will you accept its decision?' Barnes answered 
'Yes’. Spate intervened to say, 'Such a step could be a wise one in
34 The Australian, 20 December 1969, p. 4.
35 Barnes to The Australian and Post-Courier, folios 91, 94a,
DTOR 69/3556.
36 See for example letters to The Australian, 24 December 1969, p.4.
37 Folios 94a and 151, DTOR 69/3556.
38 Hay, telexes to Territories, 24 December 1969 and 13 January 
1970, DTOR 69/3556.
39 Record of discussion, 27 January 1970, folios 53-5, DTOR 
70/2008.
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the interests of the development of self-government1. Smith said he 
thought 'a quick decision could be expected, perhaps within several 
months' [author’s italics]. The meeting then broke up with all 
parties happy.^
Possibly the Minister thought the AEC would back him up,
and especially that the Ministerial Member for Health, Tore Lokoloko,
would persuade his colleagues to uphold the prohibition on the transfer
of PMC. If so his faith was misplaced. Before the AEC met to consider
the question Lokoloko visited Gunther at UPNG to seek advice. 'We
have to get CEB [Barnes' initials] off the hook', he said. 'How do 
41we go about it?' Lokoloko introduced the issue at an AEC meeting
in April 1970. He simply said UPNG should have a medical faculty.
Council then voted to transfer PMC to UPNG, subject to provisos that
the Treasury Department would advise on medical faculty finances, and
42that DPH would have representatives on the Faculty. The Minister 
accepted this. He announced he would allow the merger to proceed 
since the AEC had imposed conditions on UPNG 'which overcame difficult­
ies that prevented the government agreeing to the transfer last 
43November'. His statement also went to lengths to explain that he
had not 'somersaulted' on the issue.^ Apparently he was most anxious
for his acceptance of the AEC decision not to be seen as a 'defeat'
or 'reversal', for his department subsequently drafted a letter-to-
the-editor for circulation to the press, and a 'Dorothy Dix' question
for parliament to scotch such a thought and to point out that 'the
45government has been entirely consistent throughout the issue'.
By this stage probably few people worried whether or not 
the Minister had changed his mind. The creation of the Faculty of
40 ibid.; Gunther, RIW, p. 39; Spate, personal communication.
41 Gunther, loc. cit.
42 Record of AEC meeting no. 10 of 1970, DTOR 70/2008.
43 Ministerial press release, 2 May 1970, DTOR 70/2008.
44 ibid.
45 Smith to Hennessy, 29 April 1970; draft letter, folios 
105-7, and draft question and answer, folio 138, DTOR 
70/2008.
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Medicine and its absorption of PMC were now of more urgent concern.
UPNG and DPH busied themselves with arrangements for bringing PMC
within the University structure by the beginning of the 1971 academic
year. Maddocks, appropriately, became foundation Dean of the Faculty
of Medicine, and Scragg became foundation Professor of Social and
Preventive Medicine. Certain disagreements over medical education
continued to cause friction between the government and UPNG at least
until Gunther retired in early 1972 - the trend towards higher costs
in medical education at UPNG, the government's actions to curb this,
46and the threat to UPNG autonomy Gunther thought this posed. How­
ever, the major battle had already been fought, and these skirmishes 
were part of the mopping up.
The controversy over the future of PMC more than any other 
issue in the first four or five years of university education in Papua 
New Guinea enabled the government and UPNG to define the limits of 
their control over the emergent university system. The controversy 
showed government it could not expect to exert the far-reaching 
direct control it might regard as necessary; and UPNG learnt that it 
could never assume it had a carte btanche for new developments, no 
matter how sorely it might wish to embark on these. Once again the 
fundamental issues were the relative limits of university autonomy 
and government control. Gunther stated the UPNG position unequivocally 
'The University... cannot allow public servants to dictate what it 
shall do, and in so doing destroy the very fabric of the University - 
its academic autonomy'. ^  For its part the government was not only 
learning how jealously UPNG guarded its autonomy; it was also discover­
ing that the 'power of the purse' was circumscribed. UPNG's 1968 
campaign over finances suggested that the University would tolerate 
no government attempt to influence University policy through manipu­
lation of the purse strings. The University would probably cast any 
such attempt as an erosion of its autonomy; and if the government 
persisted there was a good chance UPNG would mount an embarrassing 
publicity campaign against it.
46 See correspondence between Gunther and Johnson, August 1971- 
February 1972, folios 185-226, DTOR 70/2008.
47 Gunther to Hay, 4 February 1970, DTOR 69/3556.
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The Minister and Secretary perhaps realized the difficulties 
they could get into if questions of university autonomy arose; but 
their conviction that government would get a poorer deal in student 
output and costs of training if PMC joined UPNG persuaded them, after 
much procrastination, to block the merger. The fact that Gunther was 
the bete noire of both seems to have made that decision easier. How­
ever, they had not reckoned with the strength of UPNG ambition, nor 
its ability to swing public opinion behind it. If, after the re­
location of IHTE and the 1968 budgetary dispute, they still needed 
reminding that the tertiary institutions were political operators who 
resented being pushed around, then the controversy over PMC was an 
object lesson.
While government had to learn to cope with UPNG and IHTE 
autonomy, the institutions in turn were learning to live within their 
means and under perpetual government surveillance. Part of that 
lesson was to realize that government did not of necessity share 
their enthusiasm for new ventures, no matter how worthwhile these 
might be educationally. The government was likely to be more interest­
ed in prosaic cost-benefit analyses of new schemes than in their 
educational value. Both government and institutions thus had something 
to learn from their disputes, and the disagreements helped them to 
find a modus vivendi.
Subsequent events have proved that the fears of the Department
of Territories were justified. Medical training costs rose
appreciably: whereas the Maddocks Report estimated the annual cost
per student would be $9800 by 1973 the actual cost was $13,000,
48compared with $3400 for non-medical students at UPNG. And fewer
medical students graduated: although PMC produced 34 diplomates in
medicine between 1965 and 1969, the UPNG Faculty of Medicine graduated
only 13 students with the M.B.B.S. degree by the end of 1975, and
49five of them were expatriates. So expensive indeed was medical 
training by 1976, and so small the return from it, that when UPNG was
48 Figures derived from UPNG Submission for Funds, July 1973, 
UPNGR K.33, and Maddocks Report, DTOR 69/5536.
49 Papua New Guinea press release no. 1401, 16 December 1969, 
DTOR 69/3555; UPNG, Calendar 1976.
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overtaken by a new financial crisis the UPNG Professor of History 
suggested closing down the Faculty of Medicine and sending the 
country’s handful of medical students abroad for training.^
Barnes’ and Smith’s assessment of the probable direction of 
medical training was thus correct; and Karmel himself later said it 
was 'realisticNevertheless they badly misjudged the mood of the 
times. Their attempt to preserve in Papua New Guinea the system of 
sub-degree level medical training might ultimately have been to the 
benefit of the country, but it was a decision only an independent 
country could take. Their decision, handed down magisterially from 
the seat of colonial power, could only be seen as a form of arrogant 
paternalism because it blocked the natural aspirations of a number of 
articulate, determined and influential interest groups in Papua New 
Guinea. By their decision they were obstructing not only the 
University’s ambitions, but those of the medical students, their 
teachers, and the medical profession generally. These groups used all 
the resources open to them to pursue their ambitions and counter the 
Minister's decision - the news media, their connections with the 
Australian medical profession, the sympathy of the Administrator and 
his DPH officials, and informal networks of communication within the 
public service. They did this to great advantage, much assisted by 
having public opinion on their side. Perhaps a less costly form of 
training at the diploma level was the country’s real need. But in 
an era of rising nationalism it was unwise for the department to insist 
on this.
The Department of Territories’ persistent refusal to heed 
the counsel of its advisers in Papua New Guinea caused it to back 
into a corner, from which in the end it had to make a humiliating 
withdrawal. Its obstinacy before it did that had a number of signifi­
cant effects. As in the budgetary dispute of 1968, one of these was 
to give UPNG confidence in entering the national political arena. It 
subsequently was never far from the national limelight. Another
50 D. Denoon, minute to Academic Developments Committee, 20 
August 1975, UPNGR E.32 (part 3).
51 Karmel, RIW, p. 2.
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effect was to solidify the ’class' interest of a section of the Papua 
New Guinean ’presumptive elite' - the medical students. The medical 
students had a strong collective interest in the future of medical 
education as it affected their future professional status, and income. 
Their vehement reaction as they entered the dispute was that of a 
professional group with a 'class' interest to defend.
Yet another effect of the department's action was to produce 
severe strains in Canberra-Port Moresby relations. The Administrator 
and his DPH advisers clearly resented the Minister's consistent 
refusal to heed their advice. They sympathized with UPNG, and were 
as persistent as the University in insisting that the PMC-UPNG merger 
should proceed. It was Port Moresby against the colonial overlords 
of Canberra, and this became obvious when the AEC settled the dispute 
in UPNG's favour without demur. The Minister's action in passing 
the issue to the AEC for adjudication was itself a significant step, 
for this was the first occasion on which a dispute between a statutory 
body in Papua New Guinea and the government in Canberra was referred 
to the embryonic national Cabinet for resolution. Although a start 
to the effective transfer of power from Canberra to Port Moresby did 
not occur until later in 1970, the referral of the PMC question to 
the AEC showed that the time was ripe and that the transfer could 
safely begin.
Once again the University had been able to influence events 
in its own favour through energetic and enterprising political action. 
This time, however, its dealings had stirred deeper ripples in the 
Papua New Guinean pond than ever before. That the university 
institutions were a potent political force had become very clear.
(c) UPNG AND IHTE AS SOCIAL LEAVEN
The controversies in which the new tertiary institutions became 
engaged in the late 1960s gave them considerable public prominence.
But UPNG and IHTE had more than a simple facility for attracting 
attention. Despite their newness they were promoting subtle though 
far-reaching changes in the colonial society that was Papua New Guinea 
of the time.
Ill
The students and staff formed an important reference group
for the rest of the community. They were a new element within colonial
society, with a distinctive style of their own. Unrestricted by public
service discipline or the restraints of village life they dressed more
casually, expressed ideas more freely, were more prepared to challenge
established conventions, and to question existing values. Perhaps
the first sacred cow they toppled was the informal racial segregation
prevailing in Port Moresby, Lae and elsewhere. When UPNG students
began drinking with their teachers in the ’whites only’ bar of the
Boroko Hotel they raised the eyebrows of black and white alike, but
before long other Papua New Guineans followed them in and the bar was 
52soon integrated. In Lae when the IHTE Australian Rules football
team took out the premiership in its first year in the town competition,
beating the team of a 'whites only’ club, they were invited back to
the defeated team's clubhouse for drinks. They were probably the first
Papua New Guineans, apart from cleaners and bar attendants, who had
53ever crossed the threshhold. There were other ways in which the 
institutions helped break the colour bar. Before 1966 there had been 
only one or two cases where Papua New Guinean men had married white 
women. But with the establishment of the campuses, where attitudes 
were more tolerant than elsewhere, a number of Papua New Guineans had 
white consorts. The sex-race tabu fast became an anachronism as a 
result.
Such changes probably came about unconsciously, without the 
institutions' deliberately setting themselves up as the iconoclasts 
within colonial society. But in other directions campus residents 
purposely set out to challenge many of the assumptions of colonial 
society. In particular they had greater sensitivity than the general 
public to issues of racial discrimination, which still existed in many 
overt and covert forms. They were ever ready to root it out whenever 
they saw it. Thus, one of the UPNG student leaders staged a one-man 
demonstration by chewing betel nut at the Port Moresby airport, where
52 Meek, RIW, p. 3; Inglis (1968), p. 72.
53 Personal observation, 1968.
54 Gunther, RIW, p. 22.
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prominent signs warned against the practice. When challenged he loudly 
drew attention to the fact that whites could smoke and litter the 
floor with cigarette butts without fear of prosecution."^
Both IHTE and UPNG also gave the country regular experience 
of a phenomenon it had rarely witnessed in the past - the large-scale 
student demonstration. In early 1968, not long after IHTE had moved 
to Lae, Institute students marched through the central shopping area 
one Saturday morning behind a wheelbarrow they hoped to fill with 
donations for victims of the Biafran civil war in Nigeria. Unused to 
such spectacles, a number of townspeople told them curtly that their 
proper place was back on the campus among their books. Other towns­
people, who possibly appreciated that Lae at long last had entered the
561960s, dropped $90 into the barrow. UPNG students on a number of 
occasions organized demonstrations to protest what they saw as the 
paternalism and colonialist attitude of the Australian government.
More than once C.E. Barnes had to enter or leave his plane furtively 
at the Port Moresby airport to avoid students massed outside. And in 
1969 they demonstrated against the so-called 'act of free choice' 
through which the neighbouring people of West Irian were absorbed into 
Indonesia. But the best publicized of the early demonstrations was in 
1968 when the South African ambassador to Australia had to run the 
gauntlet of a phalanx of UPNG students waving placards and shouting 
anti-apartheid slogans.^ It was clear that those at IHTE and UPNG 
were intolerant of many of the time-honoured conventions of colonial 
society; and it was also obvious that they wished to awaken the country 
to issues wider than local parish-pump concerns.
While some critics of the two institutions could protest that
'more [than demonstrations] was to be expected of the future leaders of 
58the country', others came to see that IHTE and UPNG were performing 
a valuable function by creating a wider social vision among both blacks 
and whites. Perhaps the changing public attitude was reflected in the
55 Hank Nelson, personal communication.
56 Personal observation, 1968.
57 PIM 39(9) September 1968, p. 27.
58 ibid., citing the South Pacific Post.
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changing tone of the local press, which became at once less suspicious
of the students and their teachers and less preoccupied with the affairs
of the European community alone. Previously the local press had tended
to stereotype the institutions as havens for disaffected whites and
easily-led black militants. A journalist who had been covering events
in Papua New Guinea for the Pacific Islands Monthly for many years
indicated something of a more tolerant view when he interviewed Gunther
in 1968. He said he had formerly been sceptical of the value of a
university in Papua New Guinea and had therefore reported UPNG adversely.
But now he could see that it was giving the community more than mere
formal training he was convinced of its value, and would henceforth
59report it sympathetically.
The institutions were indeed concerned with education in its 
broadest sense, and by no means confined themselves to classroom 
teaching. UPNG in particular provoked serious and well-informed public 
discussion of the country’s problems of development and the tasks it 
must face during the transition to independence. The monthly seminars 
of a number of UPNG academic departments and the inaugural lectures 
of the various professors were public events. They became a forum 
in which staff, students and members of the general public could 
participate. As staff members at both UPNG and IHTE began conducting 
research into many aspects of the history, sociology, economics, 
politics, geography, linguistics, law, and the education system of 
Papua New Guinea, a steady volume of published research findings 
became available to form the basis for further discussion and research. 
The intellectual impact of UPNG became most obvious at the annual 
Waigani Seminar, which UPNG began mounting in 1967 in collaboration 
with the New Guinea Research Unit of ANU. Each seminar was organized 
in turn by one of the academic departments of the University, and 
followed a theme consonant with the specialization of the department 
concerned. The seminars attracted widespread attention from scholars 
interested in development studies generally and Melanesia in particular. 
In 1972, for example, when the Economics Department ran the seminar 
on the theme ’Priorities in Melanesian Development’, more than sixty
59 Gunther to Karmel, 1 November 1968, GKC.
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scholars and experts in various aspects of development presented papers. 
Among the 'keynote* speakers invited from overseas were the radical 
educationalist, Ivan Illich, and the Africanist and developmental 
agriculturalist, Rene Dumont. IHTE also contributed to public ideas 
with an annual seminar, organized primarily for tertiary students. The 
first of these, in 1970, drew students from all the major institutions 
of tertiary education in Papua New Guinea to discuss the role of 
tertiary students in national politics. By sponsoring such activities 
UPNG and IHTE greatly stimulated critical thinking on national issues.
The two institutions helped to sustain the atmosphere of 
intellectual ferment they had created through the notable scholarship 
of some academic departments. UPNG attracted some celebrated academics 
to its staff, and their presence generated a body of distinguished 
research. The History Department under its first professor, Inglis, 
Government under C.D. Rowley, Geography under R.G. Ward, Anthropology 
under R.N.H. Bulmer, and Economics under A. Clunies-Ross established 
traditions of fine scholarship and relevant research. The Institute 
also attracted some notable scholars, and its schools of Engineering, 
Architecture and Business Administration began exploring problems of 
small-scale development, devising schemes of 'appropriate' technology 
for application in rural villages and urban migrant settlements.
Another organization with research interests in Papua New Guinea, and 
links with both IHTE and UPNG was the ANU New Guinea Research Unit. 
Established in 1961, the Unit had been conducting a number of research 
projects into socio-economic aspects of development which over the 
years resulted in more than sixty authoritative monographs. There was 
considerable cross-fertilization between UPNG and the Unit, facilitated 
by their physical juxtaposition at Waigani, and most notably revealed 
in their joint sponsorship of the Waigani Seminars. The Unit implanted 
a tradition of rigorous scholarship and critical inquiry which the 
country had not known before and which the two tertiary institutions 
were able to build upon.
As well as stimulating the intellectual life of the country 
UPNG and IHTE had a strong impact on its cultural life. Generally 
they aroused public awareness of the value of the rich and unique 
traditional art forms. UPNG made a specific contribution by helping
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develop distinctive new art forms inspired by traditional models. The
University did much for the arts by engaging a specialist in the
literature of developing countries, Ulli Beier, to teach creative
writing. Under his guidance a spectacular flowering of Papua New
Guinean literature began in the late 1960s. His students produced a
substantial body of poetry and drama, which was published in a UPNG-
sponsored journal, Kovave^  and the first books to be published by Papua
New Guineans. What he did for literature his wife did for the plastic
arts, and under her tuition a number of talented copper-beaters,
painters, sculptors and potters developed their artistic skills.
Gunther claimed that the Beiers together ’did more for the creative
arts in Papua New Guinea in three years than the Administration and
60Missions had in eighty’. Shrewdly he had the University sponsor 
their work, which not only had great public relations value for UPNG 
in its first three or four years but led directly to the later establish­
ment of the government-funded Creative Arts Centre at Waigani.
The institutions of tertiary education were thus producing 
changes in Papua New Guinea from their inception. In challenging the 
mores of the colonial society they helped the mass of Papua New 
Guineans prepare themselves for independence. More than any other 
institutions that had preceded them they were a source of.informed, 
critical and articulate comment on all aspects of the society of Papua 
New Guinea. By fulfilling that function they became something of a 
national conscience, and in the absence of a strong local press, a 
’fourth estate’. And finally, by promoting the values of traditional 
culture and by providing opportunities for the development of a new 
and national culture, they helped foster a national consciousness. In 
short they supplied social leavening which helped Papua New Guinea rise 
rapidly towards independence.
60 Gunther, RIW, p. 28.
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CHAPTER 4
RAPID EXPANSION AND PROBLEMS OF CO-ORDINATION 
IN HIGHER EDUCATION
IN 1960 the Papua New Guinean education system was poorly developed 
at 'the top', the tertiary level. This was hardly true a decade later, 
with at least fifty institutions of post-secondary education."^ A 
proliferation of training institutions had been occurring as government 
departments, statutory agencies, Christian missions and business firms 
began foreseeing the need to localize. The result was a confusing 
expansion as many organizations set up training schemes to cater for 
their own special requirements. The growth of so many institutions 
gave educational planners many a headache as they worried first over 
the effects of the proliferation, and second over means for containing 
it and producing a more rational system of tertiary education.
(a) THE EFFECTS OF PROLIFERATION
The new institutions varied greatly in scope, entry level, and 
length of training. Several church seminaries offered five to six 
year programmes of rigorous, high-quality academic education comparable 
to that of the University. Some, such as the Malaria, and Customs 
Officers Schools, offered only short courses of between one and six 
months. Many offered two- and three-year programmes of combined 
general and specialized vocational education - the nine church and 
three government teachers' colleges, the agricultural colleges and 
training centres, and the forestry college. Others offered strictly 
practical and vocational training - the Electricity Commission Training 
Centre, the Bureau of Meteorology Training Centre, the Nautical School, 
and the Posts and Telegraphs Training College. Others - the Local 
Government Staff College, the Welfare Training Centre, and the Military 
Cadet School - offered combined general and vocational courses inter­
spersed with periods of practical experience in the field. Some, like 
the teachers' college 'A' Course, and the Aid Post Orderlies Training
1 Allen Brown (et at.) (1971), pp. 17-25.
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Centre, required only a low-level post-primary education; others,
particularly the Catholic seminary, took entrants from the Form 6 
2level. In addition to these institutions were training schemes from 
technician to executive level conducted by commercial and industrial 
firms such as Bougainville Copper, W.R. Carpenter, and New Guinea 
Containers.
By the late 1960s the defects of the haphazard growth of 
tertiary education were becoming obvious. K.R. McKinnon, who had 
become Director of Education in 1966, often had cause to wring his 
hands in regret that
none of the institutions... shares a common governing 
body; there is no interchange of staff; and there is no 
co-ordination between them.... The topsy-like growth of 
tertiary institutions means that liberal arts faculties 
are duplicated in all of them; each has to have a 
library; each has science facilities (sometimes used as 
little as one-tenth of the time); each has separate 
student facilities; each has an administration. Generally 
small tertiary institutions are expensive and uneconomical 
and present policies can only become more expensive as 
time goes on.... On the academic side most of the instit­
utions are so small that staff crises occur when one key 
member of staff leaves.... Also there is the problem of 
standardization of qualifications. There is as yet no 
clear structure of degrees, diplomas, certificates and 
subsidiary qualifications.... Faculties and departments, 
once established, have a way of going on forever irre­
spective of the decline in need after the first surge of 
requirements has been met. They may use finance which 
might be better used on other courses if there were 
effective co-ordination of enrolment patterns. 3
Other educationalists joined him in deploring the fragmentation and 
dispersal of higher education. They all pointed out that ’duplication
is a financial folly,... [and] to financial waste is added intellectual
. 4waste as teachers and students are denied the stimulus of contact .
Offsetting the disadvantages of fragmented expansion were 
certain political benefits: 'the spread of these institutions around
the country is politically attractive [as it] avoids concentration of
2
3
4
ibid.
K.R. McKinnon (1971), pp. 20-1.
Dickson (1969), p. 91; cf. Roe (1968), pp. 62-7.
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expenditure in one a r e a ' T h e  political advantages of dispersal were 
underlined by the frequent demands politicians made for ever more 
educational institutions in their home districts. They equated the 
presence of educational institutions with economic development, and 
to appease their regional pride some dispersal of tertiary education 
was politic. Highlands politicians in particular were vocal in 
decrying the concentration of facilities in two or three coastal towns, 
and in demanding that such visible fruits of progress be shared more 
equitably among districts. In 1968, for example, a Chimbu parliament­
arian, Siwi Kurondo, told the House of Assembly that as Australia had 
ten universities and Papua New Guinea only one, the time had come for 
the creation of a second university - in the Chimbu Province. Dispersal 
therefore made political sense even if educationally and economically 
unsound. But whether or not its value in this respect outweighed its 
disadvantages was something no one seemed sure about.
How to tackle the uncoordinated growth, dispersal, and frag­
mentation of tertiary education was a problem. The Currie Report, 
envisaged by Hasluck as the master plan for development, gave little 
help: the structure it proposed bore little resemblance to what
actually grew. It saw the University as an 'umbrella’ organization 
eventually containing many institutions such as the teachers' colleges, 
IHTE, the Administrative College, the Medical College, Bulolo Forestry 
College, and Vudal Agricultural College. But UPNG had not developed 
in this way, and by the end of the 1960s none of the specialized 
vocational institutions were associated with it - IHTE because of the 
move to Lae; the Administrative, Agricultural, and Forestry Colleges 
because the departments controlling them wished to retain close control 
over their activities; the teachers' colleges because of UPNG's 
reluctance to take them in; and the Medical College because of pro-
5
6
McKinnon, loc. cit.
HAD 2(1) June 1968, p. 102; and 2(21) November 1971, 
p. 5454.
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crastination in Canberra. The Currie Commissioners had not foreseen 
such political contingencies, assuming the development of higher 
education would be wholly rational. Consequently their scheme was now
g
largely irrelevant.
One of the chief obstacles to co-ordination beneath a
University ’umbrella’, as intended by the Currie Report, was the
attitude of UPNG itself. UPNG had shown itself extremely reluctant
to co-operate with other institutions. The rupture with IHTE preceding
the Institute’s move to Lae, and the University’s reluctance thereafter
to engage in dialogue with IHTE, ensured that the two institutions
9remained structurally as well as geographically distant. The 
University’s insistence that, as an autonomous body, it could not 
accept direction from the government was a further problem, particularly 
in dealing with institutions run by government departments. The 
University’s determination here was one of the factors delaying the 
UPNG-Medical College merger, and it was one of the reasons why the 
Public Service Commissioner rejected suggestions for closer UPNG- 
Administrative College ties. Government departments running tertiary 
colleges feared that if UPNG took charge of their training facilities 
they would lose control of an activity in which they had made substantial 
investments.^^ And the University's attitude towards the teachers’ 
colleges prevented closer co-operation in teacher education. UPNG 
seemed to fear that its academic reputation would be tainted through 
association with the teachers’ colleges. Its early dealings with
7 The respective attitudes of the Departments of Agriculture 
and Forests to UPNG involvement in their training programmes 
is detailed in correspondence between Gunther and the 
Administration contained in UPNGR A.18 and F.81. The attitude 
of the Public Service Commissioner is evident in C.D. Rowley,
RIW, and D. Chenoweth, RIW. The UPNG attitude to the teachers' 
colleges is evident in UPNGR F.69 (part 1); Gunther, RIW,
pp. 16 and 53; and McKinnon, RIW. See also chapter 5 below.
8 McKinnon, RIW, p. 4.
9 UPNG’s attitude to closer links with IHTE is revealed in 
Gunther to Karmel, 25 March 1970, GKC, in which Gunther 
explains why the University is not interested in cross-represent­
ation between the University and Institute Councils. See also 
Gunther, RIW, pp. 10 and 52.
10 See f.n. 7 above.
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Goroka Teachers’ College demonstrated that: there was a series of
instances in which UPNG revealed an inflexible attitude towards the
courses and the staff of the college. It was reluctant to recognize
Goroka courses as worthy of credit towards degrees at UPNG, and it was
loth to recognize Goroka staff as competent to teach courses worthy
of being given such credit.^ So uncompromising was the University
in such matters that McKinnon complained publicly to the 1970 ANZAAS
Conference (held at UPNG) about the ’strongly entrenched, conservative
element within the University Professorial Board which seemingly wants
to push the University irrevocably in the direction of a typically
Australian institution and which views suggestions for co-ordination
and adjustment of the university structure to local needs as unwork- 
12able'. Gunther indignantly contested this view, accusing the
13Director of Education of 'an inexcusable attack’ on the University.
But there was nevertheless little doubt that UPNG's concern to maintain 
reputable 'international' standards made it shy of closer contact with 
lesser institutions.
There were conflicting views on how best to handle the 
'topsy-like' growth of training institutions. Roe, the UPNG Professor 
of Education, a frequent commentator on educational matters in the 
late 1960s, deplored the economic costs of dispersal but was vague 
and non-commital about solutions. Whatever happened, he nevertheless 
saw UPNG as 'the key institution'. He assumed the most academically 
able students would wish to attend UPNG, and that less able students 
would attend lesser institutions, towards which he exhibited a 
condescending attitude. (For instance, he referred disparagingly to 
the fact that 'the [IHTE]... has "Professors"'.^) He suggested that 
because students would tend to sort themselves out by academic 
ability, the institutions they chose to attend would be similarly 
sorted into some 'frankly hierarchical arrangement'.^^ Eventually
11 See correspondence between GTC and UPNG over recognition of 
GTC staff and courses by UPNG, UPNGR F.69 (part 1).
12 McKinnon (1971), p. 21.
13 Gunther to McKinnon, 31 August 1970, UPNGR A.34-2 (part 1).
14 Roe (1968), p. 63.
15 ibid., p. 71.
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they would all form some association with UPNG as intended by the
Currie Report, he thought, with the University as the brightest star
16in the constellation.
The Department of Education under McKinnon rejected such 
views. He had strong opinions on the optimal means for rationalizing 
higher education, and his attempts to put these into practice produced 
tensions between his department and the University. He believed that 
because tertiary education had not developed within the Currie frame­
work some other organizational structure must come into being to 
contain and direct the growth. Roe’s hierarchical system with UPNG 
as the key institution was inappropriate, he argued, because ’that 
type of organization would... lower [the] status of technological 
occupations’ for which students were prepared in the other institutions.' 
He had little faith in the ability of UPNG to co-ordinate the lesser 
institutions even if it willingly accepted its ’umbrella’ role. UPNG, 
he believed, under the leadership of Gunther and the Professorial 
Board was becoming ’a dreary unimaginative imitation of Australian
universities', too preoccupied with its own concerns to be much
18bothered with lesser institutions. Co-ordination and rationalization 
were therefore unlikely in a UPNG-dominated structure.
McKinnon had other misgivings too. He was concerned at the 
competition he saw developing between IHTE and UPNG. Almost as soon 
as IHTE shifted to Lae the Institute began moves to upgrade its status. 
The first big step upwards came in 1969 when IHTE successfully lobbied 
to change its name from ’Institute of Higher Technical Education’ to 
’Institute of Technology’ (IOT). The government readily agreed to 
this as 'Institute of Technology’ was at once less cumbersome, ’in line 
with existing practice in other countries’, and gave ’clearer 
indication of the types of courses likely to be undertaken'. The 
Institute’s ambitions, and the effect these might have on UPNG, worried 
McKinnon, who belonged to both IOT and UPNG Councils. Competition
16 ibid.
17 McKinnon (1968), p. 103.
18 McKinnon (1971), p. 21.
19 HAD 2(6) August-September 1969, pp. 1655-6.
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between them as the former tried to catch up and the latter endeavoured
to stay ahead seemed sure to result in unnecessary duplication and
cost. UPNG, for example, was planning to teach accountancy - an IOT
preserve - as a ’service to Port Moresby residents’, and was canvass-
20ing the possibility of moving into engineering for the same reason.
If the Institute made similar inroads on UPNG programmes such as
biological sciences and liberal arts, further duplication and increased
costs would occur. The ’gross disparities between the "big two"[UPNG
and IOT] and the other lesser tertiary institutions’ also troubled 
21McKinnon. He wished to resist 'the unthinking growth of the
22Australian hierarchy of tertiary institutions’. Such an hierarchy,
ranked according to prestige, ability of students and level of funding,
he argued, ill-befitted a country like Papua New Guinea whose needs
were as great in the sub-professional, sub-graduate manpower categories
as in the professional categories supplied by the 'big two'. But
unless the tertiary system were strictly held to well-defined paths,
the hierarchical ranking would continue with resultant imbalances in 
23the workforce.
The trend towards a 'pecking order’ among tertiary institutions 
was becoming marked by the end of the 1960s. The demand for Form IV 
leavers from government departments, private employers and training 
institutions exceeded the supply to such an extent that in 1969 
Goroka Teachers' College, the premier teacher training institution,
could not reach its target intake of 54 new students. There were only
2438 new enrolments, compared with 49 the year before. IOT experienced
a shortfall too, taking in only 75 new students for 110 vacancies.
25UPNG, on the other hand, had 108 berths, all filled. The University, 
as the prestige institution, was clearly attracting more applicants; 
and with more students it was able to claim a larger share of the
20 Report by Registrar to final meeting of Interim Council,
UPNGR D .12 (part 1).
21 McKinnon, RIW, p. 1.
22 ibid.
23 ibid.
24 Hay, telex to Territories, 19 February 1969, DTOR 68/5647.
25 Hay, telex to Territories, 4 March 1969; Smith to Hay,
21 April 1969, DTOR 68/5647.
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finance available. If this trend continued, UPNG would flourish while 
the lesser institutions languished, with adverse effects on the man­
power categories they were meant to supply. The evolution of a 
’pecking order1 concerned the Department of Territories as well as 
McKinnon, and the department believed 'strong measures' such as 
cutting back UPNG enrolments were needed to redirect students away 
from UPNG and into IOT and Goroka Teachers' College. But, possibly
realizing what a furore such a move might create among UPNG ranks, it 
26dropped the idea. Instead the department called on the Administration
for proposals for producing a better distribution of students among
the tertiary institutions. From this came a scheme of Public Service
Board cadetships offering ’generous emoluments' to students agreeing
27to undertake particular courses at particular institutions. However, 
this scheme dealt with only one aspect of a larger problem. Some 
administrative structure was still needed to ensure balanced develop­
ment in tertiary education. Sir Leslie Melville, who began making 
annual trips to Papua New Guinea in 1969 to assess UPNG and IOT 
estimates, supported this view. He suggested that to keep UPNG and 
IOT needs in perspective with those of lesser institutions, some form 
of planning/co-ordinating machinery similar in function to the
Australian Universities Commission should regulate the development of
28all post-secondary education.
Melville's own work, indeed, pointed to the need for an
organization to co-ordinate higher education and provide expert advice
on funding. Early in his appointment it had become obvious that there
were issues - the mounting of new courses, the teaching of new
disciplines - which lay beyond his scope but on which government needed 
29expert opinion. In addition there was discontent over the way he 
performed his functions. Both institutions believed his visits to
26 Draft cable, Territories to Administrator, December 1969, 
DTOR 68/5647.
27 Ministerial press release, 'Cadetships for local officers', 
3 November 1969, DTOR 68/5647.
28 McKinnon, RIW, p. 1.
29 Karmel to Inglis, citing correspondence from the Assistant 
Administrator, 21 April 1969, GKC.
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Papua New Guinea were too brief for him to assess their needs properly.
They complained that they put much effort into preparing comprehensive
and detailed submissions for funds, but that he gave them only cursory
30perusal and then did not grant them what they required. This was
ironic, because Melville deliberately set out to be generous with
them, endeavouring to recommend funding which, on a per capita student
31basis, was roughly double the levels applying in Australia. UPNG 
in particular made vociferous complaints, believing that on certain 
specific issues he had obstinately refused to give due consideration 
to its case. His adverse comments on the UPNG-Medical College merger 
was one example. Another was his substantial reduction of the UPNG 
library vote on the grounds that the University had received donations 
of some 50,000 second-hand books following a public appeal by the 
librarian. The University argued vigorously that only about a fifth 
of the books were of any value and that the rest had been disposed 
of; Melville stuck to his decision, however, claiming that UPNG did
32not need the amount claimed for the library because of the donations. 
The inadequacies of the ’one-man grants commission’ threw into relief 
the need for more comprehensive machinery for advising government on 
all aspects of tertiary education.
McKinnon, recognizing the inadequacy of the Currie Report as 
a guide, and the defects of the arrangement with Melville, believed 
a new commission of inquiry should be formed to investigate higher 
education, determine future directions of development, and recommend 
some structure for managing the system. He canvassed the idea with 
Gunther and Duncanson, who agreed with it, then took the matter up
30 Meek, RIW, p. 4; Gunther, RIW, p. 48.
31 Sir Leslie Melville, RIW. The two institutions invariably
requested more than they needed, though within reason. 
Arriving at the recommended amount was therefore a result 
of bargaining. Melville started out by trying to give them 
double the level of Australian funding; thus, in 1969 he 
recommended a per capita student expenditure of $3600 for 
UPNG and $5900 for IOT, compared with the $1800 then being 
granted to James Cook University, the $2080 going to Uni­
versity of New England, and the $1600 going to University
of Newcastle.
32 Meek, loc. cit.; Gunther, loc. cit.
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33with the Department of Territories. The department welcomed the
suggestion, especially as it promised to bring economies through more
efficient use of resources - something dear to both Minister and
Secretary. In April 1970 the department agreed to appoint a ’Committee
of Inquiry into Higher Education in Papua New Guinea' which duly came
34into being later in the year and began work in December.
During the negotiations to set up the Committee of Inquiry 
into Higher Education a complex interplay had developed between 
McKinnon and Gunther at personal and professional levels. Their 
relationship was significant for it helped shape the course of develop­
ment in tertiary education. Both were assertive and ambitious, their 
views on how tertiary education should develop varied, they had 
conflicting interests to protect, and so it was not suprprising that 
severe disagreements arose between them.
McKinnon first went to Papua New Guinea in 1954, a junior 
primary teacher in the Department of Education. His subsequent rise 
to the Directorship was spectacular, and he had demonstrated out­
standing abilities as both administrator and scholar, which Gunther
35generously conceded. His personal philosophy of education was
moralistic: he believed education should inculcate 'correct' attitudes 
and values. It was also strongly anti-elitist. He was critical of 
the elitist values he believed UPNG and IOT were encouraging, and he 
thought these inappropriate in a putatively egalitarian society such 
as that of Papua New Guinea. Trends at UPNG were especially disturb­
ing, and, he felt, reflected Gunther's influence. He believed that
the sort of institution which developed at UPNG was a 
monument to Gunther. Everything that Gunther did had 
to be successful, and the imposing buildings of UPNG 
had to be a visible sign of the success of the University 
and of Gunther's success in creating it. I had many 
disagreements with the University over its 'hidden
33 McKinnon, notes of discussions with Gunther and Duncanson, 
UPNGR A.34-2 (part 1).
34 McKinnon to Gunther, 24 April 1970, UPNGR A.34-2 (part 1).
35 Gunther to Karmel, 17 and 28 July 1970, GKC; RIW, pp. 19-21, 
49.
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curriculum*, [he said] and the sort of things the 
University taught its students about themselves - their 
superiority, their privileges, their removal and 
isolation from the concerns of the people. Gunther was 
blind to issues like this. 36
As Director of Education he was concerned with the position of UPNG 
and IOT within the total scheme of education. He had a missionary 
zeal to prevent their becoming elite institutions at the apex of 
various lesser colleges and schools. He later stated his objectives 
in tertiary education in these terms:
I wanted to end the Western, hierarchical basis of 
tertiary education which the Papua New Guinea system 
had developed, as this would foster inappropriate 
values and would make difficult the work of lesser 
institutions whose output was just as important to 
national development as the two elite institutions. 37
His position gave him considerable scope for putting personal
philosophy into official practice. From Johnson he had inherited
responsibility for co-ordinating tertiary education, and it was through
him that liaison between the Administration and the two institutions 
38took place. His personal attitude towards UPNG and his official 
function thus placed him in a position where friction with Gunther was 
certain.
While Gunther admired McKinnon’s administrative skill, he
greatly resented his executive style and ambition. He disliked
dealing with the Administration through the Director of Education,
maintaining that as Vice-Chancellor he had right of direct access to
39the Administrator. For the University to be handled through the 
Department of Education like any high school or technical college was 
to Gunther an abrogation of its autonomy. He considered that McKinnon 
was trying to bring the University firmly under Department of Education 
control, and believed he was exercising undue influence over Johnson 
(now Administrator), who seemed to be abnegating personal responsibility
36 McKinnon, RIW, pp. 5-6.
37 ibid., p. 4.
38 ibid.
39 Gunther, RIW, pp. 20-1; Gunther 
1970, GKC; Gunther to Sir Allen 
A.34-2 (part 1).
to Karmel, 17 and 28 
Brown, 10 June 1971,
July
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for the University by delegating higher education matters to McKinnon.^ 
Gunther’s experience with McKinnon led him to regret having opposed 
Australian Universities Commission participation in university 
development in Papua New Guinea. As a Currie Commissioner he had been 
against AUC involvement, but as Vice-Chancellor his budgetary dis­
agreements with government made the idea attractive. Equally attractive 
was the possibility that an AUC entry into university affairs in Papua
New Guinea would limit McKinnon's direct influence, and his ability
41to chip away at UPNG’s autonomy.
McKinnon, on the other hand, believed Gunther’s wish to
preserve the University's autonomy was 'irrational'. And the idea of
doing so via the AUC was singularly inappropriate. Australia, he
believed, 'was becoming less and less acceptable as an arbiter of New
Guinea affairs because of the growing anti-colonial mood, so that
drawing AUC into the Papua New Guinea system of tertiary education
was not a good proposition. Instead there had to be a local organiz- 
42ation'. Such an organization, McKinnon hoped, would eventuate from
the Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education . Gunther, for his
part, had reservations about the Committee. He had agreed to it
subject to the appointment of a chairman as eminent and as sympathetic
43to UPNG as, say, Karmel. Unless there were such a chairman there
was a danger the Committee would be used by McKinnon as a pawn in a
44power play to take firmer control of the University. McKinnon 
later denied he was seeking personal control. He claimed he was 
trying to establish the principle of Ministerial responsibility for 
higher education, in order to produce better co-ordination and ration­
alization. It was unnatural, he believed, for the Vice-Chancellor to 
have privileged access to the Administrator; rather, the University 
should be the responsibility of a Minister, be that the Minister for
40
41
42
43
44
ibid.
Gunther to Brown, loc. cit.
McKinnon, RIW, p. 4.
Gunther to Karmel, 26 March 1970, GKC.
Gunther to Brown, loc. cit.; to Karmel, loc. cit,; and 
RIW, loc. cit.
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Education or the Chief Minister himself.McKinnon, the educational
administrator seeking to streamline tertiary education, and Gunther,
the doughty defender of the autonomy of the country’s one university
were bound to antagonize each other for they lived in structural
opposition to each other. As Gunther later observed, ’If I had been
McKinnon in 1969-70 I would have done what he did; and if he had been
46in my position he would have taken my line.’
Several incidents at the personal level exacerbated the 
structural conflict. The most notable of these concerned the chanell- 
ing of UNESCO aid to higher education, which brought the Department 
of Education and UPNG into competition with each other. McKinnon 
believed the Administration should disburse such funds; Gunther argued 
UPNG’s right to deal directly with international aid agencies in 
seeking support for specific University projects. On one occasion 
Gunther wanted UNESCO assistance to build up the Educational Materials 
Centre created at UPNG by Roe. McKinnon, however, arranged for the 
funds to go to Goroka Teachers’ College. This led to personal rancour 
between Gunther and McKinnon, and also Roe and McKinnon, the UPNG 
pair accusing the Director of Education of ’dishonesty’ in unfairly 
using his official position to divert the funds to a ’pet’ project 
sponsored by his department.^  With personal animosities thus 
complicating conflict-prone official relations between government and 
autonomous educational institutions, the road towards smoother co­
ordination of higher education was therefore hazardous.
(b) AN ATTEMPT TO SECURE CO-ORDINATION: TEE BROWN COMMITTEE
The Chairman of the Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education 
was Sir Allen Brown, formerly Secretary of the Prime Minister's 
Department and Australian ambassador to Japan. His colleagues on the 
committee were Vincent Eri, an official of the Department of Education 
and the first Papua New Guinean graduate of UPNG; S.W. Cohen, Deputy 
Vice-Chancellor of Macquarie University and a member of two similar
45 McKinnon, loc. cit.
46 Gunther, RIW, loc. cit.
47 ibid.
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inquiries into higher education in New South Wales; and A.H. Nash,
Dean of the School of Architecture and Engineering at the Western 
Australian Institute of Technology. Like the Currie Commissioners 
the members of the Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education (Brown 
Committee) travelled widely, and in their nine months on the job 
received submissions from more than 250 individuals, groups and 
organizations. Yet their report'*' was surprisingly brief - barely 
80 octavo pages as against the 288 quarto pages of the Currie Report 
- and compared with the Currie Report it was a ’lightweight’.
Eventually so few of its recommendations were implemented that, barely 
two years after its presentation to government, a new, third committee 
of inquiry into higher education was commissioned - Gabriel Gris's 
Committee of Enquiry into University Development (CEUD).
The Brown Committee terms of reference were wide. It had
to make recommendations in respect of post-secondary and tertiary
institutions so as to 'rationalize and co-ordinate development... to
achieve balanced growth of enrolments... [and] maximum economics of
2scarce staff and physical resources'. It also had to make recommend­
ations for 'the nature, composition and powers of permanent machinery'
3to regulate tertiary education. It was thus free to plan a 
comprehensive structure to embrace all higher education, one capable 
of ensuring the development of the rational, well co-ordinated system 
so many educational commentators had been calling for. But despite 
this freedom, the Committee worked within constraints which had not 
confined the Currie Commission. By 1971 Papua New Guinea was moving 
rapidly towards independence, even though no target date was yet 
fixed. The Committee members therefore saw themselves at a disadvantage: 
they had to devise a scheme which a black government would inherit at 
independence. Three of their number were strangers to the country 
and therefore did not know sufficient of the local situation to tell
1 Allen Brown (et at.) 9 Report of the Committee of Inquiry 
into Higher Education in Papua Hew Guinea (Canberra, 1971) 
[the Brown Report].
2 ibid., p. vii.
3 ibid.
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whether the scheme which they, the 'outside experts', thought most 
appropriate would prove acceptable to Papua New Guineans. They there­
fore sought to avoid making recommendations 'which would reduce the
options open to the government [taking] over authority in the near4future'. And in proposing an ideal scheme they attempted to devise 
an organization flexible enough to cope with the period leading to 
independence, and beyond.^
How flexible their scheme was is unknown since it was never 
implemented. It was, however, complex and - according to its critics -g
unwieldy. There were three central proposals. The first was for 
the establishment of a Tertiary Education Commission (TEC) to advise 
government on higher education, particularly on aspects affecting 
manpower training, and to advise the tertiary institutions on means 
for promoting co-ordination. TEC membership would comprise an independ­
ent government-appointed chairman, the Director of Education, the 
Chairman of the Public Service Board, the Director of the Central 
Planning Office, the Vice-Chancellor of UPNG, the Director of IOT, 
and four government-appointed members.^ The second proposal was for 
a Tertiary Education Finance Board of three members, chaired by the 
TEC chairman, to assess UPNG and IOT budgetary submissions and advise
g
government generally on finance for higher education. The third 
proposal was for the creation of a series of federations or Associations 
of Colleges to link together all the tertiary institutions (excluding 
UPNG and IOT) in clusters according to vocational interest. There 
would thus be an Association of Teachers' Colleges linking all 
government and mission colleges; an Association of Technical Colleges 
linking all institutions giving technical and trade training; and 
similarly, Associations of Paramedical Colleges, of Senior High
9Schools, of Administrative Colleges, and of Theological Colleges.
The task of these associations would be to advise the TEC on matters
4 ibid., pp. 1-2.
5 ibid.
6 Gunther, RIW, pp. 18-19; McKinnon, RIW, p. 1.
7 Brown Report, pp. 1, 61-4.
8 ibid., pp. 3, 64-5.
ibid., pp. 3, 70-3, 97.9
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referred to them; to serve as a forum for discussing common problems; 
to ensure the avoidance of duplication of courses between institutions; 
and to make recommendations to the parent bodies of the various 
institutions on student facilities, terms and conditions for staff.
Each association would have a central federal committee of represent­
atives of all the member institutions, which in turn would have their
., 10own governing councils.
In the end only a handful of minor Brown Report recommend­
ations were implemented. The establishment of the Office of Higher 
Education (OHE) as an executive office for the TEC was the most notable 
outcome. The most significant consequence of the Brown Report, 
perhaps, was that none of its three major recommendations ever came 
into actual executive practice. The idea of the TEC was dropped by 
the Somare government in mid-1973 after the OHE had prepared final 
drafts of the legislation to bring it into being. The idea of the 
Tertiary Education Finance Board, also provided for in the draft 
legislation, was similarly dropped, though an analogous body, the 
Universities Finance Review Committee, was later set up by the OHE 
to take over from Sir Leslie Melville in assessing UPNG and IOT 
budgetary submissions. Nor did the Associations of Colleges ever come 
into being.
Why, then, was the Brown Report such a thoroughly abortive 
exercise? The reasons lay partly in the nature of the scheme it 
proposed, and partly in the timing of the attempt to implement it. 
McKinnon believed the Brown Committee ’shilly-shallied’ - it took too 
long to report and equivocated on many issues.^ He had hoped it 
would report promptly, early in 1971, so its recommendations could be 
implemented well before self government: he wanted to hand over to
the national government an already rationalized system of tertiary 
education, in the same way that his department would be handing over 
a rationalized, integrated system of primary, secondary and technical 
schools. But instead the report was not submitted until late 1971 
and that was no longer possible. The inquiry was also ’an untidy
10 ibid.
11 McKinnon, loc. cit.
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exercise': the committee failed to think its proposals through
12properly. For example, the role of the TEC, the central element in 
the proposed administrative machinery, was insufficiently defined.
The Report did not spell out the extent of TEC power, nor did it 
define relations between the TEC, Finance Board and Associations of 
Colleges clearly enough. Thus, there was to be a joint chairman for 
both TEC and Finance Board, but that was apparently their only 
connection. This conceptual vagueness was one of Gunther's criticisms 
of the Report. 'It was a nebulous sort of inquiry', he later said.
'I never did know what case we had to argue.... We just went along
13with the Brown Committee, frankly wondering what it was all about.'
The main objection to the Brown scheme was the cumbersome
nature of the machinery it recommended. Not only would there have
been a TEC, a Finance Board and Associations of Colleges, but numerous
subsidiary committees as well. The Committee reported, 'We see the
Tertiary Education Commission working through a series of committees
which would be essentially recommending or advisory bodies to the
Commission and which would meet more or less frequently according to
14the nature of their task.' Some of the suggested committees were
a Standing Committee ('to supervise and co-ordinate work in between
meetings of the full Commission'); a Scholarships and Guidance
Committee; and an Education Committee ('to consider the staffing of
the institutions, the need for new courses within institutions, the
need for new institutions, and the awards that each institution
gives').^  In addition there would be 'task forces' and 'working
parties' to consider specific issues as they arose - for example,
16'the through-put rates of the various institutions'. Gunther and 
Duncanson both criticized this complex machinery. Gunther, who was 
elsewhere critical of the manner in which McKinnon had set up a 
series of national, regional and local boards to govern primary and
12 ibid.
13 Gunther, loc. cit.
14 Brown Report, p. 63.
15 ibid., p. 64.
16 ibid.
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secondary education, saw in it the hand of the Director of Education.
His view was that ’a typically McKinnon approach', such as the Brown
scheme, would produce an unwieldy, unmanageable system.^ He wrote
to both Brown and Eri saying he opposed 'the proliferation of
committees in higher education' their Report would lead to. 'Management
by committees is often bad management', he said. 'I think we have
18gone committee mad'. Even though he and Duncanson were about to
retire, and would not be in Papua New Guinea to see the Brown proposals
implemented, he wrote to Duncanson to say the TEC and its related
19committees would not 'serve any useful purpose at all'. Duncanson
agreed; he replied that 'the setting up of numerous committees will
20slow down the work of the training institutions'.
The Department of Territories also queried the Brown proposals. 
The departmental officer most concerned with matters of higher 
education at this stage, L.R. Hennessy (later secretary to the 
Australian Universities Commission) raised issues which cast doubts 
against the committee's major recommendations. He drew attention to 
the failure of the Report to state which government department the 
TEC should answer to - should it be the Administrator's (later Chief 
Minister's) or Education? There were others: what would be the
extent of Ministerial action in higher education; would the Minister 
responsible deal directly with the tertiary institutions; or would he 
deal with them only indirectly through the TEC? The Department of 
Territories wanted Ministerial freedom of action, to retain for the 
Minister concerned the right to intervene directly in the affairs of 
the institutions. The Department of Education under McKinnon, however, 
believed there should be a buffer between Cabinet and the institutions 
to prevent undue interference in their affairs. The two ideas, direct 
Ministerial intervention and an intermediary TEC, were incompatible,
17 Gunther, loc. cit.
18 Gunther to Brown, September 1971; Gunther to Eri, 30 
December 1971, UPNGR A.34-2 (part 2).
19 Gunther to Duncanson, 6 January 1972, UPNGR A.34-2 
(part 2).
20 Duncanson to Gunther, 10 January 1972, UPNGR A.34-2 
(part 2).
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McKinnon argued. Debate over such issues, which the Brown report 
failed to raise, let alone resolve, delayed for a long period action 
to implement its proposals. And, as we will see, by the time an 
attempt was made to process the enabling legislation, conditions in 
Papua New Guinea had changed to such an extent that the whole scheme 
was postponed indefinitely, then tacitly dropped as being no longer 
appropriate.^
Finally, the Brown Committee proposals foundered because 
they came at a time of rapid political change in Papua New Guinea.
Late 1971 was a period when Cabinet government was fast emerging as 
the progressive transfer of power from Canberra to Port Moresby occurred. 
Since July 1970 the Australian government had been steadily passing 
power over to the Administrator’s Executive Council; and in April 1971 
it accepted the recommendation of the House of Assembly Select 
Committee on Constitutional Development that full internal self
22government should come during the life of the next, 1972-76, House.
At such a time the Australian Administration was reluctant to force
through crucial legislation, such as the Brown scheme required, and
there was similar unwillingness in the emergent Papua New Guinea
23Cabinet to take far-reaching decisions in such sensitive areas.
Action on the Brown Report was therefore more hesitant than might have 
been the case a year or two earlier.
In December 1971 the AEC decided to approve in principle
the establishment of the TEC and its associated bodies, and instructed
the Public Service Board, Director of Education, and the Deputy
Administrator to enter discussions to create a small Office of Higher
Education within the Department of the Administrator to take over
from an existing 'cell on higher education’ already operating within
24the Department of Education. Much of 1972 was taken up in such
21 McKinnon, RIW, p. 1; Hennessy, telex to McKinnon, 7 July 
1972; and AEC policy submission, 'Organization of Higher 
Education', 8 August 1972, OHER 66-1-21.
22 C.E. Barnes, 'Progress of Papua New Guinea' (1972).
23 McKinnon, loc. cit.
24 Policy submission to AEC, 'Organization of Higher Education', 
loc cit.
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discussions and in negotiations between McKinnon and Hennessy working
25out the precise powers and functions of the TEC. Eventually the
O £
OHE came into being in October 1972. At the end of August 1972
Cabinet (now using that name instead of ’AEC') approved in principle
the start of work on drafting the TEC legislation. Shortly after the
setting up of the OHE,McKinnon and Hennessy agreed that a Department
of Territories official, A.N. Page, should be seconded to the OHE for
six months to undertake the drafting. Page arrived in November, and
by early January 1973 he had a ’drafting brief’ on the TEC Bill ready
for the legislative draftsman. Preliminary drafts were circulated
to government departments and tertiary institutions for comment, and
27the third and final draft was ready for Cabinet in April 1973.
The draft Higher Education Commission (HEC - the word ’higher’
replaced ’tertiary’) Bill finally came to Cabinet in May 1973. By
that time some Cabinet members were expressing reservations about its
possible effects. They were worried the HEC might ’give advice which
would embarrass the government, or [might] try to force government
acceptance of policies opposed to the national interest, or [might]
28act contrary to the government policies or directions’. The Public
Service Board added weight to such fears by arguing in favour of the
existing system as the one best suited to government interests. The
Board claimed government would be better protected if it retained
'overall control of the recruitment, promotion, salaries and conditions
of service of teaching staff working in the higher education training
29institutions (other than the University and the Institute)’. This 
was a view Johnson and McKinnon opposed. They believed that 'unless 
the HEC has the powers in relation to staffing matters then it would 
be useless to establish the Commission’; and they pointed out to
25 ibid.
26 OHE, 'Brief for Minister', 30 March 1973, OHER file ’Cabinet 
submissions'.
27 ’Drafting brief: Higher Education Bill', 2 January 1973,
OHER 66-1-21.
28 Policy submission to Cabinet, ’Higher Education Commission’, 
30 March 1973, OHER file 'Cabinet submissions'.
29 ibid.
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Cabinet that the Bill required the HEC to consult the Public Service
Board and to take account of government policy on salaries and 
30staffing. But despite such assurances Cabinet remained dubious,
and at a meeting on 30 May 1973 decided to postpone the establishment
of the HEC for six months. This left the OHE in an anomalous position,
created by Cabinet decision to service an agency the formation of
which had now been shelved. In the meantime, Cabinet decided, the OHE
could still act as an executive agency in matters of higher education,
31and would be responsible to the Minister for Education, N.E. Olewale.
Cabinet, having postponed action on the HEC, let the matter
lapse completely. Other events intruded and the HEC was forgotten.
Early in 1973 academic staff in Australia had received substantial
salary increases. Normally such increases in Australia flowed on to
UPNG and IOT staff, but on this occasion the Labor Minister for
External Territories, W. Morrison, ruled that the flow-on would occur
only if the Somare government agreed to fund it. When Somare’s
Cabinet discussed the issue - the first time the national government
had considered academic salaries - the tie between Australian and
Papua New Guinean academic salaries was queried. Concerned by the
high cost of overseas academics, Cabinet decided to appoint a Committee
of Enquiry into Academic Staff Salaries, Allowances and Conditions to
investigate the matter. This committee, chaired by G.B. Gris, Deputy
Vice-Chancellor of UPNG, did its job between May and June 1973. It
recommended what Cabinet members had wanted personally - the breaking
32of the connection with academic salaries in Australia.
In presenting its report the Gris committee drew Cabinet 
attention to other matters relating to UPNG and IOT and the economics 
of tertiary education - the high per capita cost of educating tertiary 
students, localization, recruitment, and the relevance to the country 
of some courses being offered. The committee believed these matters
30 ibid.
31 Cabinet decision no. 206/73, 30 May 1973, OHER file 'Cabinet 
decisions'; I. Hossack to Inglis, 8 June 1973, UPNGR 
75/219.
G.B. Gris (et al.) (1973), pp. 5-6.32
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required urgent consideration but said that under its present constit­
ution it could not undertake such a task. It therefore suggested 
the expansion of its membership to enable it to conduct further 
investigations, especially in relation to the applicability to Papua
New Guinea of models of university development in other developing 
33nations. Cabinet accepted this advice and in July 1973 added seven 
additional members. The expanded committee, named the Committee of 
Enquiry into University Development (CEUD) was once again chaired by 
Gris. It began operations in September 1973 and reported a year later.
It was during the work of the first Gris committee that 
Cabinet decided to postpone consideration of the HEC Bill. With the 
formation of the CEUD the Bill was relegated into Papua New Guinea’s 
legislative limbo. The national government, perhaps realizing for 
the first time the enormous costs, absolutely and relatively, of UPNG 
and IOT, now focused attention on the two institutions at the apex 
of the country’s educational system. The grand schemes of the former 
colonial Administration for an all-embracing organization to control 
and co-ordinate the entire range of tertiary institutions were soon 
forgotten. The Brown Report was buried, along with other notable 
aborted programmes of the past, in the files of various government 
departments. Perhaps its most eloquent epitaph was the long and 
detailed report of the CEUD. This document contained only one passing 
reference to the Brown Report made barely three years previously.
The Brown proposals, presumably, had contained nothing deemed relevant 
to the needs of a self-governing Papua New Guinea.
But even though the Brown Report now seemed irrelevant, 
the work which went into it might not have been entirely wasted. In 
a negative sense it could be said to have had some effect on the course 
of educational development in Papua New Guinea. It threw into relief 
the alternatives open to the national government, which recognized 
there was a choice between a 'Western'-model grants commission and 
direct political control of tertiary institutions. Coming as it did 
at a time of transfer of power from the colonial Administration to 
the national government it helped firm the resolve of the Somare
33 ibid.
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administration not to follow Australian precedents blindly but to 
seek a model deemed more appropriate to Papua New Guinea's circum­
stances .
Tertiary education was clearly a valuable prize. As a result 
control of the tertiary institutions continued to be a source of 
conflict under the national government, much as it had previously 
when the Department of Territories had sought to impose its will. The 
disputes between McKinnon and Gunther over the respective rights of 
the Department of Education to oversee UPNG (and IOT), and of the 
University to guard its autonomy, were more than simply a clash of 
personalities between assertive and ambitious men. A struggle over 
the right to direct university development had been joined. But now 
a new contestant had entered the arena: a national government had 
joined the battle, and as it did the rules changed. No longer could 
UPNG and IOT look to 'Western' conventions for support. Talk of 
academic autonomy and the value of institutional buffers between 
government and university institutions might have carried weight with 
an Australian government which accepted the conventions of the 
'Western' model of the university system. But a new national govern­
ment would not necessarily have the same respect for university 
independence.
That the rules were changing became evident in the scuttling 
of the bill for the Higher Education Commission and the calling 
together of the CEUD. The Somare government was clearly moving towards 
a more mercenary and utilitarian view of the university system than 
ever C.E. Barnes and G.W. Smith had dared express at the peak of their 
ascendancy. The national Cabinet believed that university institutions 
- as much as any other government-controlled agencies - must 'reflect
3  #
government policies directly and be responsive to the government'. 
Somare's government was beginning to see UPNG and IOT as conspicuous 
consumers of public funds, in consequence of which the maximum 
benefits should be reaped from them. That this would mean firm and
34 Policy submission to Cabinet, 'Organisation of higher 
education', 8 August 1972, OHER 66-1-21.
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uncompromising political direction was axiomatic. Strident assertions 
of institutional autonomy would count for little in the face of such 
official attitudes. The university institutions must learn to play 
under the new rules.
Although the rules had changed with the burying of the Brown 
Report, many of the problems of higher education remained the same. 
Co-ordination of effort between institutions to prevent duplication 
and waste, competition and rivalry between the institutions for scarce 
resources, and institutional ambition and upward mobility were still 
issues to bedevil educational planners. The demise of the Higher 
Education Commission Bill meant that new approaches to these problems 
must be attempted.
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CHAPTER 5
THE EVOLUTION OF A NATIONAL UNIVERSITY SYSTEM
THE system of higher education which had grown up in Papua New Guinea 
by the early 1970s differed from that envisaged by the Currie 
Commissioners in the early 1960s. An abundance of institutions were 
still operating under their various parent agencies rather than under 
the 'umbrella' of UPNG; the Brown Committee's proposed Higher Education 
Commission was foundering on nationalist shoals; and institutional 
rivalry and the determination of government departments to retain 
control of training were keeping the institutions apart. Nevertheless, 
something of a national university system was evolving.
Thus on 1 January 1971 the medical training school of the 
Papuan Medical College became the UPNG Faculty of Medicine, despite 
some continued disagreement between University and Administration, for 
example over the establishment of some posts. Again, the upward 
mobile IOT won the right to grant degrees in 1971 and full university 
status in 1973. The Goroka Teachers' College became the second 
departmental training institution to be joined with UPNG, this time 
with less enthusiasm on the University's part and with the retention 
of some autonomy by the College. Finally, the Office of Higher 
Education became a de facto grants commission, taking on a policy as 
well as an executive function. Thus, instead of a single university 
Papua New Guinea was developing a university system.
The transfer of medical training to UPNG has already been 
dealt with; the other three developments will be the theme of this 
chapter.
(a) THE RISE TO UNIVERSITY STATUS OF IOT
From the outset the Department of Territories maintained that IOT 
should 'emphasize practical and utilitarian training', with the 'bulk 
of students' taking certificate courses and only a minority working 
at higher, diploma, levels. The handful who might need further 
training to full professional levels would be most economically sent
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overseas for advanced education. The Institute leadership, however,
had other views. Neither Matheson nor Duncanson doubted that IOT
should train the best students to degree level, and aspire to
university status. They argued strongly with the Department that
building up a low-level institution was unrealistic - against world
trends towards degree-level studies in technological education, and
2unlikely to attract good staff and good students. That IOT and 
Department held irreconcilable views became patently clear in early 
1968 with the move to Lae. Matheson and Duncanson visited Canberra 
to outline the IOT training programme. They claimed the certificate 
courses favoured by the Department were properly the province of the 
Department of Education technical colleges; instead the Institute 
should concentrate on more advanced studies. The Department seemed 
not to understand, and its officials persisted in asking questions
3such as ’What are you doing about training carpenters and mechanics?'
So frustrating indeed was the obtuseness of the Department that 
Matheson bluntly told Smith 'it looked as if the Department had in 
mind a different type of institution from what he and Dr Duncanson 
were used to operating, and if this were so thought should be given 
to replacing him as Chairman’. Smith hastily denied that his 
department was trying to obstruct the Institute;^ but the positions 
of either party remained fundamentally opposed, and caused ongoing 
conflict as IOT sought to upgrade, and the department to confine, the 
Institute.
Within months of IOT’s relocation in Lae a section of staff 
within the School of Engineering raised the question of the Institute's 
status with the IOT Council. Council deputed McKinnon and the IOT 
Professor of Civil Engineering to discuss with UPNG the possibility
1 Reseigh to Smith, 5 November 1966, DTOR 65/3288; Notes 
of meetings between IHTE and Department of Territories 
representatives, 26 September 1967, DTOR 67/3555, and 5 
February 1968, DTOR 66/6426.
2 ibid.
3 Duncanson, personal communication, March 1975.
4 Notes of meeting between IHTE and Department of Territories 
representatives, 5 February 1968, DTOR 66/6426.
5 ibid.
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of the University's issuing degrees to students completing IOT five- 
year courses. However, IOT-UPNG dialogue lapsed when the Institute 
Council postponed the matter pending the outcome of the F.M. Wiltshire 
inquiry into academic awards in Australian institutes of technology. 
Council was confident Australian institutes would soon be awarding 
degrees, and consequently thought IOT would then have a stronger case 
for granting its own degrees.
More than a year went by with no further progress, until IOT 
engineering staff once again lobbied Council, through the IOT academic 
policy-making body, the Academic Board. They argued strongly that IOT 
graduates should receive degrees because: (i) IOT five-year courses
were comparable in length and standard to UPNG degree courses. (ii) 
Employers recognized the parity between IOT and UPNG graduates, for 
example by placing them all on the same pay scale. (iii) Engineering 
required high calibre students, but IOT could not attract them while 
awarding only diplomas. There was prejudice against the term 'diploma' 
in the secondary schools; consequently schools were sending their 
best students to UPNG, where qualifications were enhanced by the title 
'degree'. (iv) Papua New Guineans had no other means for obtaining 
professional qualifications in technology than through IOT. To deny 
IOT degree-granting powers was therefore to deny the people the 
ability to obtain full qualifications. (v) Degree-level studies in 
engineering should be taken within Papua New Guinea rather than abroad 
because overseas courses could not be guaranteed relevant to Papua 
New Guinea's special problems. (vi) Professional studies such as 
those undertaken at IOT were normally acknowledged elsewhere with 
degrees. (vii) Students wishing to undertake postgraduate studies 
abroad would have difficulty in being accepted if their first qualifi­
cation were only a diploma. (viii) Better staff would be attracted 
if the qualification were called a degree. (ix) A cadre of degree- 
level graduates would be needed for localization to proceed, and 
employers would not replace expatriates with Papua New Guineans 
unless the latter had the same formal qualifications as the former.
(x) Membership of professional associations would be easier for IOT
6 P.C. Ryall, submission to IHTE Council, 'Institute qualifi­
cations', 23 June 1969, DTOR 66/6426.
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graduates to obtain if they had degrees.^ The IOT students were well 
aware of these arguments, too. They added their support to staff 
ambitions for higher IOT status by ’raising persistent questions
g
concerning the qualifications awarded by the Institute'.
With IOT staff and students solidly in favour of degrees,
Council decided to seek the right to award them. However, a cautious
group within Council remained wary of staff-student aspirations. This
group, led by McKinnon, feared that IOT would become so preoccupied
with questions of status it could neglect its obligation to train
sub-degree level students. McKinnon believed the Institute wished to
award degrees 'for the wrong reason' - to enable staff to 'upgrade
their own positions and enhance their chances of finding university9work elsewhere'. At his insistence Council agreed to petition 
government over degrees only on the condition that IOT adhered 
strictly to a policy of offering both sub-professional and profession­
al courses.^ Council deputized Duncanson to approach government.
He raised the matter with the Administrator in August 1969, proposing 
that IOT should offer both diploma and degree courses, which would be 
organized according to a 'Y-shaped' streaming process. Thus, all 
engineering students would take a common two-year course, following 
which they would be channelled into either diploma or degree studies, 
the better students doing the latter. The existing five-year course 
would be the degree stream; diploma students would attend the same 
lectures as degree students but would take fewer subjects. The main 
advantage of this arrangement, he argued, would be the reduction of 
IOT's high student attrition rates, which, at roughly 25% of IOT 
students, were wasteful. A number of less able students, who would 
previously have quit studies, would be saved by 'Y-shaped' streaming 
as it offered them a chance of entering less-demanding programmes of 
study. Another advantage - likely to commend itself to the Department
7 ibid.
8 Duncanson to Hay, 8 August 1969, DTOR 69/4293.
9 McKinnon, RIW, p. 2.
10 Duncanson, 'Notes on Institute policy in relation to courses
and awards', 19 May 1970, DTOR 69/4293.
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of Territories - was that no extra staff or finance were required."^
The Department of Territories received Duncanson's proposals
coolly. Smith saw dangers of increased costs as IOT endeavoured ’to
12obtain international acceptance of its degree’. Upward mobility
in educational institutions to him meant escalating expense; and
perhaps this was why the Department now followed the procedure which,
during the Barnes-Smith regime, was standard when it had difficult
decisions on educational policy to make - it simply did not answer
IOT correspondence. Nearly six months passed without official response,
then Matheson contacted the Minister seeking a reply. A further month
went by, then Matheson was told ’an important question of policy is
13involved’ and that he would be advised in due course. Eventually 
he and Duncanson requested permission to place the IOT case before 
the Minister personally. When they met him, in April 1970, they 
assured him the awarding of degrees was not a departure from practi­
cally-oriented training: Council, indeed, ’was seized with the
14importance of sub-degree people’. The Wiltshire Report, moreover,
had proposed degrees for Australian institutes of technology, so IOT
was simply trying to come into line with Australian practice. Barnes
now ’agreed in principle’ with the proposals, on the condition that
IOT 'would continue to devote its major efforts towards granting
diplomas for courses with substantial vocational and technical bias’.^
The Department formally advised IOT of this agreement in June 1970,
and three months later issued a press release saying IOT could hence-
16forth award degrees. In the meantime the House of Assembly duly 
amended the Institute of Technology Ordinance. The Institute assumed 
it could introduce ’Y-shaped' streaming, and rename its awards
11 ibid.; and Duncanson to Hay, 8 August 1969, DTOR 69/4293.
12 Smith to Hay, 25 September 1969, DTOR 69/4293.
13 Matheson to Barnes, 30 January 1970; Barnes to Matheson,
2 March 1970, DTOR 69/4293.
14 Notes of meeting between Barnes, Matheson and Duncanson, 
April 1970, DTOR 69/4293.
15 ibid.
16 Barnes to Matheson 19 June 1970; Ministerial press release, 
4 September 1970, and news clippings from The Canberra Times 
and The Australian3 5 September 1970, DTOR 69/4293.
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accordingly. It proceeded to advise present and prospective staff 
and students it was a degree-granting body, and made plans to teach 
both degree and diploma streams in the coming year, 1971.
The government, however, interpreted the Minister's 'agreement
in principle' rather differently from IOT. Under McKinnon's strong
influence the Administrator advised Canberra that he believed a final
decision on IOT degrees should await the outcome of the Brown Committee
which, intev alia, would examine academic awards.^ The Department of
Territories hardly needed this cautioning: it had remained sceptical
of IOT proposals for degrees, assuming that any Papua New Guinean
with an engineering degree would be too concerned with abstruse theory
to be of practical value to the country. It now decided that final
approval for IOT degrees would only be granted after the Institute
had submitted a specific submission stating the numbers of students
expected to follow the degree and diploma streams, and detailed costs 
18of both courses. Officiously, and with little justification, the
Department claimed the provision of such detail by IOT was part of
the agreement the Minister had reached with Matheson and Duncanson
19the previous April. The insistence on a detailed submission was in
line with McKinnon's view; and now, late November 1970, he informed
Duncanson on behalf of the Administrator that IOT must present its
submission to the Brown Committee, due to visit the Institute the
following March. He later told the Department his instruction had
20'placed a bomb under Duncanson'.
IOT had bombs of its own, however. Duncanson wrote to
McKinnon saying his staff had spent much time devising the most
appropriate courses and therefore found 'the misunderstanding of their
21aims most frustrating'. The Department's directive, issued at the
17 Administrator, telex to Territories, 1 April 1970, DTOR 
69/4293.
18 Leivesley to Page, 9 June 1970; Besley to Johnson, 24 
November 1970, DTOR 69/4293.
19 ibid.
20 McKinnon to Duncanson, 30 November 1970; McKinnon to 
Hay, 16 December 1970; Hennessy to Hay, 14 December 1970; 
Hennessy, note for file, 18 December 1970, DTOR 69/4293.
21 Duncanson to McKinnon, 4 December 1970, DTOR 69/4293.
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end of the year, would cause both Institute and Administration great
embarrassment and bad publicity, he warned. Current students were
expecting to enter degree studies the following year and new students
had been recruited understanding they could eventually earn IOT 
22degrees. Then Matheson entered the dispute - rather more explosively
than Duncanson. He first instructed Duncanson not to alter plans for
degree courses in 1971 as ’the understanding with the Minister and
23the change of the [IOT] Ordinance give full authority'. He then
informed the Department 'in quite irate fashion' of his opinion that
the government had gone back on a firm agreement with the Minister;
he pointed to the long delays on the Department's part in answering
IOT correspondence; he said the Department should have 'put the brakes'
on IOT plans earlier in the year, instead of waiting till the onset
of the next; he stated, correctly, that the requirement to present
details of costs and student numbers was not part of the original
agreement; and he pointed out, again correctly, that the required
details had already been provided in the IOT's current submission for 
24funds. He concluded by threatening - 'irrationally and intemperately
in the opinion of Departmental officials - to ‘go public', drawing
attention to the Minister’s broken promises, and to the Department's
25role as 'the hatchet man'.
Matheson's outbursts appear to have shocked the Department 
into giving way to the Institute. There were many a mea cuZipa in 
succeeding weeks. The new Secretary, Hay, was conciliatory in 
subsequent discussion with Matheson. He told his Department it had 
been at fault in delaying action on IOT degrees for months at a time, 
and warned his officers it must 'live up to the agreement' with IOT. 
They in turn spoke of the need to 're-establish good relations with 
Dr Matheson' and conceded that IOT had been justified in thinking its
22 ibid.
23 Territories, telex to Administrator, 18 December 1970; 
Hennessy to Besley, and Hay, 14 December 1970; Hay to Ryan, 
31 December 1970, DTOR 69/4293.
24 ibid.
25 ibid.
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triennial budgetary submission constituted an adequate statement of 
26intentions. Further reason for backing down was provided by Sir
Allen Brown, whose committee was about to begin work: he felt ’very
much disinclined to become involved in any argument between the govern-
27ment and the Institute'. The Minister now reaffirmed the Institute's 
right to award degrees - not only in civil engineering, but in
28electrical and mechanical engineering, and architecture as weil.
Ruefully the government admitted it had bungled negotiations with IOT.
It believed it had been right, but ’events have proceeded too far to
draw back at this stage, and we will reluctantly have to agree to
29allow the Institute to go forward with its plans'. Nevertheless,
it was determined 'the chief emphasis of the Institute will remain
on diplomas and only a relatively small proportion of students will 
30gain degrees'. And it was even more determined 'to ensure that the
31Institute does not drift inexorably towards a university'. But the 
drift towards university status was indeed inexorable: scarcely two
years after IOT gained approval to award degrees it underwent its 
second change of titles in four years to become the Papua New Guinea 
University of Technology.
The Institute owed its final ascent to university status 
to boosting from its new Director, J.A. Sandover, who had taken over 
from Duncanson at the beginning of 1972. The idea of changing the 
name did not, of course, begin with Sandover. At least twice, in 
1966 and 1971, IOT Council had recorded its opinion that the arguments 
for the change were compelling. A number of outsiders, such as 
Gunther, had also said IOT would and should become a university. And 
IOT staff and students had also campaigned for this, having unsuccess-
26 Hay to Hennessy, and Hennessy to Hay, 8 January 1971,
DTOR 69/4293.
27 ibid.
28 Territories, telex to Administrator, 8 January 1971, DTOR 
69/4293.
29 Administration, telexes to Territories, 3 and 18 February 
1971, DTOR 69/4293.
30 ibid.
31 ibid.
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fully petitioned the Brown Committee for the change. It was the
determination of Sandover, however, which clinched the deal. Sandover
swept into IOT, a very new broom - young, brimming with confidence,
enthusiastic and ambitious, outward-going, gregarious. In contrast
to his sedate, unobtrusive predecessor he was the flashy go-getter
who unashamedly set out from the beginning to promote the IOT public
image. These were qualities Council members thought an advantage:
after the sound but unspectacular start Duncanson had given the
Institute they thought they needed a more flamboyant Director to 'sell’
33IOT to schools, employers, and especially government.
Sandover found that most of the preliminary work in raising 
IOT to university status had already been done. Following the Brown 
Committee's rejection of the staff-student petition in 1971, Council 
had called on the Academic Board to prepare a detailed case for the 
title 'university'. The Board produced a seven-page document, which 
virtually restated, with some additions, the 1969 case for degrees.
Its penultimate claim was that despite the oft-expressed fears of 
critics - Smith and the Department of Territories, the Brown Committee, 
McKinnon - the Institute had never departed from its practical bias, 
and all the time had maintained high intellectual standards. IOT, 
moreover, had successfully conducted both professional and sub­
professional courses in a de facto university environment, thus 
innovating, adapting university education to Papua iSlew Guinean needs 
rather than heedlessly imposing 'Western' systems. IOT was proud of 
these accomplishments, and believed they 'warranted the dignity of 
the word "University"
Using these arguments Sandover began 'selling' the name 
change, concentrating the most persistent effort on Cabinet Ministers 
of the Somare government, which had only just come to power. He later
32 Academic Board submission to 27th meeting of IOT Council, 
1971, IOT papers relating to change in the Institute's 
title.
33 Personal communication, senior member of IOT Council who 
did not wish to be named, August 1975.
34 IOT Academic Board submission to 27th meeting of Council, 
loc. cit.
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said he ’beat a track from Lae to Port Moresby’ to discuss with
influential government figures various questions affecting IOT, chief
35of which was university status. In private those he met were 
generally encouraging; however, at an official level they were non­
committal. Somare, for example, replied to one Sandover letter saying 
he appreciated Sandover’s concern for IOT’s well-being but wanted 
'independent assurance’ that the change would not cause additional 
expense. He therefore intended referring the matter to the proposed
Higher Education Commission, expected to become operational early the 
36next year, 1973. As well as winning over Cabinet members, Sandover
had to convince the IOT Council, which wanted a water-tight case.
Council still contained a determined group, led by McKinnon, which did
not want IOT simply to drift into university status for the wrong
reasons. It wanted assurances that, as a university, IOT would retain
its practical bias, that the name change was not simply a ploy by
self-interested staff and students, that IOT would not become just
37another 'typical Western university of technology'. Following a
formal submission from the Academic Board in answer to such questions,
38Council set its seal of approval on the proposal in August 1972.
Sandover now began searching for an appropriate name, in
anticipation of an early christening. He received many suggestions
from his staff and students - ’University of Melanesia', 'West
Pacific’, 'Kundu' (Pidgin: hand drum), ’Ahi’ (a local tribal group),
’Butibam’ (a local village), 'Paradisia', ’Pagini’, and even Duncanson'
and 'Somare University’. In the end the search for an apt name
became a joke at his expense. He was bruiting so many gauche
suggestions that one staff wit facetiously proposed ’Lae University’
39- so student T-shirts could be emblazoned, 'I am going to Lae U ’.
35 Sandover, RIW, September 1975.
36 Somare to Sandover, 31 July 1972, UOT papers on the change 
in IOT's title.
37 Sandover, RIW; Matheson, RIW, pp. 3-4; McKinnon, RIW,
pp. 2, 6.
38 Sandover to Somare, 30 October 1972, IOT papers on change 
in IOT title.
39 K. Alexander to Sandover, 12 September 1972, UOT papers on 
change in IOT title; personal observations 1972.
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The question of a name made government take the issue rather more 
seriously. Somare's advisers pointed out that if IOT broadcast its 
intention of becoming, say, ’The University of Melanesia’, the 
country's Melanesian neighbours - Solomon Islanders, New Hebrideans, 
Fijians - could take offence. Moreover, if government gave IOT 
university status, the word ’Technology’ should be retained to indicate 
that function.^
Troubled waters still lay ahead for Sandover. Innuendoes
against him and IOT generally were circulating among the inner group
of expatriate advisers associated with Somare. This group were
suggesting that his motives and those of his staff arose chiefly from
a wish to enhance their own prestige rather than from any desire to
help the country.^ Such detractors became objects of his special
ire. He also resented some senior expatriate public servants whom
he found generally uncooperative. The Administrator, Johnson, for
example, would express no opinion on IOT's ascent until he had tested
the reaction of Inglis, who had replaced Gunther as Vice-Chancellor
early in 1972. Inglis was non-committal, however: he cited opinion
against the name change and suggested the issue should properly be
referred to the Higher Education Commission whenever that body was 
A- 2formed. This advice, and Johnson's action in seeking it, greatly
43offended Sandover, who wrote the Administrator an impassioned reply.
With renewed energy he once again began lobbying the Administrator,
the Secretary and the Minister (now A.S. Peacock) for Territories,
the OHE and Cabinet members to convince them of the justice of the IOT 
44case. Again he concentrated most effort on Cabinet Ministers, 
suggesting that his white opponents had personal axes to grind, and 
appealing to black pride by saying the matter could only be settled
40 Sandover, RIW.
41 ibid., and personal communication, 10 November 1975.
42 Inglis to Johnson, 27 December 1972, UPNGR F.2 (part 7).
43 Sandover to Johnson, 2 January 1973, UPNGR F.2 (part 7).
44 ibid.; and Sandover to Hay, 20 December 1972; to A.C. Voutas, 
2 January 1973; to Somare, 30 October 1972, and 2 January 
1973, UOT papers on change in IOT title.
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by Papua New Guineans. It was the latter approach, perhaps, that
finally tipped the balance his way, for several weeks later, in late
4 6January 1973, Cabinet approved the change in names.
The Cabinet meeting which took this decision had before it
a document from the OHE setting out cases for and against university
status for IOT. Cabinet members had previously expressed various
worries about the proposal - they were concerned that Sandover was
’empire building’, that IOT would raise its entry levels and thus
train fewer students, that it would introduce unnecessary costly
47courses, that it would duplicate UPNG programmes. The OHE document,
however, was sympathetic to IOT aspirations. It answered Cabinet
fears, argued that IOT was a de facto university institution, and
said developing countries such as Papua New Guinea often called their
48foremost technological training institutions 'universities'. Sand- 
over's salesmanship had thus received strong support from OHE, though 
in the final analysis Papua New Guinean national pride probably 
persuaded Cabinet to buy. Following the Cabinet decision the House 
of Assembly duly amended the IOT Ordinance yet again, and the change 
was gazetted in September 1973. The Papua New Guinea University of 
Technology (UOT), with Matheson redesignated Chancellor and Sandover 
as Vice-Chancellor, was now the country's second university. The 
country no longer had a University: it now had a university system.
The upward climb by UOT had perhaps been inexorable, yet 
personalities and circumstances had greatly eased its way. Given 
ambitious leadership, upward mobile staff and students, and autonomy, 
the institution was able to gain momentum; and as it did it grew in 
confidence and determination and became hard to restrain. The mood 
of the time also helped: 1972-73 was the period of Australian
colonial disengagement. Heavy-handed attempts in Canberra to direct 
the course of higher education in Papua New Guinea - so characteristic
45 Sandover to Somare, loc. cit.
46 I. Hossack to Sandover, 9 February 1972, UOT papers on change 
in IOT title.
47 Hossack, RIW, p. 5.
48 ibid.
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of the Barnes-Smith regime - were of a bygone era; and as the new
national government began flexing its muscles, appeals to national
interest and pride were timely. A ’sales1 campaign directed by a
determined promoter like Sandover stood more chance of success now
than either earlier or later. Opinion differs on whether the Institute’s
49assumption of the name ’university’ was necessary or beneficial; yet 
the fact is that IOT did progressively raise its status far above that 
originally intended, despite many obstacles. And this suggests that 
a certain relentless logic exists in the mobility of autonomous 
educational institutions.
(b) THE ABSORPTION OF GOROKA TEACHERS' COLLEGE BY UPNG
In 1964 the Currie Report recommended that UPNG should assume 
control of government teachers' colleges. Eleven years later only 
Goroka Teachers’ College (GTC), the premier teacher training instit­
ution, had joined the University. For much of the intervening period 
UPNG, GTC and the government were negotiating to this end. These 
dealings revealed much of how the University viewed itself and other 
tertiary institutions, and of how government viewed the University.
They also demonstrated that as the university system grew more complex 
its potential for conflict increased.
The Department of Education and UPNG first began exploring 
how they might implement Currie recommendations in 1967. Negotiations 
began with a meeting between McKinnon and Roe, at which McKinnon 
proposed that UPNG should absorb GTC as a college of the University.
In response Roe set out a UPNG viewpoint which greatly frustrated and 
delayed attempts to bring the two institutions together. He claimed 
that for GTC to become a UPNG college, the University must be satisfied 
GTC staff and courses were worthy of university status.^-
49 Some - McKinnon, Johnson, Gunther, Matheson - believe
university status was both desirable and necessary for the 
Institute once it had opted out of the close bond with UPNG 
in 1966. Within the present UOT, however, there is a body 
of opinion that the Institute should have been confined to 
its earlier, less-exalted role (M. Woodward, D. Dale, 
personal communications).
1 Roe to UPNG Professorial Board, n.d. [1967], UPNGR F.69 
(part 1).
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Following the McKinnon-Roe meeting, UPNG Interim Council
appointed a committee to reconsider the development of UPNG-GTC
relationships. The committee worked out a scheme it hoped would lead
eventually to a merger. The ’scheme’ amounted to little, however:
UPNG-Department of Education consultations would continue, with the
aim of setting up GTC courses UPNG could credit towards a degree; and
secondment of UPNG staff to GTC could be investigated; however, before
UPNG would agree to either of these it wanted assurances about the
?quality of GTC staff and facilities. Not surprisingly little
eventuated - seven UPNG staff from various departments later visited
GTC to give occasional lectures, and the University sponsored a one-
semester language course at the College. The Department of Education
nevertheless thought ’a co-operative relationship’ was developing;
and consequently proposed in late 1968 that during 1969 UPNG should
send staff to GTC to teach a further six units of language, education,
3and anthropology. This request did not get far. First, there was
4a shortage of UPNG staff available for secondment. And second, the 
UPNG Professorial Board, concerned about standards, decided that any 
GTC unit receiving University credit must initially be taught and 
examined by UPNG staff.^ The Board also decided to withdraw recog­
nition from a GTC English course currently being taught by a GTC staff 
member holding the UPNG postgraduate Diploma in Teaching English as 
a Second Language - on the grounds that 'no person suitably qualified' 
was available to teach it.^ This greatly angered the Professor of 
English, Frank Johnson, who accused his colleagues of 'a conservative 
and narrow minded view of... relations with GTC’.^  Further difficult­
ies arose the following year, 1970, when the Faculty of Education
2 Minutes of committee appointed by Interim Council, 6 October 
and 14 November 1967, UPNGR F.69 (part 1).
3 V. McNamara to Gunther, 26 September 1968, UPNGR F.69 
(part 1).
4 Roe, F. Johnson, and R. Bulmer to Gunther, 14, 18, and 28 
October 1968, UPNGR F.69 (part 1).
5 Minutes of sub-committee of Professorial Board, 10 March 
1969, UPNGR F.69 (part 1).
6 ibid.
7 Johnson to Gunther, 27 March 1969, UPNGR F.69 (part 1).
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stationed a lecturer full time at GTC to run a Dip. Ed. in Developing 
Countries for the College staff. Four staff members wishing to take 
the course were at first refused admission by the University, which
g
declared they were not formally matriculated. Such cases provoked 
McKinnon in particular, persuading him to castigate UPNG for 'inflexi-
9bility'. Despite such disagreements a limited UPNG-GTC relationship 
continued for a couple more years, the main connection being the 
presence in Goroka of an English Department, and an Education Faculty, 
staff member, teaching courses to College students for which UPNG 
credits were later given if the students went on to study at Waigani.^
McKinnon wanted GTC to have closer, more formal links than 
this, for he was perturbed by the 'downward spiral' in educational 
standards - the situation where 'ill-prepared teachers teach secondary 
school students badly who in turn become even worse teachers of ill- 
prepared pupils'. He feared that without strong University affil­
iations GTC would fail to attract good students, that it would sub­
sequently 'degenerate into a second rate institution', thus speeding
12the 'downward spiral'. In June 1972 he wrote to Inglis (now Vice-
Chancellor) expressing his concern for GTC. The GTC-UPNG relationship
'was not what we believe it can and ought to be', he said, reminding
Inglis that 'the University Ordinance actually specifies that [UPNG]
should take over [GTC] at a suitable time.... That time might now 
13have arrived'. Inglis referred the matter to Roe, who wondered 
whether McKinnon honestly intended a full GTC takeover by UPNG or was 
merely angling to have GTC courses recognized and accredited with 
minimal UPNG controls. He also wondered if McKinnon were simultaneous­
ly dealing with Sandover and IOT, attempting to 'sell to the highest
8 O'Neill to Thodey, 12 March 1969, UPNGR F.69 (part 1).
9 McKinnon (1971), p. 21.
10 Roe, Circular to Arts and Science faculties detailing {'inter 
at.) the history of negotiations over GTC, 12 October 1972, 
UPNGR F.69 (part 2).
11 McKinnon to Sandover, 5 July 1972, UPNGR F.69 (part 2).
12 McKinnon to Inglis, 14 June 1972, UPNGR F.69 (part 2).
13 ibid.
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14bidder1. Despite such scepticism, Roe and Inglis now entered
discussions with McKinnon. They agreed that if GTC and UPNG merged,
students taking the three-year GTC diploma could on graduation teach
for a couple of years then enter UPNG to complete a degree in
education.McKinnon was invited to submit a formal proposal to
the University along these lines. He did this several weeks later,
suggesting that UPNG should immediately assume control and supervision
16of College courses, and of staff selection and appointment. The
UPNG Council agreed to further negotiations and deputed Roe as the
University’s representative in the discussions which followed. The
Department of Education was very keen for UPNG to take professional
responsibility for GTC by the beginning of 1973, and then progressively
assume full administrative control.^ Before this could happen, how-
18ever, the UPNG Professorial Board and faculties had to be consulted.
The proposed UPNG-GTC merger was now discussed generally 
within the University, and as this happened a variety of views 
emerged. The Faculty of Education took the question up most enthus­
iastically, proposing a nine-step plan for the merger, whereby the
19College would become a Faculty of Education responsibility. Other 
faculties lacked the eagerness of Education: Arts, for example, with
strong departments of History, Economics, Government, English and 
Anthropology/Sociology, had decided views and refused to be hustled 
by Education. They were wary of Education's attempt to take a 
monopoly hold on the College. Arts and Science were as much interested 
in the pre-service training of teachers as Education - prospective
14 Roe to Inglis, 22 June 1972, UPNGR F.69 (part 2). McKinnon 
did indeed deal with Sandover, who was most interested and 
hoped 'any future relationship with Goroka would be mainly 
with us' (Sandover to McKinnon, 12 July 1972, UPNGR F.69 
(part 2).
15 Inglis, note for file, 28 June 1972, UPNGR F.69 (part 2).
16 McKinnon, 'Professional responsibility for GTC', 10 July 
1972, UPNGR F.69 (part 2).
17 Roe to Inglis, 21 September 1972, UPNGR F.69 (part 2).
18 Roe to Arts and Science faculties, 12 October 1972, UPNGR 
F.69 (part 2).
19 Roe, circular to all faculties, 11 October 1972, UPNGR F.69 
(part 2).
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teachers, after all, did general academic coursework as well as
20professional studies. But despite the conflicting views between
faculties, Professorial Board approved the UPNG-GTC union ’in principle’
it said this should begin as early as possible in 1973; and recommended
the formation of a committee of all interested parties to consider all
21aspects of the takeover. Council endorsed this decision in November 
1972.
In the meantime the Department of Education had been working
to secure government support for its proposals. The Department of
Territories, now in its final phase of existence, responded with
accustomed caution, warning of raised standards and increased costs,
of higher student wastage rates in a UPNG-controlled College, and of
22a slowing down in localization. Finally, the Department believed
'any proposal [for a merger] should wait until the Higher Education
23Commission is established’. The Papua New Guinea Cabinet was not,
however, deterred. It decided that a ’Committee on the Goroka
Transfer’ should be set up. Subsequently a five-man committee, headed
by the recently-appointed UPNG Deputy Vice-Chancellor, F. Oldfield,
was formed and at the end of May 1973 produced a detailed 36-page
report. This proposed the terms under which the transfer should
proceed, and supplied estimates of recurrent and capital expenditure
for the next triennium. The transfer, it said, should be gradual,
24taking place over the next two and a half years. Cabinet endorsed
this report in October 1973, but attached a rider stating 'that the
output of qualified teachers from the College... [be] maintained both
25in percentage and absolute terms'. And to supervise the transfer
20 O'Neill, RIW, 4 March 1976; Academic Planning Committee, 
'Relationship with GTC', 31 October 1972, UPNGR F.69 
(part 2).
21 UPNG Professorial Board Minutes, 8 November 1972, UPNGR 
F.69 (part 2).
22 ’Transfer of responsibility for GTC: Department of Territ­
ories views', 10 January 1973, UPNGR F.69 (part 2).
23 ibid.
24 Committee on Goroka Transfer, Minutes, 11 April, 9 May,
28 May 1973, UPNGR F.69 (part 3).
25 W. Rees to K.R. Long, 23 November 1973, UPNGR F.69 (part 4).
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a ’Working Party on the GTC Transfer’ was now set up, in November 1973,
with representation from UPNG, GTC, the Department of Education, and26the Department of Finance.
The Working Party on the GTC Transfer had hardly been formed 
when sections of the University community began questioning the basis 
of the transfer, particularly Cabinet’s directive on maintaining the 
output of graduates. The Working Party chairman himself, D. Stannard, 
a member of the UPNG Faculty of Education, expressed the apprehensions 
of many colleagues in these terms:
The University must undertake now, in ignorance of the 
quality of future applicants... and before reviewing 
the... work of the College or forming any judgements of 
the standards..., guarantee that enrolments... will not 
fall below the present level and that the pass rate will 
be maintained. I do not think this guarantee can 
honourably be given. 27
Inglis also voiced misgivings, pointing out to government that the
directive touched a very sensitive area for the University - its
autonomy. He said some academics had been worried all along that UPNG
control of GTC would be ’in name only’, and feared that the Department
of Education would inevitably interfere. Consequently, 'if this
apprehension [is] aroused again there may be pressure within the
University to have the College revert to Department of Education 
28control’. Despite such concerns, however, the Working Party began
activities in January 1974 and made a series of recommendations for
transferring responsibility for various administrative, financial,
29and academic matters from the Department to UPNG. Perhaps its most 
significant proposals were in the last of these areas. It recommended, 
first, the phasing out of the GTC Governing Council by mid-1974, by 
which time a formal organization for UPNG-GTC relationships would be 
established. Second, an 'Interim Academic Board of Studies' should
26 F. Oldfield to A. Tololo, 9 November 1973; G. Trevaskis to 
Inglis, 21 November 1973, UPNGR F.69 (part 4).
27 Stannard to O'Neill, 13 December 1973, UPNGR F.69 (part 4).
28 Inglis to Tololo, 7 December 1973; Inglis to Rees, 31 
December 1973, UPNGR F.69 (part 4).
29 Working Party on the GTC Transfer, Minutes, 11 January,
1 March 1974, UPNGR F.69 (part 2).
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be established at Goroka, comprising representation from GTC staff
and students, the UPNG faculties of Arts, Science and Education, and
30the Department of Education. The formation of the Interim Academic 
Board (IAB), formally approved by the UPNG Professorial Board in 
February 1974, was of particular importance: the issues that arose
over it became a source of tension between all parties involved - 
Department of Education, UPNG faculties, and various interest groups 
within GTC itself.
Most of the conflicts arising over the IAB stemmed from dis­
satisfaction of the new Director of Education, Alkan Tololo, who had 
replaced McKinnon in mid-1973, with numerous aspects of the negotiations. 
The earliest strains occurred over the IAB's composition. Tololo 
thought his Department was under-represented on the Board. The IAB, 
he protested, was dealing with matters of vital and continuing interest 
to the Department, which should therefore have greater representation.
He also believed the College over-represented: he wished to curtail
31GTC ambition and saw lighter GTC representation as a means. Further
tensions appeared soon after Inglis had solved this problem by agreeing
to heavier Departmental representation. Once again Tololo was the
central figure. He had various apprehensions about the way the GTC-
UPNG relationship was developing. First, he feared it might serve
to decrease the supply of secondary teachers. He told the Dean of the
Faculty of Education he wanted 'greater numbers of teachers more 
32quickly'. He therefore gave enthusiastic support to a scheme the
Faculty devised in April 1974 which seemed to promise this: the B.Ed.
would become an in-service (rather than a pre-service) degree, all
B.Ed. students first doing a two-year GTC diploma, then teaching for
two years before entering UPNG for a full-time two-year programme to
33complete the degree. This scheme made him a firm ally of the 
Faculty but drew them both into dispute with the faculties of Arts and
30 ibid.
31 Tololo to Inglis, 8 March 1974, UPNGR F.69 (part 5).
32 Tololo to E.B. Thomas, 10 April 1974, UPNGR G.69 (part 5).
33 Faculty of Education Planning Committee, 'Co-operation in 
secondary teacher education', April 1974, UPNGR F.69 (part 5).
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Science. The latter wished to ’keep a pathway to teaching open through
the four-year degree programme started at Waigani', believing it wrong
'to segregate cCLI teacher trainees from the rest of the University
population at an early stage' and thus giving them what might be 'an
34inferior or even a different qualification'. Arts and Science
generally felt that 'people in education are long on professionalism
35but short on academic expertise in subject areas'. Consequently
they felt they, too, should have a significant position in teacher
education; and were thus likely to resist moves to reduce their input
such as the removal of numerous students to Goroka. Tololo brushed
such arguments aside. He wrote to an Arts professor suggesting that
Arts-Science defensiveness was hindering the rationalization of
resources and facilities in secondary teacher training; members of
these faculties were, ipso facto3 inconsiderate 'of the needs of the
3 6Papua New Guinean education system and its students'. Still further
conflict arose over the relationship between GTC and the Faculty of
Education. Ideally, Tololo claimed, Faculty and College should
amalgamate 'so that a more unified approach and programme could be
worked out.... It did not make sense to have two expensive institutions
37doing the same thing'. And as the work of the TAB proceeded further 
he became ever more critical of it for failing to recommend an 
amalgamation.
In mid-1974, with the IAB following an independent approach 
to the UPNG-GTC merger, Tololo wrote a series of long letters to 
Inglis voicing his dissatisfaction with the trend of developments. He 
had a number of specific objections against the IAB, which he detailed 
as follows:
(i) The IAB... seems to be considering itself as a 
governing body rather than a group to consider curriculum 
matters. (ii) The IAB seems to be referring matters
34 A. Clunies-Ross, 'Education Faculty's Goroka Plan, April 
1974, UPNGR F.69 (part 5).
35 O'Neill, notes of discussion with D. Muffet, 28 June 1974, 
UPNGR F.69 (part 6).
36 Tololo to J. Ballard, 25 April 1974, UPNGR F.69 (part 5).
37 ibid.
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directly to the UPNG Academic Board without any reference 
to the Faculty of Education. (iii) Waigani represent­
ation in the IAB is composed too largely of people 
representing interests other than those of Education....
(iv) As a result... there is a trend by the Teachers'
College to relate what it does and how it does it to 
Waigani approaches and procedures without there being 
sufficient consideration as to whether these fit in 
with Education policies and plans approved by the Uni­
versity through its Faculty of Education. 38
Inglis replied: 'Our intention has never been to drive a wedge
between Goroka and the Faculty. We want to maintain Goroka but
strengthen its position through associating it with the University....
39The IAB seems to have become a body useful to us all.' But Tololo 
was not reassured, and the failure of the IAB to meld Faculty and 
College continued to provoke him.
Another source of disagreement was staffing. Inglis wanted
as many current GTC staff as possible to stay on after the merger,
seconded to UPNG by the Department of Education to provide continuity
40and stability during the transition. GTC staff, too, favoured
secondment since this would guarantee them various lucrative
41perquisites they enjoyed as Departmental employees. Tololo, how­
ever, adamantly refused to agree to secondments. He wanted UPNG to 
advertise all positions and find its own staff, chiefly because he 
wished to deploy current GTC staff to other government teachers' 
colleges. Inglis objected that UPNG had always understood 'the transfer
would be a gradual affair', that there would be no sudden, disruptive
42removal of all Departmental staff. Tololo sympathized, but claimed
he needed present GTC staff more than UPNG did, and that UPNG would
43be better able to recruit new staff than he. In the end Tololo had
38 Tololo to Inglis, 12 June 1974, UPNGR F.69 (part 6).
39 Inglis to Tololo, 3 July 1974, UPNGR F.69 (part 6).
40 O'Neill to Inglis, 23 April 1974, UPNGR F.69 (part 5).
41 F. Geelen to GTC Principal, 4 April 1974; M. McArthur, 
statement of GTC staff attitudes to GTC-UPNG merger, 28 
February 1974, UPNGR F.69 (part 4).
42 Tololo to Inglis, 16 April 1974; Inglis to Tololo, 29 
April 1974, UPNGR F.69 (part 6).
43 Tololo to Inglis, 8 May 1974, UPNGR F.69 (part 6).
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his way, and any old GTC staff staying on had to do so by resigning 
from the Department and applying for advertised positions. He had 
other reasons, too, for an extensive changeover in staff. First, as 
a traditionalist with little sympathy for academic freedom in govern­
ment-run institutions, he disapproved of dissent among his staff. The
IAB, in his opinion, was demonstrating an unwelcome critical faculty
44which must be curbed. The IAB contained several GTC staff members
who intended quitting the country soon and used Board meetings to air
pent-up grievances against the Department, UPNG, and the Faculty of
Education. They did not wish the College to lose its distinctive
character through absorption by the Faculty, as Tololo wanted, and
this set him against them. He regarded the expression of their
complaints as dissident 'stirring1 which was distracting both UPNG
and GTC from their joint function of producing more secondary teachers;
getting rid of the 'stirrers' would allow both institutions to
45concentrate on that task. Yet a further reason for a complete 
break between old GTC staff and new was the 'flow-on effect' - the 
tendency for any development at GTC to provoke demands for parity 
at other teachers' colleges. If GTC staff seconded to UPNG enjoyed 
conspicuous university-type advantages - lighter teaching loads, 
study leave - there would probably be demands for similar concessions 
in other teachers' colleges; and UPNG, the Department believed, was 
too self-preoccupied to appreciate the flow-on effects it might
iencourage. Better, then, for no staff to be seconded to the University.
Despite the numerous disagreements between Tololo and UPNG 
over its work, the IAB made steady progress. It set up a series of 
subject panels which thoroughly revised the curriculum; it produced 
a scheme of academic government for running the College under a Board 
of Studies analogous to a UPNG faculty; it recommended that the eight 
previous GTC teaching departments be drawn together and replaced by 
four Schools of Studies, each having the function of a UPNG academic
44 O'Neill, RIW.
45 ibid.; and Tololo to Inglis, 8 May 1974, UPNGR F.69 
(part 6).
46 T.S.F. Woods to D, Sloper, 25 April 1974, UPNGR F.69 
(part 5).
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department; it advocated the appointment of a GTC Principal with the 
status of a Dean of Faculty on the UPNG Academic Board; it set a 
staffing establishment of 36 to handle teaching; it reviewed adminis­
trative services and library facilities; and it drafted by-laws for 
the award of a Diploma of Secondary Teaching.^ In addition it 
recommended the setting up of a ’Joint Committee on Teacher Education', 
with representation from Department of Education, UPNG Faculty of 
Education, GTC Board of Studies, and the UPNG Arts and Science 
faculties. The function of this body would be to 'consider matters
of common interest to the college, the Faculty of Education, and to
48the Ministry of Education as they arise'.
Throughout the prolonged correspondence and disagreement
with Tololo, UPNG had steadily moved on with its plans for the merger,
using the IAB as its medium. By October 1974 all that was needed for
the merger to come into effect at the beginning of the following year
was Tololo's final blessing. The Joint Committee on Teacher Education
was what finally won this. The proposal for the Joint Committee was
a shrewd move by UPNG's Planning Officer, O'Neill, to whom Inglis had
delegated much of the liaison work with the Department of Education.
O'Neill appreciated just what sort of concession from UPNG would
clinch Tololo's final approval. Inglis endorsed O'Neill's suggestion
for the Joint Committee, sensing that Tololo would welcome it. He
wrote to Tololo saying, 'I believe we are getting near to constructing
the machinery we need to serve our complementary purposes.... I look
forward to an exchange with you about the final construction. Let's
149crack a bottle of champagne when at last we launch it! Tololo
did seem finally satisfied: 'At last it looks as if we might be
getting somewhere', he wrote back to Inglis in October 1974 just after 
the IAB had endorsed O'Neill's proposal for a Joint Committee. For 
UPNG that was enough: it regarded the merger as concluded and did
not bother requesting a bill of contract. Nor did Inglis crack a
47 D. Sloper, 'Report on GTC', 2 September 1974, UPNGR F.69 
(part 6).
48 GTC IAB, Minutes, 1 October 1974, UPNGR F.69 (part 6).
49 Inglis to Tololo, 11 September 1974, UPNGR F.69 (part 6). 
Tololo to Inglis, 10 October 1974, UPNGR F.69 (part 6).50
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bottle of champagne with Tololo. Instead they celebrated the approach­
ing marriage with an ’amiable lunch' at the Davara Motel, their relief 
that almost nine years' negotiations were over toasted with non­
alcoholic drinks."^
The union duly followed. However, the problems Tololo had
hoped it would solve continued. The rationalization of secondary
teacher training did not occur because both College and Faculty of
Education maintained their separate ways. The College still offered
its three-year pre-service diploma and ran various in-service programmes
for the Department of Education. The Faculty went on offering both
pre- and in-service B.Ed. programmes, undergraduate courses within
B.A., B.Ec., and B.Sc. degrees, and numerous sub- and postgraduate
52diplomas in education. Nor did the marriage prove easy: during
the next two years there were persistent recriminations from GTC,
which felt intellectually and professionally - as well as physically -
remote from UPNG, and looked on itself still as the poor relation
53among university institutions. But despite these difficulties the 
union marked the achievement of an important stage in the development 
of the country's university system. The family had grown considerably, 
and now included four of the seven major institutions of tertiary 
education.^
The protracted negotiations to achieve this illustrated much 
about the changing nature of the university system. As the system 
emerged it grew in complexity, and its capacity for conflict also 
increased. Many potential stress lines became apparent. The first 
tensions to appear were those between UPNG and the Administration,
51 Inglis, personal communication, 25 October 1976.
52 UPNG, Calendar 19763 pp. 98-108.
53 O'Neill to G.B. Gris, 15 October 1975, UPNGR 75/234.
54 Within the system were the former Papuan Medical College, 
UPNG, GTC and UOT. Still outside were the Administrative, 
Vudal Agricultural, and Bulolo Forestry Colleges. Also 
within the system, in its 'non-official sector', were the 
three leading Christian seminaries, Holy Spirit (Catholic), 
Martin Luther (Lutheran), and Rarongo (United Church). For 
a discussion of the latter, very significant, sector of 
the university system, see Appendix IV below.
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which wished to see a rationalized, coherent scheme of higher education 
established before the transfer of power to a national government.
UPNG, as usual, wished to safeguard its autonomy; and that meant 
delaying negotiations until it was satisfied it would not be saddled 
with an onerous burden that might give government an excuse to inter­
fere. After negotiations for the final takeover got under way after 
1972 a national government was in control, but that did not alter 
UPNG's determination for the merger to proceed on its own terms. This 
attitude brought it into conflict with the national bureaucracy in 
the form of Tololo. During the disagreements between him and UPNG 
new questions arose - national government's view of university claims 
to autonomy, government's wish to control the universities directly, 
and its view of the universities as specialized government agencies. 
These questions were not explicitly phrased, but that the national 
government was little committed to principles of university autonomy 
was becoming evident. Having taken over an expensive university system 
from the Administration, it was determined to gain maximum benefits 
from its inheritance. The benefits were primarily economic - a 
maximum of trained manpower in the minimum of time. The need to 
guarantee the quality and supply of manpower had prompted McKinnon 
to push GTC into the UPNG fold. The manpower imperative also drove 
his successor: Tololo supported and defended the Faculty of Education
because its plans seemed to assure him of an optimal supply.
Tololo's impatience with detractors of the Faculty of 
Education indicated a growing dissatisfaction within the national 
government over university claims to traditional rights - autonomy, 
academic freedom, the right to dissent. There was a feeling within 
national government, exemplified by Tololo's views, that these were 
not rights but privileges, and as such should be secondary to the 
universities' obligation to justify their expense by accepting 
government direction. Similar impatience lay behind Tololo's attacks 
on the IAB of GTC. His wish to direct its activities and curtail its 
right to dissent arose from a conviction that universities existed 
primarily to serve government. To bureaucrats like Tololo appeals 
to the traditional rights were humbug. This was an attitude education­
al planners of the past - Currie Commission and Brown Committee - had
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sought to protect university institutions against. ’Western' planners 
could see value in guaranteeing university autonomy to assure free 
inquiry and independent criticism; however, it was an ideal which 
national government was coming to see as sophistry - an obfuscation 
of the universities' fundamental role.
The difference in attitude between colonial and national 
bureaucrats in control became apparent during UPNG-Department of 
Education negotiations. McKinnon, who hoped his great contribution 
to higher education would be its rationalization, tried to produce 
this in a framework which guaranteed university autonomy by placing 
a buffer between universities and government (see previous chapter). 
Tololo, however, made plain that UPNG must serve national needs, if 
necessary by political direction. Cabinet shared his thinking: the
Cabinet which aborted the Higher Education Commission was the Cabinet 
which directed UPNG to undertake commitments to maintain the output 
of secondary teachers. Expatriate officials like McKinnon raised in 
traditions of university independence might conflict with the 
universities, but would concede their rights. Their Papua New Guinean 
successors were not as ready for conciliation, and where concessions 
must be made it would have to be the universities which gave way, or 
appeared to do so. It was a measure of UPNG's sophistication and 
sensitivity under Inglis that compromises were reached over GTC which 
satisfied both University and government.
The negotiations over GTC revealed other lines of stress.
Some were internal to UPNG, for example the division between Education
and Arts-Science. The attempt of the former to incorporate GTC within
itself produced a 'classic dispute between liberal arts and education 
55faculties'. As a result the arrangement made for GTC contrasted 
with that made for the Papuan Medical College four years previously: 
the former became a College of the University whereas the latter 
had become a Faculty. Another strain affecting the final outcome was 
GTC's unwillingness simply to be swallowed by UPNG. This also 
contributed to the post-marital tensions between the two. The contin­
uing friction between Waigani and Goroka eventually persuaded the
55 O'Neill, RIW, 5 March 1976.
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University's Planning Officer to propose the removal of the entire
Faculty of Education to Goroka and its amalgamation with GTC to reduce 
56the conflict. The relationship between Waigani and Goroka had not 
therefore evolved to the fullest extent. The arrangement hammered 
out between University and Department of Education had left room for 
further change, and possibly conflict.
(c) OHE BECOMES A DE FACTO GRANTS COMMISSION
Over the years a series of government decisions had deprived the 
growing university system of formal policy-making and executive 
machinery. In 1964-65 the Department of Territories under the Barnes- 
Smith regime was unwilling to allow the Australian Universities 
Commission to participate in university development in Papua New Guinea. 
This left a vacuum which Sir Leslie Melville filled when conflict 
between the Department and UPNG-IOT over finance required the appoint­
ment of an assessor of the two institutions' financial needs.
Melville's reports between 1969 and 1972 provided some basis for co­
ordination; yet the defects of a 'one man grants commission' were 
obvious, and keenly felt: he visited the country only briefly each
year; the institutions believed their claims were receiving only 
cursory appraisal; they suspected that he came more as government 
agent than independent adviser; and as new faculties and departments 
were added, the university system became too complex for one part-time 
assessor. The Brown Committee believed a Higher Education Commission 
would provide what was lacking, but the demise of that body during 
planning - a victim of nationalist determination to resist 'Western' 
innovation - once more left the university system without effective 
machinery for co-ordination. With UOT clamouring for university 
status, and UPNG and GTC about to embrace in their courtship dance, 
the university system was rapidly becoming more complex, and more than 
ever in need of co-ordination. Once again a vacuum existed, and this 
time the Office of Higher Education (OHE) filled it.
The work of OHE began in the Special Projects Branch of the 
Department of Education, a unit to which McKinnon consigned higher
56 O'Neill to Gris, 15 October 1975, UPNGR 75/234,
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education matters such as the processing of UPNG and IOT submissions 
for Melville. In late 1972 OHE came into existence within the Chief 
Minister’s Department as the executive arm of the HEC, the formation 
of which Cabinet had ’approved in principle’. Its executive officer 
was Ian Hossack, head of the Department of Education's Planning 
Division. It first took over the administrative arrangements for the 
final Melville assessment, and spent much of its early months 
mediating between the Department of Finance and UPNG and IOT over 
levels of funding. Its second task was to prepare and shepherd draft 
legislation for the HEC through various Cabinet meetings, until 
Cabinet let the Bill lapse in mid-1973. Meanwhile, OHE became involved 
in the formation of the Committee of Enquiry into Academic Salaries, 
Awards and Conditions (the 'First Gris' Committee). This body 
recommended a cutting of the tie with Australian academic salaries, 
and during the subsequent angry outcry from the UPNG and IOT staff 
associations OHE became the go-between. The 'First Gris' Committee 
led to the 'Second Gris' Committee of Enquiry on University Development 
(CEUD). OHE provided the executive and secretarial assistance needed 
by both Gris committees. It also did much executive work for the 
working parties planning two new faculties, Agriculture at UPNG and 
Forestry at UOT. In its first year OHE thus performed valuable 
executive functions. With an expanding university system, and govern­
ment taking a more critical interest in university education, it had 
a large volume of work - too much indeed for any existing government 
agency to handle. Consequently, even though its parent body, the 
HEC, had been killed, OHE lived on, spared because it was useful.^
At this stage OHE remained primarily an administrative body, 
but the potential for an additional, more influential policy-making 
role was becoming obvious. Cabinet began calling on it for advice 
in minor matters such as the composition of the First and Second Gris 
Committees, and nomination of panel members to replace Melville.
Cabinet also required it to write 'position papers' assessing advantages 
and disadvantages of various proposals, thus giving it a policy­
forming function. Some such submissions were significant - those
1 Ian Hossack, RIW, pp. 2-5.
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recommending the change in name from Institute to University of
Technology, and the placement of the Faculty of Forestry at UOT rather
than UPNG (see chapter 6, (b)). The latter case, Forestry, had become
a source of acrimonious dispute between the universities, and more
than the simple location of a new faculty was at stake: tangled
issues of environmental conservation, appropriate technologies,
foreign investment and nationalism loomed large. In such matters OHE
submissions to Cabinet could tip the balance one way or the other.
Consequently OHE began assuming a larger role than that originally
intended. As Hossack said later, ’We were in a powerful position
because we were initiating things, and quietly working towards
2decisions which would be made.'
In late 1973 Hossack was succeeded by W.C. Rees, an economist 
from the Manpower Planning Unit of the Central Planning Office. Rees 
was an active, efficient and ambitious bureaucrat with a well-developed 
appreciation of the power of public servants. Under him OHE rapidly 
developed its policy-making potential. His style, and ambitions for 
OHE, soon became apparent in the redesignation of his position: where­
as Hossack had been the ’Executive Officer', Rees became OHE ’Director’. 
Later asked if OHE would have become as influential without him, he 
answered,
It was a virgin field in those days.... Clearly as the 
universities got bigger and the whole system got more 
complicated,... it wasn’t adequate for the universities 
to be handled through a sub-section of a branch of the 
Department of Education.... Any reasonably competent 
administrator or planner with initiative and under­
standing about what the system was all about would 
rapidly have developed OHE [as I have], without legis­
lative backing, purely with an administrative approach 
to things. 3
He clearly understood 'what the system was all about' and used his 
knowledge to good effect. Even though OHE lacked a statutory base 
he lifted it to pre-eminence within the university system. Under him 
it assumed most of the functions intended for the HEC, increasing the 
range of its activities and strength of its position until it was
2
3
ibid.
W.C. Rees, RIW, pp. 28-30.
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virtually a de facto universities commission - an accomplishment of
4which he was proud.
Rees welded together an aparatus composed of various 
committees related to OHE so as to provide the co-ordinating machinery 
the university system had previously lacked. The major component was 
the Universities Finance Review Committee (UFRC), a panel of three 
formed in late 1973 to take over Melville’s functions. Its chairman, 
V.M.N. Tigilai, was a young UPNG Economics graduate attached to the 
Manpower Planning Unit; and its original members were Karmel (by now 
Chairman of the AUC), and C. Ianamu, a local government administrator. 
The UFRC, after briefing by OHE, which had already received and 
analysed carefully the universities' submissions for funds, visited 
the campuses much as Melville had done, then produced a report to the 
Minister for Education recommending whatever finances it thought 
appropriate. OHE also provided the UFRC with secretarial and executive 
services, substantially contributed to the writing of its report, and 
wrote the Cabinet submission from the Minister requesting that funds 
be granted. And so, although the UFRC was theoretically independent 
as Melville had been, in fact it relied heavily on OHE advice and 
assistance. Under Rees OHE thus effectively became the assessor of 
university finances, and, by that the arbiter of university development. 
This function was important, for it enabled OHE to achieve a degree 
of control over trends in development which had been absent before.
In allocating funds between universities, for example, OHE could 
ensure a much larger share for UOT. Previously there had been a rough 
rule of thumb by which the ratio of the allocation had been 2:1 in 
favour of UPNG; but believing technological education needed more 
emphasis, Rees scrapped this rule. Through his influence on the 
UFRC, UOT's recurrent expenditure rose from 63% of that of the Waigani 
campus (i.e., excluding GTC and the Faculty of Medicine) in 1971-72 
to 74% in 1975-76.6
4
5
6
ibid.
ibid., p. 5. 
ibid., p . 38 .
170
The second committee within the apparatus was the Committee 
on University Trained Manpower (CUTM). This body began as the Planning 
Committee on Professional Manpower, set up by OHE in mid-1974 ’to 
present the sort of manpower data necessary to ensure the structure 
of enrolments at the universities was relevant to the manpower needs 
of the country’.^  When the CEUD recommended the formation of a 
similar committee, CUTM, OHE renamed its committee and passed its 
control over to the Central Planning Office, though Rees remained a
g
member. Membership of CUTM gave OHE a voice in a subject sensitive 
to both universities and government - the structuring of university 
enrolments. With a national government insisting that the universities 
accede to its will, particularly in economic matters such as manpower 
objectives, CUTM was a potentially powerful body able to make strong 
impact on university academic programmes. CUTM activities provoked 
disagreement with UPNG, which felt that government-imposed student 
quotas threatened its academic autonomy. Eventually, after some 
dispute, it fell in with CUTM requests, voluntarily reshaping enrol­
ment patterns to include, for example, greater emphasis on Education
9and Science courses and less on Arts and Economics.
The third part of the apparatus was the Academic Salaries 
Review Committee, chaired by W. Edoni, head of the Industrial Relations 
Service, and set up by Cabinet in late 1974. Its formation followed 
a long, determined and unsuccessful campaign by the combined UPNG 
and UOT staff associations to upset the decision recommended by the 
first Gris committee - the breaking of the link with Australian 
academic salaries. The staff associations had become increasingly 
militant because of this decision, believing the national government 
had singled out expatriate academics for an exemplary and discrimin­
atory downgrading of conditions. Eventually, in September-October 
1974, they took their case to arbitration. Government counsel, 
engaged and briefed by Rees, appeared against them and succeeded in 
having their claim summarily dismissed. The Edoni tribunal was devised
7 ibid., p. 6.
8 ibid., pp. 6-8.
9 ibid.; see also chapter 10, (a), below
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by OHE in the wake of the arbitration case as machinery to overcome 
the hiatus in academic salary fixation induced by the implementation 
of First Gris Committee recommendations. OHE also calculated that 
its existence might restore academic staff morale, which had suffered 
because of the salaries issue.^ As with the UFRC, OHE had strong 
influence on the Edoni tribunal: OHE supplied its executive and
secretarial services, submitted its reports to the Minister, and 
advised him whether or not Cabinet should accept its recommendations.
In this way OHE assumed considerable power in fixing salaries, an 
area previously the preserve of the university Councils.
In other areas, too, OHE gained influence. It became the 
channel through which the universities' requests for foreign aid must 
pass before assessment by the Aid Co-ordinating Committee of the 
Central Planning Office. Several new courses - journalism at UPNG, 
fisheries at UOT - attracted donor interest. As the recognized co­
ordinator of higher education, OHE was consulted by the Central 
Planning Office on such aid projects, and OHE recommendations became 
the basis for decisions in each case. OHE also became involved, once 
more as co-ordinator of higher education, in various 'working parties' 
on new university courses. From 1973 there were a series of such 
bodies, producing proposals for courses in hydraulics, secretarial 
studies, electrical communications, mining engineering, rural 
technology, forestry, fisheries, agricultural education, land adminis­
tration, and dentistry. The influence of OHE was important in 
deciding at which institutions courses should be placed, at what level 
they should be taught, and what levels of funding, staffing and 
enrolments should apply. Finally, OHE became a more significant part 
of the university system through its overview of the whole field of 
higher education, which allowed it to see where co-ordination could 
be improved. It made a number of contributions here - the setting 
up of a National School Leavers' Scheme, and the introduction of a 
National Tertiary Scholarships Scheme. The former endeavoured to 
place school leavers in tertiary educational institutions via a central 
selection unit, rationalizing the previous untidy system where various
10 ibid., pp. 2-4; see also chapter 8, (a), below.
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employers and educational institutions competed for school leavers.
The latter sought to rationalize the 'massively diverse, inefficient,
and inequitable system of financial support for tertiary students',
whereby some institutions and sponsors paid $20 pocket money a week
to their students while the standard university scholarship allowed
12but a fraction of that.
Through its numerous activities and close association with 
committees bringing better co-ordination to the university system,
OHE moved into a position of power within the system. It could do 
this because a real need existed for some such organ to co-ordinate 
an increasingly complex set of institutions. The need had always 
existed, but had only been partially satisfied in the past. Now, 
under the guidance of Rees, who recognized its potential, had the 
right personality and skills, and acted promptly to promote it, OHE 
changed functions. The organization set up as an appendage of the 
Higher Education Commission took on, de facto, the function of the 
Commission itself. And while this facilitated improved co-ordination, 
we will see in later chapters how it also added to the tensions 
within what was now a national university system.
11 OHER 66-1-43.
12 Rees, RIW.
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CHAPTER 6
COLLABORATION, CO-OPERATION, AND COMPETITION 
WITHIN THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM
ONE era ended and another began for UPNG and IOT in 1972. Both 
institutions came under new management, and their manner of doing 
business changed markedly. At IOT Duncanson retired and handed over 
to Sandover in January, while Gunther also retired and handed over to 
Inglis in May. After IOT had moved to Lae Duncanson and Gunther had 
had only occasional contact, their chief preoccupation being to build 
up their respective campuses so as to pass on well-established 
institutions to their successors. Their paths, and those of their 
institutions, had thus crossed but infrequently. But with Sandover 
and Inglis it was different: they corresponded and consulted each
other more often; they were seen on each other's campuses; and for 
the first time since IOT quit Port Moresby there were serious attempts 
at collaboration. However, they also emerged as serious rivals for 
the first time as Sandover sought to raise IOT status from that of 
junior to equal partner. Indeed the scope for rivalry was possibly 
greater than for co-operation. They were, after all, in competition 
for the same resources - able students, government support, funds for 
expansion, and general public interest. There were also subtle 
differences of character which added to the potential for rivalry.
UPNG was self-assured, even smug, as the University, the country's 
intellectual and cultural capital. IOT by contrast was conscious of 
being only an Institute, remote from the centre of political power, 
of being looked down on by Waigani as an upstart assortment of 
Philistines and technocrats. IOT moreover had much leeway to make up 
after its slow start. The chip on the IOT shoulder was thus hefty, 
and that too made for greater rivalry.
The growing rivalry became obvious in several directions - 
in the arguments each institution used to justify its financial 
submissions, in their annual tours around the secondary schools to 
recruit students, in public relations ventures in the news media, in 
correspondence with each other and with government, in their dealings
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with national politicians, and in the personal reserve of the individ­
uals engaged in mutual dealings between them. But perhaps the rivalry, 
and corresponding attempts at collaboration, were most apparent in an 
area of equal concern - the planning of new vocational courses. In­
evitably the question would arise, 'At which institution?', and as 
an answer was found the rival interests of UPNG and IOT would crystall­
ize. This happened most notably in the cases of agriculture, forestry, 
and land administration, which this chapter will examine.
(a) THE FACULTY OF AGRICULTURE
The potential for both co-operation and competition first became
obvious in the UPNG course in agriculture. A long chain of events
led up to this becoming an issue between UPNG and IOT. The Currie
Commissioners had thought agriculture should be one of the first
activities for UPNG to engage in, because 'the native people... [had
given] the highest priority to degree courses in agriculture'.^ They
therefore recommended that a professor of agriculture should be among
the first UPNG appointments. However, because of opposition from the
Department of Agriculture, UPNG neither appointed a professor,
2established a faculty, nor taught agriculture. The opposition
stemmed mainly from F.C. Henderson, the Director of Agriculture of
the day. Henderson later became Assistant Administrator, and died in
1969, but he was a forceful individual whose ideas continued to
3influence government even after his death. He unshakeably believed
that Papua New Guinea needed chiefly middle-level, practically-
oriented diplomates, as trained at Vudal Agricultural College - people
whose interests and skills lay in physical production and agricultural
4extension among rural communities. He was sure that if UPNG taught 
agriculture the training programme of his department would suffer. 
There would, he argued, be a stress on academic standards which would
1 Gunther to Hay, 5 November 1968, UPNGR F.81 (part 1).
2 Gunther to K. Lamb, 19 June 1968, to Cottrell-Dormer, 9 
September 1968, UPNGR A.18 (part 1).
3 Gunther, draft letter to Allen Brown, 17 May 1971, UPNGR 
A.18 (part 1).
Henderson to Gunther, 7 January 1969, UPNGR F.81 (part 1).4
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eliminate many potential trainees; there would be over-emphasis on
the background sciences, and insufficient stress on practical processes
and extension; and, for the small number of graduate agriculturalists
required, it would be more economic to train them overseas or import
expatriate experts.“* He thus believed a UPNG faculty of agriculture
was premature. At the same time he wanted Vudal to remain firmly
under his department's control, untainted by UPNG connections which
might 'confuse... [its] academic level and qualifications with those0
of a university'.
Gunther could never accept Henderson's views. Throughout 
his time at UPNG he argued that Papua New Guineans wanted agriculture 
taught at university level, that delaying its introduction at UPNG 
would increase its cost, and that, ludicrously, 'agriculture alone 
among all the professions' was not being taught to degree level.^ He 
campaigned in different directions to have UPNG's right to teach 
agriculture accepted. He first attempted to introduce agriculture 
to UPNG 'through the back door', offering options such as soil science 
and applied botany which might eventually lead to an agricultural 
science degree. One of the Science professors discussed this 
possibility with the Director of Agriculture (now W. Conroy) in 1968 
and found his attitude 'encouraging and co-operative' even though 
committed to Henderson's view that a faculty of agriculture was
g
premature. During 1969 UPNG Council considered the matter and
subsequently advised the Administrator that 'a Faculty of Agriculture
9was a desirable development'. When this failed to produce results 
Gunther arranged a seminar on agricultural education at UPNG in 1970. 
Several eminent academic agriculturalists gave papers arguing that 
UPNG could, and should, teach agriculture. The target of the seminar 
was the Department of Territories, which had remained deaf to Gunther's 
previous pleas. Gunther therefore decided that, as 'the only way of
5 ibid.
6 ibid.
7 Gunther to Henderson, 20 January 1969; to Johnson, 20 August
1970, UPNGR A.18 (part 1).
8 Lamb to Gunther, 18 July 1968, UPNGR A.18 (part 1).
Gunther to Hay, 22 December 1969, UPNGR A.18 (part 1).9
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bringing the Minister to his senses is to argue with him in public', 
a public seminar might win official endorsement for UPNG ambitions.^
Gunther by this stage was chafing at the attitude of the
Department. Under Smith's influence it had decided that some Papua
New Guineans must train in specialized fields of applied natural
sciences - forestry, agriculture, veterinary science - in Australian
universities, because the small number required did not warrant the
establishment of training facilities in Papua New Guinea.'*''*' Against
the advice of the Department of Education and the hostility of UPNG
it insisted on recruiting nineteen UPNG science students in 1969 for
a 'summer school' of six weeks at ASOPA. Here they received intensive
coaching to bring them up to Australian matriculation levels. The
scheme was, according to both UPNG and ASOPA, an 'abject failure':
it cost $10,000, only one or two students were accepted by Australian
12universities, and they soon fell by the way. UPNG was irate at the 
Department's pig-headed refusal to heed advice that the alien cultural 
and educational background of Papua New Guineans would limit their 
success at Australian universities, that Australian courses were not 
geared to Papua New Guinean needs, that graduate agriculturalists 
could be more economically trained at UPNG. And the University was 
incensed by the Department's 'discourtesy' and 'arrogance' in sending 
its officials to UPNG to cream off the best of its potential science 
graduates.^
Faced with the intransigence of both Department of Territ­
ories and Department of Agriculture, UPNG now turned to the Brown 
Committee. It requested permission to begin teaching agriculture 
within the Faculty of Science, leading eventually to the establishment 
of a degree course in agricultural science. The Committee accepted
10 Gunther to McClymont, 8 September 1970, UPNGR A.18 
(part 1).
11 Pearse to McKinnon, 23 January 1970; Barnes to Bulmer,
19 March 1970, DTOR 71/3335.
12 R. Pearse, report on summer school, folio 63, DTOR 71/3335; 
Gunther to Johnson, 20 August 1970; and to Conroy, 4 
September 1970, UPNGR A.18 (part 1).
13 Gunther to Conroy, 3 August 1970; to Johnson, 20 August 
1970, UPNGR A.18 (part 1).
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the UPNG case, and stated 'we are of the opinion that professional 
level training in agriculture in Papua New Guinea should not be 
delayed any longer. Most Papua New Guineans are involved in agricult­
ural pursuits and a high proportion will continue to be for a long 
14time'. Armed with this opinion UPNG approached the Administrator 
again. He suggested the formation of a joint committee comprising 
UPNG and Department of Agriculture membership to sort out precise 
details such as the nature and scope of the proposed course, its 
relationship to the Vudal diploma, the staff and finance required, 
and the arrangements to be made for practical farm training.
The joint committee met on three occasions in early 1972,
and was steadily working towards a 'convivial' arrangement whereby
UPNG would offer a degree course, with practical 'farm' aspects
16covered during a year at Vudal. Then, in Gunther's last fortnight 
as Vice-Chancellor, with one of his final ambitions for UPNG almost 
within grasp, the whole scheme suddenly went awry. The joint 
committee had recently visited Vudal, whose Principal evinced open 
contempt for UPNG. He subsequently wrote to the Director of Agricult­
ure in scathing terms about academics who were 'remote from practical 
matters' and 'more interested in research than teaching'.^ His views 
influenced his superiors, for they now (early May 1972) told Gunther 
'it was undesirable to mix undergraduate and diplomate students' in 
the same institution; furthermore, if there were to be a UPNG-Vudal
link the Principal must have complete control over UPNG students,
18staff and facilities at the college. This was entirely unacceptable 
to Gunther: 'there seems little point in discussing Vudal and a
degree course in agriculture together', he now advised the Adminis-
_ , 19trator.
With Gunther retired and Inglis in the chair, the joint
14 Gunther to Johnson, 3 November 1971, UPNGR A.18 (part 1).
15 Johnson to Gunther, 26 November 1971, UPNGR A.18 (part 1).
16 Gunther to Johnson, 1 May 1972, UPNGR A.18 (part 2).
17 B. Boniwell to W. Conroy, 18 April 1972, UPNGR A.18 (part 2),
18 Gunther to Johnson, 1 May 1972, UPNGR A.18 (part 2).
19 ibid.
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committee began looking for an alternative to Vudal. Lae seemed 
preferable to Port Moresby, which Gunther had favoured: IOT had land
available and would share facilities with UPNG, access to the agri­
culturally rich highlands was easy, and Department of Agriculture
experimental stations in the nearby Markham Valley could help with
20practical training. Sandover was invited to join the committee,
which he did with alacrity, anxious for means of involving IOT in a
wider range of options. In his brief time at IOT he had made it plain
he wished to lead something more than an obscure technological training
school in the remote tropics. He wished IOT to become a renowned
educational centre for the Pacific Islands region, and had begun
campaigning accordingly. A keystone of the university edifice he
wished to build was the expansion of IOT’s teaching competency, and
he was soon bruiting possible new courses in rural technology, rural
engineering, horticulture, soil conservation, forestry, fisheries,
21development studies, even Southeast Asian studies. The UPNG-
Department of Agriculture joint committee was interested in what IOT
might offer in the first two or three of these. Clearly IOT's excellent
library and workshop facilities, spare land, proximity to a variety
of land-use types, and access to the crop collections of the Markham
Valley were credit points. And so, with Sandover's ready concurrence,
the committee recommended the establishment of an agricultural degree
with Waigani running the first three years and IOT providing the
22facilities for the fourth year of practical training.
Sandover, however, was not content with simply playing host 
to UPNG final year students. He wanted IOT to share in the teaching 
and, hopefully, extend its competence into the biological sciences.
He also felt there should be a fair division of new courses in applied 
biology between UPNG and IOT. His ambitions became obvious soon after 
he joined the joint committee. He told Inglis he thought it unfair
20 Inglis to McClymont, 23 May 1972, UPNGR A.18 (part 2).
21 Sandover to Inglis, 21 June 1972, UPNGR A.18 (part 2); 
Tigilai to Sandover, 12 December 1975, OHER Running File 
of Correspondence.
22 UPNG Proposal for Degree Teaching in Agriculture, n.d., 
UPNGR A.18 (part 2).
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23for UPNG to ’expect to take all aspects of applied biology'. He 
said his Council and Academic Board would expect a quid pro quo for 
providing UPNG with 50 acres for its farm. Sharing in new courses 
was what IOT wanted:
I must emphasize that I am seriously interested and very 
deeply concerned that there should be complete collabor­
ation between us. I must, however, be convinced that you 
feel the same way about this and it seems to me that... 
sharing [new courses] would be a very good evidence of 
good faith on the part of the University.... We must, I 
think, be prepared both of us to accept that we cannot 
keep everything in a particular area to one particular 
institution. 24
This was notice of a challenge as much as evidence of willingness to
co-operate. Mere co-operation in UPNG's agricultural course was
insufficient as far as Sandover was concerned. He was expecting
collaboration, a closer form of involvement. This meant that where
new university level courses were introduced - forestry, fisheries -
IOT wished to participate; and more than that, it wanted to sponsor
some, and award the degrees. Inglis and his advisers recognized IOT
ambition but had no wish to enter prolonged debate with Sandover.
They simply wanted to conclude arrangements for their agricultural
course, and were therefore conciliatory. In personal discussions
with him they satisfied him that UPNG were not trying to confine him,
25and were keen to seek his collaboration as well as co-operation.
He was soon reporting to Inglis his pleasure at the way these
discussions were developing, and noted how enthusiastic his Academic
26Board was about hosting the final year agriculture course. He made 
clear, however, that he expected the degree course in forestry, which 
was also coming into discussion now, would be an Institute programme,
23 Sandover to Inglis, 21 June 1972, UPNGR A.18 (part 2).
24 ibid.
25 R. Smart to Inglis, 5 July 1972, UPNGR A.18 (part 3);
C.N. Williams to Inglis, 30 June 1972, and Inglis to Sandover, 
6 July 1972, UPNGR F.81 (part 1).
26 Sandover to Inglis, 12 July 1972, UPNGR A.18 (part 3).
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its first two years of basic biological sciences taught at UPNG and
27its later, specialized years taught at the Institute.
UPNG and IOT worked out their final agreement after UPNG
had appointed its Professor of Agriculture in early 1973. The Institute
made available fifty acres of land for ten years for the Faculty of
Agriculture farm; it also released a building to UPNG for $27,000 for
sole use by the Faculty; it provided Faculty staff with housing and
housed the students in IOT halls of residence. Administratively the
agriculture staff and students belonged to UPNG and dealt with IOT
through the Lae-based head of the Faculty, though in disciplinary
28matters they were subject to Institute rules. Eventually the first 
agriculture students moved to Lae in early 1975, thus demonstrating 
the potential for co-operation and collaboration between the two 
universities. The preceding three years, however, had also shown 
the potential for competition and conflict. The latter became the 
hallmarks of dealings over the second course in which UPNG and UOT 
attempted collaboration - forestry.
(b) TEE DEGREE COURSE IN FORESTRY
Events leading up to the introduction of a university forestry
course paralleled those resulting in the agriculture course. Gunther
wanted UPNG to teach forestry, and his Professor of Biology, Lamb,
held discussions with the Department of Forests during 1967-68 to
explore the possibility.'*' The Department was anxious for its training
institution, the Bulolo Forestry College, to be linked with the
2University to help upgrade the course there. But once again the 
Assistant Administrator, Henderson (the former Director of Agriculture), 
was an obstacle. He obdurately maintained a Bulolo-UPNG link was 
inappropriate because the College programme was sub-professional, and 
since the chief manpower need was for middle-level personnel a
27 ibid.
28 Stephenson to Long, 8 June, and 27 June 1972; Long to 
Stephenson, 12 July 1972, UPNGR A.18 (part 3).
1 Gunther to McNamara, 31 October 1968; Lamb to Gunther,
4 June 1968, UPNGR F.81 (part 1).
Suttie to Kedgley, 20 December 1967, UPNGR F.81 (part 1).2
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university programme in forestry was premature. Again, too, the 
Department of Territories insisted that so few forestry graduates 
were needed they should be trained in Australia; and the debate over 
the ASOPA ’summer school’ for promising UPNG science students (see
4section (a) above) involved forestry as well as agricultural science. 
And then, too, the Brown Committee recommended that a degree course 
in forestry was timely and that UPNG and Department of Forests should 
resume negotiations.^
Subsequently, in early 1972, UPNG and the Department met 
informally to see what courses UPNG might run. The Department had 
many needs - botanists, ecologists, experimental officers and forest 
managers with training in both physical and social sciences. By this 
stage Sandover was becoming interested in offering courses with an 
applied biology component, and he suggested to Inglis that IOT and 
UPNG form a joint committee to discuss collaboration. Inglis responded 
circumspectly.^ He guessed Sandover's chief interest in appliedg
biology was forestry, and therefore pointed out that UPNG and the 
Department had ’gone a long way over a long period’. UPNG was clearly 
unwilling to vacate the field simply because UOT wished to enter it; 
however, recognizing IOT’s interest in forestry, UPNG invited Sandover 
to join the UPNG-Department joint committee on forestry training. 
Sandover told Inglis this gesture was 'eminently fair and acceptable 
in all aspects’;^ but he made clear he expected IOT to have a large 
share of the course, say by hosting the final two years. He also made 
clear he assumed a quid pro quo was involved: 'I would of course like 
the [forestry] degree to be awarded by the Institute as you will be
3 Henderson to Gunther, 7 January 1969, UPNGR F.81 (part 1).
4 Johnson to Gunther, 2 October 1969, UPNGR F.81 (part 1).
5 Gunther to Johnson, 31 December 1971, UPNGR F.81 (part 1).
6 Mainsbridge to Gunther, 16 March 1972, UPNGR F.81 (part 1).
7 Inglis to Sandover, 6 July 1972, UPNGR F.81 (part 1).
8 Inglis to Smart, 8 June 1972, UPNGR F.81 (part 1).
9 Inglis to Sandover, loc. cit.
10 Sandover to Inglis, 12 July 1972, UPNGR F.81 (part 1).
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11awarding the agriculture degree’. UPNG did not object, and the first
meeting of the joint committee, in July 1972, decided on a four-year
degree course with the first two years done at UPNG, the last two at
12IOT, the practical work at Bulolo, and the degree awarded by IOT.
Sandover was naturally ’very pleased... and... happy to go along with’
13this decision.
Sandover’s ambitions received a further boost soon after.
The Bulolo Principal, who thought the College was not involved enough
under the present proposals, suggested that IOT and the College should
14share the degree course without UPNG participation. Sandover
informed Inglis of his discussions with the Bulolo Principal, but said
he would pursue them no further if UPNG still wished to be involved
in the course.^ UPNG was non-committal, having adopted a ’wait and
16see' approach to the negotiations. By this stage it was well aware 
of Sandover's ambitions. Despite his assurances that he wished to 
collaborate in order to avoid the duplication of UPNG courses at IOT,^ 
Inglis strongly suspected him of scheming to extend IOT's competence
18into 'applied biology and thence... to a full range of science courses'. 
But whatever UPNG's apprehensions about Sandover's intentions, it 
continued to persevere with the joint committee on forestry education.
The joint committee went on to produce, in late 1972, a 
proposal for a degree course to be shared between UPNG, Bulolo and 
IOT as earlier decided. The proposal noted the potential economic 
importance of forest resources to the country, and also commented on 
their value in soil conservation, water resources, flora and fauna 
conservation, the tourist industry, and their importance in rural
11 ibid.
12 Joint committee on forestry education, Minutes, 28 July 
1972, UPNGR F .81 (part 1).
13 Sandover to Inglis, 21 September 1972, UPNGR F.81 (part 1).
14 ibid.
15 ibid.
16 Inglis, personal communication, 3 November 1976.
17 Sandover to Inglis, 12 July 1972, UPNGR F.81 (part 1).
18 Inglis to Lamb, 20 November 1972, UPNGR F.81 (part 1).
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sociology. However, the emphasis of the proposed course was on
utilization and merchandising rather than the conservational and
20sociological aspects of forestry. This stress later produced severe
dissension between UPNG and UOT, and the dispute which later arose
was not only between competing institutions but between conflicting
ecological philosophies. The proposed course was now (early 1973)
21circulated within UPNG and UOT for comment. Some UPNG faculties
expressed reservations about it. Education thought that involving
three institutions in one course was cumbersome, and regarded the
course as ’conservative'. Law thought too few students would be trained
to justify a degree course, that the main need was for middle-level
technicians as already being trained at Bulolo, and consequently that
22a faculty in forestry would be a 'misdirection of public funds'.
Despite such disquiet the Professorial Board nevertheless supported 
the proposal, which was now endorsed by both UPNG and UOT Councils, 
and then sent to the OHE for presentation to Cabinet.
In the meantime the Department of Forests and UOT had been 
exploring the possibility of a merger between the Bulolo College and 
UOT so that the latter might take responsibility for the sub-profession­
al training schemes of the Department. The Director of Forests, 
anticipating that UOT would soon be teaching the degree-level pro­
fessional course, thought 'it would be advisable for a single
23authority to undertake training in forestry'. He won his Minister's 
support for this suggestion and prepared a Cabinet submission to give
19 Submission for degree training in forestry, n.d. [1972], 
UPNGR F .81 (part 1).
20 ibid. The thrust of the proposed course becomes very clear 
in Appendix 2.
21 Even though the change in name from IOT to UOT was not 
gazetted until September 1973, most people had been using 
the name 'University' since Cabinet had approved the change 
the previous January.
22 D. Stace, 'Degree training in forestry', 28 March 1973, 
UPNGR F.81 (part 1). Ironically, the arguments put forward 
by Law were the very ones put forward against UPNG four 
years previously.
23 McIntosh to Sandover, 1 May 1973, UPNGR F.81 (part 2).
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2 Ait effect. The Director believed ’the merger would not adversely
affect the arrangements with UPNG with regard to professional [degree] 
25training'. Not surprisingly Sandover gave these suggestions his 
26'warmest support'. However, UOT was not to have an easy passage into 
forestry education, for the whole scheme now struck very turbulent 
waters.
The trouble began when Sandover, confident UOT would soon 
have another degree course in its array, asked UPNG for details of 
students taking science who expected to go on to UOT for forestry.
(UPNG had taken in the first forestry students in early 1973.) The
27Dean of Science could find only 23 who evinced 'positive interest'.
Oldfield, the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, now chairman of the joint
committee on forestry education, first forwarded this information to
the OHE, which was preparing the final proposal on the course for 
28Cabinet. The OHE as a matter of course referred both proposal and
renewed estimates of student numbers to the Department of Finance,
which queried the small numbers and the financial viability of the
course in view of these. Consequently OHE called in an expert on
forestry education, Professor D. Richardson, an adviser to FAO, to
comment on these issues. When Sandover heard that UPNG had far fewer
forestry students than expected, and that this was causing Finance to
question the course, he wrote hastily and angrily to the Minister for
Education, Olewale. He asserted that UPNG's 'considerable revision'
of forestry enrolments represented a 'change in attitude' towards the 
29course by UPNG. His letter inferred UPNG had been guilty of 
subterfuge in not keeping UOT informed of its change of heart when 
making its estimates known to OHE, and thus to Finance. He then 
proposed that, as UPNG doubted it would have viable numbers, UOT and 
Bulolo should run the course alone without UPNG assistance. Oldfield,
24 'Submission for integration of Forestry College and UOT,
1 May 1973, UPNGR F.81 (part 2).
25 McIntosh to Sandover, loc. cit.
26 Sandover to McIntosh, 6 April 1973, UPNGR F.81 (part 1).
27 Smart to Oldfield, 11 July 1973, UPNGR F.81 (part 1).
28 Oldfield to Hossack, 13 July 1973, UPNGR F.81 (part 1).
29 Sandover to Olewale, 3 September 1973, UPNGR F.81 (part 1).
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greatly aggrieved, answered Sandover on behalf of UPNG. He suggested
that Sandover had misrepresented UPNG's intentions to Olewale; he said
UPNG still wished to participate; and he claimed UPNG had only been
trying to assess student numbers honestly. He also said UPNG would
not oppose a joint UOT-Bulolo course if it were 'the best and most
economical means' of producing graduate foresters, but suggested it
would involve costly duplication of UPNG facilities. He doubted,
moreover, whether Sandover and the joint committee had duly considered
'long-term implications of timber extraction especially with regard to
30future productivity [and] resource replenishment'.
A meeting of the joint committee was due three days after
Sandover had sent his angry letter to Olewale and the day after
Oldfield had replied, 6 September 1973. The purpose of the meeting
was to hear the preliminary views of the FAO expert, Richardson.
Richardson, an admirer of Chinese forestry training methods (which
were geared towards community involvement), had reservations about the
course proposed by the joint committee nearly a year before. He doubted
the need for many graduates because he thought sub-professional
training more appropriate; and he believed the proposed course
emphasized resource extraction at the expense of conservation. With
Sandover firmly refuting such claims, the meeting was, not surprisingly, 
31'stormy'. A further meeting took place on 14 September to hear a
preview of Richardson's report. The UPNG representatives later
32described it as 'climactic' and 'violent'. Richardson said the most
appropriate arrangement would be a three-year diploma shared between
UPNG and Bulolo alone, with the most able students selected for a
fourth year at UPNG to complete the degree. A large staff to teach
the degree course, as required in the original proposed course, was
33therefore 'excessive', 'overly expensive' and 'unjustified'. Sandover 
hotly challenged these views and accused Richardson of 'having had his
30 Oldfield to Sandover, 5 September 1973, UPNGR F.81 (part 1).
31 O'Neill to Inglis, 8 May 1974, UPNGR F.81 (part 2).
32 ibid.
33 D. Richardson, 'Forestry training and forestry industrial 
education and training in Papua New Guinea', 18 September 
1973, UPNGR F.81 (part 2).
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34mind made up before he came here'. And he guessed there had been
collusion between Richardson and Oldfield to exclude UOT from the 
35course. He had some justification for thinking the latter: about
three days before the meeting Richardson had asked Oldfield to inform 
the coming meeting how UPNG would mount a course in keeping with the 
scheme he (Richardson) would recommend in his report. Oldfield had 
done this, producing a programme whereby students would do a year at 
UPNG followed by two years at Bulolo to complete the diploma, and a 
fourth year back at UPNG for those doing the degree. This programme 
fitted in with Oldfield’s professional interest in ecology (he was 
an environmental geographer), being strongly oriented towards environ­
mental issues in contrast to the management-biased course of the
. . , -I 36original proposal.
The second meeting and the imputations made against him
greatly distressed Oldfield. That an issue of deep personal concern -
environmental and resource conservation - had become a cockpit of
UPNG-UOT 'feuding' perturbed him; above all he wanted the future of
forestry education 'divorced... from... inter-institutional competition', 
37he said. Despite this, he announced that he intended putting his
scheme to UPNG's Academic Planning Committee in an expanded paper which
would offer the University the alternatives of acting on Richardson's
recommendations or having nothing further to do with forestry 
38education - something hardly likely to win Sandover round. Conflict
between UPNG and UOT did not worry Sandover as it did Oldfield. He
informed Oldfield he thought it natural for them to disagree as each
was protecting the interests of his institution, and that they should
39do so was no 'major tragedy'. He protested that his major concern
34 Sandover, 'Notes of meeting, 14 September 1973', UPNGR F.81 
(part 2).
35 ibid.
36 Oldfield, 'Training of forestry graduates in Papua New Guinea', 
12 September 1973, UPNGR F.81 (part 2).
37 Oldfield to Rees, to Richardson, to Sandover, 19 September 
1973, UPNGR F.81 (part 2).
38 ibid.
39 Sandover to Oldfield, 27 September 1973, UPNGR F.81 (part 2).
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was to assist the country by getting the forestry course going without
further bickering; he therefore intended calling for yet a further
meeting of the joint committee. However, to ensure objectivity, he
40did not want Oldfield but someone ’neutral’ to chair it. This
meeting duly took place, in early November 1973, with a Department of
Forests representative in the chair. As one UPNG representative noted,
it ’ended in victory for the technocrats’ - probably because the
Department, which was as keen as Sandover to see the course operational,
41supported the ideas in the original proposal. The Department, too,
appears to have favoured a relationship with UOT for Bulolo rather
than with UPNG as it was still thinking in terms of a Bulolo-UOT 
42merger. The joint committee tacitly laid aside the Richardson report,
which was deemed to have underestimated the need for graduates. After
considerable discussion it went on to make decisions which enabled OHE
to prepare a submission for Cabinet recommending virtually what was in
the original proposal - a four-year degree course, the first two years
at UPNG, the final two at UOT in collaboration with Bulolo, and the
43degree to be awarded by UOT, where the professor would reside.
UOT and Department of Forests ’tree engineers’ might have 
won the fight, but UPNG environmentalists refused to capitulate.
Several of those who had been deeply involved in the dispute now resorted 
to guerrilla tactics. They persuaded a former UPNG staff member now 
working as a consultant to government on community development to write 
and circulate a provocative paper, ’The alternative to forest exploit­
ation in Papua New Guinea’, which drew parallels between the type of 
forestry course being planned and the large-scale logging operations
by foreign companies then causing disquiet among many Papua New 
44Guineans. They also took up the question with the Gris Committee of
40 ibid.
41 D. Frodin, 'Submission to Faculty of Science', March 1974, 
UPNGR F.81 (part 2).
42 Rees, 'Summary of meeting on degree course in forestry’,
20 November 1973, UPNGR F.81 (part 2).
43 Submission for degree course in forestry, n.d., UPNGR F.81 
(part 2).
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Enquiry into University Development, suggesting the dispute would give 
CEUD ’a fulcrum for the question of one versus two universities'.^ As 
we will see, the CEUD later recommended the union of UOT, UPNG and 
Goroka Teachers' College in a single national university. One reason 
why CEUD members made this recommendation was their wish to contain 
Sandover's ambitions for UOT. They saw these as wasteful and 
destructive, and believed his conduct over the forestry course exempli­
fied this: he had, they believed, been childishly petulant, too
concerned for the good of UOT and too little with what might have been
46best for the country. They suggested to him that there had been 
undue ’friction and lack of co-operation between the two universities 
on agriculture, forestry and fisheries'; but he guessed they had been 
discussing the issue with his opponents at UPNG (where Gris had been 
formally named to succeed Oldfield, who had resigned, as Deputy Vice- 
Chancellor). He attached little weight to these opinions, attributing 
them to ’gossip' and ’influences... not favourable to UOT'.^
Having finally gained forestry for UOT Sandover was not
prepared to have it wrested from him by marauders from UPNG. As soon
as government approval was obtained, in early 1974, UOT went ahead to
establish its Faculty of Forestry formally, advertise for a professor
and lecturer, and to make ready for the first batch of third year
48students due to arrive from two years at UPNG early in 1975. In the
end UPNG had to concede that, whether or not the shared UOT-UPNG course
was the best, 'we are stuck with it', and the best hope for it to go
in the direction UPNG favoured was the appointment of a sympathetic
49professor who might 'humanize the curriculum'. The first batch of 
students duly arrived in 1975, and although the professor did not take 
up duty for another year, forestry was by now the sparkling new jewel 
of the UOT crown.
45 Frodin, loc. cit.
46 Randell, RIW, pp. 5-7; cf. A.C. Voutas, RIW, p. 1; Rees, 
RIW, p. 45.
47 Sandover to Rees, 2 July 1974, OHER 66-1-32.
48 Stephenson to Long, 1 March 1974; to Inglis, 23 April 1974, 
UPNGR F .81 (part 2).
Inglis to O'Neill, 15 May 1974, UPNGR F.81 (part 2).49
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An unfortunate legacy of the wrangling over forestry was the 
residue of distrust it left between UPNG and UOT. Both institutions 
continued, indeed were obliged by OHE pressure and CEUD recommendations, 
to co-operate; but a sour taste was left among those involved. It was 
not long before ’Dr Standover’ became the butt of the UPNG underground 
newspaper;and a feeling of resentment remained among some UPNG 
staff, who perhaps fondly anticipated the day when they might even the 
score with UOT.~^ And UOT staff who were sincerely interested in co­
operation and collaboration found Oldfield ’unhelpful’ and 'cool' in 
his reception of them. His attitude to them and the institution they
represented convinced them that the CEUD proposal for a single national
52university was unworkable, and this led them to oppose it. The 
dispute had not been without its personal and educational costs.
Several issues had crystallized during the dispute. The
importance of personalities in the development of the university system
had once again been obtrusive. Personalities were a factor no
educational planner could take into account, yet they were significant
for they helped shape development. A sensitive fellow like Oldfield,
who wished to implement training schemes befitting his personal
philosophies of education, ecology and resource development, was
perhaps bound to be bruised if he tangled with tough, determined
operators like those of UOT. Some of his colleagues suspected his
disagreements with UOT helped precipitate his departure from the
country after less than a year; and their personal antipathies became
53a factor in subsequent dealings with UOT.
To personal differences were added ideological difficulties. 
The year of the dispute was also the year in which the Somare govern-
54ment unfurled its vaunted 'Eight Point Plan for National Development'.
50 The Muffing ton Smee Reporter and Plain Dealer3 February 
1974.
51 Personal observations, UPNG, March-April 1976.
52 D. Mansell, RIW, and personal communication.
53 Personal communications, November 1975 and April 1976, from 
informants who did not wish to be named.
54 M. Somare (1975), pp. 108-9.
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This was a rhetorical statement of national aims affirming the putative­
ly co-operative, egalitarian nature of Papua New Guinean traditional 
society and endeavouring to translate that ethos into modern terms.
Late 1973 also saw the arrival of self-government, and not surprisingly 
most people gave lip service at least to the 'Eight Points'. Some, 
however, and Oldfield was one, took to heart the idealism underlying 
the 'Eight Points', and attempted to give it practical expression. The 
Oldfield-Richardson scheme for forestry education was one such attempt. 
But, in the face of determined UOT power play, which was backed by a 
government department at least as concerned with its obligation to 
develop resources as with its duty to conserve, the attempt to translate 
ideology into practice failed. What counted was not idealism and 
ideology but political toughness and adroitness - qualities the UOT 
Vice-Chancellor had in abundance. To survive against UOT-style 
politicking was perhaps the acid test of 'Eight Points' ideology; and 
in the case of forestry education the ideology had proved flimsy.
And then of course there was the obvious element of rivalry
between the institutions. This was something UOT perhaps felt more 
55keenly than UPNG. UPNG had sought to accommodate UOT ambitions by 
inviting UOT representatives to meetings of the UPNG-Department of 
Forests joint committee. But before long what had started out as a 
UPNG course was taken over by UOT, and eventually, when Oldfield 
stepped down from the chairmanship because Sandover demanded 'neutral­
ity' , the committee became in effect a UOT-Department of Forests 
partnership. That UOT, the upstart institution, the upward mobile 
interloper, had so effectively elevated itself and was now a force to 
be reckoned with must have impressed itself upon the political operators 
of UPNG. Even if Sandover's other notable 'public relations' ventures 
on behalf of UOT (his quest for university status, his public appeal 
for funds to build Duncanson Hall - the UOT auditorium) had not driven 
home the fact, UOT's usurpation of the forestry course did: UPNG was
no longer the University. It now had a bothersome contender for that 
title.
The rivalry over new courses continued. The most notable
55 O'Neill, RIW, 5 March 1976; Rees, RIW, p. 43.
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example was the dispute over a sub-graduate Diploma in Land Adminis­
tration the UOT Valuation Department had planned to provide as a 
service for the Department of Lands. The Department, following a 
commission of inquiry into land matters which produced a report 
recommending changes in the training and activities of lands officials, 
had a need for a new type of operative - a ’land administrator’ 
equipped not only with surveying and valuation skills but with socio­
logical and legal training as well. UOT responded promptly to the 
need, and with OHE assistance set up a joint committee with UOT, OHE 
and Department representation. The committee eventually produced a 
proposal for a two-year course to be shared between the universities. 
However, there were subsequent objections from the UPNG Law Faculty 
and a consultant on land reform engaged by the Department. They believed 
the proposed course too ’conservative', too preoccupied with the 
surveying and valuation aspects and too little with the sociology of 
land holding. These opinions eventually swayed the Department, which
now devised a new scheme of training totally excluding UOT and leaving
56the course in the hands of UPNG. The UPNG representatives on the 
committee were influential in producing the Department’s change of 
heart, and they seemed to relish the opportunity this afforded for 
evening the score with Sandover and UOT over the outstanding Oldfield 
account.^ Sandover effected a nonchalant mien, adopting the attitude 
'you win some, you lose some'; but his Valuation staff, who had put 
almost two years’ effort into preparing the proposed course, could not 
be so casual. They were left bitterly resentful of both UPNG and the 
Department.
But though there was rivalry between the two universities in 
issues such as this, there had also been a measure of collaboration.
That it was occurring was significant, for it was a new element in the 
UPNG-UOT relationship. In Gunther-Duncanson days it would have been 
unlikely as the two institutions then dwelt in almost separate worlds.
56 The course of events is covered in UPNGR A.40-14 and OHER 
66-1-29, from which this information is drawn.
57 Personal observations, UPNG, March 1976.
58 O'Neill, personal communication, 17 March 1976; M. Ecclestone, 
personal communication, 12 May 1976.
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But now they were showing that they could of their own volition seek 
the rationalization of resources and co-ordination of effort which 
efficiency-seekers such as McKinnon had long sought but with little 
success. In arriving at this point UPNG and UOT received considerable 
encouragement from OHE, which in the process had been demonstrating 
its own potential. OHE was emerging as the co-ordinator of university 
effort, the mediator in UPNG-UOT disputes, and the broker of training 
programmes in which government departments had interests in the 
universities. In this way the emerging university system was exhibiting 
not only negative but positive qualities. Perhaps this was a lesson 
educational planners such as the CEUD noted, for they were now able 
to see what they might expect of the system in the future.
One question, however, remains: why did the university
institutions begin collaboration under Inglis and Sandover when they 
had remained apart under Gunther and Duncanson? The answer is complex 
because a combination of factors was drawing UPNG and UOT together - 
the increasingly complicated nature of the university system, which 
meant that each institution had something to offer the other; the 
upward mobility of UOT under Sandover, and its demands for a more 
equal share of resources; the presence of OHE, which began playing a 
more effective part during 1973; pressures from the national government 
for rationalization and co-ordination as Cabinet began realizing the 
high cost of the universities; the 'Eight Point Plan', the ethos of 
which was co-operation; and the emergence of a university system from 
a congerie of isolated, unrelated institutions. These drew UPNG and 
UOT ever closer, and as that happened it was perhaps inevitable that 
severe strains would develop between them as they sought a new modus 
vivendi. But not only conflict occurred: the collaboration and co­
operation was just as significant; and as we will see in the next 
chapter, national ideology demanded that these possibilities be explored 
further.
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CHAPTER 7
THE SEARCH FOR A ’RESPONSIVE' UNIVERSITY MODEL
BY early 1973 the Somare coalition had formulated a set of national
aims, the 'Eight Point Plan for National Improvement'."^ With self-
government around the corner, it was determined not to follow blindly
precedents set by the departing colonial Administration but to explore
2more appropriate 'Papua New Guinean ways'. Over the next two years 
the 'Eight Points' were much discussed and elaborated, and in the 
process a nationalist ideology emerged. A rhetoric of nationalism 
developed too, and the various statements of national objectives 
stressed ideals such as 'integral human development', 'equality and 
participation', 'national sovereignty and self reliance', and 'tradition-
3al Papua New Guinean ways'.
The ideology was not all rhetoric, however, for it included 
practical strategies and programmes. The university system was not 
exempt, for the various statements of national aims usually referred 
to it explicitly. Trends in government thinking were clear, and that 
the universities must encompass the new ideology was obvious. State­
ments such as the following could not be ignored:
Higher education must serve primarily the government's 
needs for skilled manpower....
Particular care must be taken not to overproduce 
generalist graduates in arts, economics and law...
[and there should be] a shift in resources... in favour 
of scientific and technological courses....
As self sufficiency [in professional manpower] is 
approached there will need to be a reallocation of 
resources out of higher education and into base level 
education for the mass of the population. 4
The national government clearly saw the universities as educational 
machines, something it could tune to turn out at demand requisite
1 Central Planning Office (PNG) (1973).
2 National Planning Committee of Cabinet (PNG) (1974),
p. 18.
3 ibid., pp. 15, 18.
4 ibid., pp. 66-7.
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numbers of graduates according to changing needs; and as needs were 
met the machines might be allowed to run down a little, with the power 
used to run them plugged in elsewhere. Those planning the future of 
the universities thus had plain prescriptions for what government 
expected.
In 1973-74 three separate committees examined aspects of the 
future of university education. They produced reports which attempted 
to come to terms with government demands. These were the government- 
appointed 'First’ and 'Second Gris' Committees and UPNG's Oldfield 
Committee. The sum total of their effort was a model for future 
university development which might serve as the basis for planning 
through the early years of national independence. Constructing the 
model was an onerous task for the committees had to combine three 
possibly contradictory aims: first, they had to make the university
system more responsive to government manpower demands; second, they 
must make it more responsive to the nationalistic ideology of egali­
tarianism and self-reliance; and third, they must preserve educational 
values so that the system would not degenerate into a soulless machine 
for filling assigned manpower categories.
(a) TEE 'FIRST GRIS' COMMITTEE
Early in 1973 Australian academic staff received salary increases
of between $1200 and $3700 via the Campbell award.^ Previously such
£
increases had 'flowed on' to UPNG and UOT automatically. On this 
occasion, however, Australia's Labor government advised the Papua New 
Guinean Cabinet that if it granted the flow-on it must find the funds 
from within its own budget. This instruction, coming as Cabinet was 
considering UOT and UPNG estimates for 1973-74, focused attention on 
the considerable investment the two institutions represented. Cabinet 
was loth to grant the flow-on (which gave many academics a salary 
double that of Somare himself), thinking the academics were privileged 
enough even without the increase. After some uncertainty over how to
5 Committee of Enquiry into Academic Staff Salaries, Allowances 
and Conditions (1973), p. 2. (First Gris Report).
Johnson, telex to Territories, 21 May 1973, OHER 66-1-23.6
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handle the matter, Cabinet decided to appoint a committee of three to 
inquire into the matter. Somare made clear how he thought the committee 
should report: 'Get Crocombe - he'll cut them down!', he instructed a
g
senior official.
Somare's reference was to Professor R.G. Crocombe of the 
University of the South Pacific (Fiji), whom Papua New Guinean poli­
ticians regarded as a white man who passionately espoused Papua New 
9Guinean causes. The choice of Crocombe was significant for the imprint 
of his ideas on the reports of both the First and Second Gris Committees 
was unmistakeable. He had a reputation as an outraged critic of 
Australian colonialism, one who thought he could vocalise the resent­
ments felt by Papua New Guineans.^ Some academics in Papua New Guinea, 
however, were sceptical of his views, regarding him as a 'pop academic' 
who gained most 'mileage' by telling Papua New Guineans their country's 
underdevelopment stemmed from the wickedness of Australian oppressors.^  
He had previously found fault with the 'inappropriate', 'Western' bias 
of Papua New Guinea's university institutions; and early in UPNG's 
life he had urged the University to employ black rather than white
academics because the former would be more sympathetic to Papua New 
13Guineans. His critics looked on his ideas as a pretentious and 
patronising form of inverse racism, but Cabinet obviously approved of 
them.
The Committee, formally styled the Committee of Enquiry into 
Academic Staff Salaries, Conditions and Standards, was chaired by
7 At first Somare wished simply to ignore the issue (McKinnon, 
RIW, p. 4).
8 Personal communication, August 1975, former government 
official who wished to remain anonymous.
9 McKinnon, loc. cit. Crocombe was particularly well known for 
his attack on the country's first five-year development plan, 
which he maintained would place the economy more firmly in 
Australian hands. See R.G. Crocombe (1969).
10 Randell, RIW, p. 2; McKinnon, loc. cit.
11 J. Griffin (1975), p. 248.
12 McKinnon, loc. cit.
13 Gunther, RIW.
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G.B. Gris and was more usually known by his name. Gris had qualified
in dentistry at the Suva medical college, had a postgraduate degree
from the USA, and had been head of dental training in the Department
of Public Health. He had also served on the Weeden Committee, whose
1969 report had led to the restructuring of primary, secondary and
technical education within a national system, and he was well regarded
as being among the best educated and most able of 1 oldernational
bureaucrats. The third committee member after Gris and Crocombe was
V. Harvey, a former UPNG Economics lecturer now working for the
Department of Finance. The Committee had 'to devise for academic staff,
salary levels and conditions which, in comparison with those of tertiary
institutions in other countries, will prove competitive and yet
sustainable by the public revenue and the country's economy in the
long term'.^ It did its work during four weeks in May and June 1973,
interviewing 75 representatives of the academic community, trade
unions, employers' organizations, education officials, and politicians
to gain evidence. Its report recommended that the tie between academic
salaries in Australia and Papua New Guinea be broken and that the
Australian increases should not flow on.^ However, because there
seemed to be a moral - as opposed to legal - obligation to honour
existing contracts, it also recommended that staff on contracts should
receive an 'ex gratia' payment equivalent to the amount of the
Australian increase for the remaining period of their contracts or for
17three years, whichever was shorter. The government subsequently
accepted this advice, and staff members who had been employed before
181 July 1973 were granted a 22%% increase as an 'ex gratia' award.
In making these recommendations, which were incontestably 
appropriate to a developing country on the verge of independence, the
14 The 'older' bureaucrats were those who had received higher 
education circuitously in the days before UPNG and UOT were 
founded.
15 First Gris Report, p. 1.
16 ibid., pp. 5-6.
17 ibid.
18 Rees, RIW, p. 3.
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Committee presented a forceful argument along the following lines:
(i) Australian academic salary levels were inappropriate in a developing 
country because they were high even compared with those of other 
developed nations. (ii) Papua New Guinea’s limited funds could not 
be channelled into 'indigenous projects', where priority should lie, 
if more money were given to foreign staff. (iii) To continue the tie 
with Australian salaries would widen the gap between the privileges 
of expatriate and local staff, which could only deepen harmful divisions 
already in existence. (iv) Academic salaries in Papua New Guinea 
should be based on the country's resources rather than those of a 
foreign country, viz., Australia. (v) Existing salaries were sufficient­
ly attractive to draw good quality staff to the country; and there was
no necessary connection between high salaries and good quality staff
19as salaries were only one factor in motivating academics.
The Committee claimed it had been influenced by a number of
recurring themes in the opinions it heard. It had not been able to
confine itself solely to the salaries issue as many informants kept
referring to matters such as the function of the universities in Papua
New Guinean society, academic standards, government-university
relations, staff-student relationships, staff composition and structures,
20staff recruitment, localization, and research. Many of the views
expressed were contradictory, but that a wide cross-section of the
community held them indicated there was a fundamental questioning of
the role of universities in the country. The Committee guessed the
universities presented problems deeper than simply salaries, and
21suggested 'a major rethink is necessary’. It therefore recommended 
that this become the task of a larger committee with wide terms of 
reference to allow a probing of the issues emerging from its discussions 
with the public. Such an enlarged committee should travel widely among 
developing countries to see how problems of university development were 
being handled elsewhere, and to discover what alternatives there were
19 First Gris Report, pp. 4-5, 7-9.
20 ibid., pp. 11-25.
21 ibid., p. 10.
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to the 'Western' University model. The government acted promptly 
on this advice, and within several weeks the original Gris Committee 
had been expanded to include seven additional members charged with 
undertaking a thorough reappraisal of the university system.
In recommending the setting up of a larger committee, the
Committee made clear what it did not think appropriate in the existing
university system. First, it thought the high Australian staff
content at UPNG and UOT was undesirable. This could lead to 'wholesale
cultural and intellectual subservience to an imported set of socio- 
23cultural values'. Second, the universities had unavoidably developed
on the Australian pattern, and there was now need to 'seriously question
24the extent to which this should continue in future'. Government had
a vested interest in the university system, the Committee pointed out,
and must 'lay down guidelines for the kind of university it considers
to be of the most value to the country'. Third, and above all, the
Committee was unhappy with what seemed to be a trend towards elitism
in the universities. Indeed its report was as much a pronunciamento
of anti-elitism as a set of recommendations about academic salaries.
It argued that UPNG and UOT were 'in serious jeopardy' because they
were producing 'an out-of-touch elite... [with] ideas and attitudes...
more geared to the thinking of overseas countries than in Papua New 26
Guinea'. It used arguments previously employed by McKinnon about 
'the hidden curriculum' - the students lived in a comparatively 
luxurious physical environment in isolation from the rest of the popu­
lation; they came to view the pay, prestige and privileges of their 
teachers as the proper norm to which they, too, should aspire; 
university lecturers were an inappropriate reference group for students 
because their lifestyle was 'in conflict with the... Eight Point Plan'; 
the per-student costs of the universities were both relatively and
22 ibid.
23 ibid., P- 7.
24 ibid., P- 9.
25 ibid.
26 ibid., P- 8.
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absolutely high, with the result that students were learning to operate
27in an unrealistically extravagant milieu.
Much of what the Committee said about elitism was undoubtedly
timely. Many staff members had become uneasy with the direction the
universities were taking. In particular the isolation in which students
lived, and the elitist tendencies this fostered, caused concern. These
apprehensions had already led to a number of attempts to involve
students more directly in the wider community. At UOT, for example, a
Community Development Group encouraged student participation in 'grass
roots' community projects, and most academic departments had some such 
28involvement. And UPNG arranged for parties of students to visit
outlying districts to meet rural people and engage in 'political 
29education'. These efforts by the universities were evidence of their 
awareness of the problems both First and Second Gris Committees detailed.
Nor could anyone seriously contest that a country on the
verge of independence should have an independent academic salaries
policy. Yet the academics came to see the principle of flow-ons from
Australia as a cause celebrej an issue on which the government must be
challenged. The reason for this was that they saw the First Gris
Committee as a blatantly political act, an attempt to pin back their
conditions for exemplary purposes at a time when the salaries of other
expatriate public sector employees remained in line with those in 
30Australia. There was, of course, justification for academics to
feel they had been singled out for a discriminatory downgrading of
conditions. The Committee had been conceived of initially as an
exercise in the cutting back of expatriate privilege; and, as they were
the unfortunate group to have thus become the first victims of Papua
New Guinean nationalism over conditions of employment, they viewed the
31Committee as a punitive device. Their discontent was exacerbated
27 ibid.
28 IOT Community Development Group, Prospectusj 1972.
29 UPNG News no. 32, November 1972-February 1973, pp. 9-13.
30 Rees, RIW, p. 19. 
ibid.31
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by the knowledge that the government had no overall policy for
expatriate salaries, that its approach to the question was piecemeal 
32and erratic. It was most unfortunate that the Committee evoked such 
a negative response among academics: the recommendations made good
economic and educational sense. But because of the way in which it 
had been conceived, and the manner in which it went about its business, 
many academics rejected its legitimacy. The bitterness which arose 
over this issue was to hinder the work of the Second Gris Committee, 
and provided fuel for subsequent conflict between academics and the 
government.
The presence on the Committee of Crocombe also nurtured the
hostility of the academics. He made it clear from the outset that
the tie with Australian salaries should be broken; and his trenchantly
ideological stance in meetings with them made clear that he was
approaching the issue with preconceived prejudices. For example, when
suggestions were made to the Committee that a means of guaranteeing
conditions for academics was the payment by the Australian government
of some form of supplementation, he rejected the notion, asserting
33that ’this leads towards colonialism'. He further asserted that 
'salary should not be the crucial motivating factor in obtaining top­
line academics', constantly referring to his own university in Fiji
as an example of a wise salary arrangement for a university in an
34underdeveloped nation. Subsequent inquiries by the UPNG and UOT
staff associations suggested that he had misrepresented the situation
at his own university: its registrar reported that its salary policy
had been generally unsuccessful, the university having experienced
considerable difficulty in attracting good overseas staff and having
in consequence recently adopted a scheme for 'topping up' the salaries
of its Australian, UK, and New Zealand staff members to the levels
35obtaining in their home countries. Crocombe's provocative conduct,
32 P. Greenwood, personal communication, 13 May 1976; D. Dale, 
personal communication, 12 May 1976.
33 First Gris Committee, Minutes, 7 June 1973, OHER 66-1-23.
34 ibid., 6 June 1973, and 8 June 1973.
35 Inglis to W. Morrison, 27 July 1973; S.F. Perrott to
Stephenson, 23 October 1973, UPNGR F.105-17 (part 1).
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and apparent equivocation over the experience of his own university,
antagonized the academics and led them to complain about the Committee’s 
3 6objectivity. Much of the subsequent conflict between the academics 
and government, and some academics and the Second Gris Committee, arose 
from their conviction that government had punished them, and that 
Crocombe had been the ’hatchet man’.
For all the hostility the Committee generated, however, it 
had performed a necessary function in recommending the adoption of an 
independent academic salary structure. And perhaps more importantly 
it had drawn attention to the significance for university development 
of Eight Point Plan ideology. If the government seriously intended 
putting the Eight Points into practice, the universities would clearly 
have to bend more readily to government will; and above all they could 
not be allowed to become elitist ivory towers.
(b) THE OLDFIELD COMMITTEE
In early 1973 Oldfield, recognizing that the Eight Point Plan
held important implications for the University, suggested that UPNG
should be considering how it wished to develop in the next three or
four years.^ As a result a ’Working Party on the Future of the
University’ (the Oldfield Committee) was subsequently formed in May
1973, only a couple of weeks ahead of the First Gris Committee. This
body, with Oldfield as chairman, met on six occasions over the next
two months and in October submitted a 46-page report (the Oldfield 
2Report) to Inglis. Membership of the Working Party comprised both 
UPNG and government representatives. Both Gris and Harvey, members 
of the First and Second Gris Committees, were on it, and so was 
Alexis Sarei, who became a member of the Second Gris Committee. There 
were thus strong bonds and considerable continuity between the three 
committees concerned with university development in 1973, and it was 
hardly surprising that a number of themes kept recurring in the reports 
of each.
36 W. Manser and D. Dale to Hossack, 11 July 1973, OHER 66-1-23.
1 Working Party on the Future of the University, Minutes,
16 May 1973, UPNGR E.61.
2 F. Oldfield {et at.) (1973), p. 1. (The Oldfield Report)
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For the Oldfield Committee the central issue was government- 
University relations. The Committee thought there ought to be a high 
level of dialogue between the parties. To promote this it made its 
first task the compilation of a set of aims for UPNG which took account 
of the Eight Point Plan. A number of these aims were notable for the 
concern they demonstrated to fit in with the Eight Points: they spoke
of
co-ordinat[ing University] efforts with those of other 
institutions so that the national resources for education 
... can be distributed most rationally;... establishing 
lines of communication with the general population, 
especially village communities, and facilitat[ing] the 
effective interaction of all levels of society to avoid 
unnecessary elitist stratification within it; [and] 
creat[ing] a community with an academic, intellectual 
and social character which will [increase students’] 
capacity to serve the nation. 3
The Committee was thus concerned with making the University ’sensitive' 
and 'responsive' to government will. In particular it wished the 
University to seek economy, serve the people, and preserve the putative­
ly egalitarian nature of Papua New Guinean society.
The Oldfield Report made five major sets of recommendations.
In brief these were as follows:
(i) Meeting government manpower needs. The Committee rejected the 
view that the University existed to fill manpower categories 'mechan­
istically'. The University could not be tied to quotas because any 
estimate of manpower needs involved subjectivity and guesswork. Never­
theless UPNG must be sensitive to the dangers of under- and oversupply 
in particular categories. UPNG and government should therefore co­
operate in establishing machinery for determining manpower needs and
4orienting teaching programmes towards these.
(ii) The emphasis of the major subject disciplines. The Committee 
called for 'relevance' and 'responsiveness' to national needs from all 
the major disciplines - medicine, dentistry, the law, social sciences 
and humanities, the sciences, education. Thus, Mathematics should be
3
4
ibid.
ibid., pp. 6, 11.
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producing graduates qualified for work in computing, systems analysis, 
statistical aspects of planning, and mathematical education; while in 
the physical and biological sciences there should be emphasis on 
matters of immediate relevance such as resources, the environment, and 
ecological decline."’
(iii) Teaching and learning problems. Here the Committee called for 
greater effort in in-service training and external studies, particularly 
to enable mature workers to complement work experience with additional 
up-to-date training. UPNG, it believed, should be offering more 
courses, seminars and workshops, possibly in conjunction with otherg
tertiary institutions. With regard to actual learning and teaching, 
there was a need to 'break out of the traditional authoritarian teacher- 
pupil model', to adopt a 'problem-oriented approach to learning' with 
more time spent in interdisciplinary and practical projects. Another 
major need was to build community service into the curriculum, for 
too often the high altruism of incoming students evaporated as they 
became more interested in professional status and personal success. 
Student motivation was another problem, which the adoption of a 'work- 
study' system might solve: if students entered University after a
period of work rather than straight from secondary school, and were 
able to interrupt tertiary studies with periods of work, their 
enthusiasm for study might be better maintained.^
(iv) Staff development and localization. The Committee accepted the 
probability that academic localization would be a prolonged process, 
but nevertheless believed there must be 'rapid development of a body 
of Papua New Guinean academics large enough to have a forceful impact 
in policy-making, teaching and staff-student relations within theg
University'. In view of competition for graduates from the Public
Service, and the value of work experience outside the University, there
should be an arrangement for reciprocal exchanges of staff between
9UPNG and the public sector.
5 ibid., P-
6 ibid., PP
7 ibid.
8 ibid., PP
9 ibid.
12.
22-4.
31-2.
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(v) Student affairs. The Committee made various specific recommend­
ations for improving efficiency and effectiveness of student government. 
It also expressed concern over several endemic problems - ethnic and 
regional divisions between students, and the treatment of women. In 
relation to the former it suggested that regional affiliations might 
be used constructively, for example in maintaining discipline, rather 
than being allowed to continue as a source of dissension. The problems 
of female students were perhaps the most intractable tackled by the 
Committee. The numerical weakness of the women (only a tenth of the 
full time student population) greatly concerned it. It said there 
should be 'codes of behaviour designed to improve the present often 
unsatisfactory interaction between the s e x e s ' T h i s  was a euphemistic 
way of saying female students were a severely oppressed and vulnerable 
minority, especially sexually. The Committee hoped the proportion of 
women might be increased to a third by 1980. To achieve this, special 
provisions must be made for women - the provision of a residential 
college (as against a simple dormitory); the creation of recreation 
areas for exclusive female use; the establishment of courses specially 
designed for women, for example, special two-year sub-graduate diplomas 
in child health, nutrition, and social work to overcome the deterrent 
effect of lengthy degree-level courses.
While the above recommendations were intended to make UPNG 
more relevant to national needs, more responsive to Eight Point 
objectives, the Oldfield Report still drew much criticism. A number 
of critics thought it 'anti-intellectual' since little mention was 
made of scholarship: the Report, it was said, omitted to endorse the
fact that the University was, by valued tradition, a 'community ofHscholars'. Other critics thought there was too much emphasis on 
'relevant' research and on localization of academic staff: thus, to
warrant the title 'university' UPNG must tolerate research not directly 
related to national needs, and it must also tolerate a cosmopolitan
10 ibid., p. 37.
11 J. Winslow to Oldfield, 13 August 1973; Gunther to Oldfield, 
16 September 1973, UPNGR E.61.
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12diversity among staff. Another criticism was that the Committee
ignored its own objectives by showing little concern for other tertiary
institutions, particularly UOT. Apart from several passing references
the Report made no serious attempt to consider the co-ordination of
13UPNG's efforts with those of the other institutions.
The major criticisms, however, related to aspects where the 
Report was closest to Eight Point objectives, in particular anti­
elitism and responsiveness to government requirements. Gunther, now 
in retirement, pungently criticized the anti-elitist tone of the Report. 
He pointed out to Oldfield that a university was of necessity an 
expensive institution. Any attempt to reduce its costs significantly 
would degrade its achievement. Here he seemed to sense Crocombe’s 
influence, for he warned of the need to 'prevent interlopers creating 
a "barefoot" University in Papua New Guinea’^  - an obvious reference 
to Crocombe's University of the South Pacific, where levels of funding 
were much less generous than at UPNG and where Crocombe believed 
elitist tendencies had accordingly been minimised. Gunther was 
generally sceptical of anti-elitist rhetoric: it was ’a pious hope',
he said, to expect there could be either university or national society 
without an elite forming.^ He was here making a point which Eight 
Points ideology seemed to overlook, viz., that elitism possibly is a 
manifestation of structural phenomena, and therefore mere proscription 
might not eliminate it. Making the University's facilities less 
lavish, requiring students to have 'grass roots' involvements, was to 
treat the symptoms and not the cause of elitism. The second major 
criticism, concerning responsiveness, was even more fundamental since 
it involved the very raison d ’etre of the University. Several critics 
saw in the Report's concern for responsiveness an abnegation of UPNG's 
independence. As one UPNG academic noted, much of the Report seemed
12 ibid., and Sandover to Oldfield, 30 August 1973, UPNGR 
E. 61.
13 ibid.
14 Gunther to Oldfield, loc. cit.
15 ibid.
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designed almost entirely with a view to pleasing- 
appeasing potential critics of an open and academic 
university. If so, we have brought in the sails 
because we sense there may be a storm somewhere in 
the distance. This is a hell of a way to begin a 
voyage. 16
Similarly, Gunther said UPNG could become too responsive to government 
will. He made his point here by referring to the University of Dar-es- 
Salaam and Makerere University, which he had visited several years 
previously. These, he said, could not be called ’universities in the 
generally accepted meaning of the word’ as both 'taught exactly what 
the state wanted', which included political indoctrination as well as 
professional skills. In surrendering the right to decide what they 
would teach they had lost the attribute which had made them ’univers­
ities’ - their right to independent, critical comment.^ For UPNG, 
too, there were similar pitfalls. An uncritical espousal of Eight 
Points ideology, too great a degree of responsiveness, for example the 
surrender of autonomy in deciding how manpower needs would be met, 
would be steps along the path taken by the East African universities.
The Eight Point Plan thus presented a dilemma. Should UPNG 
make a determined stand on its right to autonomy and independent 
criticism, as Gunther believed it must? Or should it forestall attempts 
to have government will imposed on it by espousing national ideology, 
and by voluntarily making itself more responsive? The latter was 
clearly the choice of Oldfield's Working Party. As events turned out 
the initiative was taken from the University, and much of the effort 
of the Oldfield Committee was superseded by the work of the Second 
Gris Committee. However, the Oldfield Committee clearly influenced 
the Second Gris Committee, as there was significant cross membership 
on each. Not surprisingly a number of recommendations from the Oldfield 
Report reappeared in the second Gris report - the idea of university 
’outreach’, the principle of ’work-study’, the establishment of a joint 
government-universities manpower planning committee. Both reports 
attempted to apply the national ideology to university endeavour. Just 
how practicable such attempts were became apparent in the work of the
16 ibid.
17 ibid.
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Second Gris Committee, which is the subject of the following section.
(c) THE COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY INTO UNIVERSITY DEVELOPMENT
The Second Gris Committee, formally the Committee of Enquiry into 
University Development (CEUD), was intended to be to university develop­
ment in the post-independence era what the Currie Commission had been 
in the mid-1960s and the Brown Committee was meant to be in the early 
1970s. The CEUD was set up, as a result of a Cabinet decision in June 
1973, to make recommendations for future university development so as 
to achieve 'balanced growth of academic programmes and courses and of
enrolments in keeping with manpower needs; and maximum economy of
18scarce staff and physical resources'. The CEUD consisted of the 
three original members of the First Gris Committee (Gris, Crocombe, 
Harvey) as well as D.A. Low (UPNG Council member, Director of ANU 
School of Pacific Studies), I. Kilage (Catholic priest, member of the 
National Education Board), N. Rooney (UPNG Arts graduate, Administrative 
College lecturer, and the only female member of the Committee), M. Avei 
(Economics graduate of University of Queensland, and member of Somare's 
personal staff), K. Pochapon (Surveying graduate of UOT and Acting 
Surveyor General), A. Sarei (former Catholic priest, Doctor of Canon 
Law from Pontificia Universitas, Rome, and now District Commissioner 
for Bougainville), and J. Waiko (UPNG Arts graduate, now completing 
M.A. studies in history at the University of London).
The CEUD membership was significant for several reasons.
Because of the furore caused by the first Gris committee, university
development was now a 'very sensitive' issue, and government wanted
19the CEUD to contain the 'best possible people'. The chairman, Gris, 
now a veteran of three committees of inquiry into education and formally 
the Deputy Vice-Chancellor of UPNG, had demonstrated considerable 
intellectual, administrative and diplomatic skills, a sharp appreciation 
of the country's educational needs, and a commitment to the national 
ideology. Crocombe more than anyone else fervently subscribed to
18 G.B. Gris (et al.) (1974), p. 152. (The CEUD Report.)
19 Hossack to Olewale, 10 July 1973, 31 July 1973, OHER 
66-1-23.
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Eight Points ideals, and again the government thought his presence
would 'stimulate a more thorough inquiry’; however, because of his
potential for antagonizing expatriate academics Low was added as a
20counterpoise to his possible radical excesses. Harvey, once a UPNG
lecturer and now in the Department of Finance, was included for what
he might contribute as an economist who understood university staff
21members' apprehensions. But the choice of seven Papua New Guinean 
members was of greatest significance. All were graduates and three of 
the seven had postgraduate degrees. This was perhaps the most 
impressive array of Papua New Guinean talent yet assembled for an 
inquiry into an aspect of the country’s development, and if it did 
nothing else it demonstrated the efficacy of the effort in tertiary 
education in the country during the preceding decade. With such 
articulate membership heavily weighted in favour of Papua New Guineans, 
it might be expected the eventual CEUD Report would be Papua New 
Guinean to an extent neither Currie nor Brown reports could have been.
The CEUD tackled its task systematically, covering even more
ground than the Currie Commission in miles travelled, places visited,
and submissions obtained. It began work in mid-September 1973, and
over the next eleven months met on fifty occasions. At its disposal
it had 300 background reports obtained from various overseas and local
agencies, 200 submissions from individuals and groups, and the records
of 100 interviews conducted with various informants. Nine of the ten
CEUD members undertook overseas trips to visit university institutions
thought relevant to Papua New Guinea. Altogether 17 countries were
visited: the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, China, Australia, Fiji,
the UK, Mauritius, Tanzania, Botswana, Malawi, Kenya, Israel, India,
22Sri Lanka, the West Indies, and Guyana. In the writing of the report
Crocombe’s influence was strong: he assumed the role of 'the European
23who could put on to paper the feelings of the indigenous group'. Up 
to nine drafts were written for some chapters, and in a number it was
20 ibid.
21 Hossack to Dale, 23 July 1973, OHER 66-1-23.
22 CEUD Report, p. 170.
23 A. Randeil, RIW, p. 2.
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Crocombe who produced the first four or five, which would then be
worked over by Low, Gris, Randell (the executive officer), and perhaps
some of the others. Not all the Papua New Guineans were able to
contribute as much as had been hoped. Except for Gris none of them
worked full time, and a number had outside commitments which often
24distracted them from CEUD tasks. As a result the influence of 
Crocombe, Low and Gris was perhaps unduly strong; and some sceptics 
went so far as to suggest the CEUD Report should have been called the 
'Crocombe Report'.
The CEUD Report began with a statement of 'guiding principles',
an ideological preface reminding the universities of various salient
points. Thus, the universities were producing a potential elite
whereas 'national policy favours a more egalitarian society'; therefore
'both staff and students... must do everything within their power to
25minimise stratification and privilege'. Then, too, universities
must do their bit to promote self reliance, and in doing so they must
guard their soft belly: staff and students were living and working in
conditions of comparative affluence and comfort not shared by the
general populace, which was hardly 'conducive to creativity and
2 6improvization,... the hallmarks of self reliance'. Presumably the
universities, more than any other enclaves of 'bourgeois' privilege,
must set an example of Spartan asceticism. The Report then proceeded
to remind the universities of particular problems they faced as
institutions located in the Third World. As universities, they were
part of a foreign-imposed superstructure, and were not necessarily
institutions appropriate to local circumstances. This required them
to be adaptive and innovative in attempting new approaches to university
education in order to be more responsive to local conditions. They
must also preserve their intellectual independence against strong
attacks which would certainly be made against them. They should be
the very 'conscience of the nation', though they must have 'empathy
27for national aspirations'. Finally, they must avoid creating problems
24 ibid., and pp. 10-11, 13-15.
25 CEUD Report, p. 3.
26 ibid., p. 4. 
ibid., p. 7.27
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which universities elsewhere had caused - graduate unemployment, high
training costs, waste of resources, demands by their graduates for
28abundant privileges when most people were living in poverty. Many 
of these injunctions were, of course, inconsistent and contradictory; 
yet that underlined an important point: being responsive to government
ideology would be no easy task.
The CEUD Report made a total of 136 recommendations, though 
the major recommendations related to only three central issues - the 
integration of work and study, the extension of university services 
into a range of extra-mural activities, and the amalgamation of all 
university institutions into a single national university. It was 
around these that the whole Report turned.
The first of the central issues, integration of work and 
study, was an idea taken from the Oldfield Report. (Oldfield was close
to Gris, and his thinking above all others outside the CEUD influenced
29the Committee. ) The spacing of sessions of study with periods of 
practical work was attractive for a number of reasons: it allowed
students to approach advanced levels of study with greater maturity; 
it gave them an appreciation of the practical applications of theoret­
ical aspects of their courses; students reaching their academic limits 
early could be phased out with an ’honourable discharge’ instead of 
suffering the humiliation of failure; national service could be 
readily built into all study programmes; greater community involvement
was possible, with students becoming 'sensitized to the needs of
30ordinary men'. To help integrate work and study the CEUD recommended 
a 'modular approach' to the organization of courses, that is, progress 
through all university courses should be by a succession of one, two, 
and three-year self-contained 'modules', each with its own appropriate 
qualification. Thus, students completing the UPNG preliminary 
(matriculation) year would receive a 'certificate'; after two years 
of post-certificate study a 'diploma' would be awarded; two years of 
post-diploma study would lead to a 'bachelor's degree'; a year's post-
28 ibid., p. 8.
29 Randeil, RIW, p. 13.
30 CEUD Report, pp. 20-1.
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degree study would lead to a 'postgraduate diploma'; 'master's degrees'
would come after two years' full-time study beyond the bachelor's
degree; and 'doctorates' after three years' full time study beyond the 
31master's degree. Ideally a period of work experience would precede
each module, and in the selection of students for further study
preference would go not only to those with academic potential but to
those with work experience. As CEUD saw it, the diploma level module
would be an area for special university effort, and high priority
32should be given to courses at that level. The idea of work-spaced
modules was perhaps admirable, promising as it did to overcome problems
of student motivation and immaturity. On the other hand, there were
unforeseen disadvantages: under the existing system what was a 4-5
year degree could well become an 8-10 year degree when done by modules.
And the requirement to work, and then work again, tended towards what
one UPNG wit termed 'educational Calvinism' with the threat of an
33imminent sentence of work taking all pleasure out of learning.
The second of CEUD central proposals related to university 
'outreach' - 'a major expansion of all forms of university extension 
activities [including] both external off-campus... [as well as] part- 
time on-campus study,... [and] extra-mural activities such as public
3 Alectures, workshops, seminars and community involvement programmes'.
The CEUD saw 'outreach' as basic to Eight Points ideology: it would
'broaden the base of higher education', producing graduates 'likely to
be less elitist in outlook'; it would help in decentralization; it
fostered an 'attitude of self reliance'; it helped further women's
education and it would help 'late developers' who had not proceeded
35to university directly after high school. Major 'outreach' effort 
should go into external studies. Although one of the original Currie 
recommendations, external studies had never become an area for serious 
university effort. The problems of communication had seemed too
31 ibid., pp. 25-6.
32 ibid.
33 John Rumens, personal communication, 6 April 1976.
34 CEUD Report, p. 47.
35 ibid., p. 48.
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daunting; and there had been staff shortages, scepticism about the
effectiveness of external studies, and queries about high drop-out
and failure rates. The CEUD recognized such problems, but still
thought external studies should be a 'mainstream activity' - not some-
36thing 'regarded as an extra or unwanted task'. Indeed by 1978 there
should be 1200 external enrolments. The Report therefore made a series
of recommendations to allow for a massive diversion of effort into
external studies. These included the creation of a Board of Extension
Activities as a planning and policy making body; the appointment of a
Principal of Extension Activities with rank equivalent to that of the
Principals (that is, Vice-Chancellors) of the Lae and Waigani campuses;
the creation of a series of regional and sub-regional centres through
which external studies and other extension activities could be mounted;
the appointment of a large staff of administrators, secretaries and
teachers to an Office of Extension Activities which would be responsible
37for external teaching.
The third central set of recommendations, relating to
university government and the creation of a single national university
dispersed across several campuses, was the most contentious. CEUD,
in suggesting the amalgamation of UPNG, UOT and Goroka Teachers'
College in a 'National University of Papua New Guinea', was prompted
by concern over the wastefulness, duplication, and lack of co-ordination
in a system where each institution had its own separate and costly
governing and administrative structures. In addition there were the
destructive effects of institutional rivalry. And nowhere had such
disabilities been more obvious than in the dealings over the setting
38up of the university courses in agriculture and forestry. A national 
university, the CEUD contended, would eliminate such problems, and in 
particular would prevent the university system becoming 'simply an 
arena [for] institutional competition' between UPNG and UOT. (That a 
national university might provide a fine 'culture' for the equally 
insidious bacteria of internal intrigue was something that apparently
36 ibid., pp. 67-8.
37 ibid., pp. 63-7.
38 ibid., p. 122.
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escaped the Committee.) A national university would, moreover, add
39to the status of all three institutions. To govern the national 
university the Report recommended one Council, a Chancellor (ceremonial 
head), a Pro-Chancellor (Council chairman), Vice-Chancellor, Secretary, 
and Bursar. The heads of the Lae and Waigani campuses would be termed 
'Campus Principals', and of equal status would be the Principal of 
Extension Activities. To ensure that co-ordination occurred between 
campuses there should be a Planning and Co-ordinating Committee. Each 
campus would have its own 'Board', a body analogous to the existing 
Academic Boards, and its own Registrar, Student Affairs Officer, 
Accountant, Staff Officer, Maintenance Officer, and Administrative 
Officer. Communication with the government would be through the OHE, 
though when the Committee on University Trained Manpower and the 
Universities Finance Review Committee were in session it could be 
through them. Such a system would require the Council, Vice-Chancellor 
and the Planning and Co-ordinating Committee to be peripatetic,
'oscillat[ing] as frequently as possible between the campuses,... as 
personally familiar with the work of one campus as with another'.^
For ease of access to government, however, they should have their 
permanent base in Port Moresby, though to remove any suspicion that 
the Waigani campus would end up dominating the others this base should 
be physically separated from Waigani. These proposals had all the 
force of rationality; but they did not allow for institutional pride, 
nor for personal interest, which were not perforce rational in the 
same way.
In addition to the three central recommendations for work- 
and-study, outreach, and a national university, the CEUD Report made 
a series of significant recommendations in other areas - manpower 
planning, student affairs, staff matters, finance, and physical 
facilities - always stressing the need for the university system to 
be responsive to the Eight Point imperatives. Briefly, the Report 
recommended as follows:
(i) Meeting manpower needs. The CEUD was primarily concerned to
39 ibid., pp. 123-4.
40 ibid., p. 133.
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gear subjects taught and length of courses to government manpower
objectives. Thus, the universities must avoid ’overspecifying the
level of qualification', for example by ’requiring a degree where a 
41diploma will do’. They should train more diplomates than degree
holders, observing a ratio of 3:1 in favour of diplomates. To achieve
the right balances in enrolments in different courses, and between
diplomates and degree holders, the universities must adopt a system
of quotas. To the universities, of course, quotas were an anathema -
a death blow to their autonomy; nevertheless CEUD deemed them necessary
as ’the present practice... of not knowing class sizes until after
42enrolment [was] a hindrance to good planning’. There should also be
a ceiling on enrolments to ensure the university system grew only to
the required size. UOT enrolments could expand steadily for some time
yet to cater for unfilled technological manpower needs, but UPNG’s
43full time enrolments should be held at the 1974 level. To ensure 
all these preceding aims were met, a Committee on University Trained 
Manpower (CUTM) should be established, with representation from the 
Central Planning Office, OHE, Public Service Board, and the univers­
ities]. This body would annually determine and report to government
on manpower needs, and make recommendations on the number of enrolments
44in any discipline.
(ii) Student affairs. Like the Oldfield Report, the CEUD called for 
programmes to improve student motivation, develop ’attitudes of 
professional and vocational service, and of altruism’, and promote 
self reliance. To further these aims students should participate in 
decision making and accept the consequences of decision making. They 
should contribute to the physical running of the campuses, working in 
the gardens, in the kitchens, and on maintenance and cleaning jobs.
They should continue receiving a living allowance, but should also 
be required to contribute to the cost of their own education, either 
through national service, bonding, or by paying higher taxes on 
graduation. Student selection needed revision since too few children
41 ibid., pp. 13-14.
42 ibid.
43 ibid., P- 15.
44 ibid., pp. 12-15.
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of subsistence farmers (the bulk of the population) received university
education, while the children of the ’colonial elite’ (teachers,
public servants, pastors et at.) made up a disproportionately high
part of the enrolments. Similarly, female students and students from
less developed regions were proportionately under-represented. Such
imbalances could be offset by flexible selection procedures which took
45account of disadvantaged groups. Finally, the CEUD believed student
amentities were too lavish - messing costs were excessive compared
with other tertiary institutions, and needless luxuries such as student
46washing machines were all part of the ’hidden curriculum'.
(iii) Staff matters. The CEUD Report amplified issues first raised 
in the first Gris report. Thus, there should be active encouragement 
of Papua New Guinean academic staff; the country needed its own 
academic salary policy and pay scales since 'paying rich country rates 
in poor countries creates problems’ (the Report then recommended 
appropriate rates); the existing high proportion of Australian staff 
was inappropriate, and the recruiting net should be cast wider; a 
fixed proportion of staff should come from international voluntary 
services; finding 'the right staff' - those who feel empathy for the 
aspirations of Papua New Guineans' - was important; there should be 
'staff orientation programmes' of classes, and residence in villages, 
for new staff and their families; and there should be significantly 
more staff at the junior (tutor-lecturer) levels than at senior
47(senior lecturer-professor) levels, with a ratio of 3:1 applying.
(iv) Financial matters and physical facilities. The CEUD believed
'finance in the past [had] been generous', and this had 'unfortunately
led to expectations from staff and students that [their] relatively
superior position... will be maintained. This period is now drawing 
48to a close'. There was great need for economies as 'the universities
are more expensive than any other tertiary and non-tertiary instit- 
49utions'. The universities, moreover, should not receive preferential
45 ibid. , pp. 79-89.
46 ibid. , pp. 83-5.
47 ib id. , pp. 114-5.
48 ibid., p. 139.
49 ibid., pp. 145-6.
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treatment over other post-secondary institutions in the allocation of 
funds. To ensure their fair treatment the existing machinery of the 
Universities Finance Review Committee (UFRC) should be formalised. 
Concerning physical facilities, the design of buildings should be 
’carefully assessed with a view to both keeping costs as low as 
possible and creating an environment much more in harmony with that 
of the other tertiary institutions'.^ The attractive grounds and 
gardens of both universities presented something of a dilemma: on the
one hand they were a national asset; on the other the pleasant surround­
ings university students lived in contrasted with the environment in 
which many townspeople and rural dwellers existed. 'To what extent 
is elitism fostered as a result?' the Report asked. That there was a 
nexus between high cost, poor economy, and elitism seemed obvious to 
the CEUD.51
In terms of existing practice in Papua New Guinea the CEUD 
Report was thus a radical document. Its three central recommendations, 
for modular studies, outreach and a national university, called for a 
far-reaching restructuring of the university system, a redirection of 
the major effort in university education, and a thorough revision of 
the curriculum. At the same time its anti-elitist thrust, its 
determination to seek economy, and its insistence on the system's 
being responsive to government and attuned to the official ideology 
demanded that the universities examine their consciences. Such a 
document was sure to be challenged by those with a stake in the status 
quo. Whether or not its recommendations could be implemented without 
modification depended on the strength of the interests which might 
combine against it, and on how far they would go to upset it. What 
eventually happened to its proposals is the subject of the following 
section.
50 ibid.
51 ibid., p. 149.
217
(d) ACTION ON THE CEUD PROPOSALS
Most people sensed that the CEUD Report would be a turning point
for the universities, for as Inglis noted, ’the Report is quite
clearly a major contribution to the educational history of Papua New
Guinea’.^  But that was not to say its proposals would be accepted by
all. The Minister for Education recognized this when he tabled the
Report in Cabinet. It was, he said, 'so far-reaching in its recommend
ations it might be expected... [to] be subject to much debate within
2the university community and with-out’. Because of its contentious
nature Cabinet agreed for it to be widely discussed in public before
acting upon it. Copies duly went to government departments, education
al institutions, politicians, and the general public, and OHE
subsequently received 55 detailed sets of comments from various
3interested parties. The general tone of the comments was indicated 
in a summary OHE made later:
Almost without exception the comments... express 
admiration for the work done by the Committee, the 
coverage of the Report, the ideals and objectives set 
out... and the philosophy underlying it. However, at 
the same time, and again almost without exception the 
comments received expressed more or less strong doubts 
about the ways and means proposed by the Report to 
achieve its ideals. Sometimes comments argued that 
the... philosophy on some issues was poorly based, 
sometimes recommendations were said to have been poorly 
argued, sometimes comments made entirely new proposals 
to achieve some objectives.... 4
Implementation would clearly be a prolonged process, with defenders 
and detractors debating each point.
The official reaction of each university was at first mild, 
generally approving, but cautious. Each university suggested that 
before implementation there should be ’a thorough inquiry into
1 Inglis to Rees, 9 October 1974, UPNGR E.61-1 (part 2).
2 Cabinet information paper, 6 November 1974, OHER 
66-1-25.
3 'An assessment... of comments', n.d. OHER 66-1-25.
4 ibid.
218
ramifications of the R e p o r t ' . I t  was not long, however, before 
attitudes hardened, particularly over the national university. Sandover 
emerged as the most vehement opponent here. He made his views plain 
in a letter to Inglis:
I disagree pretty thoroughly with the proposals in the 
report since I am of the opinion that they are a 
retrograde step. I believe the proposals have been 
reached through fallacious arguments, and... that many 
of the proposals are a result of the prejudices of the 
Committee rather than a clear appraisal of the situation.
I thoroughly agree... that there is a great need for much 
more co-operation and collaboration between the two 
universities and I think there is a need for a co-ordin­
ating body.... However, the thought of the cumbersome 
structure they propose to establish on top of the exist­
ing university system fills me with horror and I am 
quite certain that such proposals would mean the end of 
this university as a viable institution. Your own 
university would not suffer to the same extent since the 
Vice-Chancellor would be in Port Moresby.... The 
peripheral institutions, such as our own would... become 
very similar in status to the high schools and this would 
in turn ensure that we would neither retain nor attract 
adequately trained... academic staff.... 6
This was Sandover speaking extempore and in haste, something he was 
wont to do when his own or UOT's interests were threatened;^ but it 
indicated that he would be a formidable opponent of CEUD recommend­
ations, particularly those relating to the national university.
There had always been tension between Sandover and the CEUD, 
so it was not surprising that his reaction to the report was outspoken. 
Early in the CEUD's proceedings Sandover and some CEUD members had 
antagonized each other; and the CEUD had looked on the nationalg
university as a way to contain him. He therefore had a reason for 
thinking the CEUD had not been wholly objective over the national 
university, to feel that in making him a mere 'Principal' by taking 
away his hard-won title 'Vice-Chancellor' it had acted out of spite
5 UOT Academic Board Minutes, 9 October 1974, UOTR; cf. Inglis, 
paper on CEUD Report for 38th meeting of UPNG Council, 13 
February 1975 E.61-1 (part 1).
6 Sandover to Inglis, 12 November 1974, UPNGR 76/13.
7 Personal observations, 1972-73.
8 Rees, RIW, p. 45; Randeil, RIW, pp. 5-6.
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as well as concern for the national interest. He was also convinced
the CEUD had arrived at UOT with 'preconceived notions' about the
form of university organization it would recommend, all rational
9argument to the contrary notwithstanding. Once again there was good
reason for thinking this: less than a month after CEUD had begun
operations one Committee member was bruiting his opinion that the
national university was imminent.^ Sandover also knew that on the
UOT staff he had determined opponents. He referred to them as 'the
dedicated destroyers', and believed they wished to undermine all his
effort in raising UOT to university status.^ Some of this group had,
in fact, presented well argued submissions to the CEUD suggesting
that UOT under Sandover was 'an unhappy place' and that a UOT-UPNG
12amalgamation was the best cure. Indeed his UOT opponents had gone
so far as to persuade OHE to send in a UN consultant on university
administration, N.C. Angus, who made a report highly critical of
Sandover's administration and favouring the idea of a single univers- 
13lty.
Sandover campaigned strongly against the national university
proposals. He argued to OHE that the national university would create
an unnecessary, unwieldy and costly bureaucratic superstructure which
would only make university administration more complicated than at
present. The existing administrative machinery on each campus would
have to remain, he pointed out, so what was being proposed would be
an additional and unwarranted burden. Better to leave the universities
separate as they are, and if greater co-ordination were required this
should be through the creation of a common Council for UPNG and UOT,
which would thus be closely linked while remaining individually 
14autonomous. Inglis also expressed reservations about the national
9 Sandover to CEUD, 29 October 1973, OHER S-31.
10 Harvey to Oldfield, October 1973, UPNGR E.61.
11 Sandover to I. Willis, July 1975, personal papers.
12 Submissions to CEUD, S-57 and S-58, OHER.
13 N.C. Angus to Gris, 26 June 1974, OHER S-207.
14 Sandover, Submission to CEUD, 25 February 1974, UPNGR 
E.61-1 (part 2).
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university. He had earlier advised Gris he ’guessed' that 'separate 
(but co-ordinated) universities... would make more economic use of 
scarce skills' than a 'system which has a single university with 
constituent campuses (like the University of California and the State15
University of New York)'. Sandover's opinions subsequently received 
further endorsement by a number of groups within UOT - Students'
X6Representative Council, Faculty Boards, Academic Board, and Council. 
While he had possibly acted for personal reasons as well as concern 
for UOT, those underneath him undoubtedly feared for their institution 
too. Their dealings with Oldfield and others had shown them that 
marriage to UPNG would be difficult, that the special needs of techno­
logical education would be overlooked in an institution in which the
1interests of social science and liberal arts disciplines predominated.
Proposals for the national university were not long in
entering the domain of public debate, which was carried on most notably
in the columns of the Post-Courier. UOT students were particularly
outspoken about their reluctance to be submerged in a Waigani-dominated
super-university. They said that inevitably a national university
would mean their becoming 'students from a college' located away from 
18the main campus. Then Boyamo Sali, a prominent politician, Minister
for Commerce and parliamentary representative for the region in which
UOT was located, claimed the CEUD Report was 'an insult' to his
constituents, who regarded UOT as 'their university' and did not want
it subsumed within a national organization centralized on Port 
19Moresby. Sali's comments drew a sharp rejoinder from Gris, who 
asserted that 'the introduction of a single national university system 
will [not] necessarily lead to the loss of individuality or down­
grading of [UOT]. Its status as a campus or college of a national
15 Inglis to Gris, 14 January 1974, UPNGR E.61-1 (part 1).
16 A.L. Pritchard, 'Summary of comments made by members of UOT 
on CEUD Report', paper for 37th Council meeting, 21 March 
1975, UOTR.
17 D. Mansell, RIW.
18 Post-Courier3 19 March 1975, p. 15.
19 Post-Courier3 20 March 1975, p. 2.
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20university system might in fact be elevated'. The debate later
became rather more confused when the UOT academic staff association
voted in favour of the national university. A coterie of Sandover's
most persistent opponents were influential in this body, which decided
to endorse the recommendations for the national university on the
condition that 'UOT will not be downgraded by the establishment of a
21centralized administration in Port Moresby'. This provoked the SRC
executive at UOT to accuse their teachers of 'wanting to get rid of
the Vice-Chancellor' and of 'consider[ing] only their own selfish
interests in the matter and not the long-term welfare of the students
22and the University'. The official UOT view remained that expressed 
by the University's public relations officer, who added his bit to 
the debate by saying,
there should be a national body to co-ordinate univers­
ity developments... but... a heavy bureaucratic servicing 
organization, based in Port Moresby... is not only 
contrary to... the Eight Point Improvement Plan but also 
a very expensive proposition.... [It] has been tried in 
Malaysia and Sri Lanka without success, mainly because of 
serious shortcomings... affecting the efficiency, morale 
and initiative of campus personnel.... 23
What the debate accomplished is uncertain, though possibly it emphasized 
that the way towards university reform was hazard-strewn, and that the 
whole university system was riven with tensions between numerous 
interest groups.
By mid-1975 the OHE reckoned public consideration of the CEUD
Report had gone on long enough for implementation of the major
24recommendations to proceed. Several of the more minor recommendations 
had already been acted upon: CUTM had been set up, the UFRC was
established on a permanent basis, machinery for reviewing academic 
salaries had been set up, and the universities of their own initiative
20 Post-Courier, 1 April 1975, p. 2.
21 Post-Courier, 7 April 1975, p. 3.
22 Post-Courier, 9 April 1975, p. 3.
23 Post-Courier, 14 April 1975, p. 2.
24 Cabinet information paper, 'Implementation of the CEUD 
Report', 2 July 1975, OHER 66-1-25.
222
had begun giving effect to routine recommendations in matters such
as teaching, student affairs, localization, and the maintenance of
25buildings and grounds. But modular studies, outreach and the 
national university were more contentious issues, and for that reason 
the Minister for Education, on the advice of OHE, now deputed a sub­
committee of the CEUD - Gris, Avei, Kilage - to prepare a Cabinet
26submission in conjunction with OHE. In the preparation of this
submission the national university once again provoked dissension.
Gris, by now UPNG Vice-Chancellor, still favoured the idea but he had
27been hurt personally by the reaction against it. Furthermore, he
and other CEUD members felt Cabinet had ’gone soft1 on its publicly
proclaimed ideology, that it no longer remained fervently committed
28to the spirit of the Eight Points. Indeed some CEUD members believed
Cabinet had 'sold out': they felt the government had compromised on
so many issues - foreign investment, exploitation of natural resources
by 'big technology', expatriate salaries - it would never take the
firm stand necessary to implement controversial CEUD proposals. Rather
it would probably cave in under public criticism and pressure from 
29interest groups. And so Gris did not push his proposals with great 
determination, with the result that the submission to Cabinet effect­
ively disabled them.
In the end it was the view of OHE and the Department of 
Finance which prevailed, and they both adopted the arguments proposed 
earlier by Sandover. This became obvious in the submission which the 
Minister for Education finally took to Cabinet in October 1975, and 
which OHE had prepared. In brief, this document argued and recommended 
as follows:
(i) Modular studies. The submission claimed that some disciplines 
were less amenable to modular restructuring than others. In science- 
mathematics based courses, for example, long periods of work away from
25 ibid.
26 ibid.
27 Rees, RIW, p.45;
28 Randell, RIW, p.
29 ibid.
Randeil, RIW, p. 16. 
24.
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the universities could cause students to forget basic knowledge, 
necessitating time-consuming, costly remedial programmes on their 
return to studies. Another problem was that lengthy sessions of out­
side work would prolong the period of study needed to take out a 
degree, with bad effects on manpower supply and localization. The
submission therefore recommended that Cabinet support modular re-
30organization ’wherever feasible’. In practice this meant that 
implementation was largely left to the universities themselves, and 
more significantly to individual faculties to decide whether they would 
’go modular'. Consequently, only two 'progressive' faculties - UPNG 
Arts and Law - took the matter seriously enough to plan modular courses; 
all the other, more ’traditional', faculties virtually ignored the 
recommendations and carried on as before.
(ii) University outreach. The submission noted that both universities 
were already heavily committed to various extension activities. It 
agreed with CEUD that this was proper but disagreed with the proposed 
structure of organization. This it thought 'unnecessarily complex
and bureaucratic'. Furthermore, extension was more properly a long­
term goal because there was a short-term imperative to fill manpower 
needs quickly - something best achieved via full time enrolments. The 
submission therefore recommended that only small 'pilot' external
studies departments be set up at UOT and UPNG (which had already
31taken this step of its own initiative). In this way CEUD proposals 
were thoroughly eviscerated, and the organization established was 
only a shadow of what CEUD had envisaged.
(iii) The national university. Here the submission dealt CEUD 
proposals a death blow. It argued that CEUD had rightly focused 
attention on problems existing at the time of the inquiry, two years 
before - lack of co-ordination between UPNG and UOT, and poor communi­
cation between universities and government. CEUD thought a single 
university structure would be the solution. However, the submission 
claimed, conditions had changed since then. Initiatives by OHE and
30 Submission to Cabinet, 'Implementation of the major
recommendations of the CEUD', October 1975, pp. 1-3, 10, 
OHER 66-1-25.
31 ibid., pp. 3-5, 10.
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the universities had developed ’highly successful’ mechanisms for co­
ordination between campuses and for communication with government.
Thus, the following had been achieved since CEUD's formation: financial
programming of the universities in phase with government budgeting via 
the UFRC; academic salaries determination via the Edoni tribunal; man­
power planning via CUTM; greater UPNG-UOT co-operation via cross­
membership on the two Councils and the appointment of Tololo as 
Chancellor of both UPNG and UOT; working groups on new courses with 
joint UPNG-UOT membership; and the development of OHE as 'a smoothly 
functioning and expert body’ which provided government with advice on 
all matters of higher education, interpreted government policy to the
universities, and served as a channel of communication between them 
32and government. To create the national university would mean dis­
mantling this ’tried and tested system’ and replacing it with a 
structure that had ’severe disadvantages'. Among the drawbacks were 
the extra bureaucratic structure on top of those already in existence, 
the centralization of all university power in Port Moresby 'completely 
against government policy', and the addition of an unnecessary link 
in the chain of communication between government and campuses. In view 
of such disadvantages Cabinet should therefore ’retain the separate
autonomy of the universities and not proceed with the concept of a
33national university at this stage’.
The submission duly passed through Cabinet and became policy. 
The universities remained separately autonomous, though with a signifi­
cant degree of cross-membership on their Councils, both of which were 
headed by Tololo. Sandover and other defenders of UOT integrity could 
relax for a while; Gris and his supporters had to resign themselves 
to at least a temporary eclipse. There could be no certainty, how­
ever, that the two universities would remain forever separate. Somare 
and the Central Planning Office were clearly determined to have a 
single university Council, and throughout 1976 kept pressing the OHE
32 ibid., pp. 5-7.
33 ibid., pp. 10-11.
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in that direction. With the setting up of a single Council (as 
distinct from two councils with common membership) there would only 
be a relatively small final step to full amalgamation. The battle to 
keep UOT separate may therefore have been but the first encounter in 
a long campaign.
Perhaps the government did not appreciate what an extraordin­
arily complex creature it had on the end of a leash when it demanded 
that the university system come to heel to the tune of the national 
ideology. Perhaps, too, those who tried to take the beast in hand had 
failed to appreciate the nature of the animal they were dealing with, 
naively imagining they could tame it. The First Gris Committee, the 
Oldfield Committee, and the CEUD had all done their best to make it 
'sit* in line with the ideology, but with only dubious success. Perhaps
the only way to tame it was to starve it into submission, and as we
35will see in a later chapter that was something government eventually 
tried when it cut the universities’ financial rations. The various 
committees of inquiry undoubtedly caused considerable soul-searching, 
as they had meant to; but they also provoked reactions they might not 
have intended (but perhaps should have foreseen). It was one thing 
to recommend a simple amalgamation of two universities; it was another 
to implement this when institutional self-interest barred the way. 
Similarly, recommendations to government in a document like the CEUD 
Report was only part of the task of inducing change; to get the 
document implemented intact was the other, more important, and more 
difficult part. There could be many a slip between recommendation 
and implementation, for along the way were many obstacles - departments 
and faculties within universities, the universities themselves, and 
government agencies. To take but one of these - the OHE - by mid-1975 
OHE had acquired considerable influence and stood to lose power from 
the creation of a national university. It was not therefore surprising 
that the submission OHE prepared for Cabinet came down heavily against 
a UPNG-UOT merger.
34 OHER 66-1-23. This file details the pressures on OHE to 
introduce a single Council for UPNG and UOT. This issue 
is discussed in Chapter 10 (c) below.
35 See Chapter 10 (b) below.
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All of this pointed to the difficulties of educational 
planning. All that planners like the Gris and Oldfield Committees 
could do was produce ideal models. But what was ’best' was not what 
necessarily came to be. Political infighting by various vested 
interests could always intervene to upset the most immaculate of models. 
This happened most notably with the CEUD Report. The scheme of reform 
it proposed was in keeping with the fervently proclaimed national 
ideology of 1973; but by 1975 the bloom was wearing off the Eight 
Points. The government which had once called 'Get Crocombe!' was 
perhaps now less interested in the radical proposals a Crocombe might 
produce, and was only too ready to be persuaded by the countervailing 
arguments of the interest groups. The idealism of the reformers might 
remain intact, but the schemes they had proposed foundered on instit­
utional self-interest and government apathy.
A further difficulty was the nature of the reform programmes 
themselves. Fired with the zeal of the times, they tended to be 'long' 
on idealism and rhetoric but 'short' on practicality. The demands 
they made were often inconsistent and frankly unrealistic. It was, 
for example, naive to expect the universities to shed their 'elitism'
- by accepting lower academic salaries, more Spartan conditions, 
voluntary work by students - if only the universities were to make 
such sacrifices. Such a requirement could only be meaningful if 
carried 'across the board', through the Public Service, among parlia­
mentarians, throughout the entire private sector. If elitism were to 
be rooted out only in the universities, the university community would 
have good reason to cry 'discrimination'. Nor did the self-righteous 
idealism of the reformers help: if anything it convinced their
opponents they were out of touch with reality, and that their schemes 
could be set aside with impunity.
The major fault of the reform programmes, however, was their 
simplistic conception of the university system, and of the national 
society. The reformers viewed the system as a simple tool for social 
engineering, to be adjusted to produce the ideal society. That 
required assumptions about both the system and the society, but the 
assumptions the reformers made were often dubious. Was 'elitism' 
indeed an evil? Could it be eliminated? And could fiddling with the
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universities really change the society? The reformers all answered 
in the affirmative. They apparently ignored the possibility that for 
Papua New Guinea elitism was a functional necessity. It could have 
been argued that the very existence of the Papua New Guinean state 
depended on the existence of an educated elite who would hold together 
an otherwise segmentary agglomeration of disparate ethnic and regional 
groups. If that argument were true it would also have been possible 
to argue that the proper function of the universities was to produce 
an elite as expeditiously as possible. As events turned out, the 
assumptions of the reformers proved faulty: the university system
demonstrated that it was far more complex than the reformers had 
imagined and was not readily adaptable to social engineering.
Debate over the reform programmes, particularly that of the 
CEUD, revealed complex tensions within the university system. First, 
there was considerable conflict within each university. At UOT there 
were pro- and anti-Sandover factions each with sectional interests 
to protect; and at UPNG there were 'progressive’ and 'conservative' 
faculties and departments which were often in contention over the 
direction the University should take. Second, there were the obvious 
tensions between the two universities. It was not only Sandover who 
felt the proposal for a national university was a disguised takeover 
bid by UPNG for UOT: this was a fear his Council, Academic Board
and student body shared, and they were determined to stay clear of 
the tentacles of the Waigani octopus. And third, tensions were 
developing around OHE, which had clearly aligned itself with the 
Sandover view of the CEUD reforms. OHE could retain its integrity 
while it was seen to be impartial, but if seen to be politicking to 
serve its own ends it could not remain unchallenged. And that is 
what happened, as we will see. That there were so many lines of 
stress was a function of the growing complexity and maturity of Papua 
New Guinea's university system. It had begun amidst doubt, frustration 
and improvization in 1965; but now, ten years later in the year of 
national independence, it was an integral part of the national society. 
The tensions with which it was riven were a measure of that.
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CHAPTER 8
UNIVERSITY ACTIVISM: STAFF TRADE UNIONISM 
AND STUDENT MILITANCY
THE general public had long regarded the two universities as radical 
enclaves. Possibly their reputation was undeserved, for neither staff 
nor students became forceful pressure groups until 1974-75. During 
this period both became militant, well-publicized political operators, 
the staff trying to safeguard their conditions of service, the 
students pursuing disparate aims varying from campus to campus. The 
staff and student causes were apparently little related, yet a common 
sense of discontent with the universities, the government, and the 
practical effects of national ideology ran through their grievances.
(a) ACADEMIC TRADE UNIONISM
Cabinet’s decision in 1973 to cut the tie between academic 
salaries in Australia and Papua New Guinea, in accordance with First 
Gris Report recommendations, aroused staff militancy at UPNG and UOT 
as no other issue had in the past. The decision created two classes 
of salary - the ’ex gratia' (for staff on existing contracts, compris­
ing old salary plus an allowance to bring it up to the new Australian 
award for a limited period), and the 'non-ex gratia’ (for staff on 
new contracts, comprising the old salary with no extra allowance).^ 
Academics soon came to resent this arrangement. On the one hand it 
created ’privileged’ (ex gratia) and ’under-privileged’ (non-ex gratia) 
factions, and thus internal dissension. On the other it meant a cut 
in real wages for all staff, for it effectively pegged salaries at
the old (1970) level in a time of rapid inflation. It was, they
2claimed, 'anomalous and inequitable'.
The Second Gris Committee recognized the folly of its
1 Policy submission to Cabinet, ’Salary policy for overseas 
academic staff at PNG universities', 20 November 1974, 
OHER 66-1-49.
2 M. Brown and P. Greenwood to Sandover, 4 June 1974, OHER 
66-1-49.
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predecessor. Clearly one expatriate group - the academics - out of
many could not be isolated for a salary reduction. And obviously
salaries could not be pegged: there must be an adjustable, competitive
'market* rate instead. The CEUD Report therefore tried to repair the
damage done by the First Gris Committee, recommending adjustments to
academic salaries to remove the ex gratia/non-ex gratia differential
3and to allow for regular reviews to meet inflation. However, as the 
CEUD salary proposals were not implemented until early 1975, there was 
a period of a year and a half when First Gris Committee recommendations 
were in force to fuel the discontent of academics.^
The effects of First Gris Report salaries policy were marked.
Both OHE and the university administrations noted 'the severe loss
of morale among academics, who see themselves subject to iniquitable
treatment when compared to... other expatriate employees who have
continued to receive flow-ons from Australia'.^ The academics' real
income was eroding rapidly, and some lecturers were now receiving
less than the local primary school grade teachers; they had no assurance
that salary review machinery would be established; rates of personal
taxation were increasing towards Australian levels, thus removing a
financial perquisite of employment in Papua New Guinea; and ex gratia
staff faced a 20% salary cut ($2000 to $3000) when their contracts
£
expired if they remained on under new contracts. As they realized 
these disadvantages they emerged as among the country's most militant 
trade unionists. Their 'trade unions' were the academic sections of
3 It recommended a $1333 per annum rise for all non-ex gratia 
staff, with six-monthly reviews. Under the formula adopted 
the ex gratia/non-ex gratia differential would eventually 
disappear and uniform salaries would apply, still subject to 
half-yearly reviews. Government adopted this scheme as from 
the beginning of 1975 (Policy submission to Cabinet, loc. cit.).
4 First Gris Report salary recommendations were in force from 
July 1973. The CEUD Report was released in August 1974; its 
salary recommendations were approved by Cabinet in October 
1974; the salary review machinery it recommended - the Edoni 
tribunal - came into being in late January 1975.
5 Policy submission to Cabinet, loc. cit.
6 Academic section of UOT Staff Association, Submission to 
CEUD, 22 April 1974, UOT Staff Association Correspondence, 
1975-76.
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the UPNG and UOT Staff Associations.^ These two bodies were natural 
allies and soon began collaborating closely, and over salaries - if 
not in other matters - UPNG and UOT academic staff quickly developed 
a high level of co-operation.
Generally UOT academics were more vocal and determined in 
’trade union' issues than their Waigani colleagues. There were several 
reasons why. First, they believed the CEUD had given them scant 
attention. (CEUD visited UOT on only four occasions, then only fleet- 
ingly, and never as a full committee.) As technologists they felt 
frustrated that the CEUD was overwhelmingly composed of ’Arts' 
graduates whom they believed had little appreciation of, or interest 
in, technological education. Indeed to them the CEUD seemed most 
interested in propounding its own ideological opinions and in ferreting 
out UOT elitism. This made them hostile; and that antagonized the
g
Committee. Largely as a result of such poor UOT-CEUD rapport, OHE
subsequently engaged two consultants in technological education -
G.D. Sims and J. Mahanty - to advise the CEUD, and both reported
favourably on UOT. Nevertheless, some UOT academics saw this as a
token gesture and continued to feel the CEUD had undervalued their
efforts. The CEUD to them was further evidence on top of the First
9Gris Report that government was bullying them.
A second source of particular grievance for UOT academics 
was the salary disadvantage they felt in comparison with other 
occupational groups. Many UOT academics were engineers, accountants, 
surveyors and architects with professional colleagues in industry and 
the Public Service. Such colleagues retained salary parity with 
counterparts in Australia: why should academics alone among their
colleagues take a salary cut? They were professionals, they argued,
7 Each Staff Association comprised several sections catering 
for different interest groups such as academics, adminis­
trative personnel, technical officers, and national 
employees.
8 Academic section of UOT Staff Association, loc. cit.; and 
UOT Staff Association (Academic Section), letter-to-the- 
editor, Post-Courier} 21 May 1974, p. 2.
P. Greenwood, RIW, 3 May 1976.9
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and should be paid as such - like their colleagues. Then there was 
the ’intolerable situation’ at UOT where non-academic salaries had 
risen steeply. Tied as they were to Public Service pay scales, which 
remained linked with Australian rates, some classes of non-academic 
salary had risen 45% since 1970; academic salaries had risen only 11%.^ 
The academics thus felt left behind by all.
The UOT Council and administration gave academics further
reasons for resentment. The academics became convinced the University's
leadership had 'sold out' its obligation to protect their interests.
Several incidents seemed to indicate this. First, Council ceded
control over academic salaries to government. It believed the
government's entry into academic salary fixation (via the First Gris
Committee) left it little choice but to accept whatever salary policy
government chose to adopt.^ Matheson and Sandover both made personal
representations on behalf of the academics, with whom they sympathized
and who they knew must remain contented if UOT was to retain adequate
12staffing levels and avoid industrial unrest. But this was not
enough for the academics. They grimly watched Council surrender its
salary-fixing powers, claiming its 'passivity' and 'neutral position'
13were helping downgrade their conditions of employment.
Then Council caused further displeasure, over academics' 
study leave. During 1974 Council's Finance and Management Committee 
(the sub-committee responsible for policy-making in financial matters) 
approved a new set of study leave rules favourable to academics; but 
the full Council refused to endorse them. The academics indignantly 
interpreted this as a breach of faith. They believed Sandover had 
been mainly responsible, hoping to delay the new rules to save funds;
10 H. Clark, letter-to-the-editor, Post-Courier3 7 November 
1974, p. 2; Clark to Stephenson, 6 March 1974, Greenwood 
papers.
11 Matheson to Greenwood, 2 June 1975, Greenwood papers; Sandover 
to Greenwood, 6 June 1974, OHER 66-1-49.
12 Matheson to L.G. Matthews, 22 October 1974, Greenwood papers; 
Sandover to Matthews, 2 September 1974, UOT Staff Association 
Correspondence.
UOT Staff Association, President's report for 1974; Brown to 
Sandover, 17 February 1975, Greenwood papers.
13
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and they thought Council had weakly allowed him to ’lead it by the 
nose’. Eventually they threatened to register an industrial dispute 
over the issue, and Council then gave way and ratified the new rules.^ 
By this time, however, the academics had learnt to distrust Council.
A further incident concerned the secondment to UOT of members of 
Australian university staff. UOT by late 1973 was experiencing 
considerable difficulty in attracting professional technologists.^
This lowered morale among UOT academics, who had to teach fuller time­
tables and larger classes because of staff shortages - which added to
16their sense of injustice over the salaries question. Sandover
enthusiastically espoused secondment as the solution. The Australian
government was prepared to meet the costs as special aid to Papua New
Guinea, but the Somare government opposed this because it entailed
sectoral rather than general aid and smacked of 'neocolonialism' on 
17that count. Sandover nevertheless proclaimed his readiness to
18'welcome with open arms any secondment'. UOT academics bitterly
opposed his campaign to get seconded staff 'on the cheap'. They
believed the University's first duty was to them, and they feared
that if UOT employed large squads of 'two year tourists' it would
19conveniently relegate their own interests to the background.
Sandover's influence in the UOT Council also helped vitiate 
relations between the University and its academic staff. Council 
appeared pliable whenever Sandover made requests or suggestions; it 
seemed to assert its independence chiefly when dealing with academic 
staff. Successive academic representatives on Council found they were 
often overlooked or overruled when raising matters on behalf of their
20colleagues; the Vice-Chancellor, however, never seemed to be 'gagged'.
14 Greenwood, RIW.
15 Sandover to B. Bray, 24 January 1974, UPNGR F.105-17 
(part 1).
16 Matheson to Rees, 31 January 1974, UPNGR F.105-17 (part 2).
17 O'Neill, notes of discussion with A. Martin (Department of 
Finance), 16 August 1974, UPNGR F.105-17 (part 2).
18 Sandover to Bray, loc. cit.
19 National Times} 12 October 1974, p. 38; Greenwood, RIW.
20 S. Smaridge, personal communication, 25 April 1976; H. Clark, 
personal communication, 4 May 1976; Greenwood, RIW,
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The academics therefore came to see Council, especially its Papua New
Guinean members, as Sandover's ciphers. Despite the radical utterances
some national members made outside Council, they generally acquiesced
in the face of strong pressure from Sandover or Matheson in meetings,
’siding with the strength' on contentious issues. As localization
proceeded, and nationals became the majority group on Council,
academics lost faith in it as an independent body they could rely on
21for objective decisions in matters of principle.
The dissatisfaction of UOT academics built up steadily in
the year following the First Gris Report. Some sort of militant
protest became inevitable. It took the form of an appeal to arbitration.
Discussions between the UOT and UPNG academic staff associations
revealed that both groups thought alike on the salaries question. They
consequently decided to register an industrial dispute under the
Industrial Relations Act 1962-71 and then to place a joint case before
an arbitration tribunal for a review of government's academic salaries
policy. Their case duly came before a tribunal headed by L.G.
Matthews in September 1974. Counsel for the academics was J. Griffin,
a UPNG lecturer in Law, while the government advocate was J. Macken,
a Sydney barrister retained and briefed by the OHE. Both universities
declined to appear for, as the UOT Registrar noted, 'it would be
somewhat ludicrous [for the University to appear] in that [it] does
not in fact wish to refuse the claims of the Staff Association and
is only prevented from complying with them by the actions and require-
22ments of the Government'. UPNG and UOT therefore delegated their 
cases to the OHE. After only two days' sitting Matthews adjourned 
the tribunal at Macken's request so that government could reconsider 
its position in the light of the recently released CEUD Report.
During the adjournment the OHE quickly prepared a Cabinet 
submission to implement the CEUD salary recommendations and thus 
remove the major sources of dissatisfaction among academics - the 
ex gratia/non-ex gratia differential and the lack of salary review 
machinery. Cabinet subsequently approved this submission in early
21
22
ibid.
G.N. Stephenson to Rees, 29 July 1974, OHER 66-1-49.
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23October 1974. However, the academics, and particularly those at
UOT, were still not satisfied. They announced that they would refuse
to accept the proffered increase and would continue with their case
24before the Matthews tribunal. The tribunal did not reconvene until 
mid-November 1974. In the meantime the academics had been waging a 
relentless publicity campaign in the local and Australian press.
Styling themselves as 'academic pawns' in a 'game' between the univers­
ities and the governments of Australia and Papua New Guinea, they
25maintained a flow of provocative publicity releases.
Eventually a reaction set in against militant academic trade
unionism. As Sandover observed to the UOT Staff Association, 'there
is somewhat of a slight prejudice against academics in the minds of
Government Ministers, who no doubt think we are very well paid
2 ^
compared with themselves'. Government was indeed unsympathetic:
believing that high priced expatriates, especially those expecting
Australian conditions, were a bane, it had instructed the Public
Service Board to seek future recruits in the Philippines and else- 
27where. Some academics were also perturbed by the greed of their
colleagues. A former UPNG history lecturer expressed his disgust to
the Matthews tribunal. 'The action of the [First] Gris Committee to
stop the materialist and careerist character of the universities
28should be upheld', he advised. UOT and UPNG academics, he roundly 
asserted, enjoyed 'scandalous' affluence:
[They] live in lavishly equipped houses, drive new cars, 
own boats, hold properties and investments in Australia, 
enjoy low taxation (a point they never mention in their
23 Rees to Inglis, and Sandover, 15 October 1974, OHER 
66-1-49.
24 Post-Courier, 9 October 1974, p. 3; 6 November 1974,
p. 13.
25 See, for example, letter-to-the-editor, The Australian, 
26 August 1974; UOT Staff Association press release, 5 
September 1974; National Times, 12 October 1974, p. 38.
26 Sandover to UOT Staff Association, 5 September 1974, 
Greenwood papers.
27 I. Kilage to Rees, 17 October 1974, OHER 66-1-49.
28 A.D. Ward to Matthews, 25 October 1974, OHER 66-1-49,
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submissions) and annual or biennial holidays in Asia 
or Europe and have their wives (who would have been 
lucky in most cases to obtain a place in an Australian 
university) take degree courses.... It is particularly 
offensive that the ardent staff association leaders who 
pursue the claim are former schoolteachers... who could 
themselves not have gained even a Junior Lectureship 
under competitive Australian conditions. 29
Self-righteous indignation could scarcely go further; yet it did 
indicate that among the academics were some prepared to work for less 
than Australian salaries. University trade unionists might deride 
them as ’academic missionaries’, but they, too, held determined views. 
This became clear when seven UPNG academics caused a stir among 
militant colleagues by publicly dissociating themselves from the staff 
associations' wage claim. In a provocative letter to the Post-Courier 
they said government should 'call the bluff' of the trade unionists:
There is no question in our minds that academics in 
Papua New Guinea are among the most privileged sections 
of the country - by almost any criteria.... We find the 
recommendations of the [First] Gris Committee... quite 
acceptable, even generous.... We feel that foreign 
academics may be better received and perceived by Papua 
New Guineans if the prime efforts of the former were to 
improve the conditions of employment for Papua New 
Guinean academics so that more of them would be attracted 
into academic professions. As it is the present demands 
of the staff associations portray nothing other than 
naked self-interest. 30
There were prompt and indignant rejoinders to this, accusing the seven
of a cheap 'pseudo-altruistic' posturing to gain effect before a
31Papua New Guinean audience. What angered loyal trade unionists even
more was the later knowledge that, of the seven, only one declined the
salary increase subsequently granted - the rest accepted that and 
32later increases. The flesh may indeed have been weak, but the fact
29 ibid.
30 A. Amarshi (et al.), letter-to-the-editor, Post-Courier3 
31 October 1974, p. 2.
31 Letters-to-the-editor, Post-Courier3 'Quarter Pint Pom',
5 November 1974, p. 2; H. Mcl. Clark, 7 November 1974,
p. 2.
32 Personal communications, G. Young, 9 June 1976; W. Rees, 
19 September 1975.
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remained that a number of academics found their jobs as important as 
their salaries.
When the Matthews tribunal resumed, government counsel
argued virtually as First and Second Gris Committees had, viz., 'that
salary fixations [should] be made on the basis of Papua New Guinea
work value considerations and not those of Australia or any other 
33country'. The staff associations came to the hearing with a revised
case. At the first hearing they had simply argued that, while it was
right for the link with Australian salaries to be broken, they should
be paid an 'attraction allowance' above their Papua New Guinean
34salaries to bring them up to Australian levels. At the second
hearing, however, they produced a new log of claims: using 1970
(a year when academic and Public Service salaries had been 'in step')
as a base, they claimed a 64% increase in salary, being the percentage
increase to July 1973 of the pay of clerical and administrative
officers; in addition they wanted an extra 18% to cover cost of living 
35increases. The tribunal decided that this new claim was neither 
'justified [n]or reasonable'. To seek parity with Australia was one 
thing, but to claim much higher rates 'based on an arithmetical
3 6exercise starting from January 1970 cannot reasonably be supported'. 
The tribunal consequently dismissed the claim abruptly. This was a
37humiliation for the academics, who felt 'astounded and bewildered'. 
They had thought their claim was soundly based on 'long-established 
principles of wage determination for professional employees', which
38Matthews 'disregarded'. His decision, they now alleged
39strongly influenced by political factors'.
, 'was
33 Industrial dispute between staff associations of UOT 
UPNG, transcript of evidence, 3 and 4 November 1974, 
OHER 66-1-49.
and
p. 28,
34 ibid., p. 34ff.
35 L.G. Matthews, 'Decision and determination in industrial 
dispute between staff associations of UPNG and UOT', 19 
November 1974, OHER 66-1-49.
36 ibid., p. 7.
37 Post-Courier3 21 November 1974, p. 3.
38 ibid.
39 Post-Courier3 28 November 1974, p. 3.
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UOT academics, having been the more militant, took the
dismissal of the claim much more as an affront than their Waigani
colleagues. They had been more industrially active, and had done
most of the groundwork in preparing the case for the Matthews tribunal.
There were other reasons, too, for their greater disappointment. As
technologists they were possibly more 'hard headed’, more concerned
with material conditions than UPNG staff. Many were also English,
and some observers thought that significant: such staff, it was said,
had 'the old British shop steward syndrome’.^ Then, as we have seen,
they had learnt to distrust the UOT Council and administration; and
a number of notable personality clashes were further inflaming that
mistrust, with each side accusing the other of impropriety, gross
41discourtesy, and devious dealing. For these reasons UOT academics 
generally took the Matthews decision as a huge defeat, and staff 
morale visibly slumped. Telling evidence of this was the appearance 
shortly thereafter of The Retorter (a parody on the official UOT news- 
sheet, The Reporter) - UOT's first underground newspaper - which 
flayed the UOT administration mercilessly. Witty, audacious, cruel, 
libellous, The Retorter was perhaps the only means of protest left 
to a group which saw itself defeated on all sides.
Rees, the OHE Director, had foreseen the damage the Matthews
decision would cause. OHE had therefore acted promptly to establish
the salary review machinery recommended in the CEUD Report. As a
result the Academic Salary Review Committee, chaired by W. Edoni, came
into being in January 1975. Rees's action was timely. It helped
remove the academics' sense of grievance by guaranteeing them regular
42salary reviews and indexation to match cost of living increases.
But although the academics were now assured of wage justice they 
remained a militant force, particularly at UOT, where (as we will
40 Rees, RIW, p. 19.
41 See for example, Stephenson to Clark, 30 July 1974; Sandover 
to Clark, 20 August 1974; Clark to Stephenson, 1 August 
1974, Greenwood papers; and Sandover to Clark, 23 August 
1974, UOT Staff Association Correspondence.
42 Matheson to Greenwood, 28 April 1975, Greenwood papers;
Rees, RIW, p. 13ff.
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see) administration-academic relations continued to decline. Having
learnt militancy, UOT academics were subsequently predisposed towards
registering industrial disputes. Matheson and Sandover warned that
militant trade unionism would antagonize Council, putting it 'on the 
43defensive'. For its part the UOT academic staff association seemed 
to think Council was beyond redemption, that forceful industrial 
action was the most effective means of impressing on the University 
their justifiable grievances and refusal to accept arbitrary treatment. 
Their militancy was to continue for another two years at least. Trade 
unionism was now an ongoing feature of the university system.
The rise of academic trade unionism posed several pertinent 
questions for national ideology. Could trade unionism among a 
relatively privileged group be squared with the Eight Point Plan? If 
any sectional group was successful in winning what it thought was its 
economic due, could other groups be discouraged from demanding 
matching privileges? The answer was probably 'no' both times. The 
moral incentives of the national ideology had proved incapable of 
inducing wage restraint among the most privileged sectors of the work­
force. The privileged remained so despite the strong egalitarian 
thrust of the ideology, which now began to sound more like hollow 
rhetoric.
(b) STUDENT MILITANCY
Staff activism at UPNG and UOT stemmed mainly from trade union 
issues, but the student militancy was chiefly political. In the past 
the public had generally tolerated the students' occasional ventures 
into politics. Indeed on one notable occasion a student demonstration 
had been welcomed: after several days of rioting between Papuans and
New Guineans following an inter-territory football match in 1973,
UPNG students set off on a 'march for peace' to demonstrate unity to 
the rest of the population. The police riot squad halted the march, 
fearing it might inflame bystanders; they then called Somare himself 
to parley with the students. He thought their demonstration might
43 Matheson to Greenwood, 28 April 1975, Greenwood papers.
44 Greenwood to Matheson, 14 May 1975, Greenwood papers.
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help restore peace, and so gave the order for them to proceed. Sub­
sequently student demonstrations were not as well received. In the 
succeeding two years, as student militancy and the frequency of 
protests increased, government began losing patience with the students, 
and an anti-student reaction set in.
A few months after the 'march for peace' UPNG students were 
in the news again when they, and their UOT cousins, went on strike for 
a week. The strike began as a result of a Students' Representative 
Council (SRC) decision to protest against conditions in the mess and 
the effects of inflation on student living allowances. Students boy­
cotted classes to hear SRC complaints in the UPNG forum. What had 
started as a demonstration against living conditions rapidly developed 
political overtones: to demands about living allowances were added
grievances against government use of public funds, and Ministerial 
46privileges. As R.A. Mortimer, the UPNG Professor of Political 
Studies, later noted, the issue of allowances was a catalyst for
» 47deeper discontentment and 'disenchantment with government performance'.
The boycott of classes continued the next day, 5 June 1974. A
delegation of student leaders saw Somare later in the day to place
before him a list of demands. The interview went badly. Somare was
not interested in hearing the political demands and would only agree
to a $3 a fortnight raise in student allowances whereas the students
wanted $7. Consequently 'both students and the Chief Minister felt
a sense of keen disappointment and even outrage at each other's 
48behaviour'. A hardening in government attitudes became clear next 
day when Somare gave the students an ultimatum: they could accept
the offer of $3 or have their scholarships revoked, and if they chose
45 Somare (1975), pp. 129-30.
46 Students demanded, for example, that government divest 
itself of the recently acquired Ministerial 'rest and recup­
eration' chalet in the hills behind Port Moresby, which, 
they claimed, was an elitist extravagance out of all keeping 
with the Eight Point Plan.
47 R.A. Mortimer, 'UPNG Student Strike of June 1974', UPNGR 
75/327.
48 ibid.
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the latter they could walk or swim home to their villages because
49government would not pay the fares.
Somare’s tough line radicalized the students, bringing their 
political demands to the fore. As Inglis later observed, ’what began 
as an encounter between students and the University... was transformed 
into an encounter between students and the government'. The effect 
was immediately obvious on campus. Students no longer boycotted 
classes - they forcefully disallowed them, their placards threatening 
violence to any lecturer daring to break the ban. Little violence 
actually occurred,3 "^ but its possibility persuaded the Acting Vice- 
Chancellor, A. Clunies-Ross, to cancel all classes for the strike’s 
duration. The strike soon spread as UOT students came out in sympathy 
with Waigani. Papua New Guinea thus had a phenomenon it had not yet 
experienced - a national strike. That all the country’s university 
students were now on strike was politically significant, for as 
Mortimer observed, 'in developing countries... students form part of 
a relatively small, educated urban political public, and their con­
frontation with fragile political institutions can, at times of general
political dissatisfaction, produce major political repercussions...
52[as] in Indonesia and Thailand’. The importance of this possibility 
was not apparently lost on Somare, who flew to Lae especially to meet 
UOT students. They were in a truculent mood and would not let him 
enter the campus. He had to speak to them at the entrance, but made 
little impression and returned to Port Moresby angry and humiliated.
Eventually both government and students compromised. On 10 
June Somare addressed an open letter to the students indicating a 
willingness to negotiate, and the next day a conference took place 
between him, his Ministers for Finance (Julius Chan) and Foreign Affairs
49 ibid.
50 Inglis, ’The Student Strike: Report by the Vice-Chancellor', 
8 July 1974, UPNGR 75/327.
51 One class was broken up when a lecturer who was unaware of 
the ban inadvertently began teaching, and the office of the 
professor was invaded after he had declared he would defy 
the ban.
52 ibid.
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(A.M. Kiki), senior UPNG staff, and SRC leaders. All parties showed 
their readiness to make concessions. The students accepted the $3 
raise. The University undertook to investigate conditions in the mess 
(subsequently found more than adequate by the Department of Health), 
and it decided not to hold the formal mid-year examinations due in 
several days. The government reaffirmed its commitment to the Eight 
Points and anti-elitism. The strike now ended; classes resumed the 
next day, 12 June. Something of the mutual relief of all concerned 
was obvious in Somare's summation of events: ’with a bit of wisdom
and willingness to act positively on both the students' and the govern­
ment's sides, important steps can be taken against elitism and towards
53building an egalitarian society'.
Once the strike was over it became subject to a series of 
post mortems. Clunies-Ross's analysis seemed just relieved that the 
crisis had passed. He said he was grateful for the 'frankness and 
sense of responsibility' the SRC president displayed throughout, for 
the 'imaginative responses' from government officials, and for Somare's 
'patience and magnanimity'.^ Inglis, who returned to UPNG from over­
seas just after the strike, thought it would have benefits in the form 
of an 'enhance[d]... sense of common purpose' between students, 
University and government.“*“* Mortimer, who had studied student 
strikes elsewhere, and seemed proud to have been a veteran of no less 
than ten, believed both University and government had received a 
salutary lesson:
What we have experienced is not some isolated and 
exceptional episode, but one of the numerous indicators 
which inform us that Papua New Guinea is entering a 
political threshhold well worn by many feet in other 
places. The student strike is by now an accepted occur­
ence in all parts of the world, and there is every 
reason to anticipate that it will remain part of the 
social and political scene for the foreseeable future.
... Student activism has to be taken seriously and 
incorporated into the political thinking and management
53 Quoted in Inglis, loc. cit.
54 A. Clunies-Ross, Report to UPNG Council, 12 June 1974, 
UPNGR 75/327.
55 Inglis, loc. cit.
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mechanisms of governments in new and emerging states.
If this is recognized and appropriate policies formulated, 
then a great deal can be gained from the recent events on 
our own front terrace. 56
Not all UPNG staff could be so objective. Even though some staff
remarked on 'how peacefully the week of the strike passed with no actual
57violence or damage to property', others felt 'acutely vulnerable'
because of the threats of violence, and thought the absence of violence
58was hardly grounds for UPNG to congratulate itself. Some staff were
cynical of the way students coupled a wage claim with demands for
lessened Ministerial privilege - a feeling shared by government and
59the general public. UOT staff were angered by the arrogance of some
60students in refusing to allow Somare on to the campus. Some UPNG
academics were highly critical of the University, saying it had tacitly
condoned the strike by cancelling classes and not proceeding with
61formal mid-year examinations. Others believed it had acted with
good sense and sensitivity in averting violence and minimising student
discontent. Clearly, staff opinion was divided, and often the divisions
ran along faculty lines, Science and Education believing the University
had been too lenient, Arts thinking it had wisely defused a crisis
6 2and recreated goodwill.
The strike, perhaps, troubled the government as much as it 
did the universities. During its course government had shifted ground. 
Before Somare and his Ministers realized how determined the students 
were they had taken a tough line. Only when they recognized the 
students' solidarity and the possible social and political costs of 
breaking this did they compromise. Goodwill was restored through
56 Mortimer, loc. cit.
57 Inglis, loc. cit.
58 Mortimer, loc. cit.
59 Clunies-Ross, loc. cit.; M. Woodward, personal communication, 
20 July 1974.
60 M. Woodward, loc. cit.
61 Various communications to Inglis, June-July 1974, UPNGR 
75/327.
62 ibid.
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compromise, but there could be no guarantee government would be as 
patient again. Mortimer warned the students of this at a later meeting 
between them and government officials:
I propose to the students that they consider the full 
social implications of their actions... and recognize 
that, if strike action is to work in their favour on 
future occasions, it has to be used sparingly, as a 
last resort, and with every effort to avoid violence 
or the threat of it. I would remind them that the 
physical casualties of student strikes, by a ratio of 
something like 1000:1, are students themselves. I 
would go so far as to say... that the only occasions 
when student-initiated violence can unambiguously be 
stated to have paid off have been those when the 
objective was the overthrow of the government AND the 
students enjoyed the backing of strategic interests 
outside the university. 63
It was advice the students seemed not to heed, for over the next eighteen 
months three major strikes and a number of lesser demonstrations took 
place on the university campuses.
The next strike showed that government was growing impatient.
It occurred in March-April 1975 at Goroka Teachers' College, newly 
united with UPNG. Again student dissatisfaction crystallized around 
conditions in the mess, and living allowances; and again students 
boycotted classes and presented government with a list of demands. This 
time government stood firm. Somare and the Minister for Education,
R. Taureka, told the striking students their demands would not be met, 
and if they did not return to work they could walk home sans scholar­
ships. The students held out for several days, but government refused 
to yield. In the end they returned to class chastened by their loss 
of face. Only a hard core of six students, including the SRC president, 
made 'the final form of protest' by quitting the college. 'From the 
government's standpoint the collapse of the boycott can be seen as a
64complete vindication of their hard line', the Principal advised Inglis.
A further strike, and perhaps the most serious of them all, 
followed within weeks, again at UPNG. It was purely political, sparked 
off by government's decision to invite the Queen to become head of
63 Mortimer, loc. cit.
64 H.J. Tinsley to Inglis, 1 April 1975, UPNGR 75/327.
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state. At a forum meeting on Friday 22 May the students decided to 
march on Somare's office in the Waigani government complex to let 
their displeasure be known. To their objection against the Queen they 
added complaints about nepotism in making appointments to the diplo­
matic service, and alleged financial corruption within the Ministry. 
They duly paraded in front of the government offices for two hours, 
but the protest fizzled out in a stalemate: Somare refused to speak
to them en masse, and they declined to send him the deputation he 
requested. ^  The only Cabinet Minister they saw was the roguish 
Minister for Police, Pita Lus, who appeared at a window to jeer,
6(raising two extended fingers at them in a vulgar gesture of contempt. 
Back at the campus the Vice-Chancellor (now Gris) cancelled classes 
for the day but said they would resume as normal the coming Monday.
On Monday, however, students again boycotted classes, and at a forum 
meeting called for cancellation of classes and closure of the Library. 
Various minor incidents followed as rumours spread among students that 
police spies and hostile journalists were infiltrating among them.
This led them to set up road blocks. The major incident of the day 
came soon after when a University employee drove through a road block 
on his way to work. The students bounced his car and jostled him and 
his wife, who later laid a complaint of assault against the students 
with the police.^
During the afternoon a student delegation met Somare, who 
promised to send two of his senior personal staff to the campus to 
explain the decision in respect of the Queen. Next day Somare's 
representatives met the student body in a UPNG lecture theatre. There 
was a half-hearted and probably jocular attempt to hold them hostage 
until students were satisfied with the Chief Minister's explanation.
At the same time the Police Commissioner was advising Gris that the 
complaint of assault must be investigated. Gris was worried lest 
'precipitate police action... revive the flagging strike and generate 
a student reaction that would endanger the position of the University
65 Mortimer and O'Neill, Report on the May 1975 student strike, 
17 June 1976, UPNGR 75/327.
66 C. Livesy, personal communication, 28 November 1976.
67 Mortimer and O'Neill, loc. cit.
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68including the safety of staff and property'. Next morning a
further forum took place, at which the medical students announced
that they no longer supported the strike. A resolution to call the
strike off was, however, defeated. Gris now called an emergency
meeting of Council to review the situation. Council endorsed his
policy of 'making every effort to maintain dialogue and avoid confront- 
69ation'. Impetus was now running out of the strike, and a forum on 
Thursday 29th voted to discontinue strike action and to return to 
classes the following Monday. The only problem in ending it was the 
continued threat of police action on the alleged assault. Gris there­
fore arranged a meeting between the UPNG administration, the police 
and the SRC. At this the students said they 'had neither sought the 
violence nor condoned its occurrence' but would view the arrival of 
police on campus as a hostile act aimed at all of them. The police 
said they were bound to investigate the assault and would continue 
making enquiries. They still had not appeared on campus and failed 
to subsequently.^ The strike thus ended inconclusively, with no 
party sure of what it had achieved.
The only party to see something positive emerging from the 
week's events was the University administration, which above all was 
relieved that 'despite a number of untoward incidents the University 
succeeded in emerging unscathed from a protest which did not arise 
out of University policies or conditions and by considered restraint 
was prevented from doing harm to the institution or its members'.^
But while the University felt some satisfaction on that score, the 
tolerance of the government had been strained. This was obvious in 
Tololo's comments when, as Chancellor, he read the University's report 
on the strike. He curtly informed Gris he was 'not impressed' with
72the '1975 version of... the whitewash of the annual student strike'.
He reminded Gris that the students
68 ibid.
69 ibid.
70 ibid.
71 ibid.
72 Tololo to Gris, 7 July 1975, UPNGR 75/327.
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are a very privileged elite and perhaps it is time we 
had a demonstration against their abuse of their privilege!
... Government will have to be stricter in its granting 
and control of scholarships, for example, it may be 
necessary to inform students that they will be required 
to attend lectures as one of the conditions of the grant 
and continuation of a scholarship allowance.... They must 
then accept responsibility for the results of their own 
behaviour (something they do not as a collective group 
seem to have realized yet). 73
The trend in government thinking was clear: the universities were
expected to restrain their students; students were expected to restrain 
themselves; and if neither the universities nor students complied 
then government would impose restraints of its own. Tololo's threats 
were endorsed by the Minister for Education. He issued a Ministerial 
Statement bluntly telling students their demonstrations would be 
tolerated only if peaceful and confined to the forum. He emphasized 
that government regarded UPNG as an 'expensive public institution' 
whose students were 'extraordinarily privileged', as evidenced by the 
fact that to keep one of them at university for a year cost about 
three times the minimum wage needed to support a family of four in 
the urban area. Students, he finally said, were future national 
leaders and must 'accept the obligations of this role and work hard 
accordingly'.^
Such admonitions apparently went unheeded. Mortimer's
warning that student strikes had become a permanent part of the
country's political milieu was proving timely as one demonstration
after another occurred in the first year of independence. Thus, in
February 1976 there was a vociferous protest against the presence of
the Governor-General, Sir John Guise, at the UPNG graduation ceremony.
Once again the Queen was the unwitting focus of student hostility.
As Guise rose to deliver the main address they began chanting slogans
75such as 'No Queen's bois for Papua New Guinea'. They kept up a
73 ibid.
74 R. Taureka, Ministerial Statement, 27 May 1975, OHER 
66-1-52.
75 Bois: Pidgin for 'servants', 'menials', a derogatory
term.
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deafening clamour throughout his speech, which he concluded with the 
ominous words, 'May I congratulate the protesting students for exer­
cising their right to free expression; may I also remind them of their 
responsibilities?'^ Somare reputedly flew into a rage when he heard 
of the incident.^ Shortly before this UPNG students had been in 
official displeasure over another demonstration. In protest over the 
Indonesian takeover in East Timor, they trampled the Indonesian flag 
into the dust, which led the Indonesian ambassador to accuse the 
government of having allowed his nation to be insulted. The public 
apology of the SRC president (who had been photographed stomping on
the flag by the Post-Courier), probably did little to assuage the
78anger of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Several weeks later students were news again when those at
UOT went on strike against their University's localization policies.
They demanded that Council adopt a vigorous programme of localization
in UOT's upper administrative echelon. Their foremost claim was for
the immediate appointment of a national Deputy Vice-Chancellor to
take over as soon as practicable from Sandover, whose privileges and
79affluence offended many among them. Council agreed to this, and 
subsequently Tigilai, the OHE Director and chairman of the UFRC, was 
appointed. However, despite this apparant justification of their 
protest some eight months later, they rather marred their reputation 
at the time by staying out on strike for over a week. Even though 
they used this time to clean the streets of Lae, their eminently non­
elitist gesture seemed to redeem them little in the eyes of the public,
who still saw them as an irresponsible group in abuse of their
.... 80 privileges.
In August it was the turn of UPNG students again, this time 
with a march in protest against the government's Public Order Bill,
76 Personal observation, 27 February 1976.
77 A. O'Neill, personal communication, 3 March 1976.
78 Post-Courier3 24 February 1976, p. 3.
79 Post-Courier3 29 March 1976, p. 3; 24 April 1976, p. 2.
80 H. Clark and S. Smaridge, personal communication, 22 April 
1976.
248
which, significantly, had ’teeth' that could have clamped hard on
students’ ability to stage future public demonstrations. Perhaps
judiciously, the government chose to postpone the enactment of the
bill in acknowledgement of the furore it promised to create, not the
81least among students. Though this defused yet another situation 
that threatened to become critical, it was clear that student activism 
had continuing potential for bringing government and students into 
confrontation.
The concern of government to grant students the right to
dissent was evident in the various pronouncements on this subject by
Ministers and officials. It was said 'the whole community would be
the poorer if they did not exercise their right... to voice their 
8 2opinions openly'. Yet there was also a corresponding insistence 
that students must comport themselves with restraint, and be held 
accountable for their actions, because of their conspicuous privilege 
and the great investment which made that possible. How long govern­
ment would continue to hold such a balanced view was uncertain. There 
were signs, however, that the balance could tip against the students. 
That a public reaction was setting in against them became evident, 
perhaps, in letters-to-the-editor in the Post-Courier, and more 
significantly in deliberations within the House of Assembly. The view 
of the ordinary Papua New Guinean was possibly apparent in a motion 
brought before parliament in early 1976 by a back-bencher. He proposed 
that 'in view of the frequent student strikes and demonstrations, in
particular... at the universities, this parliament requests the
83government to consider restricting student demonstrations....'
Government in fact had already thought of this: it had compiled a
list of strategies to be used on occasions when the curtailment of
84students' rights was deemed necessary.
81 M. Tigilai and W. Oostermeyer, personal communication, 24 
August 1976.
82 Taureka, loc. cit.
83 National Parliament, notice of motion no. 101, 8 April 1976, 
OHER 66-1-52.
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no. 101', OHER 66-1-52.
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The period leading up to independence had clearly been one 
of uncertainty, disillusionment, discontent and militancy for both 
university staff and students. Each group had extracted various 
concessions from the universities and government through their 
particular modes of activism. The concessions, however, were more 
likely to be in the short rather than the long term, for campus 
militancy made government the more aware of how expensive universities 
were. That one of the chief returns for conspicuous investment seemed 
to be trouble on campus was good reason, in government's view, to 
scrutinize the universities more closely. This, of course, meant 
further erosions of the autonomy early Vice-Chancellors had fought to 
safeguard. The universities were clearly in danger of declining into 
government agencies analogous to, say, the Electricity Commission.
And as we will see in a later chapter, government was nudging them 
in that direction.
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CHAPTER 9
INTERNAL CONFLICTS AND PRESSURES FOR CHANGE
PAPUA New Guinea's university system by the mid-1970s was like a 
sporting arena crowded with many different teams, each playing its 
own particular game after its own style and at the same time as all 
the others. In such a complex system was ample scope for collision 
as its numerous interest groups sought their own sectional advantage.
A number of issues revealed both the complexity and the tendency 
towards conflict as the various interest groups tried to change the 
system to suit themselves. Five issues, which this chapter will 
examine, stood out in this regard - women's rights, academic and 
structural reform, localization, multi-campus organization, and the 
role of the Vice-Chancellors.
(a) WOMEN’S RIGHTS
This section will focus on two aspects of the issue - the treat­
ment of female staff, and the problems of female students. Most of 
the emphasis in the former will be on events at UOT, where overt 
discrimination against female staff existed, and became a source of 
deep conflict as a result; and emphasis in the latter will be on UPNG, 
where the problems of female students were more apparent (though 
probably no more real) than at UOT.
At UPNG no overt discrimination against female staff existed, 
as at UOT for a time. Women occupied positions at most levels of the 
academic hierarchy (though there was never a female full professor). 
They were usually appointed on their merits, without consideration of 
marital status and not, if they were married, as appendages of their 
husbands. They also enjoyed full benefits due to their positions - 
recreation leave, study leave, superannuation.^" Despite this* apparent 
equality between sexes, some female staff believed UPNG regarded the 
women as less important than their male colleagues. They believed
1 Long to Dale, 9 November 1973; J.R.E. Waddell to Dale, 
21 November 1973, Dale papers.
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women were generally pushed into the background, if not discriminated
against, and could point to numerous instances: (i) There were few
senior female academics, and no women in the upper levels of the
administrative staff. (ii) In relation to their actual numbers women
were under-represented on UPNG's numerous academic and policy making
committees. (iii) Some academic departments habitually employed
short-term temporary tutors whom the University had no obligation to
provide with sick leave, recreation leave, housing, continuity of
employment, and other forms of security enjoyed by permanent staff.
Most often these positions were filled by women, many of whom came
to feel UPNG was getting them 'on the cheap' by exploiting their
willingness to work. (iv) Female academic staff, unlike male
colleagues, repeatedly found highly offensive obscene graffiti on
the doors of their offices. They resented all this, and came to
believe that UPNG in failing to correct the bias against them was
condoning discrimination, and reinforcing the attitude that men
2mattered more at UPNG than women. And that stimulated the formation 
of a series of on-campus feminist groups.
While UPNG had the grace to refrain from formal discrimin­
ation, UOT was unabashed in its inequitable treatment of female staff, 
particularly academics. Under Duncanson there had been few problems: 
there were only a few female academics and they were without spouses, 
Duncanson having disallowed the appointment of staff spouses at IOT.
But under Sandover IOT underwent a conspicuous 'spring cleaning',
3which included a new policy on employing spouses. Consequently 
husband-wife teams began joining the staff. Problems did not emerge 
until 1973, when married couples joined the full time academic staff 
for the first time. This presented UOT with new contingencies, 
chiefly economic. Thus, if both partners received financial benefits 
such as recreation leave, study leave and superannuation IOT would be 
paying double benefits to a single family unit whereas it had paid 
but singly in the past. This it was most loth to do, even though it 
made corresponding savings in the provision of housing, leave fares,
2 Personal communications, S.J. Gardner, K.M. Still and 
C.J. Sunderland, March-April 1976.
3 Personal observations, 1972-73.
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recruitment, and removal expenses. Having been an overwhelmingly male 
institution, UOT seemed incapable of thinking in any terms other than 
male employment. It responded to the arrival of married female 
academics with a series of ad hoc decisions which disadvantaged female 
staff. Over the next three years there were several notable cases 
causing great acrimony as experienced female academics were subject 
to crude and heavy-handed discrimination by UOT. From these the 
leading UOT officials emerged less than creditably. They prevaricated 
in providing forthright information to female applicants, applied ad 
hoc rules dogmatically but inconsistently, made one cavalier and 
insulting decision after another, and showed little regret for the 
suffering they caused.
The first case was that of the wife of a newly appointed head 
of department. She was a physicist-mathematician with a doctorate, 
teaching qualifications, and several years’ teaching experience in 
Australian universities. Before arriving at UOT she had applied for 
a vacant lectureship and was offered a tutorship on a one-year contract, 
which she rejected as insufficient in view of her qualifications. She 
later applied for a second lectureship, but her application was not 
acknowledged. She found this position still unfilled on arriving at 
UOT and duly applied for it again. Again she received the offer of 
a one-year tutorship, which she tentatively accepted. When she later 
asked why she was allowed only short-term employment and lowly status, 
Sandover said, 'Because you are a wife’.^  Later in the year, after 
two further applications, she was at last appointed lecturer, but 
with a one- rather than the normal three-year contract and no rights 
to study leave or superannuation. She refused these conditions, 
saying they were discriminatory and created precedents detrimental 
to future female staff, and left UOT for employment elsewhere feeling 
the University had insulted her. As she pointed out, she had been 
appointed three times as the most suitable applicant under open 
competition, but had been subject to rulings never applied to male 
appointees.^ Her husband, too, resented her treatment, and this led
4 M. Dale, 'Personal statement of employment history at UOT’, 
n.d., Dale papers.
5 ibid.
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him into a festering relationship with Sandover lasting until the
ß
latter left UOT three years later.
A similar case occurred the following year, 1974, with the 
wife of the incoming head of the Language Department. She had strong 
postgraduate qualifications, and experience in teaching postgraduate 
students of English Language in four universities. Before leaving 
the UK for Lae she had applied for a position in her husband's depart­
ment; UOT advised that her appointment could be discussed when she 
reached Lae. She reaffirmed her application in writing twice after 
her arrival, but received no acknowledgement; meanwhile she had begun 
working temporarily and part time in her husband's department, which 
was short staffed. The Registrar said he disliked husbands and wives 
working in the same department, but the couple pointed out that a 
precedent existed in the wife of the former acting head of the depart­
ment, who had worked in it with her husband for eighteen months.^
When the name of the new head's wife appeared on a list of fifty 
applicants for the job she was seeking, the appointments committee 
recommended her appointment unhesitatingly, ignoring an instruction 
from Sandover that 'under no circumstances' should she be appointed. 
Sandover said he had made a ruling ten months before debarring wives 
from working in departments led by their husbands; she was therefore 
disqualified, though it would be all right for her to work on a short­
term, temporary basis. The University now rejected the recommendation 
of the appointments committee, and advised it to consider applications 
again. Again it recommended her, saying her qualifications and 
experience were outstanding; however, by this time Council had 
ratified the ruling Sandover said he had made earlier, and so she 
could not be appointed. The husband was greatly angered, believing 
UOT had misled him by allowing him to think his wife could work in 
his department; he further believed it had been dishonest in not 
advising him of Sandover's ruling (which apparently did not exist in 
writing until ten months after he made it). He complained to Matheson,
6
7
Personal observations, 1973, 1975-76.
R. White to Dale, 18 February 1975, Dale papers.
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and subsequently Sandover made him an informal offer for alternative 
employment for his wife at UOT. He rejected this, saying she ’had 
applied to the University for a professional appointment - not for a
g
grace and favour job under the Vice-Chancellor’s patronage’. He 
resigned and left soon afterwards, feeling cheated, vowing to spread 
news of his wife's treatment via the Association of Commonwealth 
Universities.
There were several other cases involving female academics 
which together showed that a considerable reservoir of male prejudice 
existed within the UOT administration. They also demonstrated the 
propensity of UOT under Sandover to embark rashly on new policies but 
then to draw back as disadvantages became apparent. Unfortunately 
the nett result was a blighting of relations between UOT administration 
and academics.
By 1973 UOT had sufficient female academics to make their
collective presence known. They felt aggrieved, and began campaigning
for an improvement in their conditions. In mid-1973 they petitioned
the Staff Association to tackle the UOT Council over their status,
arguing that ’conditions of employment of academics should in no way9be determined by sex or marital status'. The Association subsequently 
took up their case, after checking with UPNG to compare conditions 
for women in each university. The UPNG Staff Association advised 
there was ’no instance of a married female academic being treated in 
a discriminatory way' at UPNG, and opined that the situation at UOT 
appeared ’shocking'.^  The Association now began pressing the case 
of female academics at meetings of Council and Finance and Management 
Committee. They claimed that all academics 'should be accorded 
employment conditions consistent with their professional status, 
irrespective of sex’. This meant study leave, continuity of employ­
ment via long-term contracts, superannuation, and other such benefits,
8 R. White to Dale, 18 February 1975, Dale papers.
9 ’Conditions of employment of female academics’, statement by 
female academics of UOT, 6 June 1973, Dale papers.
10 J.R.E. Waddell to Dale, 21 November 1973, Dale papers.
11 H. Clark, ’Employment of female academic staff’, 31 October 
1973, UOT Staff Association records.
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for married female academics. And it further claimed that UOT's
’blatantly discriminatory1 treatment of women would discourage valuable
potential recruits, and that the recruitment of husband-wife teams
represented ’a substantial financial saving over recruitment of two
12separate staff members'.
Despite determined representations like these UOT went ahead
in November-December 1973 to establish rules for employment so that
'no double benefits are payable where a member of staff is married to
13another member of staff'. Some rules turned out to be discriminatory
in practice. Thus, staff who had been recruited in Papua New Guinea
but whose spouses had been recruited overseas were classified as
'locally recruited', and as such their maximum length of contract was
a year, and they were ineligible for study leave. And where one member
of staff married another mid-contract, one of the two must henceforth
be regarded as 'locally recruited'.^  Ambiguities in the rules soon
became apparent, and it was obvious they could not cover all cases.
For example, they could not be applied to a husband-wife team recruited
overseas; so it became necessary to add a further rule that 'where
both members of the married team are employed, the senior partner only
would be allowed a long-term contract'.^ In practice it was almost
inevitably the wives who were the 'locally recruited' or 'junior'
partners, thus confirming the impression that somehow female academics
were less valuable than their male colleagues. To the ambiguities was
also added a series of arbitrary decisions by the UOT administration
promulgated as 'Council rulings' even though Council had not discussed
them. One instance was a clause which began appearing in the contracts
of all single women and widows appointed to the UOT staff - 'Your
marriage... will make the conditions contained [herein] to be null and
void', a clause not included in the contracts of single or widowed male
X6employees. Another instance, causing greater offence, stated, 'All
12 ibid.
13 UOT, CM 32nd meeting, December 1973, UOTR.
14 ibid.
15 UOT, CM 34th meeting, May 1974, UOTR.
16 J. Woodward, 'Conditions of employment for married persons', 
paper presented to Council, 36th meeting, May 1975, UOTR.
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selection committees considering wives or senior female employees must17be chaired by the Vice-Chancellor’. Such ’rulings’ not only angered 
the women, but also many male academics, who viewed them as an un­
constitutional abuse of authority by UOT's senior administrators. They 
helped widen the breach between academics and administrators which had 
opened over other issues.
UOT’s women eventually found a champion in Jack Woodward, 
the Professor of Electrical Engineering, whom many staff held in high 
esteem as the University’s most reputable academic. He was perturbed 
by the arbitrary action of the administration in making unauthorized 
’rulings’, and by the discriminatory effect they had. He urged Council 
to reconsider the rules relating to married staff because
the University in writing contracts... has departed from 
the letter of Conditions agreed to by Council.... The 
University practises clear discrimination against women 
members of staff... [and] injustice has been done to 
individual members of staff. 18
He suggested that Council re-examine all existing contracts to ensure
they were in accordance with Council rulings; where they were not, they
should be amended; and Council should affirm that there would be ’no
discrimination on the grounds of sex in the terms and conditions of 
19employment'. To Woodward’s pleas were added the protests of the
women themselves. They, too, complained to Council that ’administrative
action... [is] at variance with the terms of Council resolutions and
20is discriminatory to women employees’. As a result the UOT adminis­
tration was obliged to withdraw its offensive ’rulings’; a review of 
contracts was made to bring them in line with the rules wherever
necessary; and Council affirmed its support for equality between the 
21sexes. UOT was at last acknowledging the seventh of the Eight Points, 
that there should be ’a rapid increase in the active and equal
17 ibid.
18 ibid.
19 ibid.
20 Statement by ten female members of staff, n.d., presented 
to Council, 38th meeting, May 1975, UOTR.
UOT, CM, 38th meeting, May 1975, UOTR.21
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22participation of women in all forms of economic and social activity'.
At UPNG the problems of female students rather than of staff 
were the cause for concern. From the beginning UPNG had been receiving 
criticism over the treatment of female students. In parliament members 
occasionally complained about girls from their electorates becoming 
pregnant while at UPNG, and on one occasion a Ministerial Member had 
complained to the Administrator, the Secretary, and Minister for
23Territories in turn in an effort to seek justice in such a case.
There were also complaints from the secondary schools, particularly
those run by churches, when girls they sent to UPNG became pregnant
and discontinued studies - a galling fact since it was always the
brightest girls they sent on to UPNG. The frequency with which this
happened persuaded some schools to direct their better girls into
primary teachers' colleges, which seemed safer places for girls than 
24the University. The upper echelon of the Department of Education
was also critical of what it saw as the laissez-faire attitude of UPNG.
McKinnon in particular faulted the approach to the question by UPNG,
which seemed to think the students were all adults and therefore could
25not have an official morality imposed on them. Because female
students generally came from village backgrounds where their personal
conduct was closely supervised, he argued, UPNG must protect them in
loco parentis. The villages had entrusted their best young girls to
the University, so that each girl returning home pregnant represented
a dereliction of its duty. McKinnon later said he battled to make
UPNG aware of its duties but it preferred to turn a blind eye to the 
26issue.
Some within UPNG were concerned. Christian groups on campus 
regularly made representations about the need to improve the moral 
climate of the campus to better protect female students - to the
22 Central Planning Office (1973).
23 See for example, HAD 2(14) May-June 1971, p. 4333; Hay to 
Barnes, 20 October 1971, DTOR 71/4403.
24 Personal observations in high schools in Wewak, Madang, Lae 
and Manus, 1970 and 1973.
25 McKinnon, RIW.
26 ibid.
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27Oldfield Committee and the CEUD, for example. Unfortunately such
petitions made little headway, for the reports made by various
committees of inquiry generally skirted around the problem delicately,
28as if to avoid offending the University’s sensibilities. Perhaps 
the sternest critic was a member of the Faculty of Education, J.P. 
Powell, who in 1974 put forward a list of what he said were UPNG’s 
eight major failings, which he facetiously termed ’the Eight Point Plan 
for Downfall’. One was a moral failure: UPNG had always adopted a
’neutral attitude' to its students' behaviour, the result of which was 
a ’moral vacuum’. He said,
there is never any publicly expressed criticism of student 
attitudes, values or activities, and one never senses that 
the University feels it has any responsibility in this 
sensitive but vitally important area. Vandalism, theft, 
misappropriation of funds and, more recently, intimidation 
and threats of violence have gone unpunished and even 
unreprimanded. 29
The most persistent agitators for a more responsible attitude on the 
part of the University were, however, the feminists; and to Powell's 
catalogue of uncensured sins they added the exploitation of female 
students by male colleagues restrained by very few sanctions.
An on-campus feminist movement had existed, albeit fitfully, 
from the early 1970s. In 1975-76 the movement gained in cohesion, 
probably because of the presence among staff and expatriate students 
of committed, articulate and determined feminists who found a common 
purpose in the problems of Papua New Guinean female students. To the 
feminists the disadvantages of female students on a campus where they 
were outnumbered 10:1 epitomized flagrantly the oppression all women 
suffered in male-dominated societies. The renewed interest in the 
treatment of women became obvious in a number of directions. Several 
formal women's organizations and informal discussion groups came into
27 See for example comments of Bishop D. Hand, et at, 3 to the 
Oldfield Committee, UPNGR E.61 (part 1); and submissions to 
the CEUD, for instance OHER S-56.
28 See for example the manner in which the Oldfield Report
(p. 37), and the CEUD Report (pp. 85-9) deal euphemistically 
with sexual issues.
29 J.P. Powell (1974).
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being; a feminist journal, Yumi Wankain (Pidgin: ’we are equal’) began 
appearing; various seminars considered feminist issues; courses in 
’women's studies' began for the first time; and a number of female 
staff pursued research on a range of topics of concern to feminists.
Perhaps one of the most significant research projects by a 
feminist was that of K.M. Still, who in 1976 produced a report for the 
UPNG Educational Research Unit on the difficulties of female students 
at UPNG. The title of this, ’Something has got to be done so we can 
survive in this place’, indicated something of the desperate plight 
in which she and her informants believed female students existed. 
Still's findings were perhaps embarrassing for the University, since 
it was hard to ignore them, or dismiss them as puritan protestation.
She had conducted a survey to identify what the 140 full time national 
female students at UPNG in 1975 perceived as their chief problems.
These sorted themselves into four main categories - academic, accommo­
dation, social, and personal - and overall a depressing pattern 
emerged of aggression by male students, and oppression of the females. 
One academic problem was the lack of confidence the women felt in 
class discussions. They attributed their hesitancy to the hostility 
of the men when they did attempt to participate: they felt subjected
to ’whistling and other forms of aggression' (looks, remarks, gestures) 
which discouraged them from taking further active part in class.
Another problem was a failure to utilize available study facilities. 
Again male aggression was the root cause: the women lived in continual
fear of attack, which limited their use of resources for study. They 
were, for example, generally afraid to leave their rooms after dark 
to use the Library only 200 metres away because the path was unlit and 
they had 'frequent unpleasant experiences’ walking along it. Some who
did use the Library at night were too afraid to visit the adjacent 
30toilets. Accommodation posed a number of related problems. Luavi 
House, the women’s hall of residence, had been deemed ’demonstrably 
unsuitable' by the Oldfield Report: it was surrounded by high brick
walls topped with barbed wire, was patrolled by uniformed male security 
guards, had no place for social gathering or entertaining friends, and
30 K.M. Still and John Shea (1976).
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its study facilities were minimal. Its occupants regarded it as 'a
prison’. Despite the security measures, visits by drunken males at
all hours were ’commonplace’. Associated with male drinking - which
the women identified as their single most serious problem - was violence
towards women. Bashings of women, often within Luavi itself, for
purposes of sexual coercion were also ’commonplace’. Pregnancy was
another related problem: an earlier study by the Department of
Education indicated that ’40% of UPNG women became pregnant while at
the University’ (compared with 26% at the neighbouring Port Moresby
31Teachers’ College). Male possessiveness and aggression seemed to 
be significant, for it was said that when a male student had a girl­
friend he thought making her pregnant would ’stop others from having 
32her'. Consequently a ’high correlation between drink, safety and
pregnancy’ seemed to exist. ’One might almost propose the following
formula to express "Life in Luavi": Drink + Hostility Towards Females
33= Pregnancy’, Still wrote. The attitude of female students to this
34combination was one of 'considerable anger'. 'Why should we be
housed in a prison? Shouldn’t our male oppressors be imprisoned in
35their dormitories instead?' were questions they commonly asked.
As the anger of UPNG women built up it became difficult for 
the University to disregard. But that the UPNG administration still 
seemed to prefer ignoring the problem became apparent in late 1976 
when an incident occurred which brought into focus the dissatisfaction 
the women had been feeling. This was the attempted rape of an ex­
patriate female staff member early one afternoon near the UPNG child
minding centre. She reported the matter to both University and police
36but ’nothing was done'. This angered some women and led to a meeting 
of the recently formed Women’s Staff-Student Association to discuss
31 Marion Jacka (1974), pp. 37-8.
32 Still, loc. cit.
33 ibid.
34 ibid.
35 Comments by female students at a seminar to discuss Still's 
report, UPNG, March 1976, personal observations.
Uni Tavur 2(25), 23 October 1976, p. 2.36
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this and other recent attacks. Some of those present were indignant
that, whereas the University had promised to publicize the threat to
women posed by the recent attacks, all it had done was insert a bland
notice in the UPNG weekly news-sheet. This reminded 'staff/students
... of a few basic security precautions which should always be kept
in mind..., particularly in the urban area' but made no mention of 
37women. Thirty of the women at the meeting subsequently addressed 
a petition to the UPNG Secretary, K.R. Long. It accused the University 
of displaying a culpable reluctance to publicize the attacks and 
apprise women of the dangers they faced on the campus. It also contain­
ed a list of demands for the better protection of the female population 
38of the campus. In several meetings with senior members of the 
administration to discuss the issue the women's representatives were 
angered by the official response. The UPNG leadership seemed more 
concerned about the effect of bad publicity on the University's recruit­
ment programme than about the problems of the women. The feminists 
strongly felt that UPNG, in not acting decisively, was condoning male
aggression. And this was a point they made clear at meetings, in
39their publications, and in correspondence with the University.
As 1976 turned into 1977 the situation for UPNG women was 
deteriorating. A young white UPNG tutor was terrorized and raped 
after her flat had been broken into late one night. Subsequently 
three national men, two of them UPNG students, were charged in connection 
with these events and two of them were later gaoled. Apart from 
guaranteeing the students' bail the University officially ignored the 
incident. Then over Easter 1977 a female student was pack raped by 
a gang of about fifteen youths while returning to her dormitory from 
an on-campus dance at Waigani. After this incident a group of ten 
female UPNG students, 'most of whom [had] been assaulted or robbed at
37 The University This Week3 22 October 1976, p. 2.
38 L. Bala (et a t.) to Long, 29 October 1976, UPNG Women's 
Staff-Student Association records.
39 Personal observations: discussions with members of the
UPNG Women's Staff-Student Association, November 1976; and 
correspondence file of the Association.
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some time during their university careers’, publicly protested to the
Post-Courier, claiming that women at UPNG 'lived in fear of violence,
rape, theft and drunken male students’ Their protest stirred up
a UPNG hornets' nest: they, and the women journalists who reported
their complaints, were said to have been threatened with 'rape or
worse' by incensed male students; the UPNG Council 'openly condemned
them for speaking out and degrading the name of the University'; and
Gris, while announcing tighter security and disciplinary measures
including the closure of the University Club (the on-campus drinking
facility), nevertheless displayed the UPNG official reflexive tendency
to play down such complaints, 'denying that the problem [was] any
41worse on campus than in other parts of Port Moresby'. Attacks on
women on the Waigani campus, however, could no longer conveniently
be ignored, for, as the correspondent of an Australian newspaper noted,
there appeared to be a 'growing University crime wave', and the
University's response in 'suppressing reports, dissuading students
from speaking to the press or police, and refusing to take action
against the offenders, some of them the sons of powerful men in [Papua
A 2New Guinea]', was clearly inadequate. To the 'storm of criticism'
beating against Waigani doors Somare added his voice, publicly stating
that UPNG must ensure that its women could 'go about their everyday
43activities without being threatened or harassed'.
Whether the furore would actually serve to improve the lot 
of women at UPNG was doubtful. The repressive measures against male 
students which seemed necessary would probably not foster relaxed and 
harmonious relations between the sexes. If anything they promised to 
institutionalize in a modern and national context the antagonism 
between the sexes which some ethnographers thought was characteristic 
of a number of the country's traditional societies. And so the prospect 
for UPNG women, staff and students alike, remained grim, and there 
seemed little they could do to improve their conditions. As Still had
40 John Waugh, 'PNG women face the dangers of life on the 
campus', Sydney Morning Herald3 23 April 1977, p. 8.
41 ibid.
42 ibid.
43 ibid.
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observed, 'realistically,... a ratio of 10:1 makes... a breaking down 
of existing [male] prejudices and stereotypes... quite unlikely’.^ 
Yet, having become convinced of their grievances, and confident in 
articulating them, the women in the country’s university institutions 
were unlikely to give up the struggle.
(b) REFORM OF ACADEMIC GOVERNMENT
Powell, author of the 'Eight Point Downfall Programme', 
credited UPNG with several major achievements, among which he counted 
the reform of academic government. 'The University', he said, 'has 
succeeded in democratizing its own internal government to an extent 
unmatched by any university in Australia'.^ This accomplishment, the 
hallmark of the Inglis Vice-Chancellorship, was confined to UPNG.
UOT's one attempt to produce greater staff participation in decision­
making foundered. Consequently the two universities stood in strong 
contrast by 1975-76, UPNG's diffuse committee system being the polar 
opposite of the centralized organization revolving round the person 
of the UOT Vice-Chancellor. Neither system was perfect, and each had 
detractors and defenders. The conflict which each engendered was very 
much a part of the tensions with which the whole university system was 
riven by the mid-1970s.
(i) Democratization at UPNG
Staff who worked at UPNG under both Gunther and Inglis generally 
compared the two Vice-Chancellors by saying that the former 'built' 
the University and the latter 'humanized' it. Gunther was above all 
an effective administrator who made and implemented decisions exped­
itiously, and dominated the administrative hierarchy he presided over. 
Under him UPNG was structured along traditional lines: teaching
departments were headed by professors and grouped into faculties by 
discipline; departmental heads belonged to a Professorial Board, the 
academic policy making body, chaired by the Vice-Chancellor; and above 
all this was the supreme legislative body, the Council. At all levels
44 Still and Shea, loc. cit.
1 Powell (1976), p. 5.
264
Gunther's influence was strong and pervasive. This was perhaps the
optimal system in the earlier phase of development, but as UPNG
became more complex some within it, who felt excluded, came to resent
2the 'rather autocratic mode of government'.
Towards the end of Gunther's Vice-Chancellorship there had
been several developments drawing staff attention to possible flaws
within the ancien regime. During 1970-71 a general tightening of the
University budget caused reductions in some areas of concern to
academics - travel on duty, recruitment. At the same time some staff
viewed new capital construction projects promoted by Gunther as 
3unnecessary. All this led them to query the decision making process
controlled by Gunther. Staff discontent over their lack of involvement
came to a head in late 1971, only several months before Gunther's
retirement. The issue which finally aroused them to action was the
idea of a Deputy Vice-Chancellor to assist Inglis, now Vice-Chancellor
designate. Inglis wished to continue with his research and teaching,
and Gunther thought a Deputy Vice-Chancellor would make this possible
and also lighten the increasingly heavy administrative burden.
Professorial Board, thinking there was need to discuss the proposal
further, appointed a sub-committee under R.G. Ward, the Professor of
Geography, to consider and report on the possible functions of a
Deputy Vice-Chancellor. The sub-committee was given a week for this
task, and was to report to a joint meeting of the Professorial Board
4and the Faculties of Arts, Science and Education on 25 November. This 
joint meeting was an unusual device, primarily called together to 
consider end-of-year examination results. The report of Ward's
2 V. Harvey (et at.), 'Submission to the Faculty of Arts 
concerning the office of Dean and other matters', n.d. (1971), 
Faculty of Arts minutes, 3 November 1971, UPNGR E.12-2-13.
3 For example, a new sealed road a mile-and-a-half long was 
constructed to provide a second link between the academic 
buildings and the staff housing area; and $200,000 was spent 
in laying down roads and sewers for a hundred new houses 
which in the end were never built (O'Neill, personal communi­
cation, 4 April 1976).
4 R.G. Ward, 'Position of Deputy Vice-Chancellor', 17 November 
1971, UPNGR E.8-50-1.
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sub-committee and discussion of the proposals contained therein appeared 
last on the agenda. This irritated some academics, who saw the matter 
as being tacked on as an afterthought - something they were expected 
to endorse automatically. Gunther was absent at the time, and perhaps 
it was because of this that some of the more dissatisfied staff took 
the opportunity to vent grievances which had been building up over a 
long period.
The most disaffected staff were a group of ’young Turks’ of 
relatively low status within the academic hierarchy. They resented 
the lack of consultation between upper and lower level staff in decision 
making; they felt a small circle of senior administrators and heads of 
departments were making decisions without due consideration of those 
further down; and they disliked being unaware of what decisions were 
being made, which they blamed on the poor communication within depart­
ments. To them the handling of the Deputy Vice-Chancellorship 
epitomized the lack of consultation and communication. As one junior 
lecturer said, ’the whole question smacks of the autocratic adhocracy 
that has characterized the running of the University since its 
inception’.“* Their chief spokesman was V. Harvey (later a member of 
the First and Second Gris and the Oldfield Committees). He made their 
collective feelings plain when he advised Ward's sub-committee that, 
among staff,
the most commonly stated feeling is one of anger at the 
indecent haste with which the whole matter is being 
carried out.... I doubt if there is enough time left in 
this academic year to consider... any of the arguments 
which may arise.... [There is] suspicion of a conspiracy.
With no information supplied and such incredible haste, 
one can hardly blame those who fall into this camp. 6
When the joint meeting of the Professorial Board and the faculties 
took place the majority present agreed with Harvey's faction that 
Council would be acting with ’undue haste' if it created the Deputy
5 A. Power to Ward sub-committee, n.d., UPNGR E.8-50.
6 Harvey to Ward sub-committee, n.d., UPNGR E.8-50.
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Vice-Chancellorship at its next meeting as Gunther wished. Most 
academics said they would probably support the proposal if given more g
time to consider it; and so they voted to postpone the final decision. 
Eventually the position was created, and Oldfield appointed to it. He 
took up duty in early 1973 almost a year after Inglis had succeeded 
Gunther. Democratic will had thus prevailed over administrative 
expediency, though at the cost of considerable delay, which was to be 
a frequent occurrence at UPNG in succeeding years.
While UPNG was debating the proposal for the Deputy Vice- 
Chancellorship, another significant development also occurred. This 
was the creation of a committee by the Faculties of Arts and Science 
’to investigate the means by which greater involvement by academic 
staff in the University government can be achieved and to consider 
relationships between academic and administrative staff’. Harvey was 
its chairman and it became known as the Participation and Communication 
Committee. Its formation stemmed from a submission to the Faculty of 
Arts by Harvey and two colleagues, who suggested it as a means of 
producing ’a substantial increase in participation in the government 
of the University by sub-professorial academic staff’. ^  At its roots 
was the same sense of dissatisfaction which delayed the creation of 
the Deputy Vice-Chancellorship. With Harvey and like-minded colleagues 
comprising its membership it performed its task energetically, and 
over the ten months from November 1971 produced a series of recommend­
ations which led to the democratization of UPNG that occurred under 
Inglis.
The Participation and Communication Committee's terms of 
reference required it to review the existing governmental structure 
of the University, to recommend changes ’to facilitate increased [staff] 
participation, and to investigate the possibility of engaging adminis-
7 Minutes of joint meeting of Professorial Board and Faculties 
of Arts, Science and Education, 25 November 1971, Arts 
Faculty records, UPNG.
8 ibid.
9 Participation and Communication Committee, Minutes, 19 
November 1971, UPNGR E.53.
Harvey (et aZ.), loc. cit.10
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trative staff in teaching.^ The overall aim was ’to utilize the
collective wisdom of the University to produce an institution which
12gives maximum value for the funds allocated to it’. The spirit of
the times greatly facilitated the Committee’s operations: when it got
down to serious business in early 1972 Somare’s (the first national)
government had just come to power and Inglis had taken over from
Gunther. Impatience with the past and eager anticipation of the future
were the keynotes of the time in University and country alike, and
13reformers were everywhere in the ascendance.
The Committee examined many aspects of UPNG's government, but 
its main recommendations were in three directions. First, it recommend­
ed a reconstitution of Council membership to include a significant 
proportion of staff and students. Second, it thought the Professorial 
Board should represent not only the various disciplines but the 
different levels of the academic hierarchy. Thus, it should have 
student membership, and academic departments should be represented by 
people chosen by the departments rather than by non-elected professors.
It therefore proposed that an Academic Board ’rely[ing] on election
14rather than automatic right’ should replace the Professorial Board.
An electoral system, it argued, would enable the University to dip
more deeply into its reservoir of talent; fewer people would be
excluded from taking part in university government; departmental heads
would be forced to communicate more regularly with members of the
departments. Third, it suggested that departments should function as
committees, electing heads (who need not of necessity be the professors),
distributing department funds, allocating and organizing teaching
duties, and making decisions on the direction of research and teaching 
15programmes.
11 Participation and Communication Committee, Minutes, 19 
November 1971, UPNGR E.53.
12 D. Elder, ’Participation and Communication’, 25 April 1972, 
UPNGR E.53.
13 O’Neill, RIW, 4 April 1976; personal observations, 1972.
14 Harvey, memorandum to academic staff, n.d., UPNGR E.53.
15 Participation and Communication Committee, Minutes, 16 March, 
12 April, 15 August, 14 September 1972, UPNGR E.53.
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Not all of these proposals were welcome, and it took some 
fifteen months after the final meeting of the Participation and 
Communication Committee before they could be implemented, at the beginn­
ing of 1974. In the case of the Academic Board, staff were rather
apathetic, less than a quarter of them supporting the proposal with any
16degree of enthusiasm. The main objection, however, came from a 
conservative element among the professors which favoured the retention 
of the Professorial Board. This group argued that, as the professors 
were 'amongst the most experienced of academics... [and] appointment 
to a Chair indicates recognition of academic merit and experience above 
the ordinary1, they should not be replaced by elected representatives."^ 
Similar conservative opposition stood in the way of the proposal for 
elected departmental heads, and this led to a lengthy debate in which 
the role of the professors was reassessed and defined. On the one hand 
conservatives claimed that the professors were the ones to lead depart­
ments, and if replaced by young and inexperienced elected heads their
talents would be underemployed, and departments would become rife
18with 'political manoeuvre'. On the other hand reformers argued
that the professors' most useful role was as 'scholar[s] and teacher[s]
of superior talents whose advice will be sought and leadership
exercised by virtue of these talents'; moreover if freed from adminis-
19tration they could work more effectively. Eventually the conservatives
were won round when it was agreed that professors on existing contracts
should have the right to continue without election as departmental
20heads. In the end most chose to face election. Further conservative 
apprehensions stemmed from the constitutional amendments necessary for 
the reforms to proceed. O'Neill (then Academic Registrar) produced a 
scheme under which the programme could be implemented while the UPNG
16 Participation and Communication 
1973, UPNGR E.53.
Committee, Minutes, 13 June
17 M. McKay to Harvey, 8 May 1972; 
June 1972, UPNGR E.53.
R. Bulmer to Harvey, 18
18 Stace, 'Structure of academic government', 
UPNGR G.47-1.
24 July 1973,
19 O'Neill, 'Academic government', 
G.47-1.
20 September 1973, UPNGR
20 O'Neill, RIW, 4 April 1976.
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Ordinance was being changed, and that eased those fears. The Profess­
orial Board finally adopted the reforms in July 1973, and set January 
1974 as the time for their inception. Council endorsed this decision 
in October 1973. What had begun as Gunther’s fiefdom was now poised 
to become a modern democratic academic state.
What was the effect of the reforms in the years following 
January 1974? How well did democracy function in comparison with the 
’benign autocracy’ it replaced? And was there the more satisfactory 
degree of participation and communication intended by Harvey’s ’young 
Turks’?
The most noticeable effect was to make a complex organization 
even more complicated. UPNG became a labyrinthine network of inter­
locking committees in which many veteran staff members felt lost. The
UPNG organizational chart eventually showed a maze of over 70 permanent
22bodies. At the ’grass roots’ level were about 28 departments
teaching courses and conducting research, and organized into seven 
23faculties, which administered and co-ordinated the degree and diploma 
programmes. Above both departments and faculties was the Academic 
Board, the supreme policy making body, with representation from depart­
ments, faculties and the student body. It controlled some nine sub­
committees, for example a Standing Committee, Academic Developments, 
Postgraduate Awards, Preliminary Year. And above everything else was 
Council, the legislative body supreme, which noted and considered 
Academic Board policy, administered finance, and appointed and promoted 
staff. It, too, worked with the aid of sub-committees, eight in all, 
including Finance and Building, Appointments, Study Leave, Research.
In addition to all these there were several Vice-Chancellor’s advisory 
committees - Budgets, Deans of Faculties, Non-Academic Staffing. And 
some faculties had subsidiary committees and boards, for example the 
Standing, Steering, and Planning Committees, and the Boards of Studies
21 O’Neill, 'Academic government', loc. cit.
22 The departments include the four Schools of Studies of 
Goroka Teachers’ College, the Educational Research Unit, 
and the Educational Materials Centre.
23 The faculties include Goroka Teachers' College, which has 
faculty status.
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in Social Work, Police Studies, Journalism, and Commerce, of the 
Faculty of Arts.^
This intricate structure certainly produced more participation. 
All academic staff, from the lowliest tutor to the most venerable 
professor, were theoretically drawn into the decision making process 
to greater or lesser extent. The committee system also had other 
advantages claimed by its supporters.Briefly: (i) It allowed those 
with particular talents to be better utilized. Professors little 
interested in administration were free to devote their creative energies 
to teaching, research and innovation, while more junior departmental 
members with administrative skills were able to contribute these.
(ii) It helped academic localization, giving national academics a range 
of experience and the chance to develop administrative skills. (iii)
It facilitated certain operations such as the streaming of students 
into courses and faculties, and the development of experimental pro­
grammes such as the Foundation Year of interdisciplinary studies for 
first year students of Arts, Law and Education. (iv) It raised the 
quality of discourse within departments, and gave their members greater 
sense of direction and purpose. (v) It helped pull together the more 
inherently schismatic departments where fundamental ideological 
cleavages existed - most notably Political Studies and Economics.
(vi) It mitigated internal intriguing by providing acceptable and
25productive channels for the energies of would-be academic politicians.
Offsetting these benefits were disadvantages which even the 
staunchest advocates of democracy conceded: (i) It retarded decision
making, and led to numerous complaints that UPNG was ’losing momentum’, 
(ii) It relied heavily on personalities. While it was a system that 
might have functioned smoothly under an Inglis, it failed to do so 
under a Gris. The committees operating best were those run by dynamic
24 Stace, 'UPNG: Establishment and membership of academic 
committees’, December 1975, records maintained by UPNG 
Academic Registrar.
25 O’Neill, ’University structure and organization’, 6 July 
1976, paper prepared for UPNG Council, UPNGR G.47; personal 
communications, O’Neill, 4 April 1976, D. Denoon, 5 April 
1976, J. Rumens, 6 April 1976; P. Bolger, 11 November 1976, 
W. Gammage, 6 December 1976.
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and ambitious chairmen; at the same time some committees tended towards
dormancy, because those in charge were ineffective. (iii) It failed
to solve some problems, notably interdepartmental competition. Weak
departments still lost in the competition for scarce resources, such
as funds for research, staffing allocations, and representation on new
courses, much as weak professors had missed out in the past. (iv) It
was sometimes hard to find people willing to work on committees, as
many viewed committee work as an onerous chore; and some departments
were generally unwilling to contribute to the committee system. (v)
Not all faculties and departments democratized, and some continued to
be mini-autocracies. Possibly only Arts, which was ’committee-ridden’,
carried the spirit of democracy to its logical conclusions. (vi) The
communication problem was not adequately solved, for while there might
have been more discussion within departments, the flow of information
between the various boards and committees was greatly slowed down by
the very complexity of the system. (vii) It intensified academic
politicking. While it suited academic political operators, their
colleagues and students did not necessarily benefit. (viii) It placed
even greater power in the hands of a few select senior members of the
administration who serviced the various boards and committees. They
were the only ones with an effective overview of the entire system,
and as a result were in a position to control the flow of information
and influence decisions being made. (ix) It generated a vast amount
of paper work, which in turn required a large secretarial staff, all
26of which pushed up administrative costs. The democracy sought by 
the reformers of 1971-72 thus came with a vengeance. Whether or not 
it was for the ultimate good of the institution was an issue of lively 
contention.
(ii) Centralization at UOT
Whereas UPNG democratized in the period 1972-76, UOT remained 
a Vice-Chancellor’s fiefdom. Despite some attempt at reform, what UOT 
managed was more apparent than real. Those who had hoped for a UPNG- 
type transfiguration had cause for cynicism, for if anything power at
26 ibid.
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UOT became more centralized. The UOT structure was, and remained, 
parallel to that of UPNG under Gunther. There were ’schools' function­
ing much as UPNG faculties - Engineering, Basic Studies, Business 
Administration, Architecture, and later Natural Resources. Each 
comprised academic departments headed by a non-elected professor or 
associate professor. Schools and departments were represented on the 
supreme academic policy making body, the Academic Board; above this 
was the legislative body, Council; and in the latter two bodies the 
Vice-Chancellor’s influence was strong.
There were occasional grumblings against Sandover’s dominance 
during his first two years, in matters such as the employment of 
married female academics and his intervention in staff appointments.
But until university status was attained there was no concerted attempt 
to reduce his influence as occurred at Waigani in the case of the UPNG 
Vice-Chancellor. Staff generally agreed that the director of an 
institute of technology might function differently from a university 
vice-chancellor, that the former was properly a ’director’. The
first attempt to reassess the function of the UOT head did not there­
fore come until late 1973 when the recently appointed Professor of
Civil Engineering, Don Mansell, successfully brought a proposal before
28Academic Board to set up a Working Party on University Government.
He reasoned that UOT’s governmental apparatus should be overhauled
29to ensure it accorded with the newly won status. The Working Party, 
consisting of the Vice-Chancellor, Registrar, six professors and two
30associate professors, was duly set up and began work in November 1973.
The Working Party spent most of its first six months preparing 
a submission to the CEUD and only got down to its real business after 
that. It first examined the structure of the schools, each of which 
was governed by a board of school members of the status of lecturer 
and above. It recommended that the schools be renamed faculties; that
27 Mansell, RIW.
28 Academic Board, 58th meeting, Minutes, 26 September, 3 
October 1973, UOTR.
29 Mansell, loc. cit.
30 Working Party on University Government, Minutes, 6 November 
1973, UOTR.
273
heads of schools be called deans; that deans be not elected but appointed
by Council (as school heads had been in the past), though faculties
could nominate candidates for consideration by Council. Candidates
for deanships should be senior lecturers or better. And there should
also be deputy deans, appointed the same way as deans, though without
31restriction on the rank of candidates. The Working Party next
examined departmental structure. It apparently failed to consider that
members of departments might elect their heads, perhaps assuming heads
were best appointed by Council. The only discussion was on the correct
status of heads; should they all have professorial status? Sandover
thought so, but the majority believed associate professorships sufficed
32in departments teaching at only the lower levels. Third, the Working
Party made token gestures towards democratic reform in relation to
Academic Board. In addition to deans, professors, and non-professorial
departmental heads, each faculty should be represented by three elected
33members, one a student. A further attempt at democratization failed. 
This concerned the Vice-Chancellor's Advisory Committee, an informal 
meeting of departmental heads to discuss academic policy and develop­
ment with the Vice-Chancellor. A suggestion that elected departmental 
representatives should also attend the meeting got nowhere: the
Working Party decided against this as it 'would tend to slow down the
3 Aexecution of decisions'.
The Working Party spent most time discussing faculty compo­
sition. Mansell had suggested that, whereas some faculties consisted 
of several departments, the three single-department faculties (Business 
Administration, Architecture, Forestry) 'were not in a position to be
sufficiently self-critical... and tended to have disproportionate
35influence in the deliberations of the University'. He proposed a
31 Working Party on University Government, Minutes, 22 May 
1974, UOTR.
32 Working Party on University Government, Minutes, 31 July 
1974, UOTR.
33 ibid.
34 Working Party on University Government, Minutes, 10 June 
1974, UOTR.
35 Working Party on University Government, Minutes, 5 July 
1974, UOTR.
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rearrangement of departments and faculties so that every faculty con­
tained more than one department to overcome this problem. Business 
Administration could be split into separate departments of Accountancy 
and Business Management; Surveying could be detached from Engineering 
and joined with Architecture in a Faculty of Environmental Studies; 
Chemical Technology could be hived off from Basic Studies and joined 
with Forestry in a Faculty of Natural Resources. In the end only the 
last of these rearrangements came about. The Professor of Business 
Administration, Keith Cleland, vetoed the splitting of his faculty, 
walking out of meetings where the matter came up for discussion, 
claiming his contract stated he was head of both Accountancy and Business
Management; and the Professor of Architecture asserted that Surveying
36rightly belonged in Engineering and not with Architecture. The major
fear of both professors, however, seemed to be the diminution of their
influence within their faculties if other departments joined or came
into being within them. When the Working Party resolved that all
faculties should consist of more than one department, both professors 
37dissented. Only when they received assurances that the proposal was
'in principle only' (and therefore uncertain of being implemented)
38would they assent to it. The one subsequent attempt to create an
additional department in a single-department faculty failed. This was
in Business Administration, where Cleland, with Sandover's support,
tenaciously held on to his purported contractual right to head both
Accountancy and Business Management, against the popular vote of his
39faculty and the Academic Board. Great rancour attended his continued 
refusal to see the faculty split into separate departments, and dis­
affected staff within the faculty made allegations about the misuse 
of professorial power.^
36 Mansell, loc. cit.
37 Working Party on University Government, Minutes, 29 October 
1974, UOTR.
38 Academic Board, 73rd meeting, Minutes, 20 November 1974, 
UOTR.
39 On Campus 1(2) June 1976, p. 7; R. Adams, paper presented 
to Faculty of Business Administration, 12 November 1975, 
Adams papers.
40 ibid.
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In the end the addition of students and more elected staff 
members to Academic Board was the Working Party's main achievement.
It produced at least token democratization here, but elsewhere there 
were few advances. Most of its deliberations were marked by stulti­
fying conservatism, and a severely limited conception of how decision 
making may be democratically shared within universities. Compared 
with UPNG, UOT displayed a conspicuous lack of democratic imagination. 
The very composition of the Working Party reflected this: whereas the
corresponding body at UPNG consisted of 'young Turks', not one a 
departmental head, all members of the UOT party were either professors 
or associate professors. And while UPNG opted for elected deans and 
departmental heads, UOT chose to retain appointed officials. And so 
most UOT reforms were ultimately semantic - little more than a cosmetic 
redesignation of existing officials and structures.
The UOT Working Party nevertheless had the potential to
achieve more, and might have, if Sandover had not abruptly halted its
activities. This happened in October 1974, a year after it had begun
work, when several members drew attention to 'ways and means of
41improving efficiency within the University administration'. They
suggested that 'administrative effectiveness might be increased
by decentralizing certain aspects of the administration, [and] that
an investigation be made into the overall administrative structure in 
42the University'. By raising such matters the Working Party dealt 
itself a death blow, for that was its final act. Sandover, the chair­
man, simply allowed it to lapse by calling no further meetings. Pre­
sumably, he saw its wish to investigate the administration as a threat
43to his personal command of the administrative structure. Sixteen
months went by without further meetings, though in the meantime the
University claimed the Working Party was extant and working towards 
44reform. At last Mansell, its progenitor, became impatient with the
41 Working Party on University Government, Minutes, 29 October 
1974, UOTR.
42 ibid.
43 Mansell, loc. cit.
44 UOT Annual Report, 1975.
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hypocrisy of this situation, and at the March 1976 Academic Board 
meeting moved to have the body formally buried. Sandover was 'only 
too pleased to comply'; and Academic Board, cynical about the chances 
of democratization under such a Vice-Chancellor, voted to dismantle 
it.45
UOT not only failed to democratize; many staff thought that
under Sandover power became more centralized, until the University
resembled a web and the Vice-Chancellor the spider looming at its axis.
For his part Sandover claimed UOT had democratized, vaunting the open
forum he said existed there. He asserted that staff had ample scope
to present views and influence policy via established channels of
communication. They could do this through their departments, or the
Vice-Chancellor's Advisory Committee and Academic Board - two bodies
comprising fully a third of academic staff - or through On Campus (the
Staff Association journal), or at his regular meetings with departments 
46and faculties. His critics on the other hand maintained that, as he
either chaired the significant policy making meetings himself, or
ensured that his loyal supporters did, his personal control was 
47complete. As one of his most persistent critics pointed out,
'committees by the dozen must not be confused with democracy, nor
48dissent with disloyalty'.
UOT's failure to reform arose from a combination of factors. 
First, there was uncertainty about how far reform should extend, 
possibly owing to the fact that UOT began as an Institute run by a 
Director. There was no university tradition, no ideal view of the 
University as a community of scholars all enjoying the status of Vice- 
Chancellor's colleagues. Sandover came as the Director, and many of 
his staff came as Institute employees; he continued to 'direct' and 
they generally accepted that he should. University status required
45 Mansell, loc. cit.; Academic Board, 84th meeting, 17 March 
1976, UOTR.
46 On Campus 1(2) June 1976, p. 6; 1(3) July 1976, p. 2.
47 On Campus 1(4) August 1976, p. 3; Anon., 'The power and 
the glory: Hitech - who gets what, how much and why', paper 
circulated at UOT, 1976.
48 On Campus 1(6) October 1976, p. 10.
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more of the democratic spirit, however. It took several years and
prolonged conflict for UOT to learn this. Second, there was Sandover’s
personal style. He admitted distrusting ’participatory democracy' of
the UPNG type, and justified his role at UOT by asserting that the
Vice-Chancellor was above all UOT’s most senior executive officer,
49decision making being his prime function. Even supporters regarded 
him as a 'temperamental a u t o c r a t H i s  abrupt closure of the Working 
Party when it threatened to intrude on his demesne was a measure of 
his determination to retain tight personal grip on all aspects of UOT 
government. Third, UOT was inherently conservative. This was plain 
in the narrow scope of the reforms the Working Party envisaged. UOT’s 
dominant figures were the professors, who - as Cleland demonstrated - 
could claim pre-eminence by right of appointment. Some might have 
been 'progressives’, but by comparison with their opposite numbers at 
UPNG most were arch traditionalists, defenders of professorial 'divine 
right'. Because the Working Party consisted of such men it could 
envisage only severely circumscribed democracy at UOT. Finally, there 
was the nature of UOT disciplines. Most departments were technological; 
only one (Language and Social Science) was a humanity. The effect of 
such technical bias seemed to be a preoccupation with practical 
projects and conditions of employment rather than with principles of 
university governance. The contrast with UPNG was strong: at Waigani
there was excitement at the prospect of structural reform, emanating 
most notably from departments with sociopolitical interests. Lacking 
such a 'radical' element, UOT was less enthusiastic. And so, while 
Waigani moved fast and far towards democracy Lae marked time. But, as 
we shall see, even a conservative university of technology could learn 
to resent autocracy.
49 Sandover, personal communication, 23 April 1976; On Campus 
1(2) June 1976, pp. 6-7; Sandover, 'Problems of management', 
address to Papua New Guinea Institute of Management, Lae,
24 February 1976, Adams papers.
50 N. Quarry to Rees, 30 July 1974, UOTR VC/1.22:5.8, and 
5:23.1.
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(c) LOCALIZATION OF EMPLOYMENT
Localization only became a major political issue after the election 
of the Somare government, as it became obvious that extensive indigen- 
ization of all sectors of the workforce must precede independence. When 
government began extending reserved occupational categories the 
universities found themselves exposed: as enclaves of privilege they
were conspicuous targets for politicians making localization a cause 
c&lebve. This became clear in mid-1972 when the only woman in parliament, 
Josephine Abaijah, publicly attacked UPNG’s localization programme 
shortly after joining its Council.^ Her complaints showed that local­
ization was a sensitive issue for nationals, one in which the 
universities must be seen to be making strenuous efforts.
Localization placed the universities in a quandary. Expert 
opinion suggested that academia could remain unlocalized at least until 
the 1980s. The demand for graduates elsewhere would be more pressing; 
chances for promotion outside the universities made the arduous climb 
into senior academic ranks unattractive to young graduates; and 
university perquisites compared unfavourably with the easy pickings 
outside, particularly in the private sector. Yet localization was 
politically volatile, for failure to localize at any level would 
antagonize nationals within and without. That academic localization 
required ten-year apprenticeships, and must perforce proceed slowly, 
was insufficient excuse for tardiness. No one was more determined 
that UOT and UPNG should localize than their own students and national 
staff. And as we will see in the case of UOT, their strong resolution 
was enough to trigger the removal of an expatriate Vice-Chancellor.
(i) NOT
UOT had always employed nationals in technical and clerical 
positions, but only began planning to localize in 1974. Previous
1 Motion no. 39 for House of Assembly, 22 June 1972, UPNGR T.2.
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attempts at localization had been desultory, the main UOT achievement 
having been to train apprentices for the technical staff and to recruit 
undergraduate cadets-in-training for the administrative and accounts 
sections. And because no overall plan existed many recruits were 
unsure of their careers at UOT and left for better prospects elsewhere.
As localization began looming as a national issue UOT formed 
a Localization Committee, in early 1974. But even then it seemed 
unaware of urgency: those placed on the Committee were low level
personnel with little influence. The Committee sensed its own short­
comings. It requested the appointment of a ’Staff Development and
Training Officer’, without whom its value would be 'seriously curtailed'
3and its existence 'no more than a token gesture'. UOT responded 
dilatorily to these pleas. The staff development officer was not 
appointed till 1975. This, in the Committee's opinion, prevented the
4launching of 'an effective programme'. The Committee, moreover, felt 
hampered in playing 'a vital role' through its inability to achieve 
satisfactory communication with other UOT committees interested in 
staff training.^ Positive UOT effort did not therefore begin until 
the staff development (localization) officer arrived. Various groups 
within UOT by this time were becoming increasingly critical of the 
poor progress. The Accountancy students, for example, were protesting 
that a national tutor who resigned to take an outside job had left 
because of UOT's failure to advance him. And concerned academics were 
trying to focus attention on the problem - lobbying Council members,
Lae City Council, and local parliamentarians to put political pressure 
on UOT for greater commitment.^
2 In 1971, for example, IOT advertised for a localization 
officer, but when the selected applicant rejected the offer 
of employment on the advice of no less than the Registrar, 
the position was allowed to lapse (Tony Johnstone, personal 
communication, August 1971).
3 Localization Committee, Minutes, 8 May 1974, UOTR.
4 M. Ecclestone, 'A proposal to restructure the Localization 
Committee', n.d., Localization Committee records, UOTR.
5 ibid.
6 Localization Committee, Minutes, 8 May 1975, UOTR.
Personal observations, 1975-76.7
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Even the presence of a localization officer achieved little. 
First, Finance and Management Committee was generally unwilling to 
advance him large sums for localization training. When he said, for 
example, that training apprentice motor mechanics would be cheaper 
than having UOT vehicles maintained commercially (the half-yearly 
commercial maintenance bill being over $6200), Finance and Management 
remained unimpressed and would not grant adequate funds for apprentice-
g
ship training. Second, a lack of accommodation for trainees restrict­
ed his ability to attract recruits. He and the Localization Committee 
both argued that recruits joined employers who guaranteed accommodation, 
but UOT remained unmoved. It refused to house trainees in vacant
student accommodation despite Committee warnings that the localization9programme was ’grinding to a halt’ as a result. Third, he was unable 
to do his job properly because UOT used him as a ’dog's body’, trans­
ferring him from department to department relieving for absent staff 
members.^
The failure to make headway eventually became too much for 
the Localization Committee. Its chairman declared that UOT's unwilling­
ness to house trainees was ’seriously deferring the localization 
programme', while the absence of trainees 'in the pipeline' meant that 
UOT was unable to 'consider localization seriously'.^  Such opinions 
offended Sandover, who rebuked the chairman, Nallon Derr (a national
graduate who had been an executive officer to the CEUD and later became
12Deputy Registrar) for 'uninformed comments'. The Localization 
Committee seemed destined for a confrontation with the UOT adminis­
tration. A decision of the Finance and Management Committee (F&M)
8 C. Ratcliffe, RIW, 13 May 1976; 'Allocation of training 
positions', June 1975, Localization Committee records, UOTR.
9 'Report on low, medium and single local officers' quarters 
housing', June 1975, Localization Committee records, UOTR.
10 Ratcliffe, op. cit.; P. Mortimer, 'A look at localization 
and training at UPNG and UOT', OHER.
11 'Report on low, medium and single local officers' quarters 
housing', loc. cit.; 'Estimates of staffing and training 
posts, 1976-77', n.d., Localization Committee records, UOTR.
12 Sandover to N. Derr, 17 June 1975, Localization Committee 
records, UOTR.
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spared it this, however. As a means of coping with the budgetary ills
afflicting the universities in 1975-76, F&M withdrew its funds. UOT's
response to financial stringency was to reduce activity to a minimum
in areas deemed non-essential to the 'prime function of tertiary
teaching'. F&M accordingly took money from 'secondary' functions
14such as research, staff travel, and localization training; and so 
whereas the Localization Committee had $186,000 in 1975 it got nothing 
in 1976. The Committee saw little point in carrying on. It therefore 
voted in September 1975 to go into self-abeyance until F&M should grant 
the funds required.^
The failure of the Localization Committee became a major
source of discontent among UOT's nationals. This fact emerged in early
1976 when the OHE surveyed their opinion. One Committee member said
UOT had done 'virtually nothing' about localization and training, and
had consequently lost many promising graduate staff members who saw
'little future in remaining with the University'.^ All eleven
nationals interviewed by OHE expressed similar convictions. Most of
them also said they resented the 'colonial mentality' of UOT's senior
expatriate administrative staff, a number of whom were former British
colonial officials.^ They were also cynical about the sincerity of
a University which could cut localization training with one hand
because of lack of funds, and with the other grant generous salary
18increases to senior expatriate administrative staff.
UOT finally adopted more urgent approaches to localization 
in 1976, driven to this point in the end by student and national staff 
revolt. The student strike in March was significant, for important
13 Form 10, UOT, Submission for funds, 1975-76 (submission to 
UFRC).
14 Finance and Management Committee, Minutes, 7 January 1976, 
UOTR.
15 Localization Committee, Minutes, 11 September 1975, UOTR.
16 Cited in Mortimer, loc. cit.
17 ibid.
18 ibid.; On Campus 1(3) July 1976, p. 5, and 1(4) August 
1976, p. 7; Sandover, Statement regarding Bursar's salary, 
Finance and Management Committee, agenda for 69th meeting, 
30 April 1976, UOTR.
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developments followed in its wake. The students struck on a day
Council was meeting. Under pressure from demonstrating students massed
outside, Council agreed to appoint national deputies to the Vice-
19Chancellor and Registrar. A further decision was to appoint to
academic staff any national graduates requesting a position. OHE
added its voice to the students', saying that UOT's localization
programme was 'in a sad state' compared to UPNG's, that 'a definite
colonial attitude' was holding back the programme, and that the
'manipulative' and 'suppressive' behaviour of entrenched senior ex-
20patriate staff must cease. UOT was eventually forced by such pressure
to adopt an overall plan for localization whereby each administrative
and academic department set out a timetable for the achievement of
21total localization.
UOT's dawning realization that it must take localization
seriously was evident at the first meeting of the Localization Committee
for 1976. The Committee had not met in over seven months, but now
Sandover attended and spoke of 'the urgent need for effective local- 
22ization'. He also informed Council that he hoped the administration
would be 'completely localized, except for a few specialist positions,
by the end of 1978'. F&M, too, had a change of heart, for it
accepted that, as 'each localized position saved $12-13,000', the 'most
2 Aimportant' way to economize was via rapid localization. Then in 
July 1976 the University staged a public seminar on localization, 
apparently as a public relations exercise to satisfy critics that the 
nationals were indeed advancing at UOT. Impressive figures were 
produced to indicate how fast localization was proceeding. Cynics, 
however, suggested that the statistics had been manipulated and were 
therefore deceptive; and they further suggested that most of the
19 Ratcliffe, RIW.
20 Mortimer, loc. cit.
21 Ratcliffe, loc. cit.
22 Localization Committee, Minutes, 27 April 1976 , UOTR.
23 On Campus 1(3) July 1976, p. 5.
24 Report of F&M Ad-hoc Committee, 26 March 1976, 
69th meeting of F&M, 30 April 1976, UOTR.
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speakers had been carefully selected for their loyalty to the Sandover 
25regime. Critics of the regime asked embarrassing questions about
F&M's cutting of funds for localization training, and about the failure
2 6to advance nationals into the key decision making positions. Thus,
the seminar failed as a public relations venture; and this was compounded
by Sandover’s later action of engaging his critics in further debate
in On Campus. He simply succeeded in exposing UOT's shortcomings 
27further. For Sandover localization proved a major stumbling block. 
UOT's failure to take it seriously had alienated too many nationals, 
and they blamed him. As we will see, their grievances led them to 
rebel later in the year, and that spurred his premature departure from 
the country.
(U) UPNG
In early 1976 UPNG's first national dean of faculty (Education),
soon to become UPNG's second national Deputy Vice-Chancellor, said
that 'the University at present speaks of localization but in fact it
28is virtually non-existent'. Many of his countrymen within UPNG
29shared this belief. It was an odd complaint about an institution 
which had been punctilious in advancing national staff. That UPNG's 
record contrasted strongly with UOT's underlined the importance of 
localization, for if nationals at Waigani were passionate in their 
protests, this indicated how strongly Papua New Guineans felt about 
the matter.
UPNG showed early concern about localization. In early 1968,
when the Department of Territories required details of localization at
30UPNG for publicity purposes, Gunther said his records and transport 
officers were both nationals, but, regretfully, 'the only university
25 On Campus 1(4) August 1976, pp. 6-7; personal observations, 
June-July 1976.
26 On Campus 1(5) September 1976, pp. 4-5; 1(7) November 1976,
pp. 3-4; 1(8) 1976, pp. 3-4.
27 ibid.
28 Mortimer, loc. cit.
29 ibid.
30 L. Newby to Gunther, n.d. (1968), UPNGR T.2.
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in the world without a national on its academic staff’ was UPNG.
UPNG had recruited and trained Papua New Guineans for non-academic 
positions from the outset, though not systematically until 1970, when 
it engaged a firm of management consultants to advise on manpower 
planning. The firm produced a report on non-academic localization 
recommending the appointment of a ’non-European’ Vice-Chancellor by 
1975; localization of the Registrarship by 1978; progressive replace­
ment of expatriate female secretarial staff from 1971 as resignations 
occurred; localization of stores, transport, catering, accounts, and 
architectural sections by 1980; scholarships for recruits to take 
professional and technical courses; the appointment 'as a matter of 
urgency’ of an expatriate training officer to superintend the local­
ization programme; and the planning of career paths for all national 
32staff members. UPNG followed all but the second of these recommend­
ations; consequently it had over 100 nationals in training for non-
33academic positions within two years. A further seven months later
the UPNG Secretary reported to Council that the programme was advancing
well: nationals were occupying 293 of 356 non-academic positions (82%),
and only the most senior administrative posts (Vice-Chancellor, Deputy
Vice-Chancellor, Secretary, Academic Registrar, Architect, Staff
Officer, Accountant) and a number of middle level positions remained
unlocalized. Nationals filled all lower level clerical and technical 
34positions.
Academic localization proceeded with much greater caution.
In early 1976 only 8% of appointed staff (10 out of 126) were nationals,
all employed as lecturers or lower, with the first appointment made
35only in late 1972. UPNG had always been keen for academic localization, 
but its insistence on 'proper standards’, and the small number of 
graduates, were obstacles. As Inglis noted soon after becoming Vice- 
Chancellor, 'because higher education began so recently in this country
31 Gunther to Newby, 8 April 1968, UPNGR T.2.
32 P.A. Management Consultants Pty Ltd (1970), pp. 4-5.
33 Inglis to Olewale, 3 August 1972, UPNGR T.l.
34 Long, 'Review of progress of localization', 3 August 1973, 
UPNGR T.l.
35 UPNG, Calendar 1976, pp. 19-40.
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it will be many years before the University will be able to look to
36its own graduates as the principal source of academic staff’. Both
University and government manpower planners had customarily used this
argument against rapid academic localization. In 1970, for example,
when the student representative on Council had asked for its policy
on academic localization, it stated it would give UPNG graduates
preference 'provided they were suitably qualified... [with] a good
postgraduate qualification’. A figure sometimes quoted was that 5%
of UPNG graduates could be attracted into academe, and persuaded to
undergo advanced studies. Thus, there must be 1000 graduates before
there were 50 national academics, so that significant academic local-
38ization could not occur until the late 1970s. These were not, however, 
arguments or timetables which the nationals themselves accepted.
Demands by national staff and students from the early 1970s
39for 'a more concrete programme’ indicated that nationals were
impatient with expatriate-ordained criteria. The main boost for
vigorous action, however, came from a motion Josephine Abaijah put to
parliament in June 1972. She wished the Vice-Chancellor to inform
the House how far localization extended at UPNG, giving 'particular
attention to the... plan for the faculties which might be more easily 
A0localized'. She may only have been playing her accustomed role of
parliamentary gadfly,^ but her questioning of UPNG's sincerity stung
it into renewed action. Professorial Board now set up a committee to
42examine and report on academic localization. As a result of the work 
of this body, UPNG introduced a scheme for taking national graduates
36 Inglis to Olewale, 3 August 1972, UPNGR T.l.
37 ’Council resolution relating to localization', n.d., UPNGR 
T.2.
38 Bulmer to Inglis, 7 July 1972, UPNGR T.2.
39 See for example, P.B.B. Bengo, 'Points of reference on the 
pace of localization at UPNG', 12 March 1973, UPNGR T.2.
40 Motion no. 39 for House of Assembly, 22 June 1972, UPNGR 
T.2.
41 As a UPNG Council member she could have obtained the inform­
ation she wanted without raising the matter in parliament. 
See Inglis to Olewale, 3 August 1972, UPNGR T.l.
42 'Council resolutions relating to localization', n.d., UPNGR 
T.2.
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in as 'teaching fellows' to assist in tutorial work while studying 
towards higher degrees, on the understanding they may become full time 
academics on completing their study programmes. By early 1976 UPNG 
had 20 nationals working in this capacity.^
Further strong impetus for academic localization came from 
UPNG's financial difficulties in 1975-75. The threat of severely 
restricted budgets in future, and the high cost of expatriate academics, 
forced UPNG to view the matter more urgently still - even if that 
meant lowering recruiting standards by employing staff with less than 
the 'good' qualifications required in the past. The small body of 
national academics strongly supported rapid academic localization as 
a means of surviving financial stringency. The first national Dean of 
Law probably spoke for all his national colleagues when he said:
The financial viability of the University... requires that 
the present highly paid expatriate academic staff be paced 
[sic] out as soon as practicable.... At the same time a 
full-pledged [sic] localization programme is vital if this 
University is to attain self-reliance within the next 
decade. It is disheartening to see that some departments 
have hardly any potential Papua New Guinean academics on 
their staff either as teaching fellows or tutors. Every 
faculty and department should be directed to strive to 
persuade Papua New Guinean graduates to take up academic 
careers in their respective disciplines. Any Dean or Sub- 
Dean who does not toe the line should be seriously con­
sidered unco-operative and as such cannot be regarded as 
serving the national interest. 44
Financial starvation, if nothing else, thus seemed the strongest 
incentive to academic localization, and indeed the most powerful ally 
of academic nationalism.
The views of the Dean of Law indicated something of the dis­
satisfaction national staff felt over what they saw as UPNG's un­
necessarily slow pace in localization. His was not a lone voice. When 
OHE had conducted its survey in early 1976 a high degree of congruence
43 The University This Week no. 6/1976, 27 February 1976, p. 1.
44 Tony Deklin, Some observations on matters pertinent to 
the current financial crisis, UPNG Educational Research 
Unit, 'Discussion paper on issues facing the University 
in Papua New Guinea', March 1976.
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among the opinions of UPNG national staff became evident. Most of the 
ten graduate staff interviewed agreed that 'not enough is being done’; 
there was high turnover in national staff because of lack of promotion­
al opportunities; national staff felt that senior expatriate staff 
were keeping them 'in the dark' about localization planning; and there
was need for a forceful programme of localization in all departments,
45academic and non-academic. In addition to these opinions were those 
of Gris himself. In mid-1976 he circulated a discussion paper through­
out the University asserting that 'UPNG is not really geared for 
serious staff development and localization' because of a set of false 
assumptions commonly made by expatriate staff. Among these was a
belief that, unless they could obtain a similar job elsewhere, they
46need not enthusiastically work towards their own localization. By 
inference, expatriate self interest was the chief obstacle to effective 
localization, and drastic surgery might be needed to remove it.
Papua New Guinean impatience for full localization was 
becoming ever more obvious. It was perhaps futile for anyone, partic­
ularly expatriates, to argue that a university staff should be cosmo­
politan, or that UPNG still needed the wise, sympathetic guiding hands 
of senior expatriate staff. Though Papua New Guinean academic 
nationalism was yet a sapling, it promised to become a sturdy forest 
giant soon. There were, of course, dangers in promoting too lusty a 
growth. The UPNG Secretary, Long, warned of this after returning from 
a tour of Asian and African universities in 1975. In the universities 
he visited he found
it is widely accepted with localization that the national 
who is available at the time of localization is not always 
in the longer term the most satisfactory appointment.
Others more able, better qualified and more widely experi­
enced often emerge. It is therefore important that for 
some time to come universities such as UPNG should only 
make appointments on a relatively short-term basis. 47
45 Mortimer, loc. cit.
46 Gris, 'Staff development programme - further guidelines: 
a discussion paper', 20 April 1976, circular distributed 
among UPNG staff.
Long, 'Report on Study Leave', n.d., in Educational Research 
Unit, loc. cit.
47
288
But whether or not the ardent localizers, who probably included most
48Papua New Guinean staff, heeded such advice was uncertain. For them 
just localization was enough. Other problems could be sorted out once 
that was complete.
(d) PROBLEMS OF MULTI-CAMPUS ORGANIZATION: THE WAI GANI-GOROKA 
RELATIONSHIP
One of the chief obstacles to the UPNG-Goroka Teachers’ College 
merger had been Tololo's insistence that the College be absorbed within 
the Faculty of Education. As we have seen/ opposition from GTC and 
the Faculties of Arts and Science prevented such a development. Under 
the agreement GTC became a virtual faculty of UPNG, though geographical 
distance from Waigani enabled it to continue in a state of semi­
independence. It was thus left in the ambiguous situation of being 
a university campus but not a fully independent institution - 'neither
fish nor fowl' as its Principal, H.J. Tinsley, pointed out to UPNG
2Council several months after the union. This fact produced tensions 
between GTC and UPNG and between GTC and the Department of Education, 
their mutual difficulties again throwing into relief the issue of the 
multi-campus university. Whether or not such an organization was 
practicable, as the CEUD believed it was, became a moot point. And 
this had obvious implications for the feasibility of a national 
university, an idea which still had proponents.
Advantages and disadvantages which might be expected in a 
multi-campus organization in a developing nation were evident in Sri 
Lanka’s national university, which had favourably impressed the CEUD. 
During 1975 Long visited the University of Sri Lanka, which had come 
into being through the amalgamation of five autonomous universities 
in 1971. He reported to UPNG that there was great dissatisfaction 
in Sri Lanka over the arrangement because -
48 Personal observations, March-April 1976, at meetings of 
national staff at UPNG to discuss localization and the 
University’s budgetary difficulties.
1 See Chapter 5, section (b) above.
2 H.J. Tinsley, 'Progress report on Goroka campus development 
since its incorporation into the University’, 21 April 1975,
UPNGR F.69 (part 8).
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it is a very centralized system, bureaucratic with the 
individual campuses having little or no authority....
The headquarters tended to be out of touch with what was 
going on because of their isolation.... There are, how­
ever, distinct advantages in the arrangement. There are 
economies to be had from rationalization of course offer­
ings, staffing and in the administration. In terms of 
national goals in a country like Sri Lanka, government 
control is much more easily exercised through a single 
organization. 3
The way in which the relationship between GTC and the main campus 
developed during 1975-76 revealed some of the disadvantages but not 
notably any of the advantages.
At first GTC was pleased with the change in sponsorship from 
the Department of Education to UPNG. In April 1975 Tinsley advised 
Council, 'our consensual view [is] that the change was imaginative, 
bold, and is clearly working'.^  Nevertheless there were immediate 
problems: 'the students, uncertain of their place in the new scheme
of things, have been suspicious of the University'; 'the Waigani 
system of faculties and departments has not happily transferred to the 
Goroka context'; and GTC was uncertain where it stood in relation to 
Faculty of Education courses, unsure of 'what type of professional 
it [must] produce' V'is-a.-V'is the Faculty's.“* Further problems emerged 
as the first year wore on. First, some at Waigani still suspected 
that neither GTC staff nor students measured up to UPNG standards. 
Shortly before the merger, for instance, Max McKay, the Professor of 
Mathematics, sourly noted the disparity between Waigani and Goroka, 
saying that GTC's head of Mathematics had such meagre qualifications 
he would not get a job at Waigani. And afterwards, when GTC insisted 
on appointing lecturers whom he thought should only be tutors, he 
advised the Vice-Chancellor to be 'vindictive' by requiring GTC to 
'live with the results of their own choice'. Another example was a 
dispute over the standing of the first post-merger intake of GTC 
students. One view at Waigani was that the students were not matricul-
3 Long, loc. cit.
4 Tinsley, loc. cit.
5 ibid.
6 McKay to Inglis, 20 August 1974; to Gris, 9 May 1975,
UPNGR F.69 (part 8).
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ated because they fell below UPNG entry requirements. Another view 
was that if GTC students were granted matriculation they might 'drift 
down to Waigani rather than complete the Goroka c o u r s e' G T C , how­
ever, maintained that its students must be regarded as matriculatedg
otherwise their enrolment would be illegal. After considerable
discussion within the Faculty of Law, Waigani eventually decided that,
legally, admission to GTC implied matriculation. But though Waigani
assured GTC that 'students at Goroka have become students of the
University in the fullest sense of the word', some people at Goroka
9wondered how many at Waigani really accepted that.
A second matter which concerned GTC was the 'structural 
inertia' which those at Goroka felt had beset the union.^ They began 
thinking GTC was destined to play the perpetual Cinderella to an older 
sister at Waigani. O'Neill outlined the problem in these terms:
College staff are more than usually irked by what they see 
as Waigani ignorance, indifference or suspicion of College 
plans and aspirations. The teaching resources of the 
College are poor by comparison with those available in 
other parts of the University; more is demanded of the 
staff; their distance from Port Moresby compounds the 
problems of contact and assistance. The College staff feel 
there is little appreciation of the difficulties facing 
them. 11
GTC had anticipated joining Waigani as a co-partner not a poor relation 
and that reality fell short of expectation caused disenchantment.
Added to this were certain semantic difficulties. Tinsley was unhappy 
with the titles 'College' and 'Principal', which he thought 'irrelevant 
and indeed obstructive anachronisms to genuine progress'. He 
proposed changing the one to 'Goroka Faculty of Education' and the 
other to 'Deputy Vice-Chancellor at Goroka'. The semantics seemed to 
indicate an institutional hankering after higher status, for he was 
displeased that GTC was just 'a University campus [where] no degree
7 O'Neill to Gris, 9 April 1975, UPNGR F.69 (part
8 ibid.
9 ibid.
10 Tinsley to Gris, 29 July 1975, UPNGR 75/234.
11 O'Neill to Gris, 15 October 1975, UPNGR 75/234.
12 Tinsley to Gris, loc. cit.
291
13courses are offered'. Instead of its teaching merely a pre-service 
Diploma of Secondary Teaching he wanted it to offer a B.Ed. course 
in order to 'create academic incentive', provide 'intellectual 
stimulation', and give the campus 'a genuine University atmosphere'.^
GTC upward mobility soon brought it into conflict with Tololo. 
He told Tinsley he was disturbed that GTC was 'pushing the idea that 
[it] should be another faculty duplicating a range of courses already 
being conducted elsewhere, or perhaps even another University!'"^
He emphasized a point he had often made before to Inglis: there was
little justification for a division between GTC and the Waigani 
Faculty of Education, which should ideally be merged. And he threaten­
ed that government might feel obliged to resume control of GTC if
16Gorokan ambition became too grand. Tinsley perhaps recognized that 
in Tololo the Director of Education there was something of Tololo the 
Tolai traditionalist who feared rapid or disruptive change. He saw 
the threat for what it was and hastened to give assurances that he was 
not 'an obdurate expatriate Principal hell-bent on foisting his own 
irrelevant ideas on an unwilling Papua New Guinea educational system'.^ 
Tololo accepted this, but stressed his wish 'to see the College 
settled into its role within UPNG as a pre-service institution before
even considering such a move' as upgrading it to degree-granting
_ _ 18 status.
Some at Waigani were more sympathetic to Gorokan aspirations 
than Tololo, appreciating perhaps that heavy-handed threats were no 
way to contain institutional ambitions. O'Neill, for example, believed 
that it was preferable to accommodate than proscribe GTC's hopes. He 
therefore suggested that UPNG upgrade GTC by relocating the Waigani- 
based Faculty of Education there, together with the Educational Research 
Unit and the Educational Materials Centre. The entire UPNG effort in
13 ibid.
14 ibid.
15 Tololo to Tinsley, 25 October 1975, UPNGR F.69 (part 8).
16 ibid.
17 Tinsley to Tololo, 27 October 1975, UPNGR F.69 (part 8).
18 Tololo to Tinsley, 31 October 1975, UPNGR F.69 (part 8).
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Education would thus be at Goroka, and this could solve at one blow
numerous problems - GTC's Cinderella complex and its status mobility,
the GTC-Faculty of Education rivalry, government's anxiety over poor
collaboration between Faculty and College, and Tololo's propensity to
19meddle in UPNG’s internal affairs. Whether such an arrangement would 
eventuate was uncertain, however. There was sure to be powerful 
opposition from the Faculties of Arts and Science, who wished to con­
tribute to the B.Ed. programme; and the Faculty of Education was un­
likely willingly to forego the advantage of main campus and capital 
city location.
By the end of 1976 GTC had been part, of UPNG for two years, 
but the difficulties within the relationship were still not fully 
resolved. They remained salutary evidence of the problems of multi­
campus organization - a fact Sandover alluded to in defence of UOT's
20integrity. Perhaps, as Long had hinted, the multi-campus university 
was not really workable in an underdeveloped nation. He had found 
little support for it within the universities where it was operating; 
and by 1976 its deficiencies were becoming obvious in Papua New Guinea 
as well. The main advantage claimed for it, viz. its amenability to 
government direction, had not been notable, and if anything posed a 
threat to university autonomy. But that was unlikely to discourage 
government figures from trying to manipulate the university system 
in the interests of what they claimed was national policy.
(e) THE ROLE OF THE VICE-CHANCELLORS
Among the contentious issues of the mid-1970s were the role of 
the Vice-Chancellors and their personal impact on university affairs. 
Previous chapters have stressed the importance of personalities in 
earlier stages of university development. We have seen how Gunther's 
forceful tactics often won concessions for UPNG, though often at the 
expense of good relations with government. The contrast with Inglis 
was strong. Whereas Gunther had bull-dozed, albeit on well chosen
19 O'Neill to Gris, 15 October 1975, UPNGR 75/234; RIW, 
5 March 1976.
20 Sandover, personal communication, 23 April 1976.
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occasions, Inglis was the classic liberal humanitarian, his restraint 
and tolerant manner belying the toughness and determination his closest 
associates recognized. At UOT were similar contrasts: while Duncanson
had toiled unobtrusively but persistently through established channels, 
his flamboyant successor wheeled-and-dealed in a blaze of publicity 
and controversy. The contrasts between contemporaneous Vice-Chancellors 
were also strong. Thus, some at UPNG faulted Gris’s reticence and lack 
of personal visibility in superintending the complex democratic 
structure bequeathed to him by Inglis, while many at UOT complained of 
Sandover's highly personalized and centralized regime. The personal 
style and administrative philosophy of the university heads had always 
been significant in shaping university development; but during 1975-76 
they were more important than before, particularly at UOT, as they 
generated controversy and internal conflict.
(i) G.B. Gris at UPNG1
Gris took over from Inglis in April 1975 after a year as Deputy 
Vice-Chancellor. He had impressive qualifications for a Papua New 
Guinean of the 'older' generation and was indeed one of the few 
nationals who could have been considered for the job. He was a good 
chairman; had a facility with English enjoyed by few of his countrymen, 
even those with educational advantages he lacked; his range of adminis­
trative-academic experience was almost unique among his countrymen; 
and his chairmanship of the CEUD had impressed influential supporters 
such as Oldfield and Low (the ANU Vice-Chancellor, who had been a CEUD 
member). Once on the job at UPNG, however, he revealed weaknesses 
which aroused both concern and criticism within the University. He 
tended not to work well under pressure, but by 1975 the conflicts and
1 Gris's performance as UPNG Vice-Chancellor is little
documented. Critics were reluctant to commit themselves to 
paper, in the interests of giving him 'a fair go'. This 
section derives from discussions with people who have observed 
him in action: W. Rees, M. Tigilai, W. Oostermeyer, A. Randell,
J. Sandover, J.A.L. Matheson, D.A. Low, J.T. Gunther, A.J. 
O'Neill, D.A. Stace, D. Denoon, J. Rumens, S.G. Weeks, Jim 
Griffin, P. Bolger, and E.B. Thomas. Because some of these 
informants are still closely associated with Gris, it is not 
appropriate to attribute comments to individuals.
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tensions of the university system were such that the Vice-Chancellor 
was continually under stress. Unfortunately, he often interpreted 
the forceful representations from staff, students, Council, OHE, UOT, 
and government officials as a lack of faith in him personally, and he 
often reacted by withdrawing. His chairmanship of the First and 
Second Gris Committees proved a disadvantage here, for many academics 
had attacked the reports which had appeared under his name. He was 
perhaps oversensitive that staff might be watching his performance 
critically, especially because he lacked a strong university background. 
This may explain why he failed to act decisively in implementing CEUD 
proposals. His reaction, once again, was to withdraw, to dissociate 
himself as Vice-Chancellor from his work as CEUD chairman. This was 
disconcerting to those who supported the CEUD recommendations, for 
they expected him to give them a strong lead.
Shortly after he took over from Inglis the student strike 
over the Queen erupted. Some at UPNG thought his deft handling of 
a delicate situation prevented violence, but others thought he should 
have been firmer. Cabinet in particular strongly felt he should have 
been ’tougher' with the students, and Tololo later accused him of 
’whitewashing' students in the report on the strike. During the strike 
he became ill and at times had to retire to his residence. Some of 
his on-campus critics later observed that his illnesses seemed to 
coincide with moments of crisis at UPNG. The various student disturb­
ances of 1976 brought similar complaints and criticism about his 
handling of events. Another stumbling block for Gris was the complex 
committee structure erected at UPNG during the Inglis era. This 
perhaps functioned well with Inglis present as master co-ordinator. 
However, a newcomer like Gris needed time to become familiar with it.
In doing so he faced a number of problems. First, he attempted to 
delegate much of his power (as Inglis had with advantage), but critics 
said he delegated too much. They thought he should have retained 
greater personal control, for example by attending more meetings of 
key committees where his personal opinion was needed instead of 
absenting himself. Second, he had difficulty in handling on-campus 
'politicians', each pursuing various ambitions and pushing 'wheel­
barrows' of unsuspected contents. He suspected they were more devious
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than they would have him believe, but, lacking Gunther’s bluntness and 
Inglis’s assuredness, mediating their schemes was a problem. Once 
again, he delegated or withdrew. Consequently intrigue mounted, 
decision making slowed down, and critics began complaining that UPNG 
was losing momentum under him.
Gris's withdrawal and delegation of authority created what 
some critics termed 'the vacuum at the top'. As evidence mounted 
that he was a 'weak' rather than a 'strong' Vice-Chancellor, UPNG 
Council tacitly concluded that the acephalous state was unsatisfactory. 
There had been disagreements in Council over his appointment: whereas
Oldfield first promoted his appointment as Inglis's Deputy and Low 
his elevation to the Vice-Chancellorship, some on Council thought he 
should not be entrusted with UPNG because he had never really proved 
himself in running a large and complex organization. As his weaknesses 
revealed themselves they seemed to vindicate the misgivings of the 
latter group, and several prominent figures within UPNG - Low and 
Long in particular - began promoting the idea of a Deputy Vice- 
Chancellor to buttress him. Gris welcomed the suggestion, possibly 
seeing it as an 'honourable way out': after, say, a six-month period 
for 'running in' the Deputy he could hand over and retire from the 
scene gracefully. He therefore convened a committee to make an appoint­
ment. Rab Namaliu, a UPNG graduate and former lecturer now on Somare's 
staff, was proposed but rejected the offer. Various other names were 
then tossed about, including O'Neill's and McKay's, but in the end no 
appointment was made and Gris scrapped the idea as 'an economy 
measure'. Several strong personal rivalries within the UPNG adminis­
tration seem to have played a considerable part here. Low, however, 
who perhaps felt responsible for Gris's appointment, still believed 
the Vice-Chancellor needed a 'back-stop'. At a Council meeting in 
early 1976 he made an impassioned plea for support for Gris as a result 
of which an informal group consisting of Long, O'Neill, McKay, R. Lohia 
(UPNG graduate, Dean of Education, later Deputy Vice-Chancellor), and 
D. Sarwabe (UPNG graduate, Academic Registrar) began meeting regularly 
with the Vice-Chancellor to help ease his administrative burden. In 
this way the 'vacuum at the top' was more or less filled.
The five who began meeting with Gris comprised an inner circle
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of senior administrators and academics he trusted the most. The Vice- 
Chancellor working in concert with his confidants might have been a 
useful functional arrangement, but it, too, aroused criticism. Some 
staff believed a couple of advisers were exerting undue personal 
influence over Gris, that a handful of officials with no constitutional 
authority were making the important decisions. For example, some said 
that a controversial decision in early 1976 to save money by cutting 
staff back by 10% had been foisted on Gris by advisers who would 
certainly not be among the unfortunate 10% facing the loss of their 
jobs. Such action seemed against UPNG's democratic ethos, which many 
thought the most valuable legacy of the Inglis era. Some also thought 
the inner circle was making Gris increasingly inaccessible. He had 
maintained an unsatisfactorily low profile previously, they said; but 
now, sheltered behind his quintet of advisers, he became even further 
removed from ordinary staff and students. UPNG veterans, who agreed 
that the personal visibility and approachability of Gunther and Inglis 
were among their strongest points, inevitably made unfavourable 
comparisons between Gris and his predecessors.
Gris apparently recognized the problem he presented at UPNG, 
for after less than two years as Vice-Chancellor he announced he would 
not seek a further term but would return to the Public Service instead. 
It had certainly been hard for a national with restricted adminis­
trative and academic experience to preside over the mini-state built 
up under Gunther and Inglis. Gris was perhaps a victim of his time. 
Like many of his generation he had been propelled upwards into a 
position of power without benefit of the prolonged apprenticeship 
enjoyed by counterparts in more developed nations. His difficulties 
revealed the costs to be paid in localizing the upper levels of the 
university system, though given the political climate of the mid- 
1970s the costs were probably necessary and unavoidable. And, while 
he might have suffered personally and professionally by daring to 
follow a Gunther and an Inglis, Gris could reflect with satisfaction 
that, like many contemporaries, he had been a pioneer, paving the way 
for younger, more advantaged and better prepared nationals to follow.
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(ii) J.A. Sandover at UOT
Preceding chapters have referred to Sandover frequently. Some­
thing of his style, and the hostility he could arouse, have been 
evident in sections dealing with IOT’s rise to university status, the 
dispute over forestry education, the defeat of proposals for a national 
university, academic trade unionism, the demise of the UOT Working 
Party on University government, discrimination against female academics, 
and localization at UOT. So many controversies centred on him, indeed, 
that his very presence in the country was itself a contentious issue.
Sandover had many positive qualities. He was first and fore­
most a tireless worker for UOT, and possibly no one made more prodigious 
effort on behalf of an educational institution in Papua New Guinea than 
he. His labours produced notable dividends. First, he achieved a high 
degree of public recognition for UOT. Whereas the public had custom­
arily confused the institution with the Lae Technical College in its 
early years in Lae, few could have made that mistake in 1975-76. In 
1968, some three years after the Institute's formal foundation,
Duncanson had difficulty in explaining its role even to the Department 
of Territories, which seemed to think it was a school for training 
apprentices. Eight years later the UOT role was probably understood 
even in the remotest corners of the country, thanks to Sandover's 
effective public relations work. Second, high schools were no longer 
reluctant to send their best students to Lae as in IOT's early days. 
Enrolments reflected this: from about 100 in 1968 they rose to almost
1000 in 1976. UOT had gained academic status and respectability in 
the public mind, and its technological degrees were now as attractive 
as generalist UPNG degrees had been earlier on. The manpower and 
localization benefits deriving from this were obvious. Sandover's 
detractors might argue that the growth would have occurred without 
him; however, that was debatable. To his credit it must be allowed 
that his persistent lobbying of Cabinet Ministers and OHE was very 
influential in bringing about a reallocation of financial resources 
between the two universities, and thus greater emphasis on technological 
education. When he arrived a rule of thumb had applied whereby funds 
were divided roughly 2:1 between UPNG and UOT; later the division 
shifted in favour of UOT and funds were then split 1.3:1.
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In other areas, too, Sandover made contributions, for he
was builder as well as promoter. The campus he left in late 1976
was barely recognizable as the one he had come to five years before,
so extensive were its new physical facilities. The most notable of
these was the UOT centrepiece, Duncanson Hall, for which he was almost
solely responsible. During Duncanson's time government had set itself
against a public lecture theatre for IOT, a luxury it nevertheless
2allowed UPNG to build. Sandover therefore launched a public appeal 
which he promoted so tirelessly that the necessary $500,000 was raised 
and the theatre built within two and a half years. Detractors argued 
that much of the building programme was planned in the Duncanson 
years. Nevertheless, without his drive and determination the programme 
could easily have been shelved by an economy conscious government 
wishing to cut back on 'elitist' tendencies such as extensive university 
buildings. Anti-elitists argued that Sandover achievements such as 
fine buildings and university status distracted UOT from its primary 
task - the training of some professional and many sub-professional 
technologists. The counter argument is that, without the various 
university appurtenances added by Sandover, adequate staff and able 
students would not have been attracted in sufficient numbers, thus 
leaving priority manpower categories unfilled. Again, to his credit, 
it must be conceded that UOT went a long way towards meeting targets 
and furthering localization. And despite the fewer graduates 
produced, its achievement compared very well with UPNG's: whereas
roughly 40% of UPNG graduates were expatriates, who would probably 
leave the country eventually, 97% of UOT graduates were nationals.
Sandover was also anxious to co-operate with UPNG, as
required by government for better co-ordination of university effort.
3It was generally he who made the overtures. This was something 
people at UPNG noticed, and for a time the UPNG underground newspaper 
amused readers by describing an importunate Sandover being kept at
2 Johnson to Hay, 25 March 1971; Besley to Johnson, 16 April 
1971, DTOR 71/1697.
Many letters on the UPNG file give evidence of Sandover's 
readiness to co-operate with Waigani. The replies are polite, 
but generally restrained and reserved.
3
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arm's length by a wary Inglis. It also caused concern to some at 
UPNG. Thus, Powell included Waigani’s aloofness to UOT approaches 
among the 'Eight Points of Downfall’: 'UPNG has completely failed to
develop any functional relationship with UOT’, he claimed."* It was 
not for want of trying on Sandover’s part, however. Senior staff at 
Waigani possibly had a jaundiced view of his veracity and motives, 
seeing in his advances the sheepskin hiding the wolf from Lae. Yet 
he was frank about his intention of gaining a more equitable share of 
university resources for UOT, which he was justified in thinking wasg
severely disadvantaged vis-a-vis UPNG. And his ambition for UOT did 
not preclude co-operation with UPNG, as the shared courses in agri­
culture and forestry demonstrated.
Sandover’s major troubles stemmed from internal dissension 
within UOT, arising as a result of his views, policies, methods, 
personality, and life style. Taking these in turn, first his adminis­
trative philosophy was bound to provoke resentment. He often likened 
UOT to a business company and himself to its managing director - the 
chief executive and decision maker. Committees, boards, departments 
and faculties, he said, were valuable devices for allowing staff and 
students to contribute ideas and air grievances; but the final and 
crucial decisions must be made by the Vice-Chancellor.^ UOT academics 
who were veterans of university staffs elsewhere did not share these 
views. They generally regarded universities as 'communities of 
scholars', and Sandover's managerial mode of thought seemed inimicalg
to that. When he actually began practising the philosophy, for 
example by using his influence to overthrow decisions made by Academic
4 Muffing ton E. Smee Reporter and Plain Dealer.
5 Powell (1974), p. 5.
6 During 1975-76 OHE conducted a study to determine the extent 
to which UOT might be disadvantaged. Allowing for recent 
improvements to the allocation of funds between the univers­
ities in favour of UOT, the disadvantage of the latter was 
still deemed 'significant'. See W. Oostermeyer, 'UOT-UPNG 
Budget Notes', n.d., OHER 66-2-2 (part 1).
7 Sandover, 'Problems of management', address to the Papua New 
Guinea Institute of Management, Lae, 24 February 1976; On 
Campus 1(3) July 1976, pp. 1-3.
Mansell, RIW.8
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Board, he could only arouse their hostility. ’Managerialism’ might
have worked well enough if Sandover’s personality had not intruded.
Unfortunately he took opposition personally, bore grudges, and struck
out vindictively at those who seemed to be thwarting him. Consequently
the ranks of disaffected staff lengthened over the years, and staff
gained the impression that those who consistently opposed him would
9be singled out for exemplary punishment. The Registrar, G.N. Stephen­
son, was a salutary reminder of what might befall opponents of the 
Vice-Chancellor. Sandover and Stephenson fell out in the earlier part 
of 1975, following which they engaged in an unseemly exchange of charge 
and counter-charge over alleged malpractices. Eventually Council 
intervened and forced Stephenson to quit UOT prematurely.“^
There were numerous objections to Sandover’s methods. One 
notable critic was N.C. Angus, a consultant to the CEUD whom the OHE 
called in to investigate administrative procedures at UOT. Angus 
later said he
gained the impression of a tightly controlled, highly 
personalized administration by a Vice-Chancellor 
reluctant to delegate authority and responsibility in 
a systematic fashion and who perhaps finds it difficult 
to adapt to the consultancy role common in most uni­
versities. He runs what is often called in administrative 
jargon ’a tight ship'. This phrase is usually in contra­
distinction to the phrase ’a happy ship’. 11
Sandover’s domestic opponents had many complaints about the way 
'highly personalized administration’ worked in practice. Some alleged 
it was based on a system of rewards and punishments: those proving
compliant received promotions, salary increases, generous research 
funds, overseas trips, and extra study leave benefits; those who opposed 
found themselves denigrated, isolated, left behind in the pursuit of 
promotion, branded as misfits, and confronted with non-cooperation
9 On Campus 1(8) November 1976, pp. 1-2; ’The Power and the 
glory...', anonymous paper circulated at UOT, 1976.
10 Matheson, RIW, p. 6; cf., The Retorten  ^ 31 October 1975,
pp. 1-2.
11 N.C. Angus, ’Organization and administration of the PNG UOT', 
June 1974, UOT Library.
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12from the administration. This, the opponents maintained, led to 
moral corruption and the emergence of a clique of loyal retainers and 
sycophants whose pre-eminence at UOT owed much to the Vice-Chancellor's 
patronage.
Sandover's opponents also had complaints about the UOT records 
system. First, UOT had no central repository of records like UPNG's, 
despite the recommendations by two administrative consultants from ANU 
that one should be established. Many records were therefore inaccess­
ible to ordinary staff, and the administration defended the situation 
by pleading confidentiality. Even documents such as Council, Academic
Board, and Finance and Management Committee records were deemed
13confidential by the administration. This aroused hostility among
academics, who maintained that such documents were public property.
As one dissident noted, 'the only people to gain from this cloak of
silence disguised as confidentiality are those who have something to
hide and are not prepared to defend their decisions'.^  Some academics
also complained of difficulty in finding what had taken place at
important meetings because minutes were incomplete, or glossed over
controversial debates. On other occasions some academics suspected
that the minutes had been discretely and selectively edited to slant
the record in favour of the Vice-Chancellor and his supporters and
against his opponents.^ Further complaints still arose over UOT
public relations resources. It was said that the various official
publications projected a highly favourable image for the Vice-Chancellor
and his supporters which created a misleading impression about the true
state of UOT affairs. Critics also alleged that the UOT news-sheet,
The Reporter, was subject to selective editing which favoured 'Sandover-
ites' while denying the right-to-reply to those with countervailing 
16views.
12 On Campus 1(8) November 1976, pp. 1-2; 'The power and the
glory--- '
13 On Campus 1(2) June 1976, p. 1.
14 On Campus 1(4) August 1976, pp. 2-3.
15 On Campus 1(8) November 1976, p. 1.
16 For example, The Reporter of 9 April 1976 published an attack 
on the member of parliament for Lae, who had criticized the 
UOT administration in the House. He wrote a reply which The 
Reporter did not publish.
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Sandover's educational views also caused concern among some
UOT staff. He gave the impression that he subscribed to a 'Big
Technology' philosophy, which implied that UOT should be training
students for work in large-scale, capital-intensive projects funded
by foreign investment.^  Some UOT academics, however, were of the
'appropriate technology' persuasion, and they thought UOT should also
emphasize training in small-scale technology applicable in village-
level projects, where minimum capital and maximum self-reliance were
the criteria. Other critics complained that under Sandover UOT existed
in an 'ideological vacuum', that is it had no guiding philosophy about
the type of institution it should be or the type of graduate it should
produce. A CEUD consultant on engineering education, J. Mahanty,
added weight to this point of view when he said UOT was 'totally
geared to meet only the short-term objective of meeting immediate
18technical manpower needs'. The critics believed a broader educational 
vision than that was necessary.
The Vice-Chancellor's personal life style provided further
grounds for criticism. His luxury motor cruiser, sunken swimming pool,
de luxe official car and various perquisites of office, and his
numerous parties and entertainments attracted much attention. While
some members of the general public and the University community
praised him for his generosity and readiness to share his wealth,
others doubted the propriety of such conspicuous expatriate affluence
19in a poor nation with an anti-elitist ideology. That Cabinet
Ministers and senior government officials were regularly seen at the
Sandover residence only strengthened doubts and laid him open to
allegations that his largesse was a corruptive influence. And there
were also allegations that the deployment of University staff and
facilities in connection with some of his private projects was a misuse 
20of UOT resources. The critics also said he had personal failings
17 His views seemed to be summed up in the title of a seminar 
paper he gave - 'There is no half-way house in technology'.
18 J. Mahanty, 'Report to CEUD', 31 January 1974, OHER S-69.
19 Randeil, RIW, pp. 8, 11; Post-Couriers May 1976, p. 2.
20 Lae Pius 3(15) 17 November 1976, pp. 1-2.
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they thought inappropriate in the head of a University. They said 
they could detect a certain gauchev'te which sometimes made them feel 
publicly embarrassed for UOT.
In the end the issues which finally counted most against him
were UOT's localization and recruitment policies. As we have seen,
national staff were not convinced by the statistics UOT produced from
time to time to show the national-expatriate staff ratio, and because
nationals did not occupy the key decision making positions they
21believed only token localization was occurring. A further cause 
for national discontent was the presence among senior UOT administrators 
of British ’ex-colonials’, whom nationals accused of having a ’colonial 
mentality’. Ambitious national staff were angered to think that the 
Vice-Chancellor’s compatriots not only had ’wrong’ attitudes but were 
obstructing their own professional advancement. Another element on 
the UOT staff for whom Sandover was held responsible were the 'Asians’
- a diverse group including Pakistanis, Indians, Sri Lankans, Bangla 
Deshis and Philippinos, most of whom were recruited during the Sandover 
years. Students complained about their teaching, and European staff 
thought they were clannish and all-consumingly preoccupied with 
personal status and advancement. Some Asians drew disparaging comments 
from European colleagues who said they were ingratiating themselves 
with the UOT ’establishment’, heedless of moral principle in the 
scramble to get ahead.
The first hints of concerted opposition to Sandover became 
evident during 1973 when the salaries issue and the employment of 
married female academics became a cause ceZebve for the Academic Staff 
Association. As these issues rose to prominence Association officials 
more or less inevitably came into conflict with the Vice-Chancellor.
The next year, with a new executive, events repeated themselves as 
academics once more confronted the UOT administration over matters 
such as salaries, secondment, and study leave. Members of the executive 
who experienced Sandover's ire in return became his most outspoken 
critics. Consequently it became a UOT aphorism that joining the executive 
meant becoming a militant anti-Sandoverite. The strength of feeling
21 On Campus 1(8) November 1976, pp. 3-4.
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against him was obvious in a number of directions. First, a series of 
rancorous personal feuds ensued between him and various members of 
staff such as had hardly ever occurred under Duncanson. Second, a 
polarization between academic and administrative staff occurred, the 
one seeing the other as the Vice-Chancellor’s personal henchmen - a 
development which impressed itself on outsiders such as Angus. Third, 
it was obvious in UOT submissions to the CEUD, some of which attacked 
the Sandover regime and promoted the idea of the national university, 
possibly out of a wish to strike the Vice-Chancellor on a sensitive 
nerve. Fourth, it was obvious in correspondence between the Vice- 
Chancellor and the Staff Association, the files of which are replete 
with numerous examples of the festering relationship between Sandover 
and successive cohorts of Association officials.
But above all hostility to the Vice-Chancellor revealed 
itself in the appearance of the underground newspaper, The Retorten3 
which began appearing in early 1975. The Retorten3 which began as a 
mild parody of The Reporter3 became more scathing in its criticism of 
the Sandover regime with each successive issue. Eventually, after a 
particularly outrageous edition, the staff member thought to have been 
responsible was physically attacked by a professor who was a Sandover- 
ite, and the same night his bedroom windows were smashed by stones.
The Retorten could no longer be ignored. Council threatened that if 
further issues appeared it would ferret out and punish those responsible. 
Council perhaps missed the point, for, as Woodward pointed out, while 
the appearance of such an underground newspaper was to be condemned,
22it was evidence of the distrust and animosity existing on the campus. 
After the demise of The Retorter the Staff Association began producing 
its own officially approved journal, On Campus3 as a legitimate vehicle 
for the expression of staff opinion and grievances. It was not long 
before this journal, too, came into disfavour as articles attacking 
the regime began appearing. An editorial complained there was ’a 
desire on the part of certain persons to stifle all comment that is not 
completely innocuous’, and the editor was said to have been officially
22 UOT Council, 40th meeting, 14 November 1975, Minutes.
23 On Campus 1(6) October 1976, p. 1.
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warned and threatened about the tone of the articles. In answer to
the various attacks upon his rule Sandover customarily asserted that
the disaffection emanated from a small and disgruntled minority among
white staff which had various personal axes to grind - their failure
to gain promotion, lack of academic qualifications, disappointment
over the salaries issue, jealousy of himself. Staff were generally
happy, he claimed, and were it not for the little band of 'dedicated
25destroyers' all would be well at UOT. His critics, however, believed 
the UOT malaise was more deep seated than that. 'There are many 
grievances felt on this campus', one critic pointed out, 'and... it 
does no good to pretend they do not exist. The unrest and dissension 
are a symptom of something gone wrong'.^
Several events in 1976 brought together the strands of 
opposition to Sandover, and finally led to his downfall. We have seen 
how the UOT student strike in March was directed partly against him.
The students claimed his perquisites of office and life style were 
inappropriate in a developing country; they blamed him for the pace 
of localization; and they called for a public inquiry into his adminis­
tration. Soon after this he again came under attack, this time in 
parliament when Tony Ila, the member for Lae, raised grievances over 
localization which dissatisfied staff members had taken to him. The 
response of the UOT administration was to attack Ila in The Reporter3 
suggesting he had been misinformed by a small group of dissident and 
malicious expatriate academics. When Ila replied to this the editor 
declined to publish his letter. Sandover was thereafter assured of 
vehement criticism from at least one corner of parliament.
Then in mid-1976 a series of events at UOT again brought the 
academics and administration into confrontation. Some members of the 
Promotions and Appointments Committees alleged to be Sandover supporters 
refused to serve on the committees with Stan Smaridge, a member elected 
by staff, on the grounds of his alleged Retorter connections. At the 
same time threats were also said to have been made against Smaridge
24 On Campus 1(8) November 1976, pp. 1-2.
25 See for example, Post-Courier 18 November 1976, p. 3.
26 On Campus 1(8) November 1976, p. 6.
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and some prominent anti-Sandoverites: it was said, for example, that
the contracts of some would not be renewed, and there was alleged to
be an informal ’short list' of academics for whom this punishment
was reserved. It was also alleged that Smaridge and others would not
be having their entry permits to Papua New Guinea endorsed by the
University, which meant they would be unable to return to the country
if they went overseas on leave. These incidents were seen as a threat
to all staff, and their effect was to bring into the anti-Sandover
faction many who had previously tried to remain neutral. Then, in
August, a petition on behalf of Smaridge signed by three-quarters of
the academic staff was sent to Council through Tololo. It protested
Smaridge's 'victimization and intimidation' and asked that he 'be
27not subject to discriminatory and punitive treatment'. For some
reason Council did not see this petition, a fact which angered
academics generally and added to the rising tide of staff hostility
28against the Sandover regime.
What finally led to Sandover's downfall was a chain of events
triggered off by a stop-work meeting of UOT national staff on 12
November 1976. The meeting was called by the National Staff Association,
which had come into being in early 1976 and was led by enterprising
and articulate young graduates from both academic and administrative
staffs. Over the year they, too, had become increasingly critical of
the Vice-Chancellor, especially over localization. The stop-work
meeting revealed the general and deep dissatisfaction of national
staff, which was plain in their demands for 'an immediate public
inquiry into evidence of malpractice, maladministration and victimiz- 
29ation' at UOT. In the fortnight before the stop-work meeting the 
National Staff Association had also joined its non-national counter­
part in requesting the Department of Labour to appoint a tribunal 'to 
hear evidence relating to a series of cases of alleged intimidation,
27 Executive Committee of UOT Staff Association (Non-National), 
press release, 14 November 1976, UOT Staff Association 
records.
28 ibid.
29 ibid.
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victimization, defamation, unfair dismissal and malpractices affecting
30employment of staff association members both national and non-national’. 
In addition similar complaints had been laid with the Ombudsman 
Commission.
The day after the stop-work meeting Tigilai, who had only 
been on the job as Deputy Vice-Chancellor for several weeks, flew to 
Port Moresby for consultations with Tololo, W. Edoni (Secretary for 
Labour), and I. Kilage (the Ombudsman) to consider solutions to the 
antagonism between the Vice-Chancellor and the majority of his staff.
The meeting between the four officials had before it a set of conditions 
formulated by the joint UOT staff associations. These included the 
immediate resignation of two officers of the University, reputedly 
Sandover and Cleland; reconstruction of Council and the Finance and 
Management Committee; an investigation of UOT finances in relation 
to allegations about financial malpractice; establishment of a committee 
with Staff Association representation to consider the numerous griev­
ances and complaints of staff; and a re-examination of recent decisions
31regarding contract renewals, appointments and promotions. The four
officials decided that the situation required 'urgent attention' and
32therefore proposed that the UOT Council conduct an inquiry. Perhaps
they hoped that, by referring the matter to Council, an embarrassing
situation could be smoothed over and the voices of dissidence hushed
up. But the two UOT staff associations were not willing to let the
matter be swept under a Council carpet. They vehemently rejected
the suggestion that Council should conduct the inquiry: Council, they
said, had 'failed to exercise the necessary checks and balances
against alleged malpractice and abuse of power', and any findings it
33may reach would be 'the subject of some suspicion'. They made these 
opinions plain several days later when almost 350 staff members - 
75% of the entire UOT staff - attended a meeting which voted in favour 
of advising the Prime Minister that there should be a public inquiry
30 ibid.
31 ibid.
32 ibid.
33 ibid.
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34into UOT affairs. Sandover said he wanted an investigation too, but
into the activities of ’the small group of expatriates’ who were
35bringing UOT ’into disrepute’. Over the next fortnight the controv­
ersy continued. At a stormy meeting of the Non-National Staff
Association a group of Sandover supporters unsuccessfully tried to
36unseat the Association executive with a no-confidence motion. And
in parliament Ila was demanding that Sandover, who was due to leave
the country in two months to take up an appointment in Australia, be
37kept in the country pending a public inquiry.
The climax came on 26 November, a day scheduled for both the 
annual graduation and a Council meeting. Perhaps strategically, the 
National Staff Association held another stop-work meeting that day. 
Almost the entire national staff - academics, administrators, clerks, 
drivers, grounds, catering, cleaning and technical staff - picketed 
the Council meeting in demand of a public inquiry. Council attempted 
to filibuster by prolonging its meeting in the hope that they would 
go away, but they sat the Council out, waiting all morning and after­
noon in the hot sun for an answer. Council could not ignore such 
solid national opposition to the Vice-Chancellor, and in the end 
agreed to call on the Ombudsman to make an investigation. It also
had before it a letter from Somare which said UOT's best interests
38lay in the immediate localization of the Vice-Chancellorship. Council
was thus pressured into asking Sandover 'if he would be prepared to
vacate the position earlier than intended to allow localization to 
39take place'. He had little option but to accede, for to have
refused might have meant the disgrace of dismissal. He left Papua
40New Guinea five days later, insisting he had not been sacked. How­
ever, the suddenness of his departure, coming on top of comments he
34 Post-Courier, 17 November 1976, P- 1.
35 Post-Courier, 18 November 1976, P- 3.
36 Post-Courier, 22 November 1976, P- 3.
37 Post-Courier, 29 November 1976, P- 3.
38 ibid.
39 Post-Courier,
40 ibid.
30 November 1976, p. 3.
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had been making to the effect that he had Council’s full confidence, 
created the impression that Council had told him to go.
After Sandover's departure the Ombudsman announced his 
intention of proceeding with an investigation, and both OHE and 
interested parties at UPNG were urging Tololo to call in two ’independ­
ent’ consultants - Oldfield, Sandover's former UPNG sparring partner,
and Sims, the former consultant to the CEUD - to examine the UOT
41administration and make recommendations for reform. In addition 
one or two aggrieved staff members were contemplating legal action 
against prominent Sandoverites. No matter how much Council might 
have wished to sweep it all under the carpet, UOT linen seemed assured 
of a public washing even though the one many held responsible for 
soiling it would not be present.
The troubles of the two ’independence' Vice-Chancellors,
Gris and Sandover, illustrated the complexity of pressures on and 
within the university system as Papua New Guinea attained independence. 
There were confused issues of educational philosophy, administrative 
procedure, academic government, expatriate staff influence, national 
staff ambition and academic nationalism, the personal propriety and 
suitability of the university leadership, and student dissent. These 
were perhaps an index of how complex the system had grown. By their 
position the Vice-Chancellors were most often the focus of the 
tensions, and to survive under the pressure to which they were increas­
ingly subject called for exceptional qualities. Gris and Sandover 
in their own way were each found wanting. The system demanded that 
the Vice-Chancellors be Olympians, and it was their misfortune that 
they were not.
41 Post-Courier3 3 December 1976, p. 16; O'Neill, personal 
communication, 16 December 1976.
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CHAPTER 10
THE EROSION OF UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY
IN the year following independence Papua New Guinea’s university system 
seemed to have arrived at a cross road, and appeared unsure of the 
direction it wished to take. There were, however, certain signs 
pointing one particular way, along a path it might regret taking but 
appeared destined to follow.
First, government was suggesting that the universities adopt 
a less controversial public role and concentrate on their training 
function. Concerned at the huge sums they were consuming and determined 
to make the most from the investment, government began demanding that 
they adhere more strictly to that function alone. Second, at the same 
time it was insisting that they must cut costs drastically; and to 
help them do so it arbitrarily reduced their funds by 20%, rejecting 
the contrary advice of its own expert adviser, the OHE-UFRC. These 
were ominous portents for the universities: increasing government
surveillance of their educational effort plus an apparently punitive 
financial policy towards them added up to a loss of the independence 
their founders had sought to guarantee to them and which their success­
ive heads had struggled to retain. Third, as all this was happening, 
the OHE, which had become an intermediary between government and 
universities, was declining in importance. As a body with no statutory 
underpinnings it owed its influence partly to the personality of its 
leaders, and more especially to their ability to 'deliver' to govern­
ment and universities the ’goods’ they each required. It strove to 
retain its self-appointed policy making and co-ordinating functions; 
but in a period when government wanted more direct control of the 
universities, and they were becoming disillusioned with its ability 
to guarantee them adequate supplies of their scarcest resource - 
money - its influence could only lessen.
The university system which had developed in Papua New Guinea 
in the decade preceding independence was therefore unsure of itself.
This chapter will examine the effects of this uncertainty through a 
consideration of manpower planning, budgetary problems, and the decline
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of the OHE. In doing so it will show how the university system seemed 
to be in a state of flux by the end of 1976. As we will see, the 
universities seemed fated to lose their long cherished independent 
status, to decline from the role academics traditionally claimed for 
them into being public agencies under direct government control. 
Perhaps this was their most appropriate role in a country feeling its 
way through the first difficult years of nationhood. Yet the erosion 
of their autonomy seemed unfortunate. In the short space of a decade 
they had built up a tradition of scholarship, intellectual inquiry, 
informed social comment, and the seeking out and serving of what 
national leaders vaunted as 'Melanesian values'. They had frequently 
been in conflict with the government, with each other, and within 
themselves as they sought to function as they believed universities 
should; but they had always been a highly active yeast within the 
wider society. Whether they would be able to continue providing such 
vigorous leavening seemed doubtful.
(a) UPNG’S COMPLIANCE WITH GOVERNMENT MANPOWER GOALS
In the period following self-government the government showed 
increasing interest in bending the university system to its will.
This became most evident in manpower planning, where it became more 
and more impatient to direct the universities. Its view of the uni­
versities was nowhere more plain than in the public utterances of 
Tololo, who, significantly, by 1976 was not only Director of Education 
but had nominal responsibility for OHE and was Chancellor of UPNG and 
UOT as well. In August 1976 he told a UPNG seminar on government- 
university relations that ideally the link should be 'co-operative'.
He defined this as a relationship
in which the government asks the University to accept the 
role and responsibility of educating [the government's] 
highest level manpower.... The government... having given 
the University [this] responsibility... and supported it 
to do this, the responsibility of the University is to 
get on with the job, not to become sidetracked with other 
issues.... If a university cannot carry out its part of 
the co-operative relationship..., if it becomes actively 
involved in other issues of the day - social, political,
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economic - than that of educating the nation's highest 
level manpower, then it is not fulfilling a useful 
function and ought to be closed. 1
The instrumentalist and utilitarian view he expressed was pronounced.
It had been implicit in the Eight Point Plan, and the CEUD Report 
clearly articulated it; but Tololo stated it baldly, without concessions 
to educational philosophy. The universities could be in no doubt that 
they were expected to be government directed manufacturers of skilled 
personnel.
During the Gunther-Duncanson era there had generally been a
laissez faire approach to manpower planning by the tertiary training 
2institutions. So few Papua New Guineans had tertiary qualifications
that any national with a degree had many options in choosing a job.
However, as more graduates emerged the danger of over-supply in some
areas became apparent. That Papua New Guinea might replicate the
Indian experience of a surfeit of Arts and Law graduates became a
spectre haunting educational planners. Government economists, too,
had long pondered this problem and its corresponding difficulty, the
under-supply of graduates in highly technical areas such as agriculture 
3and engineering. Government concern to ensure the balanced develop­
ment of the tertiary trained workforce had become apparent in the 
setting up of the Manpower Planning Unit in 1968. This body in 1970
produced projections for the decade ahead, setting out the expected4demand in the various categories of professional skills. Especially 
as self-government approached and the national government began taking 
a more critical interest in its investment in university education 
was it concerned to tie university programmes to such projections.
Government interest focused chiefly on UPNG as this was the 
institution educating the feared Arts-Law generalists, while under­
supply in the technological categories trained by UOT was chronic.
1 Tololo, 'The relationship betwen Government and University: 
what should it be?', Yagl-Ambu 3(3) August 1976.
2 R.F. Salisbury to Inglis, 3 December 1973; Rees to Inglis,
14 March 1975, UPNGR E.32 (part 2).
3 Inglis to Gunther, 25 January 1968, UPNGR T.2.
4 Manpower Planning Unit, 'Demand for professional manpower in 
Papua New Guinea, 1970-1980', UPNGR T.2.
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For this reason most conflict over manpower planning centred on Waigani. 
The thought of government direction was anathema to UPNG, a fact which 
became clear in 1968 when the head of the Manpower Planning Unit 
suggested to Gunther and Inglis that the country needed more students 
in science and fewer in the liberal arts. This they thought an 
’ominous’ and ’restrictionist’ assumption.“* However, the continued 
work of the Unit and its projections of needs showed UPNG that govern­
ment had an abiding interest in manpower planning. To accept the 
guidelines set out in these projections was the best protection against 
the imposition of directives, and so UPNG endeavoured to pre-empt 
government interference by voluntarily working to fit in with govern­
ment’s goals. To facilitate this, and to show it was unwilling to 
’maintain a passive role in the discussion of its future’, it set up 
its own Sub-Committee on Manpower Planning in late 1973.
UPNG’s first major statement on manpower planning was the 
first report of the Sub-Committee, in early 1974. This made a number 
of recommendations: (i) The University should set target figures for
enrolments in the various disciplines and should impose quotas to 
achieve these. Thus, the B.A. in Politics, and the B.Ec., which had 
been oversubscribed, would have restricted enrolments and the surplus 
students would be syphoned off into under-subscribed programmes such 
as the B.Ed. (ii) The imposition of quotas and streaming of students 
between courses should be done by a committee of academic staff 
rather than, by implication, some government agency. (iii) To assist 
with streaming, students wishing to take Arts, Law and Education 
should study a common core of subjects in their first year of degree 
studies. This core would be analogous to the existing common core for 
first year Science, Agriculture, Forestry, Medicine and Dentistry 
students, which should also be retained. (iv) Government should 
assist in the streaming process by adopting an 'incentives’ salary
5 Inglis to Gunther, 25 January 1968; Gunther to Karmel, 
26 June 1968; J. Conroy to Gunther, 22 October 1970, 
UPNGR T.2.
6 O ’Neill, 'Manpower planning report', 12 June 1974, UPNGR 
E.32 (part 1).
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policy in association with the University's quotas so as to attract 
students into those under-subscribed disciplines deemed priority areas.^
At the same time as UPNG was demonstrating this willingness 
to come to terms voluntarily with government priorities OHE was becom­
ing more interested in manpower planning. The OHE Director, Rees, 
was a manpower economist by training and inclination, and as we have 
seen the OHE under his influence had set up the Planning Committee on 
Professional Manpower (later called the Committee on University Trained 
Manpower (CUTM)) in 1974. Rees believed OHE had a responsibility to 
ensure there was 'a reasonable balance between [manpower] categories 
in progressing towards full localization... [so] that all areas of
g
professional expertise are served by PNG nationals'. Both OHE and 
Planning Committee on Professional Manpower believed secondary teaching 
was the area of greatest need and therefore wanted a 'substantial 
increase' in B.Ed. enrolments. Rees informed UPNG that government 
thought 'the supply of PNG graduate teachers to date has been practic­
ally negligible and if the long-term viability of the high schools and 
teachers' colleges is to be ensured, a shift of emphasis of considerable 
magnitude is required in favour of B.Ed. enrolments, largely at the 
expense of B.A. and B.Ec. courses'. He advised UPNG to readjust 
enrolments accordingly, and also asked UOT to stream more students 
into the telecommunications course.^
Both universities resented OHE attempts to guide them. Sand- 
over said UOT was in sympathy with government's wish to see enrolments 
reflect manpower targets, but it could only 'take advice... not 
direction'.^  UPNG expressed similar sentiments. There was also 
strong opinion at UPNG that if government wished to effect a reallo­
cation of students between courses this 'must be through the carrot 
not the stick - through the manipulation of government-controlled
7 UPNG Sub-Committee on Manpower Planning, 'Report', February 
1974, pp. 8-9, UPNGR E.32 (part 1).
8 Rees, 'Structure of new enrolments to degree courses for 
1975 and 1976', September 1974, UPNGR E.32 (part 1).
9 Rees to Inglis, 18 October 1974, UPNGR E.32 (part 1).
10 ibid.
11 Sandover to Rees, 24 October 1974, UPNGR E.32 (part 1).
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incentives such as increased rates of pay, bonuses and improved con-
12ditions of service'. Coercion, it was pointed out, could prove 
counter-productive:
dragooning students into a B.Ed. course and preventing 
their taking any but teaching posts on graduation are 
likely to prove singularly uneconomic. Not only will 
they further degrade the teaching profession, but they 
would force unwilling students into a field where creat­
ivity and innovation are essential and are inevitably 
based on genuine interest. 13
Further strong opinion within UPNG held that there should not be quotas 
at all and no ceiling to enrolments as proposed in the Oldfield and 
CEUD Reports. This view, articulated most eloquently by the anthro­
pologist R.F. Salisbury, whom Inglis had consulted, maintained that 
UPNG should simply continue to accept all qualified students for what­
ever course they chose, because localization was still so poorly
advanced the country would need all the graduates it could produce in
14every field at least until the 1980s. UPNG opposition to OHE attempts 
to issue directives led to a gentlemen's agreement between them: quotas
and streaming would not apply in the coming year, 1975, and instead 
they would explore together means of streaming in order to find a 
mutually acceptable policy for 1976.^ How much value OHE placed on 
this arrangement is uncertain, for it seemed determined to have its 
own way, and UPNG was soon volubly protesting that it was breaking 
promises. The alleged breach of faith occurred at the beginning of 
1975 when Rees advised that students unable to matriculate to the 
faculty of their choice be directed into Education or Science, and 
further that ex-Preliminary Year students who had elected in 1974 to 
study in a particular faculty but had since changed their minds be 
refused a scholarship for the course of their choice. UPNG greatly
12 J. Ballard, 'Manpower planning for the universities: the
need for rethinking in the light of government priorities', 
n.d., UPNGR E.32 (part 1).
13 ibid.
14 Salisbury to Inglis, 25 January 1974, UPNGR E.32 (part 1).
15 Inglis to Tololo, and to Rees, 28 October 1974, UPNGR E.32 
(part 1).
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resented this instruction, which it saw as a government attempt to
16impose quotas in contravention of the gentleman's agreement.
Rees rejected UPNG's angry protestations and denied he was
breaking an agreement. He claimed that without his firm direction
'the laissez faire policy of enrolments favoured by the University
17would have resulted in no shift [in enrolments] whatsoever'. This, 
he argued, would have been intolerable since the 'trend of enrolments 
towards "generalist" courses in Arts and Economics which has been the 
bane of high level manpower development in other Less Developed
18Countries in the post colonial era has clearly emerged at UPNG'.
He forcefully asserted that
a great deal of effort has been expended by the University 
in trying to ensure that government does not dictate its 
own quota requirements but very little seems to have been 
achieved to provide an alternative.... All this adds up 
to a process of masterly inactivity.... 19
He accused UPNG of selfishly adhering to its own 'micro-view' of the
manpower problem and of refusing to appreciate the government's 'macro- 
20view'.*- And summarizing the whole issue from the government manpower 
planner's standpoint he declared,
The situation reduces to this. The University agrees 
with the need to have enrolments reflect national man­
power priorities but is prepared to do little that is 
practical to achieve this end. The solutions proposed 
by the University are theoretically sound but are really 
the stuff of which academic theses are made.... They 
raise so many policy problems that their introduction is 
probably not feasible and certainly only in the long 
term. For example salary scales for particular professions 
can be adjusted to make a profession more attractive but 
as is well known, salary relativities are all-important, 
particularly in the Public Service, and to raise one pro­
fessional scale or to start a particular group further up 
the scale will bring pressures from other professional 
groups for similar treatment. 21
16 ibid., and Stace, 'note for file', 21 February 1975, UPNGR 
E.32 (part 1).
17 Rees to Inglis, 14 March 1975, UPNGR E.32 (part 1).
18 ibid.
19 ibid.
20 Rees to Inglis, 17 March 1975, UPNGR E.32 (part 3).
21 Rees to Inglis, 14 March 1975, UPNGR E.32 (part 1).
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Not since the days of G. Warwick Smith, the former Secretary for
Territories, had UPNG received such unvarnished opinion as this.
Perhaps his surprise at being addressed so frankly prompted the usually
genial Inglis to reply in frosty tones that he hoped Rees’s 'gratuitous-
22ly anti-academic’ comments would not unduly provoke UPNG staff.
UPNG was not prepared to yield passively to OHE, Central
Planning Office or any other government agency. It mustered a range
of arguments against greater government direction in manpower production
Briefly, these were as follows: (i) It was not only educationally
unsound to use coercion but also wrong to insist on early specialization
Rather, students should follow generalist studies in the earlier part
of their courses, which was the philosophy behind the introduction of
23the common foundation year for Arts, Education and Law students.
(ii) There could be no guarantee that a student who had studied in a
particular field would enter that field on graduation. The student
graduating B.Ed. could well pursue an administrative or commercial
24career, for example. (iii) The imposition of quotas would be in­
effective unless accompanied by a government-enforced system of bonding 
students to their allotted professions. At the same time bonding 
would discourage students from entering university and result in a
high drop-out rate among those assigned to courses in which they had 
25little interest. (iv) The ’residual procedure’ by which manpower 
planners determined the need for the various categories of graduates 
was methodologically unsound. This process defined the need in the 
more readily assessable specialized professions (medicine, dentistry, 
engineering) first, leaving the generalist professions - those normally 
supplied by the Faculty of Arts - till last. Consequently Arts had 
a low priority with manpower planners which was out of keeping with 
the importance of the administrative employment many Arts graduates
22 Inglis to Rees, 19 March 1975, UPNGR E.32 (part 3).
23 O'Neill and E. Waters, 'Foundation Year Studies’, 26 March 
1975, UPNGR E.32 (part 1).
24 ibid.
25 O'Neill and J. Conroy, ’University enrolments and manpower 
planning', 3 April 1975, UPNGR E.32 (part 1).
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26would obtain. (v) Projections of manpower need were at best specu­
lative, and past experience in Papua New Guinea had shown what in­
accurate and conflicting forecasts government manpower planners could
make. In many cases, moreover, as for example with the priority B.Ed.,
27government was unsure of the numbers it wanted.
Raising points of educational philosophy and casting doubt 
against the assumptions of manpower planners in this way may have 
confirmed the convictions of those at UPNG, but government remained 
singularly unimpressed. The Central Planning Office, for example, 
bluntly told the universities that
the problem of resource allocation cannot be avoided.
When the cost of a university degree... in Papua New 
Guinea [is] eighty times the Gross National Product per 
capita, how much of its resources should [the] country 
devote to a form of education that is frankly non- 
vocational in its objective? 28
And when Inglis complained to Tololo that OHE was attempting to tie 
scholarships to particular courses, and was thus imposing controls in 
breach of their gentleman's agreement, the latter flatly said,
The situation simply stated is that the University is a 
service institution, which could provide a most important 
and essential service.... I would have hoped that the 
University would have adopted its own internal quota 
system already to meet what are obvious and clear needs 
and priorities. If the University does not do this then 
the alternative avenue of directing government tertiary 
scholarships will need to be used. 29
The UPNG response to government advances, which became more determined
as OHE, Department of Education and Central Planning Office began
acting in concert, was to promote the foundation year for Arts, Law
30and Education students. The foundation year aimed to enable UPNG 
'to equip as large a proportion of students as possible to fulfil as
26 ibid.
27 ibid.
28 R. Castley, 'A retort to Part II, University Enrolments and 
Manpower Planning', 25 April 1975, UPNGR E.32 (part 3)
29 Tololo to Inglis, 25 March 1975, UPNGR E.32 (part 1).
30 O'Neill and Waters, loc. cit.
319
many different functions as possible1 by leaving the manpower categories
31’as broad as possible’. Its introduction also bought UPNG some time
for it would not be taught until 1976, which meant that streaming and
32quotas could be delayed until the beginning of 1977. Only time was 
bought, however, for there could be no avoiding the setting of 
imperative goals by government; and Gris, recently having taken over 
as Vice-Chancellor, assured Tololo that UPNG would proceed to channel 
students according to government priorities once students were emerging 
from foundation year. Tololo accepted these undertakings, saying how 
pleased he was that
the University is finally getting round to considering 
relating course structures and student enrolments to 
national manpower needs. I do hope this will be more 
than words and will result in some action that means, 
for example, more skilled manpower in areas where it is 
needed, for example secondary teaching. 33
Government pressure on UPNG became stronger after CUTM began
operations in mid-1975. OHE and Central Planning Office representatives
on CUTM made plain to UPNG how impatient they were for the University
to structure its enrolments in line with government manpower goals,
34especially those for secondary teachers. Department of Education
supplied figures to bolster their demands: it estimated that, because
of the continual opening of new high schools and the low level of
localization on high school staffs, there was an insatiable need for
35graduate teachers, 530 B.Eds. being required in the period 1975-80.
Under force of such demands UPNG had to give way sooner than it had 
hoped. In late 1975 it adopted a policy on streaming to apply from 
the beginning of 1976. It decided that all new undergraduate students 
would enrol in one of three streams - Arts (including Arts-Education), 
Science (including Science-Education), or Law; on completion of first 
year they could opt to specialize in Arts, Social Work, Economics,
31 D. Denoon to Faculty of Arts Planning Committee, 20 August 
1975, UPNGR E.32 (part 3).
32 Gris to Tololo, 4 June 1975, UPNGR E.32 (part 1).
33 Tololo to Gris, 7 July 1975, UPNGR E.32 (part 3).
34 CUTM, Minutes, 25 August 1975, UPNGR E.32 (part 3).
35 R.S. Henry, ’Graduate Teacher Training’, Department of 
Education Planning Paper, 3 March 1976, UPNGR E.32 (part 3).
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Education, Law, Science, Agriculture, Forestry, Medicine, or Dentistry;
but only some students would get the faculty of their first choice
36because of quotas restricting entry to over-subscribed faculties. The
first such streaming was to occur in 1977 after the first foundation
year, but the 1976 pattern of enrolments led to an earlier introduction.
In February 1976 registrations for new courses revealed such a great
imbalance between Arts-Law and Science that if UPNG gave students their
choice government would certainly have intervened to impose its own
quotas. The target for Science was 180 but only 110 students registered;
in Arts-Law it was 190 but 287 registered. Faced with such embarrassing
under- and over-subscriptions the UPNG Sub-Committee on Manpower
Planning decided, under pressure from Department of Education and
Central Planning Office, to 'identify Arts students qualified to trans-
37fer to the Science stream in order to get nearer the target quota'.
Subsequently 34 Arts-Law students were compulsorily transferred to 
38Science. Howls of protest from staff and students greeted this
39arbitrary exercise, but in view of government determination to curb 
Arts-Law enrolments and boost Science and Education, the University had 
little choice.
By taking decisive action voluntarily UPNG had, for a time, 
forestalled direct government intervention. But there would probably 
be only temporary respite. Tololo continued making ominous statements 
to the effect that UPNG's chief duty was to accept the fulfilment of 
government manpower goals as its main task. And Tigilai, as OHE 
Director, said that government, in spending '3% of the total budget 
on only 0.1% of the population [had] high expectations of the univers­
ities in return for the high investment it [had] made in them'.^ He 
did not need to add that UPNG's acceptance of government advice on
36 O'Neill and Stace, 'Mechanism for streaming', n.d., UPNGR 
E.32 (part 3).
37 Sub-Committee on Manpower Planning, Minutes, 26 February 
1976, UPNGR E.32 (part 3).
38 Sub-Committee on Manpower Planning, Minutes, 11 March 1976, 
UPNGR E.32 (part 3).
39 Uni Tavuv 2(6) 25 March 1976, p. 4.
40 M. Tigilai, 'Relationships between government and universities', 
Yagl-Ambu 3(3) August 1976.
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quotas was part of those expectations. The universities had sought 
to preserve their autonomy, but in surrendering to government over 
quotas they had made at least a token gesture of submission; and having 
retreated on that front their ability to withstand concerted government 
pressure in other issues was uncertain. As in a number of other 
developing countries the utilitarian and instrumentalist philosophy 
finally seemed to have predominated over the educational. And as a 
result Papua New Guinea’s universities were in danger of deteriorating 
into mere government agencies, factories for producing requisite man­
power quotas on demand.
(b) BUDGETARY REDUCTIONS DURING 1975-76
Until independence the universities had generally been able to 
assume an almost unlimited growth potential. Both Oldfield and CEUD 
Reports had proposed enrolment ceilings but UPNG and UOT continued to 
expand despite that. Their budgets, which increased steadily into 
the mid-1970s,reflected this, as can be seen in the diagrams on the 
following page. Rapid inflation exaggerated the growth curve, but the 
expansion was real enough: they were teaching more students, employing
more staff, adding new courses, moving into new outreach activities, 
and extending their physical facilities. By late 1975, however, the 
lusty growth was nearing its maximum. Trends in the national economy 
indicated that even if the beanstalk was still immature it was ready 
for pruning. The nation by this time was experiencing severe financial 
difficulties owing to the lower profitability of the Bougainville 
copper mining operations, loss of substantial tax revenues as more 
expatriates quit the country, and lower levels of foreign aid.^ That 
UPNG and UOT would feel the slash of the Treasurer’s knife along with 
all other government agencies became obvious.
In December 1975 the Secretary for Finance informed all 
government-funded agencies of the cuts they should expect National 
Planning and Budget Priorities Committees to make to their estimates.
He said government was aiming at an overall reduction of 20% in
1 Department of Finance circular memorandum no. 9 of 1975: 
Estimates, 1976-77, 5 December 1975, OHER.
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University Expenditure ($'000)2
1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76
UPNG* 3862 5243 5679 6949 8030 8160
UOT 2430 2825 4158 4820 4799 6400
Total 6292 8068 9837 11769 12829 14560
excluding Goroka Teachers’ College
University Expenditure 1970-71 to 1975-76
$ million
1973-74 1974-751972-73 1975-761970-71 1971-72
Total ------------ U P N G ------------  UOT -----
expenditure expenditure expenditure
2 Figures, supplied by OHE, June 1976, include both recurrent 
and capital expenditure.
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expenditure and must adjust the budgets of all instrumentalities accord­
ingly. In the case of the universities the maximum permissible 
expenditure for the coming financial year would be $7.92 million for
UPNG (including Goroka Teachers’ College) and $6.5 million for UOT, a
3total of $14.42 million. This meant their budgets were to be pegged
at approximately the same level as the previous year. To be thus tied
to a fixed income at a time of inflation and rising salaries was to
suffer a loss: ’it is not just a question of "no-growth” in 1976-77',
as UOT pointed out, 'but there is in fact a reduction in the financial
4assistance given to the universit[ies]’.
The proposed pruning came as a shock to OHE and the univers­
ities. In late 1975 the UFRC-OHE had examined the universities’ 
financial submissions for the coming year and had recommended to 
government levels of expenditure only slightly lower than what they 
had requested.^ Had government granted the recommended amounts, as in 
the past, the universities would have continued their former steady 
upward growth curve. But government's insistence on a 20% reduction 
made nonsense of all the assumptions they, OHE and UFRC used in arriving 
at what was deemed reasonable estimates of their needs. As Gris 
advised OHE,
the University's submission as modified by the UFRC can 
in no sense be followed as a plan for the University's 
operations. The level of grant the Committee recommended 
... is some $2,078 million in excess of the revenue likely 
to be available to the University. 6
OHE, apparently embarrassed at the arbitrary manner in which government 
had rejected UFRC advice, made urgent representations to have the 
universities' financial difficulties reconsidered,^ but to little avail.
3 ibid.
4 Finance and Management Committee, Minutes, 7 January 1976, 
UOTR.
5 UFRC recommended $10.57 million for UPNG (6.3% less than 
requested) and $7.7 million for UOT (1.3% less). (Figures 
derived from UFRC Report, December 1975.)
6 Gris to Tigilai, 10 March 1976, agenda papers for meeting of 
Academic Developments Committee, 12 March 1976, UPNGR.
Tigilai to M. Morauta, 9 December 1975, OHER 66-2-2 (part 2).7
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Tololo succinctly summed up the government attitude as follows:
We just do not have the resources to continue to fund the 
universities at the level they have become used to. This 
is one of the facts of life and a very realistic one. Nor 
is it desirable that so much should be spent on so few....
It is most unlikely that there will be any additional 
finance for the universities. 8
However devasting the pegging of funds might be, UPNG and UOT must 
simply learn to live on less.
Government left the universities to make cuts wherever they 
could. There was great breast-beating on each campus as they realized 
their precarious situation. ’Financial stringency’, 'severe budgetary 
difficulties', and 'monetary crisis' were soon part of the university 
lexicon as they agonized over how to cope with straitened circumstances. 
As they undertook their reviews they perhaps realized how very depend­
ent all their activities were on adequate injections of government 
money. They were indeed like great vines with long-extended branches, 
the health of the whole plant highly sensitive to interference with 
the soil at their roots.
Each university quickly formulated schemes for coping with 
its reduction in funds, and each produced both long- and short-term 
plans for getting by. Among the dozens of suggestions the UPNG manage­
ment received from staff and students were ideas that fell into the 
following categories:
(i) Academic staff: non-replacement of staff as they resigned or
their contracts expired; a halt to recruiting people from 'far away 
places like Europe, Africa, America'; rent increases; savings on clean­
ing expenses by having staff clean their own offices; elimination of 
salary increments; reduction of staff in less vocationally oriented 
faculties, particularly Arts; abolition of study leave; waiving of 
requirements for six months' notice of resignation to enable staff to
8 Tololo to Tigilai, 29 March 1976; cf. R. Wiggins to Tigilai 
11 February 1976, OHER 66-2-2 (part 2).
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resign early; greater priority to localization.
(ii) Students: a requirement that students work in gardens, grounds,
Union, and dining hall to save employing unskilled labour; an obligation 
on students to contribute towards tuition fees and catering costs; 
diversion of profits from the SRC-operated canteen to the dining hall
to lighten the catering subsidy.^
(iii) Academic structure and course offerings: elimination of less
popular courses, a reversion to the 'basic disciplines', and the offer­
ing of fewer 'fancy' options; a reduction in size, or cancellation, of 
Preliminary Year; a tougher approach towards student selection, and 
elimination of 'borderliners'; immediate introduction of the modular 
organization of courses, which would remove all third year students 
from the campus in 1977; amalgamation of academic departments into 
'schools', and the adoption of interdisciplinary teaching and courses.^
(iv) Generat: reduction in the number and frequency of university
publications; severe restrictions on consumables and telephone calls; 
replacement of departmental secretarial staff by typing pools; replace­
ment of air conditioners by other, cheaper forms of ventilation; 
reduction of funds for gardens and grounds; immediate localization of
expatriate secretaries; severe curtailment of research, library
12acquisitions, staff travel, and student excursions.
UPNG reckoned it could produce 'substantial savings' through 
a combination of such measures, but even so would still have a budget 
deficit of $340,000 by the end of 1976."^ And that was not the worst 
for, as McKay claimed in a letter to Tololo,
9 UPNG, 'Synthesis of responses on financial stringency', 26 
March 1976; McKay to Vice-Chancellor's Advisory Committee,
6 April 1976; Educational Research Unit, 'Discussion Paper 
on Issues Facing the University', March 1976; UPNG Academic 
Board, agenda papers for 25th meeting, 9 April 1976, UPNGR.
10 ibid.
11 ibid.
12 ibid.
13 McKay to Tololo, 15 March 1976, OHER 66-1-27 (part 5).
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within the last two months it has become increasingly 
clear that our position is potentially much worse than 
we had at first realised. This has been emphasised by 
a series of salary increases, including the minimum urban 
wage, the $60 rise for national staff and prospective 
rises for expatriate non-academic staff... as well as the 
academic salary increases.... These are likely to increase 
our deficit to something like $1 million by the middle of 
1977 even with the economies we have planned.... 14
He was perhaps exaggerating, but the threat of a large deficit was real, 
and UPNG could only hope to lessen it through drastic cuts on many 
fronts. There were, however, severe disadvantages to whatever set of 
economies were adopted. UPNG could not simply reduce the size of its 
permanent staff because of contractual obligations; it could not allow 
all vacancies to remain unfilled without producing severe imbalances 
between departments and in the teaching programme; nor could it restrict 
enrolments without having a serious effect on manpower production.
The leading question, therefore, was how far economies could go without 
disrupting the work of the University.
The UPNG community pondered this question at great length.
The sheer volume of discussion that ensued was some indication that
this was perhaps the most significant issue to date in the ten year
history of the university system. It seemed clear to many that the
very existence of the universities as such was threatened, and this
caused a re-examination of the assumptions on which they had always
functioned. Academics generally agreed that ’a university in Papua
New Guinea [had] essential functions' which included teaching; research;
outreach; service as 'a repository and cultivator of Papua New Guinean
culture through the study of local values, history, social life,
religions, literature'; provision of 'independent and informed comment
on national affairs'; and the supply of 'a high level of professional
training with a significant emphasis on encouraging the growth of the 
16"whole man"'. The struggle to seek economies focused attention, 
perhaps for the first time, on 'the relative importance [that] should 
be given to these and other functions
14 ibid.
15 Gris to Tololo, 10 March 1976, loc. cit.
16 J. Silvey, in Educational Research Unit, loc. cit.
17 ibid.
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The whole issue, in the view of many at UPNG, reduced to 
the question, ’What type of institution does government want the 
University to be?’ Did it want the type of body they themselves under­
stood by the word ’university’? Or did it want some form of lower- 
level, more circumscribed training college? If the former were the
case then government policy was misplaced for it would ’destroy the
18University as a reputable institution'. But if the latter were true
then government must provide clear guidelines to enable the University
to scale down its activities accordingly. As one academic observed,
’we have surely reached the stage where we need to sit down with the
government, make clear the effects of cuts already made, point out
the alternative consequences of further cuts, and ask government what
reductions in university services it is prepared to accept’. Unless
government gave the University guidance it would continue drifting
uncertainly; this would greatly lower staff morale and lead to 'a mass
exodus..., with drastic effects on the operation of the University';
and that, it was claimed with perhaps justifiable hyperbole, meant
UPNG's declining into 'a third rate institution with no acceptance
20outside of Papua New Guinea’.
There was rather less public discussion of the budgetary
cuts at UOT than at UPNG, a function perhaps of UOT's less democratic
nature. But there was no escaping the fact that UOT was the more
severely crippled of the two. Lae suffered more than Waigani-Goroka
because a significantly higher proportion of its funds went into
salaries and staff benefits: 82.6% of UOT recurrent expenditure was
going into salaries and superannuation by 1975, compared with 72.3%
21at UPNG. This was because Lae staff seem to have been appointed 
at generally higher levels, and UOT trade unionism had been most 
effective in winning cash benefits for staff. The latter fact caused
18 UPNG circular, ’Synthesis of responses on financial 
stringency'.
19 M. Wilson, in Educational Research Unit, loc. cit.
20 UPNG circular, 'Synthesis of responses on financial 
stringency'.
21 Percentages calculated from figures in UOT and UPNG sub­
missions for funds for 1976-77.
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the UOT Registrar in early 1976 to comment sarcastically on Staff 
Association 'skirmishes' with the administration in questions of 
salaries and conditions:
The payment of increased salaries and other incentives 
now takes up more than 85% of the University's income.
With luck the Utopian situation may soon arrive when this 
figure is 100% then... [we can all] go home.... In view 
of the financial situation when the University's income 
is pegged... any increased commitment to staff... can 
only be achieved at the expense of some other develop­
ment. The staff are now in danger of pricing themselves 
out of the market. The position is such that in the fore­
seeable future the number of staff employed by the 
University will need to be reduced annually and perhaps 
it is time to maintain the status quo rather than to press 
for increased staff benefits. 22
The danger he pointed to was real. With contract commitments to pay
a high percentage of its income on salaries, and the likelihood of
even higher proportions in future as new salary awards pushed up the
23bill for wages by 5% annually, UOT had little option but to freeze
expenditure on 'secondary' budget items - localization training,
research, outreach activities, travel, capital purchases, consumables,
24and all services except for urgent maintenance. And like UPNG it 
had to contemplate the termination of some courses, non-replacement 
of staff as vacancies occurred, and non-renewal of contracts deemed 
inessential.^
For UOT the most obvious solution lay in localization because 
the larger part of its huge salaries bill was that of the expatriates. 
However, here it faced a dilemma: it had virtually eliminated
spending on localization training to conserve funds, and this could 
only delay the replacement of high priced expatriates. Moreover only 
long-term benefits would be felt in the area where the biggest savings 
could be made - academic positions - for an internal study showed 
that effective academic localization would cost an additional $132,000
22 The Reporter_, 26 March 1976, p. 3.
23 Finance and Management Committee, Minutes, 18 March 1976, 
UOTR.
24 ibid., 7 January 1976.
25 ibid., 18 March 1976.
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during 1976-77, and that savings would not come until 1978 when
existing expatriate contracts would run out in sufficient numbers to
allow for large-scale national replacements. Only after 1979 would
26the savings be substantial.
The immediacy of the crisis prompted Sandover to act with
the same panache that had been his hallmark when seeking university
status for IOT. He lobbied far and wide, pressing UOT's case with
27anyone who might help - OHE, Tololo, Somare. But all was in vain.
Government politely expressed its sympathy but remained adamant it
was ’unable to recommend any increase in appropriation due to the most
28stringent financial situation'. His response to the firm refusals
was to reach out for any straw that might keep UOT afloat. One he
grasped at caused considerable consternation at UPNG - in effect the
transfer of UPNG funds to UOT. He informed both OHE and Somare that
to keep its head above water UOT might have to cut some courses, and
went on to propose 'that if any courses are to be cut they should be
29the non-professional [Arts-Humanities] courses at UPNG'. This,
presumably, would enable funds to be diverted to training UOT's
'desperately needed' graduates. He did Gris the courtesy of advising
him of the measures he had suggested to government to alleviate 'the
almost disastrous position at UOT', justifying his actions by saying
'if you think you are hungry then we are starving'. He had good
reason for the latter view: OHE shared it and could produce evidence
31to show UOT had been 'unfavourably treated' vis-a.-V'ts UPNG. But
26 J. Chinnappa, 'Notes on academic localization', n.d., paper 
prepared for Finance and Management Committee, 1976.
27 Sandover to Tigilai, 4 December 1975; to Somare, 16 December 
1975; to Tololo, 5 March 1976, OHER 66-2-2 (part 2).
28 R. Wiggins to Tigilai, 11 February 1976, OHER 66-2-2 (part 1).
29 Sandover to Gris, 5 March 1976, OHER 66-2-2 (part 1).
30 ibid.
31 Oostermeyer, the Acting Director of OHE, examined UOT and 
UPNG revenues and advised Tololo that UOT was carrying a 
proportionately bigger deficit, its building programme was 
incomplete while UPNG's was almost fully 'built up', and 
it was generally 'worse off financially'. (W. Oostermeyer, 
'Comments on UOT V-C's letter to Mr Tololo re budget 
situation', 5 March 1976, OHER 66-2-2 (part 1).)
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Gris and his advisors could not see things this way. With little 
disguised disdain he wrote back to Sandover saying,
I note that you are still convinced that UPNG is more 
preferentially treated than UOT.... There seems to be 
an assumption that UPNG has no financial problems, yet 
you must know from discussions in Council [of which 
Sandover was a member] that the suggested budget ceiling 
for UPNG this year (and probably for future years) 
severely limits our activities and will cause us to cut 
back in those areas you mentioned and in addition a 
probable pruning of student numbers and staff. 32
This disagreement between Vice-Chancellors revived something 
of the rivalry between the two universities which had become apparent 
in 1973 when Matheson, in complaining to Inglis that UPNG was receiv­
ing a more favourable allocation of funds than UOT, had accused
Waigani of 'prodigality' in appointing professors, in contrast to
33Lae's abstemiousness. Inglis had been angered that UOT should be
3 /
'making such comparisons', and rejected Matheson's charges. But
the UOT leadership remained convinced 'that we are expected to work
35in a much less favourable situation than our sister institution', 
and that they must consequently strive to outbid a rival. Sandover, 
in hinting at a diversion of funds from Waigani to Lae, might only 
have been 'flying kites' as he was wont to do; but for all that, and 
despite the bonhomie and politeness which most usually marked UOT- 
UPNG correspondence, the two institutions clearly remained adversaries 
in competition for the most essential university resource - government 
money. That this commodity was in ever scarcer supply could only 
emphasize the rivalry.
As 1976 wore on it seemed obvious that UOT and UPNG would 
probably remain in competition for the same resource, for there was 
little doubt the years of 'fat'-layered university budgets were gone 
forever. More than ever before government was viewing the universities 
primarily as training institutions 'neither more nor less important
32 Gris to Sandover, 23 March 1976, OHER 66-2-2 (part 1).
33 Matheson to Inglis, 12 December 1973, UPNGR K.32-2.
34 Inglis to Matheson, draft letter, n.d., and 20 February 
1974, UPNGR K.32-2.
Sandover to Inglis, 4 March 1974, UPNGR K.32-2.35
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than many other state-supported activities’, and was insisting that
during the distribution of funds they take their place in line with
36other government agencies. They wanted privileged status and
special consideration, but government was plainly not inclined to
give them ’priority above everything else', especially when ’a quite
disproportionate amount [was] spent on university education compared
with the sums available for primary and secondary education, social
37services, and rural development’. As government stripped them of 
their ’fat’ and distributed it elsewhere they faced uncertain lean 
years ahead. The future promised to be a time in which they could 
look back longingly on the years of plenty and seemingly unlimited 
growth - in retrospect a blissful era when their funds had been 
assured, and their right to autonomy taken for granted.
(o) THE DECLINING IMPORTANCE OF OHE
We have seen how OHE under Rees assumed an integral role within 
the university system despite its lack of statutory backing. It 
acquired significant policy making functions in addition to its
36 O'Neill (1975).
37 ibid. The extent of UOT-UPNG financial privilege vis-a-vis 
the primary and secondary schools can be gauged from the 
relative expenditures in the different levels of the edu­
cation system in the last year of ’fat’ university budgets, 
1972-73. Total expenditure on education in that year was 
$25,234 million, of which the amount going to primary and 
secondary schools and Departments of Education-sponsored 
tertiary training institutions was $15,397 million, or 61%. 
This meant there was an outlay of $62 a head on the 246,516 
students in that sector. By comparison the universities 
lived in great luxury. Their share of the total education 
vote was 39%, or $9,837 million - $5232 a head on their 1880 
students. (Figures and percentages from Papua New Guinea 
Annual Report 1972-73, and UFRC Report 1973.)
The universities were also privileged by comparison 
with other tertiary education institutions. In 1975 a total 
of $15,061 million recurrent expenditure went to 24 non-uni­
versity training colleges with an enrolment of 7392, a per 
capita cost of $2035. At the same time there was an outlay 
of $10.56 million recurrent on the two universities, or 
$3756 per capita for 2811 students. UOT and UPNG between 
them consumed 41% of recurrent funds available to tertiary 
education while 24 other institutions shared the remaining 
59%. (Figures and percentages derived from OHE, 'Comparison 
of recurrent per capita costs for 1975 academic year, OHER.)
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executive duties because, in the absence of the stillborn Higher 
Education Commission, there was a clear need for such a body to co­
ordinate university effort. Rees’s personal ambition, and his promotion 
of OHE helped too, while his executive dash persuaded government and 
universities that OHE was an indispensable part of the university net­
work. His departure in late 1975 caused difficulties, however. His 
successors lacked his administrative flair; they were unable to 
’deliver’ to the satisfaction of UPNG and UOT; they became embroiled 
in a series of feuds with the universities and several government 
departments; and with government seeking more direct control over 
the universities there seemed less need for an intermediary body such 
as OHE. All this caused government and universities to question its 
role, to challenge its self-appointed right to act as the arbiter of 
the university system. Opinion varied on what to do about it: some
wanted it to revert to its former limited administrative role, 
absorbed within either Department of Education or Central Planning 
Office; others wanted it abolished altogether. Living under such 
uncertainty about its future and finding it could not enforce its 
will, its influence waned. And as a result during 1976 questions of 
whether it could survive, in what form, and with what powers, pre­
occupied much of its attention.
There were arguments both for and against an OHE with a 
policy role. Those in favour were as follows: (i) Because UOT and
UPNG were apt to bicker when their interests conflicted there was ’a 
clear need for a referee who has the authority and power to make the 
final decision'.^ OHE was the obvious referee. (ii) The large sums 
spent on the universities - roughly 3% of the national budget - 
demanded the presence of a monitor, most appropriately OHE, ’to 
ensure that this money is spent to the best advantage’. (iii) OHE 
was a specialized body with a detailed knowledge of the universities.
It was uniquely placed to give government expert and objective advice 
in matters of higher education. Other government agencies - Central 
Planning Office, Department of Finance - had neither the expertise
1 Oostermeyer, 'Function of the OHE’, 11 June 1976, OHER 
66-1-3.
2 ibid.
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nor interest of OHE in such affairs. (iv) There was considerable 
potential for conflict and misunderstanding between government and 
universities. This could be counterproductive if there were no inter­
mediary or machinery for resolving disputes between them. (v) OHE 
had justified its existence by saving government money through requir­
ing the universities to prepare detailed estimates, vetting their 
proposals, and causing them continually to reassess their priorities.
OHE promoted these advantages in its continued existence 
to government and universities, but there were also arguments to 
offset them: (i) OHE added an unnecessary link to the chain of
communication between government and universities. (ii) OHE's role 
as a buffer between government and universities was inappropriate in 
a developing nation where there was an imperative for the universities 
to be ’responsive’ to government. (iii) OHE had interests of its own 
to protect, chiefly its ability to interpret government policy to the 
universities. In jealously guarding these interests it could resort 
to politicking. This meant it was not always the rational, objective 
body its directors liked alluding to, and could be a hindrance to 
government and universities alike. (iv) OHE was proving ineffective, 
most notably in matters of finance. Government was ignoring its 
advice on levels of university funding, and so it was becoming redund­
ant in one of its chief functions. (v) There were cases where head­
strong government departments which ran training institutions of 
their own resisted OHE attempts to co-ordinate their activities with 
the effort of the universities. OHE had no power to restrain them 
if they duplicated university programmes. It therefore seemed more
practical for the departments and universities to deal directly with
3each other in reaching some division of labour.
A series of incidents in 1975-76 demonstrated the weaknesses 
of OHE and related committees. The foremost was government’s 20% 
reduction of university expenditure in late 1975. At considerable 
expense - about $50,000 - UOT and UPNG had prepared their submissions 
for funds and placed them in OHE hands by August 1975. UFRC examined 
these during November, and presented its report in February 1976,
3 ibid., and O’Neill, RIW, 15 June 1976.
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recommending a level of funds government had already decided not to 
grant. The UFRC Report was thus meaningless, and the chaos that 
descended on the universities’ budgetary arrangements persuaded them 
that, rather than go through the costly and time consuming process of 
preparing highly detailed submissions for the OHE, they would be 
better off dealing direct with government. They came to see that, 
in a small country with tight finances, a budgetary process modelled 
on the Australian University Commission’s was inappropriately cumber­
some; and it would be more functional for the Department of Finance 
to set them a figure within which they could operate, then let them
4prepare and submit estimates in the manner of government departments.
While the budgetary difficulties merely illustrated that
much OHE effort was becoming redundant, there were other cases where
OHE came into conflict with either government departments or the
universities over its role. The first involved a survey being carried
out by the Department of Labour and Industry. OHE set itself against
this, claiming UOT had already completed a similar project. It
lobbied the Department of Finance to call off the survey on the grounds
of waste, but the Department of Labour and Industry insisted on doing
its project and simply told Finance that OHE was ’not a significant
policy making body' and had no right to interfere.^ OHE resented
this slight but could do little to effect the rationalization of effort
it believed necessary. A similar case occurred soon after when the
Department of Agriculture set up a Diploma in Fisheries similar to£the one at UOT, against OHE counsel to the contrary. The Department 
was clearly powerful enough to ignore OHE censure. Obviously OHE's 
ability to co-ordinate and rationalize within higher education depended 
primarily on the goodwill of the parties it dealt with. Even the 
universities could ignore OHE. UPNG demonstrated this in two notable 
instances. First, it set up a Diploma in Mass Communications against
4 Gris, report to UPNG Council on government-university 
relations, 12 July 1976, Council papers, UPNGR; O'Neill, 
RIW,15 June 1976.
5 Secretary of Labour and Industry to Secretary of Finance, 
18 November 1975, running file of correspondence, OHER.
Oostermeyer, loc. cit.; see also OHER file 66-1-31.6
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opposition from OHE, which maintained the new course duplicated the 
existing Diploma in Journalism. Second, it awarded highly favourable 
'C-type' contracts^ to some administrative staff despite the most 
determined last-ditch OHE resistance. OHE had decided these contracts 
were unwise because they created salary differentials which might 
create disruptive cleavages among staff. In an effort to forestall 
the UPNG decision Tigilai as OHE Director persuaded the Chairman of 
the Public Service Commission, the Secretary of Finance, and the 
Director of the Central Planning Office to join him in threatening 
UPNG that if it persisted in granting the contracts government would
g
refuse to ’allocate additional resources'. When this ruse failed
9OHE endeavoured to have Cabinet overrule UPNG's decision. This action 
caused great hostility at UPNG and led the Staff Officer to accuse 
OHE of conducting a campaign 'full of half-truths, misleading state­
ments and statistics, and outright falsehoods'.^ OHE complained to 
Gris about the 'immoderate and ill-considered language' directed 
against it from UPNG, but it obviously lacked the power to upset the 
University's decision. And unfortunately for OHE its covert manoeuvres 
in that direction led those at UPNG to distrust it and to query its 
vaunted impartiality and objectivity.
Partly because of such disputes, partly because of OHE's 
failure over finances, UPNG by early 1976 was placing little value on 
OHE efforts. It did not feel that such a body should be the broker 
of university activity. Not surprisingly then, influential figures 
at UPNG - Gris, O'Neill, Long - began working actively to undermine 
OHE's position. They questioned the constitutionality of the OHE role, 
pointing out that OHE had assumed powers never intended for it. They 
asserted that it had become largely redundant because of its failure
7 These were contracts related to Australian salaries made 
available by the government to certain categories of 
employees previously in receipt of generous salaries sub­
sidised by the Australian government.
8 S. Pitoi, M. Morauta, C. Lepani and Tigilai to Gris, 3 May 
1976, OHER 66-1-3.
9 Tigilai to Secretary of Public Service Commission, 25 May 
1976, OHER 66-3-20.
10 G. Young to Long, 4 March 1976, OHER 66-3-20.
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in university finances. They argued that government's requirements 
of the universities - strict economy and adherence to manpower goals - 
would be best met through direct dealing with government agencies 
such as Department of Finance and Central Planning Office. They 
promoted the idea that co-ordination of the universities' programmes 
would be achieved more readily through the creation of a single joint 
UPNG-UOT Council rather than through OHE. They privately sought to 
persuade key government officials it should be disbanded. And they 
tried to bypass it at every opportunity.^
OHE reacted to these manoeuvrings by mounting a rearguard 
action to convince all parties it was fulfilling an essential task. 
When, for example, Tigilai caught UPNG out in an attempt to deal 
directly with the Public Service Commission he sternly reminded the 
Acting Vice-Chancellor that OHE was 'the accepted channel of communi­
cation between the University and government' and must not therefore 
be bypassed. He also chided UPNG for its ingratitude in forgetting
that OHE had in the past 'taken up the cudgels on the University's
12behalf... with no mean rate of success'. OHE also sought to promote 
its role as a necessary mediator between government and universities. 
But here again it had to politick against Central Planning Office 
arguments that a single UPNG-UOT Council would effect greater co­
ordination while, ironically, being required to write the Cabinet
13submission recommending the union of the two existing Councils. It
suggested that having a single Council would mean creating the national
university, an idea Cabinet had already dismissed as 'unnecessary 
14bureaucracy'. It clearly recognized that the Central Planning
Office proposal would give government more direct control over the 
universities, and thus further obviate the need for the OHE. And, 
finally, OHE proposed the formation of a 'Task Force on University
11 Gris, Report to Council on University-government relations; 
Gris to Tigilai, 3 March 1976, OHER 66-1-25; O'Neill, RIW, 
15 June 1976.
12 Tigilai to McKay, 29 January 1976, OHER 66-3-20.
13 Draft Cabinet policy decision, 'One Council for UPNG and 
UOT', n.d., OHER 66-1-25.
14 Tigilai to Tololo, 2 March 1976, OHER 66-1-25.
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Development'. This body, with representation from the universities,
OHE, Central Planning Office, and Department of Finance, would have
the job of producing a five-year plan to assist government to allocate
resources in accordance with national priorities.^  Its full time
staff and servicing would come from OHE. UPNG greeted these suggestions
unenthusiastically, possibly seeing in them an OHE attempt to give
16itself a reason for staying in business a while longer. And since 
UPNG had decided that OHE was an unnecessary obstruction there seemed 
little purpose in prolonging its life.
By the end of 1976 OHE was under siege. It had lost the 
influence enjoyed under Rees and was jealously holding on to whatever 
power it could retain. Like the universities', its future was un­
certain, and it was unsure if it would be allowed to continue as an 
independent body, be absorbed into some other government agency, or 
simply disbanded. Uncertainty was the keynote of the times for the 
university system in Papua New Guinea. Perhaps the only certain 
thing was that the whole system, and the assumptions it rested upon, 
were in a state of change.
15 Policy submission to Cabinet, 'Task force to prepare a 
5-year plan for the universities', 20 April 1976, OHER 
66-1-25.
16 Gris to Tigilai, 3 June 1976, OHER 66-1-25.
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EPILOGUE
ALTHOUGH it was a recent outgrowth, a creature of the late colonial 
era, Papua New Guinea's university system had been through an intricate 
process of development. Moves to establish it were first initiated 
by the Australian government in the early 1960s, in recognition of the 
need to develop an indigenous bureaucracy as a precursor to independ­
ence. Beginning with the Willoughby Report in 1961, several schemes 
were proposed before the Currie plan, as modified by government, was 
finally adopted in 1965. Much controversy attended the formulation 
of the various proposals for development as parties with various 
interests in them debated over what model was most suitable and when 
it should be implemented. One of the most important considerations 
was cost, and an economy-conscious government was determined to build 
a system Papua New Guinea could pay for, rather than one which imported 
the remarkable costs of Australian universities.
When the institutions were finally established in the mid- 
1960s there were many difficulties which produced further conflict.
There were temporary but immediate logistical difficulties in rapidly 
setting up new facilities for new institutions. But the more signifi­
cant problem was that of government-university relations, particularly 
in regard to the limits to government control over autonomous 
institutions. A number of notable disputes occurred - over budgeting, 
and the control of medical education - and these helped demarcate for 
a time the boundary between governmental direction and institutional 
autonomy. There were also significant differences of opinion between 
the institutions which led one of them, the Institute of Higher 
Technical Education, to relocate its facilities. This dispute showed 
something of the potential of the emerging system for inter-institution­
al competition. The conflict generated by these disputes had positive 
aspects as well as negative for it enabled the institutions to work 
out a modus vivendi with government and with each other.
The foundation of university institutions in Papua New Guinea 
was not an isolated educational phenomenon. Rather it was part of the 
general expansion of post-primary education which occurred during the
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1960s as the Australian government made ready for independence. The 
expansion was rapid and led to a proliferation of diverse tertiary 
training institutions which was wasteful because it was uncoordinated. 
Various attempts were made to reorganize higher education so as to 
rationalize effort. A major scheme for reorganization was commissioned 
by the Australian government, but before it could be implemented the 
transfer of power to the national government intervened and the scheme 
was scrapped. In the meantime the university institutions for a 
variety of reasons - institutional ambition, government pressure - had 
begun operating as part of a cohesive system rather than as unrelated 
bodies. The emergence of such a system in the early 1970s from the 
chaotic proliferation of training institutions of the '60s had been 
accompanied by considerable conflict. Once again institutional 
autonomy and the government’s wish to direct the development had 
generated disputes, and there were further tensions as the transfer 
of power from the colonial to the national government proceeded. One 
of the most important sources of conflict was that between the instit­
utions. All institutions displayed certain ambition and status 
mobility. This, and the fact that they were essentially rivals for 
the same scarce resources - funds, students, new courses - often led 
them into disputes with each other.
As independence approached the impact of the national govern­
ment’s policies on the university system became marked. Conscious of 
the huge financial burden the universities represented, government was 
determined to gain the maximum from its investment. The universities 
were told to be 'responsive' to government policy, a euphemism perhaps 
for submitting to government control. To formulate guidelines for 
'responsiveness' a series of committees of inquiry investigated various 
aspects of the university system. These bodies produced radical 
proposals which challenged the interests of many with a stake in the 
system. The conflict which ensued as various individuals and groups 
fought to protect their interests produced modifications to the 
proposals, and consequently to the reshaping of the system desired by 
government. Many other disputes arose in this period - over staff 
conditions, students' political rights, the treatment of women, optimal 
forms of academic government, and the personalities and role of the
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universities’ leaders. It seemed that the era of national independence 
was fomenting widespread conflict and change within the university 
system.
The most significant changes in the later stage of university 
development were possibly those in the relations between the univers­
ities and the government. Government was clearly losing patience with 
the universities. It regarded them as a heavy economic burden made 
more irksome by their privilege and their tendency towards embarrassing 
dissent. It clearly believed the time had come to exert direct control 
over their affairs, not only to ensure that the expected dividends 
flowed from the investment but also to curb their unwelcome waywardness. 
The universities prized their autonomy and had always defended it 
resolutely; but with government becoming less tolerant their ability 
to retain such a right was uncertain. And because of that it was 
possible that as Papua New Guinea entered independence the biggest 
changes within the university system were yet to come.
There were numerous lessons which educational planners could 
learn from the development of the university system in Papua New 
Guinea. First there was the sheer difficulty of planning changes in 
such a complex organization. Rowley has commented on the paradox 
facing the educational planner: the plan will be the 'object of
pressures, and its implementation subject to the conflicts, of all the 
individuals and the groups affected'.^ As a result what is implemented 
may not be the same as what was planned; planners therefore must
2strike a balance between what is possible and what is desirable. Many 
planners, from the Willoughby Committee of 1961 to the Gris Committee 
of 1974 had attempted to chart the course of university development 
in Papua New Guinea. All had discovered that the planning process was 
attended by conflict which determined how much of the desirable was 
possible.
A second lesson concerned the nature of autonomous educational 
institutions. The development of Papua New Guinea’s universities showed 
that there was a certain relentless logic to university growth. Autono-
1 Rowley (1971), p. 17.
2 ibid.
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mous institutions tended to be status conscious, upward mobile, and 
prone to self-aggrandisement. Being independent, their ambition was 
hard to contain. They developed a momentum of their own as they became 
political operators in their own right. They were quick to manipulate 
internal divisions within government, to call on the support of 
’experts’ from the professions, and to appeal to public opinion through 
the news media to ensure their growth. And often government seemed 
powerless to stop them. Perhaps the only way they could be restrained 
was through outright starvation, a means to which the Papua New Guinean 
government eventually resorted. Such drastic action was probably 
possible only in a developing country, where government could plead 
economic necessity in moving against the universities.
A third lesson, more especially for planners within univers­
ities, was that the educational philosophy universities customarily 
used to justify their independent activities was a mystification of 
their essential role in a developing nation. As Papua New Guinea’s 
university system depended almost entirely on government funding it was 
to be expected that government would view the universities as instruments 
to be deployed in the national interest. As Rowley has observed,
educational institutions do not exist ’in a vacuum’ - they are regarded
3
as a means to an end by the governments which support them. ’Educat­
ional’ arguments, such as the universities' rights to academic 
autonomy, free expression, dissent, and critical comment, may only be 
tolerated when not obstructing government ends or threatening what is 
deemed national interest. The government of a developing country 
which can, once again, plead economic necessity might not therefore 
allow the universities to exercise their traditional rights. That was 
a constraint Papua New Guinea's university planners had to accept, 
for though the government had not muzzled the universities it clearly 
wished to direct them.
Finally, planners could learn that the costs of university 
development were social as well as economic. The nationalist ideology 
of 1972-73 vaunted Papua New Guinea’s putatively traditional egalit­
arian society, yet the very fact of university development was premised
3 ibid., p. 13.
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on the destruction of such a society. The country’s university system 
was created and sustained primarily to produce a bureaucratic- 
managerial class capable of integrating an inherently centrifugal 
congerie of regional and ethnic groupings, and of guiding them into 
national independence. The price to pay for having such a class with
such functions was, first, the flowering of elitism and the possible
. . 4consequent growth of what in Africa has been termed a kleptocracy . 
Periodic anti-elitist campaigns might temporarily eliminate the worst 
flauntings of class privilege. However, if a university-trained elite 
were a functional necessity for the Papua New Guinean state it was 
doubtful whether elitism and class privilege could be proscribed 
effectively. Papua New Guinea’s universities were premised on elite 
formation, and, as van den Berghe has observed of Nigerian universities, 
’elitism suffuse[d] their entire conception’.^
Another social cost of university development was that the 
’new class’ produced by the universities might fail to adapt itself 
to Papua New Guinea, that it might be 'Western' rather than ’Melanesian' 
in outlook, despite the imperatives of national ideology to conserve 
traditional values, to innovate, to be self-reliant. Van den Berghe 
has observed that in Nigeria the universities and their products did 
not adapt: rather the country adapted to the kind of social system 
the university helped create and reproduce. It was not a 'modern', 
innovative society but a colonial society, for the historic role of 
the universities was to produce a 'mandarinate', a successor to the 
British colonial bureaucracy. Steeped, of necessity, in the Western 
educational tradition, 'the neo-colonial mandarinate is a creditable 
intellectual replica of its mentors’. There was no certainty that 
Papua New Guinea was entirely analogous, especially as the government 
demonstrated a readiness to reduce university privilege, most notably 
through drastic cuts in funds. However, as in Nigeria, the relation­
ship between government and universities was one of mutual inter­
dependence. The universities relied on government for funds, and
4
5
6
van den Berghe (1973), p. 60. 
ibid., p. 184. 
ibid., p. 268.
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government relied on the universities for its high level manpower; and 
that relationship limited the extent of government severity. It could 
not therefore be certain that the universities would be prevented from 
continuing as privileged enclaves, reference points and agents in the 
process of class formation.
The final cost, and the one this thesis has dwelt upon, was 
conflict. A university, as van den Berghe has suggested, is more 'a 
basketful of crabs' than a happy (and largely mythical) community of 
scholars.^ Papua New Guinea's two universities and three campuses 
ensured that the multiplicity of personal and group interests was 
perpetuated, and with it the vast potential for conflict. As we have 
seen, there were positive qualities to the conflict, but there were 
also destructive aspects and because conflict was inherent little could 
be done about that. Indeed government action in reducing university 
funds promised to heighten the conflict: the resource on which all
groups within the university system depended was in shorter supply, 
and this would seem likely to intensify the competition between them. 
Consequently the universities in Papua New Guinea seemed sure to 
continue, like those in Nigeria, as 'a hotbed of conflicts wrapped ing
the deceptively serene-looking shell of a palm-shaded Oxbridge'.
7
8
ibid., p. 262. 
ibid., p. 268.
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APPENDIX I
Persons Referred To
Many different persons’ names appear in the thesis. There could 
be some confusion over names because in a number of cases the one 
person occupied a number of positions over a period of time. Dr (later 
Sir) John Gunther is a case in point, having been Director of Public 
Health, Assistant Administrator, Currie Commissioner, Chairman of 
Council of the Administrative College, Vice-Chancellor of the University 
of Papua New Guinea, member of the National Education Board, and a 
director of Bougainville Copper Ltd among others. The following persons 
appear in the thesis:
ABAIJAH, Josephine : Member of the House of Assembly (MHA) 1972 ff.;
member of UPNG Council 1972.
ANGUS, N.C. : consultant to CEUD 1974.
AVEI, Moi : member of CEUD 1973-74; officer in charge of UPNG
external studies section 1976 ff.
BARNES, C.E. : Minister for Territories 1964-72.
BARRETT, Don : MHA 1964-67; member of IHTE Council 1965-67.
BEAZLEY, K.E. : Labor politician and commentator on PNG affairs
c.1957 ff.
BEIER, Ulli : UPNG senior lecturer in creative writing and promoter
of PNG arts 1967 ff.
BROWN, Sir Allan : chairman of Committee of Inquiry into Higher
Education 1970-71.
BULMER, Ralph : UPNG Professor of Anthropology 1966-73.
CHENOWETH, David : Chief Training Officer and head of Public Service
Institute 1953-61; Principal of Administrative College 1962-72.
CLELAND, Sir Donald : Administrator of PNG 1952-67; Chancellor of
UPNG 1970-72.
CLELAND, Keith : Professor of Business Administration, and sometime
Acting Registrar and Acting Vice-Chancellor, UOT, 1973 ff.
CLUNIES-ROSS, Anthony : UPNG Professor of Economics and sometime
Acting Vice-Chancellor 1968-74.
CRAWFORD, Sir John : Director of ANU Research School of Pacific
Studies 1960-67; ANU Vice-Chancellor 1968-73; Chancellor 
of UPNG 1972-75.
345
CROCOMBE, R.G. : Director of ANU New Guinea Research Unit 1961-68;
member of Committee of Enquiry into Academic Staff Salaries 
1973; member of CEUD 1973-74.
CURRIE, Sir George : chairman of Commission of Inquiry into Higher
Education in Papua and New Guinea (Currie Commission) 1963-64.
DERR, Nallon : UPNG graduate; graduate assistant at UOT, 1972-76;
Deputy Registrar, 1977.
DICKSON, Merare : member of PNG Legislative Council.
DUNCANSON, W.E. : Director of IHTE and IOT 1966-72.
ERI, Vincent : first national graduate of UPNG 1970; member of
Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education 1970-71.
EDONI, William : chairman of Academic Salaries Review Tribunal
1974 ff.; Director of Department of Labour 1976 ff.
FOOT, Sir Hugh (later Lord Caradon) : leader of UN Visiting Mission
to PNG 1962.
FOXCROFT, E.J. : First Assistant Secretary, Prime Minister’s
Department till 1962.
GRIS, G.B. : member of Advisory Committee on Education in PNG 1969;
chairman of Committee of Enquiry into Academic Staff Salaries 
1973; member of Working Party on the Future of the University 
(Oldfield Committee) 1973; chairman of CEUD 1973-74;
Deputy Vice-Chancellor of UPNG 1974-75; Vice-Chancellor of 
UPNG 1975-77.
GROVES, Murray : anthropologist; commentator on PNG affairs c.1958 ff.
GROVES, W.C. : Director of Education for PNG 1946-58.
GUISE, Sir John : PNG nationalist and politician; Governor General
of PNG 1975-77.
GUNTHER, Sir John : Director of Public Health for PNG 1946-57;
Assistant Administrator 1957-66; Currie Commissioner 1963-64; 
Vice-Chancellor of UPNG 1966-72.
HARVEY, Vern : chairman of UPNG Participation and Communication
Committee 1971-72; member of Working Party on the Future 
of the University (Oldfield Committee) 1973; member of 
Committee of Enquiry into Academic Staff Salaries 1973; 
member of CEUD 1973-74.
HASLUCK, Sir Paul : Minister for Territories 1951-63.
HASTINGS, Peter : journalist and commentator on PNG affairs c.1958 ff.
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HAY, D.O. : Administrator of PNG 1967-70; Secretary of Department 
of Territories 1970-72.
HENDERSON, F.C. : Director of Agriculture for PNG till 1966;
Assistant Administrator 1966-69.
HENNESSY, L.F. : official of Department of Territories.
HETZEL, B.S. : Professor of Medicine, Adelaide and Monash Universities
member of UPNG Interim Council and Council 1965-72.
HOSSACK, Ian : Executive Officer of Office of Higher Education
1972-73.
ILA, Tony : MHA for Lae 1972 ff.
INGLIS, K.S. : UPNG Professor of History 1966-72; Vice-Chancellor
1972- 75.
JOHNSON, L.W. : Director of Education for PNG 1962-65; Assistant
Administrator 1965-70; Administrator of PNG 1970-73.
KARMEL, P.H. : chairman of UPNG Interim Council 1965-68; Chancellor
of UPNG 1969-70; member of UFRC 1973.
KERR, Sir John : Principal of ASOPA 1946-48; commentator on PNG
affairs c.1958 ff.; consultant to Currie Commission 1963-64.
KIKI, Sir Maori : MHA 1972 ff.; Minister (1inter alia) for Foreign
Affairs.
KILAGE, Ignatius : member of CEUD 1973-74; Ombudsman 1976 ff.
LAMB, Ken : UPNG Professor of Biology 1961-77.
LAMBERT, C.R. : Secretary of Department of Territories 1951-63.
LAVERY, John : Professor of Civil Engineering at University of
Queensland; member and sometime Acting Chairman of IHTE 
Council 1965-69.
LOHIA, Renagi : UPNG graduate; Dean of Education 1976; Deputy
Vice-Chancellor, UPNG, 1976-77
L0K0L0K0, Tore : MHA 1964-77; Governor General 1977 ff.
LONG, K.R. : Secretary of UPNG 1972 ff.
LOW, D.A. : Director of ANU Research School of Pacific Studies
1973- 75; ANU Vice-Chancellor 1975 ff.; member of CEUD 
1973-74; member of UPNG Council 1973 ff.
McCONAGHY, F.W. : official of Department of Territories.
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McKAY, Max : UPNG Professor of Mathematics 1967-76; sometime Acting
Vice-Chancellor of UPNG.
McKENNA, B.J. : adviser on education to Administration of New Guinea
1929-30.
McKINNON, K.R. : Director of Education for PNG 1966-73.
MADDOCKS, Ian : Dean of Papuan Medical College till 1970; Dean of
UPNG Faculty of Medicine 1970-74.
MAHANTY, J. : consultant to CEUD 1974.
MANSELL, Don : UOT Professor of Civil Engineering 1973-76.
MATHESON, Sir J.A. Louis : Vice-Chancellor of Monash University
1961-76; member of UPNG Interim Council 1965-68; chairman 
of IHTE-IOT Council 1966-73 then Chancellor of UOT 1973-76.
MATTHEWS, L.G. : chairman of arbitration tribunal considering
academic salaries dispute 1974.
MEEK, B.J. : official of Department of Territories till 1965; Bursar
of UPNG 1966-72.
MELVILLE, Sir Leslie : adviser to Department of Territories on
financing of UPNG and IHTE-IOT 1969-72.
MORTIMER, R.A. : UPNG Professor of Political Studies 1973 ff.
MURRAY, Sir J. Hubert P. : Administrator and Governor of Papua 1906-40.
MURRAY, J.K. : Administrator of PNG 1945-52.
NAMALIU, Rabbie : first PNG national to be awarded a postgraduate
degree; first PNG national on UPNG academic staff; sometime 
principal private secretary to Somare and Provincial 
Commissioner; member of UOT and UPNG Councils 1973 ff.; 
chairman of Public Service Commission 1976 ff.
NEWBY, Lyall : Director of Extension Services for PNG till 1972.
OLDFIELD, Frank : Deputy Vice-Chancellor of UPNG 1973; chairman of
Working Party on the Future of the University (Oldfield 
Committee) 1973.
OLEWALE, N.E. : MHA 1968 ff.; Minister for Education 1972-74.
O'NEILL, Arthur : Academic Registrar of UPNG 1968-74; Planning
Officer 1974-77.
OOSTERMEYER, Bill : Senior Projects Officer and sometime Acting
Director of PNG Office of Higher Education.
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PAGE, A.N. : official of Department of Territories seconded to PNG 
Office of Higher Education 1972-73.
PEACOCK, A.S. : Minister for Territories 1972.
POWELL, J.P. : UPNG senior lecturer in Education 1970-74.
RANDELL, A.E. : executive officer to CEUD 1973-74.
REED, Stephen : anthropologist and author of The Making of Modem
New Guinea (1943).
REES, W.C. : Director of Office of Higher Education 1973-75.
RESEIGH, Claude : official of Department of Territories and depart­
mental representative on UPNG Interim Council 1965-68.
RICHARDSON, D. : consultant on forestry education to CEUD 1973-74.
ROBERTS, Stephen : Vice-Chancellor of University of Sydney 1947-67.
ROE, Ernest : UPNG Professor of Education 1967-72.
ROWLEY, C.D. : Principal of ASOPA 1950-64; Professor of Political
Studies at UPNG 1967-74.
SALI, Boyamo : MHA for Morobe Regional 1972 ff. and sometime Minister
for Local Government, State, and Commerce.
SANDOVER, J.A. : Director of IOT then Vice-Chancellor of UOT 1972-76.
SAREI, Alexis : first PNG national to be awarded doctoral degree;
member of Working Party on the Future of the University 
(Oldfield Committee) 1973; member of CEUD 1973-74.
SCRAGG, Ron : Director of Public Health for PNG 1957-70; UPNG
Professor of Social and Preventive Medicine 1970-74.
SIMS, G.D. : consultant to CEUD on technological education 1974.
SMITH, G. Warwick : Secretary of Department of Territories 1964-70.
SMITH, M.C. Staniforth : sometime Administrator of Papua.
SOMARE, Michael T. : MHA 1968 ff.; Chief Minister/Prime Minister
of PNG 1972 ff.
SPATE, O.H.K. : Currie Commissioner 1963-64; member of UPNG Interim
Council and Council 1967-72.
SPENDER, Sir Percy : Minister for Territories 1949-51.
STACE, D.A. : Academic Registrar of UPNG, 1973-75.
STEPHENSON, G.N. : Registrar of UOT 1973-75.
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STILL, Kathy : UPNG research assistant and tutor, and spokeswoman
on feminist issues 1975 ff.
SWIFT, R.S. : First Assistant Secretary in Department of Territories.
TAUREKA, Reuben : MHA 1968 ff.; Minister for Education 1974-75.
TIGILAI, V.M.N. : Chairman of Universities Finance Review Committee
1973-76; Director of Office of Higher Education 1975-76; 
Deputy Vice-Chancellor and Acting Vice-Chancellor of UOT 
1976 ff.
TINSLEY, H.J. : Principal of Goroka Teachers' College 1975 ff.
TOLOLO, Alkan : member of IHTE/IOT/UOT Council 1965 ff.; Director
of Education for PNG 1973 ff.; Chancellor of UPNG 1975 ff. 
and of UOT 1976 ff.
WAIKO, John : member of CEUD 1973-74.
WARD, E.J. : sometime Minister for Territories 1944-49.
WARD, R.G. : UPNG Professor of Geography 1967-71.
WATKIN, Sir Herbert : chairman of IHTE Council 1965-66.
WATSON, Lepani : MHA 1964-71; member of UPNG Interim Council.
WEDGWOOD, Camilla : anthropologist and educationalist attached to
Army Directorate of Research and Civil Affairs 1944-45.
WILLIAMS, F.E. : Government Anthropologist of Papua.
WILLOUGHBY, J.E. : First Assistant Secretary in Department of
Territories till 1962.
WOODWARD, Jack : Professor of Electrical Engineering at UOT 1971 ff.
350
APPENDIX II
Persons Interviewed
The writer interviewed the following persons during the course 
of his research. In some cases the interviews were tape-recorded and 
a transcript subsequently typed out; these are marked (trans). In 
other cases notes were made during the interview and were later typed 
into more complete form; these are marked (t). In other cases only 
handwritten notes were made; these are marked (h). In all cases where 
interviews are referred to during the text of the thesis the abbrevi­
ation RIW (record of interview with Ian Willis) is employed in the 
footnotes. Transcripts of two interviews by other research workers 
are also included in this list.
BEAZLEY, Kim, Canberra, 20 May 1975 (t)
BURCE, Rev W., Lae, 12 May 1976 (h)
CHENOWETH, David, Port Moresby, 15 June 1976 (h)
CURRIE, Sir George, Canberra, 9 July 1975 (t)
DENOON, Donald, Port Moresby, 5 April 1976 (h)
DOWNS, Ian, Canberra, 7 April 1975 (h)
GREENWOOD, Peter, Lae, 3 May 1976 (h)
GUNTHER, Sir John, Buderim (Queensland), 29 and 30 July 1975 
(trans)
GUNTHER, Sir John, transcript of tape-recorded interviews with 
Hank Nelson, Port Moresby, April 1972; copy of trans­
cript in National Library, Canberra
HASLUCK, Sir Paul, Melbourne, 11 September 1975 (t)
HASTINGS, Peter, Canberra, 25 July 1975 (t)
HAY, David, Canberra, 20 June 1975 (t)
HOSSACK, Ian, Canberra, 4 November 1975 (trans)
JOHNSON, L.W., Canberra, 4 March 1975 (t)
KARMEL, P.H., Canberra, 17 June 1975 (t)
KEMELFIELD, Graham, Port Moresby, 7 April 1976 (h)
KERR, Sir John, Canberra, 22 July 1975 (t)
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LOW, D.A., Canberra, 23 May 1975 (t)
MANSELL, Don, Lae, 20 April 1976 (h)
MATHESON, Sir J.A. Louis, Melbourne, 26 August 1975 (trans)
McKINNON, K.R., Canberra, 8 July, 5 August 1975 (t)
MEEK, B.J., Wollongong, 1 August 1975 (t)
MELVILLE, Sir Leslie, Canberra, 10 July 1975 (t)
MURPHY, Fr Pat, Port Moresby, 3 March 1976 (t)
O ’NEILL, Arthur, Port Moresby, 4 and 5 March, 2 April,
15 June 1976 (h)
O ’NEILL, Arthur, Port Moresby, transcript of tape-recorded 
interview with Sue Robertson, Port Moresby, March 
1975; copy of transcript in the New Guinea Collection, 
UPNG Library
OOSTERMEYER, W. (Bill), Canberra, 28 July 1975, Port Moresby,
18 September 1975, 3 March, 7 June 1976 (h)
PARKINSON, Vic, Sydney, 2 October 1975 (t)
PARKER, R.S., Canberra, October 1975 (h)
RANDELL, Alan, Canberra, 30 October, 5 November 1975 (trans) 
RATCLIFFE, Chuck, Lae, 13 May 1976 (h)
REES, W. (Bill), Port Moresby, 18 and 19 September 1975 (trans)
RESEIGH, C.E., Canberra, 9 July 1975 (t)
ROWLEY, C.D., Canberra, 24 July, 5 August 1975 (t)
RUMENS, John, Port Moresby, 6 April 1976 (h)
SANDOVER, J.A., Lae, 17 September 1975, 23 April, 12 May 1976 
(h and t)
SIAGURU, Wilhelmina, Port Moresby, 18 May 1977 (h)
SPATE, O.H.K., Canberra, 2 April, 7 July 1975 (h and t)
STACE, D.A., Port Moresby, 22 September 1975 (t)
STEFFAN, Fr Arnold, Port Moresby, 1 March 1976 (t)
SWIFT, R.S., Canberra, 12 August 1975 (t)
VOUTAS, A.C., Canberra, 23 June 1975 (t)
WAIKO, John, Canberra, 5 March 1975 (h)
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APPENDIX III
Persons Who Supplied Specific Items of Information
As research and writing proceeded, specific items of information, 
opinions on various subjects, and checking of facts came from numerous 
informants. The following people helped in conversation and discussion, 
by telephone, or through correspondence. Where information obtained
from them has been used in the text, 
'personal communication'.
I
ADAMS, Bob, UOT 
BOLGER, Peter, UPNG 
BROWN, Monty, UOT 
BROWN, Russell, UOT 
CLARK, Hector, UOT 
DALE, David, UOT 
DALE, Mary, UOT 
DUNCANSON, W. Eric, UK 
ECCLESTONE, Mick, UOT 
FARRELL, Lindsay, UPNG 
GAMMAGE, Bill, UPNG 
GARDNER, Susan, UPNG 
GASS, Ian, UOT 
GERRITSEN, Rolf, ANU 
GRIFFIN, Jim, UPNG 
GRIS, Gabriel, UPNG 
GUNTHER, Sir John, Buderim 
HENNESSY, Lance, Canberra 
HENNESSY, Peter, UPNG 
HENRY, R. Stirling, Port Moresby 
HOSSACK, Ian, Canberra 
INGLIS, K.S., ANU 
JINKS, Brian, Sydney 
KELLY, David, Port Moresby 
KEMELFIELD, Graham, UPNG 
LAMB, David, Port Moresby 
LITTLE, Daphne, Port Moresby 
LIVESY, Chris, Port Moresby
it has been acknowledged as
MADDOCKS, Ian, ANU
McKINNON, Ken, Canberra
MEEK, Lynn, UPNG
MORTIMER, Peter, Port Moresby
MURPHY, Fr Pat, Port Moresby
MURPHY, Penny, UOT
O'NEILL, Arthur, UPNG
OOSTERMEYER, Bill, Port Moresby
PICKETT, Brian, UOT
POSSIN, Hans, UOT
RIORDAN, John, UOT
SANDOVER, John, UOT
SARWABE, Damien, UPNG
SIAGURU, Wilhelmina, Port Moresby
SILVEY, Jonathan, UPNG
SMARIDGE, Stan, UOT
SPATE, O.H.K., ANU
STACE, Doug, UPNG
STILL, Kathy, UPNG
SUNDERLAND, Jane, UPNG
TAMATE, Leontine, UOT
TIGILAI, Matt, Port Moresby
WANDAU, Peter, UOT
WEEKS, S.G., UPNG
WILLIAMS, Rev. Ronald, Rabaul
WOODWARD, Jack, UOT
WOODWARD, Mary, UOT
YOUNG, Gary, UPNG
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APPENDIX IV
The 'Non-Official1 University Sector: 
The Christian Seminaries1
The university system in Papua New Guinea has an ’official’ 
sector, consisting of the government-funded institutions, UPNG and 
UOT. There is also a ’non-official’ sector, comprising the seminaries 
run by various Christian churches. This thesis has dwelt upon the 
former because it illustrates better the theme of conflict. That does 
not mean that religious education has been without conflict, nor that 
the writer has ignored or discounted the notable contribution of the 
churches to university development in Papua New Guinea.
There is little doubt that considerable conflict arose over 
religious education. The churches made strong representations to the 
Currie Commission for the inclusion of theology in the UPNG array of 
courses, and for the establishment of denominational colleges at UPNG.
The Currie Commission, apparently not wishing to become embroiled in 
sectarian issues, and also finding the evidence from the church lobbies 
to be inconsistent, refrained from making firm recommendations about 
the place of religion in the University. Two Ministers for Territories, 
Hasluck and Barnes, strongly favoured the idea of denominational 
colleges, however. During 1968-69 Barnes tried to pressure both UPNG 
and IOT into setting up such colleges, but both institutions firmly 
rejected his proposals. Instead of colleges, the churches provided 
full-time chaplains, who, in some cases, became virtual staff members 
by taking part in teaching as well as counselling. In addition a 
small religious studies unit was set up within the UPNG Faculty of Arts. 
The churches also made their presence known by acting as the ’conscience' 
of the campuses, speaking out on questions of morality and ethics; and 
they could always be relied on to form a strong lobby during the 
deliberations of committees of inquiry such as those run by the Brown, 
Oldfield and Gris Committees.
1 The information in this appendix is derived largely from 
discussion with Frs Pat Murphy and Arnold Steffan, Dr W.
Burce, and Rev Ronald Williams. Material from DTOR 62/4733 
and 71/4403 is also used.
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There was no doubt of the value of the churches’ contribution 
to formal university education. As we have seen (in chapter 1), the 
earliest further education in Papua New Guinea was that provided by 
the Missions in the training of teachers and lay helpers. In the same 
way that Mission effort predated that of government in further 
education, so did that of the churches precede state endeavour in 
university work. The Methodist (later United) Church, for example, 
opened its Rarongo Theological College in 1962, while the Catholic 
Church established its Kap Theological Centre near Madang and its 
de Boismenu College at Bomana (outside Port Moresby) in 1963. The 
Lutherans set up their Martin Luther Seminary at Lae in 1966, the same 
year that UPNG opened.
In 1969 the fourteen seminaries and theological colleges in 
Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands formed the Melanesian 
Association of Theological Schools (MATS) to systematize theological 
training by standardizing qualifications. MATS operated as an accred­
iting agency, assessing and approving the qualifications awarded by 
member seminaries. The seminaries awarded a range of qualifications, 
from lower level catechitical certificates through middle level 
diplomas to degrees in theology. The MATS-approved B.Theol. degree 
was accepted by UPNG as a fully accredited first degree entitling those 
holding it to proceed to the UPNG Master's programme.
The numbers of those trained to diploma and degree level by 
the three major degree-granting seminaries, Rarongo, Martin Luther, 
and Holy Spirit (formed in 1969 by the union of the two previous 
Catholic seminaries), was small by comparison with the output of the 
two ’official’ sector universities. By the end of 1975 only 109 had 
graduated at these levels, as the following table indicates:
Graduates from the major seminaries to 1975
Rarongo
degree
6
diploma
35
total
41
Martin Luther 16 14 30
Holy Spirit 19 19 38
Total 41 68 109
The small numbers, however, were out of proportion to the strong impact
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of seminary graduates on Papua New Guinean society. Seminary graduates 
were generally of high standard, having undergone a rigorous six-year 
programme of study post-Form IV. They were probably among the best 
graduates the country’s education system had produced, and their 
influence was felt more widely than in church affairs alone. Most 
seminarians went on to pastoral duties on graduation, but some went 
into education, broadcasting, politics, and postgraduate study. In 
politics, perhaps, their influence was felt the most strongly, especial­
ly that of the graduates from Holy Spirit.
Former seminarians who rose to senior positions within their 
churches were inevitably destined for both national and regional 
political roles, whether they or their churches liked it or not. This 
fact was perhaps epitomized by the statements of the Bishop of Bougain­
ville, Gregory Singkai, a Holy Spirit graduate, during the 1975-76 
debates over Bougainville secessionism. Singkai’s public comment, made 
as a private Bougainvillean, could not be dissociated from his position 
as Catholic prelate. Similarly, a Tolai or Motu bishop of the United 
Church could not speak publicly as a member of a regional group alone, 
for his ideas would always be assumed, rightly or wrongly, to be those 
of his church as well, and thus of a strong pressure group.
The impact of the former seminarians in formal politics was 
also strong. A number of them entered national and regional politics 
or government administration, becoming notable public figures. Frs 
John Momis and Ignatius Kilage, and Dr Alexis Sarei were perhaps 
better known for their political activities than for being Holy Spirit 
graduates. Momis was a member of the House of Assembly and chairman 
of the committee which produced the Papua New Guinean constitution; 
Kilage after working for the National Education Board and the CEUD 
became the country’s Ombudsman; Sarei was Bougainville Provincial 
Commissioner and later head of the Bougainville Provincial Government. 
And just as significant as the theological graduates were those who 
discontinued their seminary studies. Many of the country’s leading 
politicians and public servants received their secondary and tertiary 
education in the seminaries - Mathias Toliman, Joseph Langro, Tony Ila, 
Oscar Tammur, and Leo Hannett, for example.
The Catholic seminaries also played a significant part in
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the rise of Papua New Guinean nationalism. The Kap seminary, for 
example, came into public prominence during 1965-66 when its student 
newspaper, Dialogue, began making articulate demands for national 
independence. Widely condemned by the settler community as seditious, 
Dialogue was perhaps a portent of the student activism to come. With 
the formation at about that time of Somare's Pangu Pati, it was also 
evidence of a rising tide of nationalism, which it helped to swell 
with its sophisticated, clear voice. The nationalism welling from 
the seminary could not be ignored, for those expressing it were the 
finest product of the best education Papua New Guinea offered at the 
time.
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B I B L I O G R A P H Y
I Records in Australian Archives3 Canberra
A518 AG836/3 'Murder of Miss Jean Wilson'
A518 B818/1/5 'Papua: education and special training of
natives outside the Territory'
A518 U832/1/3 Part 1, 'Training of medical practitioners
1932-49'
C.P. 146, file 25/18947, 'Forsayth school prizes trust, New
Guinea'
C.P. 637/1, Bundle 3, Item 19, 'Ministerial sub-committee -
Territories of Papua and New Guinea: 
Permanent Agendum item no. 11, Training 
of Cadets'
II Department of Territories Official Records3 Canberra
File 61/6508
File 62/895
File 62/1462 
File 62/3488 
File 62/4306 
File 62/4307 
File 62/4309 
File 62/4733
File 64/2626 
File 64/6746
'Report of the committee on development of
tertiary education and higher training in 
Papua and New Guinea'
'Report of the committee on development of
tertiary education and higher training in 
Papua and New Guinea'
'Establishment of a university in Papua and 
New Guinea'
'Discussions with the 1962 UN Visiting Mission 
on education in Papua and New Guinea'
'Establishment of an administrative college in 
Port Moresby'
'Establishment of a university college in 
Papua and New Guinea'
'Establishment of a multi-racial teachers' 
college, Papua and New Guinea'
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of Papuan Medical College within University 
of Papua and New Guinea'
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Budget 1969-70'
Budget July 1970 - June 1971'
Budget 1971-72'
Budget 1975'
Manpower and localization planning'
Goroka Teachers' College'
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H of R 19, 1959; H 
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H of R 36, 1962; H 
H of R 66, 1969-70; 
1967; S 57, 1973
of R 20, 1958; 
of R 33, 1961; 
of R 42, 1964;
H of R 67, 1970;
Australian School of Pacific Administration (ASOPA), ’Report 
on Education 1958', report produced by no. 3 Senior 
Officers’ Course, ASOPA, 1958
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Brown, Allen (et al.)9 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into 
Higher Education in Papua New Guinea (Canberra, 1971)
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1964 (see Currie, G. (et at.), 1964)
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Gris, G.B. (et at.), 1973)
Committee of Enquiry into University Development, Report, 1974 
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at.), 1974)
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1971)
Currie, George (et at.), Report of the Commission on Higher
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McKinnon, K.R., and Daloz, L., Locatization and Executive
Training (Port Moresby, Department of Education, 1973)
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X BookSj Journal Articles3 Seminar Papers and Addresses3
University Theses
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1874-1941', M.Ed. thesis, UPNG, 1972
AUSTRALIAN COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, Education in Papua New Guinea 
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papers of the A.C.E. conference, Port Moresby 1974
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BOTSMAN, P.B., ’Institute of Technology', EPNG 1972
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Summer school of the Council of Adult Education, Melbourne, 
January 1968
369
_______ , A Time For Building: Australian Administration in Papua
Flew Guinea_, 1951-1963 (Melbourne, Melbourne University- 
Press, 1976)
HASTINGS, Peter, 'The New Guinea Elite’, The Observer, 2 April 
1960
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B.Litt. dissertation in Education, University of New 
England, 1973
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